Masaryk university

3. 4. Escalation

In this section we will focus on the possible manners in which an escalation of conflict can occur. In line with Kriesberg “conflict escalation generally refers to increases in the severity of the coercive inducements used and increases in the scope of participation within a conflict”.¹⁶⁹ In the same vein Pruitt and Kim describe the escalation as “an increase in the intensity of a conflict as a whole”.¹⁷⁰ The first step in the escalatory scenario is the situation where there is no progress in implementation of reforms affecting the Kurdish issue, and other wide-range matters concerning the deepening of democratization in Turkey (A1). It is true that not many reforms have been materialized so far despite a strong rhetoric that has indicated the reversal. Regarding the current reforms effort, given the strong opposition to some key items in the constitutional amendments package and the thorny approval process in the parliament, it is plausible that the reform package will not go through. But even if it was approved the subsequent referendum that will most certainly be carried out may not approve the constitutional change. If the reforms are not approved it will seriously falter the support for the Kurdish initiative among both Kurds and Turks (A3) who are observing the policy with high expectations and would therefore feel strongly disappointed. The same reaction may nonetheless follow also in the case that the amendments package is approved, but there are as yet no evident short-term outcomes because of the lengthy implementation process.

The waning backing for the Kurdish initiative is likely to go hand in hand with the rise in Kurdish nationalism (A2). As the structural change model indicates, changes in groups may occur. These changes, for example the development of hostile attitudes or strong polarization, have to be seen as a result of the prior escalation but they are also fueling a further escalation.¹⁷¹ As the conflict analysis showed, both groups are already polarized and they also share hostile attitudes underpinned by a sense of fear and mistrust. It is thus plausible that the sequence of events described above will lead to PKK’s decision to start a new wave of violence (A4). The rise of nationalism which would lead to the rising tension and instability were already visible when the conflict escalated in 2006 and 2007.

According to transformations during the escalation of the conflict, tactics are likely to shift from light to heavy and as are issues from small to large.¹⁷² Hence, we can expect that PKK’s current occasional attacks will intensify in both lethality and scope. As a response to PKK’s escalating attacks and the lack of motion within the Kurdish initiative the government may decide to break down the terrorist group by military means once for all (A5). At this stage we can foresee three different developments.

The course of events is dependent on the U.S. stance vis-à-vis a possible larger military operation against the PKK led by Turkey on Iraqi territory. The U.S. has already tolerated a few very limited Turkish ground assaults in Northern Iraq in February 2008. The U.S. provided critical cooperation including the opening of Iraqi air space and sharing satellite intelligence that was able to detect PKK bases.¹⁷³ The new Obama administration is holding a strong rhetoric concerning the terrorism, albeit during his public speech the President does not refer to ‘war on terror’ in contrast to his predecessor George W. Bush. President Obama also presented the plan to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011 along with the plan for Afghanistan which included a considerable increase in the number of U.S. troops there. Both of those plans try to consolidate the position in the Middle East which is still characterized by significant tensions. Moreover, the powers such as Iran or Russia aim to establish a more dominant position in the region and thus threaten the balance of power currently dependent on the U.S. security assurances. In order to assure this balance of power the U.S. should advance the strategic relationship with Turkey, a dominant NATO member in the Middle East. Ankara is also a valuable partner for economic reasons. On the way out of the economic crisis, the U.S. will seek new possibilities and the Turkish market is not yet fully explored.¹⁷⁴ The vital strategic and economic partnership could be fostered by further supporting Ankara in its fight against the PKK. Hence, we can presume that the U.S. could acknowledge Turkey’s right to combat the PKK on Iraqi territory again – under certain constraints as was previously the case (A6).¹⁷⁵ This decision can be also influenced by an effort to contribute to the immediate solution of the PKK insurgency.

On the other hand the U.S., given its fear of serious conflict in Northern Iraq, the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the rising troubles with Iran, might prefer not to destabilize the region and oppose the Turkish action. The U.S. reluctant stance to the Turkish decision to launch a larger cross-border operation may prevent Turkey from exercising such a move which would lead to a cross-over into the status quo scenario (B6). However, in the third possible course of events Ankara could decide for a unilateral large-scale military operation without the consent of the U.S. (A10). This move would probably be the most disastrous one and would lead to destructive escalation.

In a situation when the U.S. is willing to cooperate or at least tolerate Ankara’s coercive solution on Iraqi territory the stance of KRG has to be taken into account. The territory under control of the KRG has become crucial for the survival of the PKK because of the safe havens it provides. The cooperation between KRG and Turkey is thus perceived as crucial because it seems that the long-term damage to the terrorist group can be done only when both parties cooperate.¹⁷⁶ However, so far KRG has not been willing to fight PKK’s bases on its own territory,¹⁷⁷ which appears to be among one of Turkey’s major conditions for collaboration with the KRG.¹⁷⁸ In regard to cooperation with KRG we can identify two contradictory approaches within the Turkish establishment. The members of Kemalist-nationalist circles perceive the KRG as an existential threat and therefore advocate diplomatic isolation, whereas pro-European liberal circles believe that the KRG could play an important role in combating the PKK for which reason they argue reinforcement of diplomatic ties.¹⁷⁹

Nonetheless in the escalatory scenario when Turkey has the support of the U.S. it will seek to use both the U.S. and the central Iraqi government pressure on KRG to join the fight against the PKK (A7). The Joint Committee established between the U.S., Turkey and KRG have already presented a three-phased plan on how to combat the PKK. Following the U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), it was made it clear that Iraqi territory should not be used as a base for attacks against other countries.¹⁸⁰ Additionally, after the withdrawal of the U.S. from the region, the KRG will be in need of partnership with its neighbor. Finally, there are strong economic incentives for Northern Iraq to improve the relations with Turkey. Hence, ultimately the KRG may decide to back the Turkish operation (A9). The KRG-Turkey cooperation will probably lead only to a limited military action on Iraqi territory (A11), which would result to an escalatory spiral, but not as destructive as in the case of the large-scale military strike. The KRG will help with the cracking down of the PKK but will try to keep it limited in order not to risk a high degree of instability.

On the other hand, KRG may decide to refuse the cooperation with Turkey (A8). Although the KRG publicly condemns the PKK and declares that it shares the same view as Turkey,¹⁸¹ there are allegations that the KRG is tacitly backing the PKK.¹⁸² In this respect the issue of identity can play a significant role. As Calhoun points out, the identity as a tool is a significant motivator for action and may therefore affect KRG’s decision.¹⁸³ Though never united in their struggle, Kurds long for a common Kurdistan that would transcend the national borders, albeit the PKK as has been noted, in the analysis, abandoned this goal and call for a solution within the state borders. Nonetheless the governments both in Turkey and Iraq still fear the pan-Kurdish tendencies that could result in the secession of Kurdish areas and creation of a ‘greater Kurdistan’. In light of the relatively strong autonomy of the KRG it seems that this goal has never been closer. The situation of Kurds in Northern Iraq could possibly cause a spillover effect and trigger the same tendencies in Turkey.

When the KRG is not willing to cooperate with Ankara, Turkey may proceed with a large-scale operation against the PKK. Such an act would be another step in the escalatory spiral as a response to the PKK’s attacks, growing in both size and number. According to the conflict spiral model, which describes the escalation as deriving from a vicious circle of action and reaction, a retaliating act is usually more severe than the one to which the response is directed.¹⁸⁴ Thus we can assume that the PKK’s response would be even harsher and we could be witnessing a grave escalation. However, we can expect that the possible military incursion either limited or on a large-scale would not last more than several months because a long-term intervention would seriously destabilize an already shattered region which would not benefit any of the included parties.

At this stage of such a destructive escalatory spiral, it is interesting to examine the motivation of both the PKK and the Turkish state to resort to violence which further contributes to the persistence of the escalation. In line with Coser, we can argue that the PKK’s use of violence has been triggered by two main reasons – slow progress in economic the improvement of southeastern Anatolia which has resulted in a great socioeconomic backwardness, and the persisting restricted space for articulation of Kurdish political demands. Both aspects consequently lead to an aggressive behavior which is perceived as the only way to pursue existing demands.¹⁸⁵ The relative deprivation and dissatisfaction with broken promises regarding the Kurdish initiative may also affect the PKK’s dedication to violent tactics. Aside from unmet expectations the state’s decision for coercive measures fosters the feeling that there may be ‘no other way out’ than the violent struggle.¹⁸⁶

The AKP as the government, has increasingly accepted that military solution is insufficient to bring about the solution to the conflict which relates to the fact that the PKK insurgency is no longer equated with the broad Kurdish problem. However, this liberal view stands in strong opposition to the Kemalist-nationalist establishment that includes the opposition parties in the parliament (CHP and MHP), Turkish armed forces and the influential parts of bureaucracy and judiciary. These maintain the hard-line position that military means can result in a solution of the conflict. Moreover, any policy of alleged concessions to the PKK is condemned as negotiation with terrorists which goes against the foundational principles of the republic. Combined with a weakened EU support and a fading public backing for the Kurdish initiative, the AKP may find itself in a difficult position for advocating a non-violent solution to the PKK issue. The diplomatic pressure on the KRG to cooperate in bringing down the PKK in Northern Iraq in accordance with the U.S. green light for military strike, presents a suitable solution for the government. It would satisfy the hard-liners calling for harsher policies towards the PKK and would not threaten the relation with the U.S. who would likely approve the joint KRG-Turkey action.¹⁸⁷ Finally the AKP would avoid the image loss – according to Pruitt and Kim “fear of image loss discourages yielding”¹⁸⁸ – by demonstrating that the state is strong enough to eradicate the terrorist organization, challenging the stability within its borders.

The escalation also persists due to a mechanism called self-fulfilling prophecy – “Party’s beliefs and attitudes about Other make Party behave in ways that elicit behavior from Other that reinforces these beliefs”.¹⁸⁹ The PKK’s threat to national security justifies the hard-line policies of the state. Ankara’s coercion consequently generates strong support for the radical tactics used by the PKK because they are seen as an adequate response to the state’s measures. It can be thus argued that to some extent the state labeling PKK as a terrorist group and subsequent restoration to violence, reinforces the PKK’s hardliners resolve to fight back.