Masaryk university

3. Conflict Scenarios: the Turkish Government vs. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

The second part of the bachelor thesis intends to depict three different scenarios of possible future development to the conflict in Turkey analyzed in the first part. Each scenario – status quo, escalation, and de-escalation – will follow the sequence of events beginning from the starting point as drawn in the scenario tree. All scenario sketches are based on the timeframe of two years in the future.

3. 1. Current situation and starting point

There has been a significant motion concerning the sensitive Kurdish issue in Turkey recently. The government initiated a open and wide-ranging debate when it launched its Kurdish initiative in the beginning of the summer 2009. It was an unprecedented move which ties the liberal and pro-EU policy advocated by the AKP. However, the initiative has for a long time lacked concrete content and has been more of a common belief than that of what the military measures can bring about, the termination of violence flamed up between the PKK and the state.

Nonetheless the ‘opening’ had some response from the rebel’s side. In support for the initiative so called ‘peace group’, 34 people, 8 of them from the PKK and the rest from the Mahmur refugee camp, surrendered at Harbur border between Turkey and Iraq on the 19^th of October 2009. Returners carried a ‘message of peace’, hoping to open the way to a peaceful solution. Although they refuse to repent, returners were in contravention to the Repentance Law released. This breakthrough event initiated by Ocalan made many think that it may lead to disarmament of the PKK.¹⁵² However, it did not take long until Erdogan suspended the ‘peace group’ initiative; probably because the returners were welcomed with public glory as winners which harmed the government’s credit for the process. Recently court officials announced that the released group will stand trial for suspected links to the PKK. In addition, the initiative was significantly faltered by the disclosure of the DPT on the 11^th of December. The Constitutional Court banned the party for alleged links to the outlawed PKK and two representatives were prohibited from political activity for five years. The rest of the representatives joined the newly formed pro-Kurdish BDP which currently holds 20 seats in parliament.

The submission of the constitutional amendments package on the 22^nd of March has shown the commitment of the government to continue its Kurdish initiative and deepen the democratization process in Turkey by necessary changes in the constitution.¹⁵³ It is the first genuine measure the AKP has taken within its ‘opening’ policy of the Kurdish problem, although the reforms touch upon a wide range of other issues not related to the Kurds. The amendments package that would, if accepted, result in changes in at least 107 laws,¹⁵⁴ was approved by the parliamentary commission and is now negotiated in Parliament’s General Assembly. The package includes generally accepted articles, however, three items are facing strong opposition – two are related to the judiciary, and one makes the party closure more difficult.¹⁵⁵ In light of the strong resistance to those changes from the two major opposition parties (CHP and MHP) along with military and judiciary, the final fate of reforms is indeed unclear.

The position of the major opposition party CHP has been very inconsistent – despite initial strict demission to the package, the party has proposed a two-part offer that could assure the consensus over the AKP’s amendments. Deniz Baykal, leader of CHP, suggested that if the government separated three main controversial articles his party would support the rest of the package. As the second part of the offer the party asks the government to delay the approval of three controversial articles until after the elections in 2011.¹⁵⁶ However, Prime Minister Erdogan did not agree to the proposal and refused to separate controversial articles from the reform package.¹⁵⁷ In response, CHP has recently changed its stance so that it increased its opposition to 12 articles. The consensus seems therefore nearly impossible. The compromise will not be easy to reach with the pro-Kurdish BDP, who also conditioned the support of amendments by meeting its demands – party put forward the list of proposals of constitutional reforms.¹⁵⁸ Finally the second biggest opposition party MHP announced as was expected, that it would not support the package either.

The ruling party holds 336 seats in the parliament,¹⁵⁹ down from 337 after Zekai Özcan, a deputy for AKP, who was known for his adversary stance to the Kurdish initiative, resigned.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the Speaker of the parliament and AKP deputy Mehmet Ali Şahin is prevented from voting so the party has only 335 votes. The package has to receive at least 330 votes to pass – the approval process requires that the reform package would be subjected to the referendum if it receives between 330 and 367 votes. In the case that the package receives over 367 votes (more than two-thirds of a majority) it would be submitted to the approval of the president who can ratify it, send it back to the parliament for further discussion, or decide whether there would be a popular vote or not. If there was a referendum, the last poll showed that 48 per cent of voters would vote in favor of the constitutional changes and 38 per cent plan to say ‘no’ to the referendum.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, a popular vote would probably be perceived as the vote proving the confidence the people have in the ruling AKP and their belief of its future continuance in office. The opposition parties would definitely mobilize their supporters to vote against it. Therefore, the ruling party naturally seeks to get the package approved without being obliged to forward it to a referendum, in order for this it needs to assure a win of at least 31 votes from the other parties.

It is assumed that the approval process could be completed by the end of June. However, the passing of the amendments package is only the first step, the implementation of reforms – harmonization of the current legislation with the package – is an important second step that is expected to take at least half a year.¹⁶² The package has already set in motion serious constitutional debates within Turkish politics and tensions are expected to continue until the final vote on the reforms is carried out.

The decision to continue the Kurdish initiative has been taken as the starting point (SP) from which we can envisage three different possible scenarios as future developments unfold in the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government. By the amendment package AKP kept the promise that it will pursue changes in the constitution which are needed for further reforms regarding the Kurdish problem and in doing this achieved another step toward fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria. The steps taken within the renewed support for the initiative are fundamental and can lead to a notable and different outcome on the future political landscape.