Masaryk university

3. 5. De-escalation

The de-escalation describes the situation as the reverse to the escalation that has been presented above. It refers to the general decrease in severity or scope of the conflict. It is noteworthy to mention that de-escalation always precedes the conflict resolution although it does not necessarily have to lead to the solution of the conflict.¹⁹⁰ The first step in the de-escalatory scenario is conditioned upon the implementation of reforms addressing the Kurdish issue (C1). Regarding the AKP’s amendment package the consensus on controversial articles is of high importance. In order to assure that the AKP has to carefully negotiate with main opposition parties who, however, seem reluctant to shift their priorities on this issue. Even if they maintain their resistance to particular constitutional changes, the ruling party has enough votes to pass the package to the referendum that might approve it. We have to bear in mind though that the amendment package has to be not only approved in parliament and eventually by popular vote, but also implemented. Implementation would require significant work and time to assure the harmonization of the standing Turkish laws with the reforms. Turkey is repeatedly criticized for ineffective implementation that does not translate into concrete progress,¹⁹¹ for which reason it is vital that any changes must be visible in the short term. Unease with the implementation relates to the fact that whereas the EU may have an impact on the institutional change, the impact on values, norms and identities is only limited.¹⁹²

The EU welcomed the constitutional amendments package as ‘positive’; however, it remains concerned about three main areas – freedom of expression, religious freedom and the 10 per cent threshold for elections.¹⁹³ It is thus important that Turkey also renew its commitment to the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis,¹⁹⁴ adopted in December 2008, and should continue preparing reforms which are of a major EU concern. Other positive steps toward the free expression of Kurdish identity, such as was the establishment of satellite TV channel TRT 6 which broadcasts in all three main Kurdish dialects, all would favor the positive environment for de-escalation.

The EU will, as a response to this motion, send a clear positive sign (C2) instead of confusing signals as was the case in the status quo scenario. It is believed that the EU’s full membership will promote a sufficient domestic democratic reform that will contribute to the acknowledgement and protection of the Kurdish minority within the state.¹⁹⁵ The EU has already proved the power of its leverage over the reform process – most of the reforms were adopted when the EU-Turkey relationship was at its best (national reform package was approved in 2000-2004). For this reason it is highly important that the EU member states would adequately appreciate positive developments in Turkey which will consequently translate into additional progress. In addition the EU need to make clear weather it seeks only a privileged partnership with Turkey or full membership. The Commissioner for enlargement, Stefan Füle expressed his opinion on this question positively: “Can I see Turkey as a member? Yes I can. It's about the credibility of the EU, but also about Turkey fulfilling all criteria. I'm confident it will be a new, modern and reformed Turkey, that will be to the benefit of the EU and Turkey.”¹⁹⁶

Indeed the accession process with Turkey, which was initiated by the Ankara agreement¹⁹⁷ in 1963 but did not officially start not until 2005, proves the cohesiveness and credibility of the EU. There are many benefits deriving from Turkey’s membership that would profit the EU. Besides economic incentives, such as expanding markets and a young workforce that would make the EU more confident and influential on an international arena, the admission of Turkey would make the Union genuinely multicultural which may disprove assumptions about a clash of civilizations. Given the current effort to constitute an effective Common defense and security policy, Turkey, with its strategic territorial position and large army can make a significant contribution as well. On the other hand Turkey may benefit from the EU democratization effect of enlargement.¹⁹⁸ The role of the EU is especially important in relation to the Kurdish issue – it is generally accepted that a solution to the Kurdish issue is largely dependent on the Turkish membership within European structures.¹⁹⁹ As a result an essential number of Kurds prefer to be part of the EU rather than the ‘greater Kurdistan’.²⁰⁰ The EU is unlikely to support Ankara in any military solution to the Kurdish problem; instead it could provide a useful and fruitful guideline to a political one, which would lead the scenario to de-escalation. However, we have to bear in mind that EU’s engagement with Turkey is aside from internal conditions, such as full liberalization and democratization, seriously hindered by external ones, most importantly by the Cyprus-Turkey relations, that add to the complexity of costs and benefits of Ankara’s membership.

The positive development in Turkey concerning the reform process incited by the improvement in relations with the EU may lead KRG and U.S. to cooperate with Turkey and thus promote further de-escalation (C3). Unlike the EU, KRG and U.S. have only limited influence on domestic politics; however their influence lies in the possible cooperation on fighting and consequently the disarmament of the PKK in Northern Iraq.

Turkey’s relationship to KRG as has been noted above has been influenced by three main factors – the status of Kirkuk and Mosul, presence of the PKK, and fear of the pan-Kurdish separatism. The Turkish stance toward cooperation with KRG is also affected by the division within ruling circles, where only pro-European AKP and liberal intelligentsia seek to initiate diplomatic political and economic ties with KRG.²⁰¹ However, according to Barkey an improved KRG-Turkey relationship would have a positive impact on decreasing the tension in Turkey and not vice versa. Turkish Kurds may moderate their behavior when Turkey accepts the KRG as a representative body of the Kurds. It is also unclear how strong the Kurdish desire to live in a greater Kurdistan is feared and whether it is still perceived as a feasible goal or rather an unrealizable dream, because according to some observers most Kurds desire solution within the Turkish borders.²⁰² In addition, it is in the Iraqi Kurds interest to disband the PKK.²⁰³

However, for a long time neither party due to lack of mutual trust was willing to initiate a rapprochement.²⁰⁴ The U.S. has played a significant role in upholding the cooperation. The U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that followed the establishment of joint Committee among Turkey, Iraq and the U.S., opened the space for improved relations. The agreement clearly stated that Iraqi territory cannot be used as a base for attack on its neighbor. Besides the KRG became fully responsible for the stability and security which forced Turkey to establish official diplomatic ties with the KRG.²⁰⁵ The opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil on the 13^th March 2010 confirmed the positive development which aims at decreasing political tensions and encouraging the growing economic ties between countries.²⁰⁶ Both parties seem to be committed to the cooperation that has been unthinkable until recently. Northern Iraqi-Turkish rapprochement can be an “important sign of changing times”.²⁰⁷ The positive relations broaden the space in which KRG will be willing to cooperate on combating the PKK. The KRG could for instance play a positive role so that it could urge the PKK to disarm by negotiating the ceasefire.

There are also prospects for improved cooperation with the U.S. – Washington has recently discussed an ‘action plan’ on possible future assistance with Turkey in a fight against the PKK threat.²⁰⁸ The cooperation may be reinforced by fear from repeated rising tensions in the region as well as from the Iranian or Syrian subsequent reaction. The U.S. role in the de-escalation could be highly beneficial – it may use its positive relations with both Turkey and Iraqi Kurds and help to demobilize the PKK. The PKK is not likely to disarm to the Turkish, but might to do so to the Americans.²⁰⁹

However, the disarmament of the PKK has to be preceded by the development within the Turkish political arena. In a situation when the EU, the KRG and the U.S. are included in and committed to the conflict de-escalation we can presume the BDP will become the third party in the conflict (C4). It would be unlikely that the government would be willing to talk directly to the PKK before it abandons violence, mostly because of the persisting policy that it will never negotiate with terrorists. The pro-Kurdish party may thus act as the mediator which can play a significant role in promoting the de-escalation.²¹⁰ It may act as the catalyst needed to begin the negotiations.²¹¹ For the government to accept BDP’s role in the conflict resolution, party has to according to the request of both Ocalan and the EU, deny any links to the outlawed PKK and work independently in the legal arena,²¹² because to be effective the third party should be impartial. In this situation the BDP may develop the conditions for the problem solving strategy – “alternative that satisfies the aspiration of both sides”²¹³ – in bargaining with the government over the Kurdish issue. Since the party will successfully advocate Kurdish interests in parliament while distancing itself from the use of violence by the PKK, it could also win some more support especially from the moderate Kurds and those who are tired of the conflict and demand political solution. The changed conditions for representation of Kurds are a significant factor promoting the de-escalation.

Consequently, the party may mediate a short-term concession on both sites of the conflict. As another step in the de-escalation path the government offers amnesty to the PKK militants (C5). This move is perceived as a necessary prerequisite for further development in this scenario. Although PKK and its sympathizers demand also the release of Ocalan and wish him to become a negotiator, it is highly unlikely that the government would be willing to include him as a part of the initiative, due to the extreme opposition from nationalist parties.²¹⁴ In parallel with amnesty, the government should discuss with Iraq and the U.N. measures to assure the closure of the Mahmur U.N. refugee camp and coordinate the return of its refugees (C6). The camp established in Northern Iraq provides shelter for about 11 000 Turkish Kurd refugees who were forced to migrate from southeastern Turkey in the 1990s when the violent struggle between the PKK and the state began.²¹⁵ Mahmur is perceived as the major source of recruitment for the PKK and its closure is therefore seen as another precondition for disarmament of the terrorist group.²¹⁶ The ‘peace group’ project set off by Ocalan in the autumn of 2009 was a significant turning point in this sense because the majority of the returned were indeed from that camp. However, without the amnesty, the returned would face charges because of their links to the PKK. The repatriation of the Mahmur camp residents could be easily reapplied in a situation if Ankara cooperates with the KRG.

Following the offers made by the government and mediated by the BDP – amnesty to PKK fighters and the closure of the Mahmur refugee camp along with the assurance of their safe return to Turkey – the PKK may be sufficiently convinced about the sincerity of the proposal and change its behavior and edge away from violence (C7). Other factors may also influence this decision. In contrast to the escalatory scenario where we assumed the restricted space for Kurdish demands, the true access to the political system – allowing all groups in society to express their demands – could successfully minimize the political violence.²¹⁷ The role of BDP that may become a representative of Kurdish demands in the parliament and generally a more open-minded stance toward the Kurdish problem may further weaken the broad populous support of the PKK. According to the grievance-motivated approach as origins of the incompatibility, the PKK is backed mainly because it expresses the unmet needs and frustration of the Kurds. This has generated the so called ‘relative deprivation’, contributing to the violent escalation of the conflict.²¹⁸ Nonetheless, the support for policies of violence is low amongst the Kurdish people who now gradually believe in winning by other means.²¹⁹ Moreover, if the KRG is willing to cooperate on eradicating the PKK from Northern Iraq, the group’s position will be significantly weakened. Finally, the PKK will come to the awareness that the benefits of dialogue are far higher than the benefits of continued violence.

The PKK’s disarmament would lead the de-escalation scenario to the last step – the cessation of armed struggle on both sides of the conflict (C8). Although the termination of violence does not mean a conflict resolution it provides the necessary precondition. The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe can, in the future, play a noteworthy role in a further conflict resolution. Its potential lies in promoting a democratic solution to the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government, as was achieved by the Irish Diaspora in America that influenced the peace agreement between the IRA and the Irish government.²²⁰ Clearly, a parallel can be drawn here with the peacemaking potential of the Kurdish Diaspora, particularly considering its size and influence. The active Kurdish community, concentrated mostly in Germany, could through civic organization, apply considerable pressure and take on a crucial role in assuring the peace agreement.