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2. 5. Dynamics


The conflict noted several shifts in dynamics in the chosen time period. It did not go through a classical sequence of stages (emergence stage, stages of escalation and de-escalation and termination stage) but rather it went through spirals of escalation and de-escalation.75 The insurgency began on the Turkish territory in 1984. Initially the revolt was rather spontaneous, tribally based and without a clear articulated political goal.76 It has over time developed to the mass insurgency that has created a circle of violence. The violence escalated in the early 1990s when the low level guerilla actions reached the level of war according to estimated battle-related deaths. The main decisive factor that created space for significant de-escalation of the conflict was the capture of Ocalan in 1999. The leader in line with announced unilateral ceasefire called for withdrawal from the southeast of Turkey and proclaimed the will to negotiate with the Turkish government. The number of death-related battles profoundly decreased, however, sporadic clashes between the security forces and the PKK continued. This indicates that the group did not fully respected Ocalan’s call for employment of non-violent strategy and may be an indicator of increased unease in coordinating PKK’s militants. After a period of relative peace the conflict escalated sharply when the PKK called off a unilateral ceasefire in 2004. Another ceasefire broke down in 2006 and clashes increased after authorization of Ankara’s incursion in Northern Iraq. The cross-border operations in 2007 and 2008 escalated the conflict again.77 Currently both parties seem to be deadlocked and only a low-level violence is reported.

Both warring parties have used several tactics to fulfill their aspirations. The PKK resorted to the guerilla campaign. Initial actions of the PKK were aimed, in line with its underlying socialist rhetoric against exploitative Kurdish landlords.78 The Turkish government responded to the outbreak of violence by introducing the so called Village Guard System in 1985.79 Local Kurdish villagers were, as an additional help to security forces, armed so that they could protect themselves against the PKK.80 During the 1980s and 1990s Turkish security forces resorted to forcible evacuations of villages under the emergency rule in an attempt to hinder the PKK militants’ access to goods and infrastructure.81 The evacuations were conducted unsystematically and with extreme brutality which resulted in a great problem of internal displacement. In addition to the military response the state has until recently maintained the policy of denial and replacement of Kurdish identity which embodied in a series of violent and coercive measures against the expression of ‘Kurdishness’. Threats have become common practice on how to spread fear among Kurdish citizens.

Since the public recognition, of the Kurdish problem proclaimed by the Prime Minister Erdogan Ankara has taken series of symbolic steps that should improve the condition of Kurds in Turkey. In 1991 the private use of Kurdish language was allowed and further legal regulations were made for the sake of the EU membership. For instance the government allowed the education of Kurdish in private language courses or the one-hour broadcasting in Kurdish.82 Most recently the government allowed the establishments of the state satellite TV channel TRT, which broadcast in all three dialects of Kurdish.83 Despite those modest developments, the Human Rights Watch and other agencies repeatedly reported that the reforms are insufficient.84 Regarding the state tactics, the Turkish police reportedly uses violent techniques against innocent people. This fact, nourished by the adoption of amendment to the Law on the Fight against Terrorism in 2006, which by its vague definition of terrorism, created space for advanced competences of security forces.85

The PKK initiated a guerilla war. Aside from the initial violence against other Kurds, it has used classic insurgency tactics.86 The group often resorted to one-sided violence against civilians who were seen as potential collaborators with the state. The most casualties were reported in 1994, afterwards the PKK started to change its tactics away from hurting civilians to concentrating more on economic and military targets. It announced its intention to comply with the international rights commitments that protect civilians during the conflict.87 In addition to its statements the PKK members asserted that they had never harmed civilians intentionally and that they do not intend to do so in the future.88 Yet, PKK’s violent tactics has spread fear in the southeast rural areas and has resulted in a change in demography so that many Kurds have fled to the urban cities.89

As has been briefly noted above, both parties behavior developed over time. The major change in behavior on the PKK side was initiated by Ocalan when he declared unilateral ceasefire and called for democratic solution to the conflict. The declaration of unilateral ceasefires became a frequent tactic, although it never took long until the group came back in arms. However, along with the name changes the ceasefires indicate that the PKK is willing to abandon the violence in exchange for political dialogue which is an important sign of moderation in PKK’s behavior, albeit it still remains violent. Ocalan showed the will to transform the PKK guerilla into a more political actor.90 Noteworthy, the shift in objectives transformed the conflict from a zero-sum game between Turks against Kurds to the situation where both parties can gain (a win-win game).91

On the side of the state the change has been more subtle. The PKK has been constantly labeled as a terrorist group which has not gone through the essential changes needed to be recognized as a legitimate negotiating partner.92 The ceasefires have been thus seen as a pure weakness. Nevertheless, the government mostly under the pressure of the EU has implemented limited reforms toward the rights of Kurdish population that broaden the space for possible debate. Those reforms and the latest ‘opening’ in the Kurdish issue can be seen as slight gradual changes in the government’s behavior. It raises hopes about the termination of PKK’s insurgency; however, the final success of such initiative is conditioned upon many seemingly insurmountable factors (that will be discussed in the next chapter) so the optimism should not be overestimated. Another change of behavior can be seen in the shift of the battle-field from the southeast of Turkey to mainly Northern Iraqi territory.

The protracted nature of the conflict and the failure to its settlement is also caused by hostile attitudes, such as stereotyping, anger, fear or, suspicion, that has rooted between the parties. From the side of the Turkish government there is a strong prejudice against the legitimacy of the Kurdish identity rooted in the strong Turkish nationalism.93 Officially, the PKK is perceived as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world, trying to undermine Turkey’s effort to ensure economic and social wellbeing for its citizens.94 This mirrors the hardliner’s view which sees the Kurdish problem only as an issue of national security95 - the PKK is equated with a problem of terrorism and not as an indicator of deeper Kurdish problem. Although the liberal approach to the question has broken many taboos connected to Kurds in recent years, it is still too early to say whether it can outweigh the ingrained adversary mindset or not. The attitudes are intensely stereotyped – the PKK has been painted as the enemy to the state ever since the insurgency started. This perception seemed ideal since it provided justification for severe counter-measures. Stereotyping is also influenced by a high degree of mistrust prevailing between the parties. Any shift in PKK’s policy has always been envisaged as a mere cover-up. Another important factor is the government’s fear of image loss. The failure to combat the PKK is believed to induce weakness in front of the domestic public but also in the international scene, especially in the eyes of the U.S.

Kurds have perceived sensitively the intense far-reaching discrimination from the side of the government. The harsh counter-terrorist campaign conducted in the early years of the conflict has rooted widespread hostility among PKK members.96 The long-term suppression of Kurdish rights accompanied with economic marginalization has caused accumulation of anger and frustration. According to the basic needs approach the conflict often arises from the frustration and deprivation that emerges as a result of unmet needs.97 In this respect the situation where basic needs were not satisfied, naturally gave rise to the violent struggle.

The conflict is also influenced by a strong emotional factor. The security forces are labeled as behaving heroically.98 In the same vein, the PKK fighters killed in confrontation with the military are often painted as martyrs.99 In this situation it is very hard to change the attitude of the parties toward another. It can be therefore argued that despite changes in behavior, the attitudes of parties remain mostly unchanged.

The community in the conflict tends to polarize over time which means that “communities become fractured into two large camps, with positive relations among the people in each camp and negative relations between the camps”.100 It can be argued that as the conflict in Turkey intensified the society became increasingly polarized – the neutrality in the conflict was not an option101 because Ocalan demanded to choose between support of the PKK and the state. However, there are some difficulties when describing polarization. The first problem came with the support of the PKK. There is a discussion whether the group stands for the representation of the Kurdish attitudes in large. In light of the peculiar role of the pro-Kurdish political parties which have always acted as a spokesman for the PKK,102 we can assume that the PKK holds a strong support because many see no other alternative in the closed centralized system where the Kurdish voice is so limited. Yet, many Kurds are tired of over two-decades of long armed conflict and do not want the war any longer. Even Ocalan warned the newly formed Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) that was created after the closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) to distance themselves from the PKK.103 This corresponds to the strong support for Kurdish initiative within the society.104 There is also a rising discontent against the PKK terror rising from the neo-nationalist circles that perceive the PKK as a part of wider disintegration tendencies.105

The second problem is the doubted positive relations within the Kurdish camp, because most of the lives lost during the insurgency were paradoxically Kurdish.106 This fact is often used by the government to point at the hostile relationship between Kurds in the region and supports the claim that the PKK does not really represent the Kurds. In addition, we have to take into consideration the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe which stands for Kurds abroad.

Some authors argue that the conflict resulted into a psychological gap between Turks and Kurds,107 whereas other suggests that the ethnic boundaries remain quite open.108 We have to bear in mind that many Kurds become assimilated in the sense that they accepted Turkish identity.109 Kurds who successfully integrated into Turkish society (also called ‘occasional Kurds’) hold more moderate views and behave in legitimate opportunity spaces although there are many close to the PKK among the radical youth.110 A recent survey111 carried out to ascertain the public perception of the Kurdish situation interestingly disclosed that there may be a strong integration between Turks and Kurds. The study claims that there is no significant perception of enmity or hostile sentiment between those two communities as one would expect. On the contrary, the relations between Turks and Kurds seem generally positive. The survey states: “despite the political polemics, violence and terrorism that have been occupying the agenda of Turkey for many years, no enmity, hostility, distrust and social disintegration is occurring in Turkey”.112 However, it is needless to say that Turks and Kurds are still divided on political issues. The majority of Turks perceives that Kurds want a separate state which leads to the fear that the country could be divided along ethnic lines, whereas most of Kurds do not see the separation as an ultimate goal.113



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