Masaryk university

4. Conclusion

The thesis has set three hypotheses which relate to three different scenarios. It is an objective of the concluding part to confirm or rebut each one of them. The first hypothesis deals with the status quo scenario: The situation will remain a status quo. The development away from this path will be hindered by internal factors – strong role of hardliners in conservative establishment, army, and judiciary as well as external factors – the ambiguous support of the EU. The status quo scenario assumes that the decision to continue the Kurdish initiative will be followed only by limited progress in the implementation of reforms. In this development as well as in further courses of events the internal factors play an important role. The nationalist establishment that acts as a guardian of traditional Kemalist principles has a strong voice in every day’s politics. Although the parliament is dominated by the liberal AKP party which is advocating a progressive style in politics, departing from the conservatives dogmas, it has to confront the opposition from CHP and MHP that are both more or less advocators of traditional Turkish politics. Therefore, the party finds itself in a difficult position when it promotes a political solution to the PKK’s rebellion because apart from the opposition parties, military and a significant part of the judiciary favor the military means as the most suitable way on dealing with the PKK. It ties to the traditional mindset where the PKK insurgency is equated with the broad Kurdish problem – a solution to this problem is therefore seen in the defeat of the PKK. As long as this attitude persists in influential policy circles, the development away from the status quo is seriously constraint.

However, we have to add that the behavior of the Kurdish public, especially that of PKK’s sympathizers has to be also counted among internal factors influencing the persistence of the status quo path. The reluctance to the government’s initiative and subsequent radicalization among Kurds as the most possible response also impede additional progress away from status quo. Also the PKK violent actions make the status quo scenario more possible because they hinder the government’s decision to shift away from coercive counter-measures.

Regarding the second part of the first hypothesis all scenarios indeed showed that the EU exercises noteworthy leverage over the development in Turkey. In the case of mixed signals towards the future prospects for Ankara’s full membership, the EU risks that the reform process and overall pro-EU commitment in Turkey will slow down. We can consequently expect that the EU will be able to influence the Kurdish situation and effectively put a pressure for a political solution only to a limited extent.

Overall, the first hypothesis seems to be confirmed. In light of the current state of events the status quo scenario also comes into sight as the most likely one. Both internal and external factors will presumably thwart the development away from this path. Given the peculiar nature of the Turkish political system the strong position of hardliners is unlikely to move in favor of liberal moderates. Although mandate of the ruling AKP remains strong, so that it can pursue unpopular steps, given the coming general elections in 2011 it might harden its stance in order to secure its position. It is plausible that the effort to accommodate both hardliners and liberally disposed voters, many of them from Kurdish areas, will control the AKP’s policy in years ahead. This two-track policy is unlikely to generate fundamental movement within the Kurdish initiative. Rather we should expect that improvements will take turns with slight setbacks that would not motivate the PKK to lay down its arms.

The second de-escalation-related hypothesis assumes: The situation will de-escalate depending upon the Turkey’s relationship with the EU, which can successfully exert pressure on Turkish government to terminate violent conflict and find political solution. It has been proven that the strong support from the EU could generate significant motion concerning the Kurdish issue in Turkey – within the effort to meet political criteria as a condition for the membership Ankara will be forced to deal with the Kurdish problem. EU as an advocate of non-military solutions to the conflict between the PKK and the state, pressures for deepening of domestic democratic reforms that will indispensably also touch upon the situation of Kurds in Turkey. The EU expresses a high concern about the issue of freedom of expression, religious freedom, and protection and the tolerance of language, culture and fundamental rights vis-à-vis minorities which remain restricted. Regarding an effective pressure on those issues it is necessary that the EU will send to Turkey clear positive signs that it is committed to Ankara’s accession. In Turkish eyes it is also essential that member countries will depart from the idea of privileged partnership that creates distrust among both Turkish government and the public toward the prospect of membership. When this is achieved, Turkey is likely to progress in the reform process which is expected to lead to the de-escalation of the conflict.

However, as has been shown the EU-Turkey relations works on reciprocal basis – the EU articulated support for Turkish membership goes hand in hand with Ankara’s progress. Turkey therefore has to demonstrate improvement in effective implementation of already adopted reforms. Generally speaking in order to promote de-escalation to the conflict both EU and Turkey have to encourage the cooperation by showing strong commitment. However, not only EU alone could exert pressure for solution but also the KRG and the U.S. could play a beneficial role. Their willingness to cooperate with the Turkish government on disarmament of the PKK may, along with other factors accelerate the PKK’s change in behavior away from violence and put forward negotiations.

Besides external factors the de-escalation of the conflict is also dependent on the favorable domestic environment. The scenario assumed that the pro-Kurdish BDP party will become the third party to the conflict. This is plausible only in the case that access to the political system is opened to the extent that the BDP is able to freely articulate its demands. Consequently the mediation power of the BDP may press the PKK to accede a democratic and peaceful settlement path. The positive steps from the government such as amnesty for the PKK militants appear necessary for the PKK to lay down its arms.

In sum, the de-escalation scenario appears to be the second most likely one. It would be plausible in a situation when the AKP renewed its pro-EU commitment and took necessary measures satisfying the Kurdish demands. The adoption of constitutional reforms as presented by the amendment package may advance the position of moderates in the government and mobilize the supporters of Turkish membership within the EU. Consequently the rational calculation could lead the leaders to choose a political solution because it would be perceived as less costly than the military one.

Finally, the third hypotheses relates to the escalation of conflict: The situation will escalate in case of a weakened EU support, radicalization of the PKK and consequently Ankara’s decision on a military solution. Escalation again takes into account the role of the EU – in contrast to de-escalation it portrays the situation when the EU support is considerably weakened. It is true that if the EU relaxes its pressure, as was the case between 2005 and 2008, we cannot expect so strong a Turkish commitment to the reform process. Ensuing stagnation of reforms is likely to lead to radicalization of the PKK. Increasing violence may result in the government’s decision for military solution which would climax to an escalatory scenario. Therefore also the last hypothesis appears to be confirmed.

The escalatory spiral would be broken only if the U.S. does not acknowledge Ankara’s right to pursue cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and would increase its pressure for a non-military solution. The U.S. role could ultimately discourage Turkey from exercising a military strike and shift the events into a status quo scenario. However, since the decision on military action is made within the Turkish government, the powerful hardliners, who are likely to gain the upper hand when the violent clashes intensify, are expected to advocate military force whatever the cost. It has to be also borne in mind that radicalization of the PKK tends to unite the country against terrorist threat. Consequently military measures would win far-reaching national support – we can go back to the situation in 2007 to demonstrate this pattern. Although we consider escalation as the less likely scenario of development, it is still a relevant possibility in regards to the strong hardliners’ voice in parliament, persisting radical support for the PKK and the unclear nature of the EU-Turkey ties in the future.

Overall, each hypothesis seems to be confirmed in relation to its correspondent scenario. However, it was revealed that there are other factors that have to be taken into account. Due to the complexity of the conflict in Turkey it cannot be said whether internal or external factors play a more important role – it is always the interplay of both that creates favorable conditions for any particular development. Yet, we have to take into consideration that certain instability and unpredictability of the Turkish politics combined with recent frequent changes in approaching the Kurdish issue may give rise to a completely different course of events in each scenario. Nevertheless, given the past and present development that can hint some trends, and the general patterns in conflict development, the sequence of events as presented in each scenario are considered as the most probable.