Masaryk university

2. 6. Internal and external factors

The composition of the government is another internal factor. The majority of the parliament is since the elections in 2007¹¹⁹ composed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that gave birth to the Kurdish initiative. AKP has gained an increased support from the Kurdish southeast and therefore holds a strong mandate from Kurds. The party places emphasis on a pro-EU agenda and has declared to be committed to addressing the need for constitutional reforms.¹²⁰ As a part of this promise, the party officially unveiled the constitutional amendments package on the 22^nd of March which is now discussed among the parliament. Two parties – Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) – stand in opposition to AKP’s policy. They are reluctant to any concessions toward the Kurdish minority and basically ignore the existence of the Kurdish issue. Both parties argue that the initiative of cooperation with terrorists shows weakness in the government.¹²¹ The similar stance, although not so loudly expressed, holds the military establishment and judiciary. In sum there is a strong opposition that could possibly prevent the Kurdish initiative from happening. Nevertheless, according to Watts division within the establishment over how to approach the Kurdish issue creates a space from which the pro-Kurdish politics can profit and not vice versa.¹²²

The restricted space for minority parties in the Turkish political system has to be also taken into account. The establishment of the Kurdish party, e. g. based only on ethnicity, is not permitted¹²³ which links to the deficits in minority rights in Turkey. Besides, there is a 10 per cent national threshold for entering the parliament that prevents broader political representation. However, pro-Kurdish parties have established and have gradually attracted the voters support, albeit their survival has always been aggravated by interference by the Constitutional Court, which has the right to abandon the party.¹²⁴ Current representatives of Kurdish interests, BDP, hold 20 seats in the parliament; therefore they can become an important part of the discussion over constitutional amendments. However, we have to bear in mind that the limited space for articulation of Kurdish interests in the parliament has worked in favor of the PKK’s support.

There are also internal factors on the side of the PKK that have influence on the conflict. The party’s structure as established in 1978 lacks pluralism and is organized along the personality cult resembling the style of Stalin.¹²⁵ The group has a special illegal character typical for authoritative parties – it is a “solid, all day professional organization”.¹²⁶ Hierarchy and discipline are associated with “charismatic authority” of the leadership.¹²⁷ In spite of his imprisonment, Ocalan has remained the undisputable leader still controlling the organization through his lieutenants. Symptomatic is also the strong loyalty of the group to its leader. The continual insistence on Ocalan’s amnesty as well as recent demonstrations against new cell’s conditions indicate that he still enjoys high respect among his followers. In fact he is seen as the key player in any solution to the conflict. Unfortunately the government appears reluctant to include Ocalan as a legitimate negotiator in its initiative. However, since Ocalan’s communication with the PKK is limited, possible only through his lawyers on irregular basis, there are voices that the organization has lost the strict hierarchical structure it used to have. This argument can be underpinned by the fact that Ocalan’s call for cease-fires has never resulted in full abandonment of violence.

The external sponsorship and backing of the PKK should be considered as a crucial factor for the PKK’s survival. Ankara is persuaded that the Kurdish insurgency is from a considerable part, a consequence of very external funding.¹²⁹ Outside support both financial and moral provided by the European Diaspora is also a fundamental factor that influences the Kurdish internal fight against the state. The Turkish public believes that the PKK’s insurgency is a tool of ‘outside forces’ who wants to divide the country.¹³⁰ It relates to the Sevres syndrome rooted in Turkish society – the state tends to believe in conspiracy theories in which secondary parties such as the EU or the U.S. are trying to weaken the country.¹³¹ It also links to the division in the establishment where hard-liners believe that the problem is externally driven, while the liberal moderate stance admits that it is to large extent a result of Kurdish identity denial¹³² and thus a broader democratic solution is needed. Regardless of this division Ankara’s overall objective is to pressure for cooperation with European countries (especially Germany and Sweden where the majority of Kurdish migrants reside) to take actions against the PKK on their soil. The vital diplomatic campaign with European governments aiming at cutting PKK’s resources started last year.¹³³

In 1995 Turkish Kurds established the Kurdish Parliament in exile. It does not present itself as a tool of the PKK although the majority of its members are at least pro-PKK sympathizers.¹³⁴ The parliament was recognized by several European governments and established information offices in several cities. It aims at the political solution to the conflict through negotiations.¹³⁵