Masaryk university

2. 7. Solution proposals

In December 2007 Ocalan from his prison publicly introduced Proposals for a Solution to the Kurdish Question in Turkey.¹³⁸ He presented a vision of a democratic resolution to the very complex conflict that cannot be characterized as one of terrorism and therefore cannot be treated by violent means. He made it clear that the group does not intend to challenge the secularist and unitary character of the republic in order to establish a separate state, instead he proposed a ‘Democratic Self-Rule’ for Kurds – more precisely Ocalan suggested 9 proposals as a way to a solution.¹³⁹ Although those proposals provide a valuable framework for the establishment of ‘Democratic Nation’, there are no specific measures listed how to realize them. More elaborative should be Ocalan’s Road Map to Peace which is expected to include necessary steps to be taken to implement short-term and long-term solutions, conditions for PKK’s disarmament as well as ten fundamentals necessary for the settlement.¹⁴⁰ Most recently PKK’s acting leader Murat Karayilan presented three principles and four steps to the termination of violence.¹⁴¹ However, in light of the contested position of the PKK as a sole representative entity to all Turkish Kurds, it is not clear what the Kurdish demands really are. The PKK and Ocalan seek to be recognized as negotiating partners and therefore as the ones who can state the Kurdish demands.

The government reacted to those developments by launching its own comprehensive and multi-tiered policy which became known as the Kurdish initiative. It was hinted for the first time by president Güll who told journalists that “good things are expected to happen concerning the Kurdish issue”.¹⁴² The government issued six initial steps, for example the establishment of an independent human-rights institution to monitor human rights violations or allowing political parties to communicate during the election campaign in other than Turkish language.¹⁴³ However, it has to be borne in mind that the Kurdish initiative is rather an idea with no exact definition of what it really is; there is only hope that it will bring about the end of violence.¹⁴⁴

The fate of the initiative is now very unclear. It was shattered by disclosure of the Democratic Society Party which triggered violent demonstrations, and is still facing strong opposition from nationalists. There are also serious suspicions whether the AKP really means the initiative seriously and is willing to challenge its position in the parliament in order to keep the promise. The inconsitency of Erdogan’s commitment to the political solution can be demonstrated by the hardening of his position in 2008.¹⁴⁵ Yet, currently the party has increased the pressure on a political solution again and renewed its commitment to the initiative – it presented the package of constitutional amendments – but we can expect that the approval process will be facing serious hindrances because the official Kemalist ideology is likely to resist. Nevertheless many observers suggest that the current stage of the conflict can offer a window of opportunity.

The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) issued comprehensive proposals for the solution of the Kurdish situation¹⁴⁶ which covers series of steps, from political and economical to security measures. This view has much in common with Ocalans proposals. It calls for a multi-focused approach that will understand the Kurdish situation not as a mere terrorism problem which will be resolved with the destruction of the PKK insurgency. In addition to measures that should be taken domestically many authors agree that the solution can be achieved through EU candidacy.¹⁴⁷
Taken into account all proposals mentioned, an ideal series of steps toward conflict transition will be suggested. To settle the conflict it has to be transformed from violent to non-violent behavior by the parties themselves.¹⁴⁸ In order to start negotiations primary parties have to recognize each other as legitimate partners who can enter agreement. Considering only a limited representation of Kurds other than PKK, the negotiation cannot start without Ankara regarding the PKK as legitimate party to negotiate with. This has to be anticipated by the transformation of the PKK into a reliable bargaining partner. In exchange for PKK’s unconditional withdrawal from violence the government should immediately stop all domestic and cross-border operations and accept the group as a legitimate and representative spokesman for Kurdish demands. In this process the pro-Kurdish BDP can play a crucial role – it may become the third impartial party to the conflict and lead the parties to cease military action and consequently start negotiations.

Before the negotiation process starts, the pre-negotiations, where the genuine negotiations are planned and prepared, should take place. During this stage it is highly important that, given the different understanding of the term Kurdish issue, parties regulate incompatibility in order to agree on its common definition. On one hand the government needs to as a prerequisite to negotiations, admit to the wider Kurdish problem instead of narrow understanding of PKK’s insurgency as a purely security issue. PKK on the other hand needs to clearly define its demands. The confidence-building measures should take place within this process to show sincerity of intentions by both parties and assure the stability of ceasefire. To change the structure of the conflict, its dynamics, in order to acquire a common denominator for further negotiations is sine qua non for the solution and probably also the most difficult part of the conflict transition.

During the negotiations themselves the importance of the third parties increases. The EU as well as the U.S. could brush up and exert their political leverage on the conflict and develop an effective mediation power and foster trust between parties. The role of BDP is also highly important because it can claim Kurdish demands within official policy structures. The involvement of growing and increasingly plural Kurdish civil society, respected representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent intellectuals not connected to the PKK could be also highly contributive. The more perspectives on the conflict are included, the more probable it is that the process reaches a fruitful end. The role of third parties would be especially helpful to complete a final deal. Mechanisms that would provide phased political amnesty for PKK members are mentioned in almost all proposals and seem to be of high importance for the negotiations to start. The final proposal which would ideally be a product of those negotiations should resolve the main incompatibility.

The possible proposal has to meet at least certain minimum demands – reforms addressing cultural rights, Kurdish language, education and minority rights which should couple with economic measures, a plan for economic reconstruction of the Kurdish southeast region (the completion of GAP Project would be a good option). Those reforms would require an introduction of a new constitution. The government should also deal with the Village Guard System which is considered as the major obstacle to consolidation of the situation in southeast Turkey. The replacement of the personnel and security apparatus should help to consolidate the situation in the Kurdish region.¹⁴⁹ Ideally the final solution will include some sort of local autonomy for Kurds in the southeast since the secession or federation is unacceptable option for the state. However, regarding the experience with slow implementation of reforms and strong opposition from nationalists, the autonomy would probably be left until later. The reforms mentioned earlier should have priority because they can become a basis for further arrangements.

Such a proposal is a type of integrative approach using the cooperative problem solving mechanism which intends to provide a positive-sum solution where both parties gain at the same time. It is an example of a compromise where both parties have to make concession steps in order to meet the settlement. It partly deals also with the package deal because the proposal includes different reforms ranging from political to economic and security issues.

During the implementation and consolidation phase of the conflict resolution the time dimension is crucial. It is of high importance that the proposed comprehensive deal will be realized according to some schedule. The different phases of implementation are necessary for the solution to be workable. Success of implementation and consequentlyof the consolidation phase is from a large extent dependent on social relations between the parties. In light of rooted hatreds and hostile attitudes between the parties it seems necessary to provide a reconciliation process addressing those types of stereotyped attitudes. It corresponds with Ocalan’s proposal of Commission for Truth and Justice as an instrument aiming at mental trauma caused during the conflict. The problem of internally displaced people should be also addressed properly.¹⁵⁰ The assistance to people forcibly displaced from their villages such as Back to the Village Program or Homecoming Law have to continue. In this dimension the involvement and pressure of the international community will be fundamental.¹⁵¹