Masaryk university

3. 2. Scenario tree

3. 3. Status quo

The status quo scenario presumes that there will be no significant shifts to both the escalation and de-escalation path, and thus the conflict remains ongoing in the similar low-level violence between the two primary parties along with any significant progress in Kurdish rights. The scenario assumes that there will be only a limited progress in implementation of reforms addressing the Kurdish issue (B1). Even if the current reform package is accepted the issue of implementation is a far-reaching process that can be seriously slowed down. It is plausible that the implementation will cover only generally accepted issues leaving the controversial matters behind. It is also possible that the major opposition party CHP keeps its promise and takes the amendment package to the Constitutional Court. This move would definitely slow down any progress that could be finally abated completely.

In relation to the EU there remains certain ambiguity from the Turkish side concerning the commitment to reform.¹⁶³ Besides, there is a difference in perception held by both Turkey and the EU concerning the time-frame in which reforms should be implemented. Whereas EU expects to see the changes materializing in the short-term, Turkey foresees a further horizon.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, many current reforms exist only on paper rather than in practice.¹⁶⁵ Along this line of reasoning, even if the Kurdish issue is addressed through Turkish reforms, the short-term outcomes of reforms may not be visible. Combined with the lack of other steps addressing the free expression of Kurdish identity the progress in Kurdish initiative will be seriously hindered (B2).

In an effort to keep the initiative alive the government would probably continue to offer promises and incentives to the Kurdish public, however, real outcomes of the initiative are likely to be lacking. According to Pruitt and Kim¹⁶⁶ we can identify some problems with promises. Regarding the situation in Turkey the main problem the AKP faces is to decide how much and what exactly to promise to the other party, the Kurds. It ties again to the uncertainty of the Kurdish demands due to PKK’s dubious representative position. Moreover, there is the cost of reward which has to be given if the promise is to be effective. When the government promises too much it can be far too costly and thus can be perceived as uncreditable. In the same vein when the AKP promises too little it is more likely to create the sense of distrust in the eyes of the other party. In both cases the promise would not work effectively and thus would not contribute to the solution of the conflict.

When the government did not manage to offer credible promise which met at least some demands perceived as crucial by the Kurds, the Turkish public is likely to be dissatisfied and feel reluctant toward the initiative as a whole (B3). The lack of support to the initiative may favor the PKK, which would be seen as the only relevant actor capable of advocating Kurdish interests. Along with the sense of increased legitimacy of the struggle the PKK would consequently continue to attack the Turkish security forces from the Iraqi territory. The resulting low-level violence on the border (B4) would sharpen the stance of the PKK’s sympathizers both inside Turkey and in the European Diaspora. Pro-Kurdish demonstrations are likely to be accompanied by occasional outburst of violence (B5) that would be defeated by repressive measures from state’s side.

Neither the Turkish state nor the PKK would at this stage express the will for a peaceful settlement. In this situation – where no party seems to be willing to lay down its arms – the dialogue is often initiated under outside pressure. In approaching the armed struggle as an interstate geopolitical conflict, it is unlikely that the international community will press for a solution that grants Kurds and an autonomous region within the present Turkish borders. The defending of territorial integrity is, ultimately, one of the cornerstones of the UN Charter.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the international community may be hesitant to press for a hard-line solution and may rather promote political measures to terminate the conflict (B6). The U.S in particular, given the unpopularity of its coercive measures in the region over the past few years and its concern for stabilization of situation in Iraq, may remain the furthermost advocate of a non-violent solution. Similarly the EU, in the context of the ongoing accession process with Turkey, may press for revitalization of the Kurdish initiative as a part of its pressure to fulfill the political criteria for membership within the EU.

The support of the EU is indeed crucial. There is a common belief that Turkey needs strong commitment from the EU to progress; the ambiguous signs of support from the EU may thus seriously influence Turkey’s commitment to reforms and consequently radicalize the actions of the PKK. The failure to address the Kurdish issue is likely to delay the EU membership, maybe forever. Therefore, the Turkish reform process and the role of EU seem to be mutually dependent. On one hand reforms are unlikely to be adopted without the EU strong support; on the other hand it appears implausible that the EU will support Turkey’s membership without seeing sufficient improvement in reform process.

If the pressure to address the Kurdish issue is prioritized in the conditions set for EU accession, it may lead to a cross-over into the de-escalation path (C1) which assumes that both parties of the conflict will finally approach negotiations. However, when this is not emphasized the Kurdish issue may be pushed lower down on the EU agenda. The confusing support embodied in advocacy for privileged partnership (B7) may lead to slow-down in the admission procedure and thus weaken the reform progression in Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly stated that Turkey’s goal is full membership¹⁶⁸ and therefore, the lack of a clear sign whether it will ultimately materialize or not, underpins its mistrust toward sincerity of EU’s final intentions. Given the absence of strong encouragement to a non-violent solution and the protracted nature of the conflict, neither the PKK nor the Turkish government will lay down their arms at this stage (B8). The PKK is likely to gain confidence and restore to violent clashed which will be reinforced by the state’s counterterrorist measures and persisting opposition to negotiation with terrorist organizations. Ultimately, a lack of visible reforms and minimal pressure from the outside community will result in a continuation of low level violence as the status quo.