1. MI5 copies go to G9, counter middle eastern terrorism, and G6, the international terrorism agent running section. The NDO is the MI5 night duty officer
2. '1807' is the time the telegram arrived on 04 Dec 95. The 'Z' stands for Zulu Time or Greenwich Meantime, as it is better known. I talked of this document long before this material appeared on the Internet. The following is from Secrets and lies, page 24, par 63, published in June 1999:
. In December 1995, MI6 circulated a CX report to Whitehall and the other agencies in which it reported intelligence of a potential coup in Libya. The report also detailed the requirements of the group in terms of equipment and weaponry. The name of the agent and the fact that he was involved in the plot were not made clear in the CX report as is usual in such cases. (If MI6 had not issued the report, it would have been criticised by those not privy to its role in the plot for failing to gather prior intelligence of it).
The equipment requirements are, I believe, further discussed in another more detailed CX report.
3. From London station of MI6, ie MI6 HQ at Vauxhall Cross
4. To the permanent under-secretary's department, telegram no. 185, ie the 185th telegram sent from LONDON to PUSD in 1995
5. Research department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6. MI5's name in Whitehall
7. The urgency of this telegram. It ranges from FLASH, the quickest, through IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY to the lowest, ROUTINE.
8. UK S E C R E T This material can only be seen by UK intelligence personnel. Information cannot be shared with a foreign power
DELICATE SOURCE This indicates that a sensitively placed human source was involved
UK EYES ALPHA Apart from being the title of a book about the services by Mark Urban, intelligence correspondence of the BBC, this indicates that only certain departments within the UK are allowed to see this kind of material
9. This is a code for a particular Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence requirement, like for example, 'Intelligence on internal unrest in Libya'
10. Permanent Under-Secretary's Department. This is the FCO's equivalent of Sir Humphrey Appleby's department. The PUSD is a very senior civil servant who advises the Secretary of State directly
11. Drugs International Crime and Terrorism Department of the FCO. Known to wags as the Crime, Undercover Narcotics and Terrorism Section, this department deals with security and crime issues affecting the foreign office. One of its principle tasks is to advise on the Lockerbie issue.
12. North east and North Africa Department. It is responsible for diplomatic relations, such as they've been, with Libya.
13. Research and Analysis Department - Middle East (an offshoot of the foreign office).
14. Defence Intelligence Staff, the department responsible for central intelligence assessments in the MoD.
15. Joint Intelligence Committee. This is where significant intelligence is collated, assessed and disseminated. The members of the committee include the heads of the intelligence agencies and personnel from departments likely to be affected by threats to the UK, ranging from other Civil Service departments to the Bank of England.
16. Government Communications Headquarters. Z10A2 is the head desk officer responsible for Libya.
17. These are MI6 posts abroad, known as 'CX stations'. Hence the MI6 office in Cairo is known as 'CX CAIRO'. The head of station is known as H/CAIRO. His subordinates are known as CAI/1, CAI/2 etc.
G9A5 Me, the co-ordinator of MI5's efforts against the Libyan target
G6A5 MI5 handler of Libyan agents
G6A3 MI5 handler of Libyan agents and one of the most capable officers I met in MI5.
19. CX is the name SIS gives to its intelligence reports. It calls MI5 and GCHQ reports 'FX'. 95/53452 is the unique reference number for this report. R/ME/C is the Libyan requirements officer in MI6. The system works like this: the agent TUNWORTH gives PT16/B, his agent runner (not mentioned in this report), the intelligence. PT16/B passes it to R/ME/C, who writes the report and disseminates it to Whitehall. GTN is the Government Telephone Network
20. I have seen the original of this report. I can confirm that the deletions cover material which might have helped identify TUNWORTH.
21. Names of high ranking Libyan officials who were involved in the plot. I believe they will have been removed to protect them from reprisals after this report entered the public domain
22. This is the period I referred to when I first disclosed details about the plot.
23. "The coup plotters would launch a direct attack on QADAHFI and would either arrest him or kill him." This is confirmation of information that I have already disclosed regarding the plot.
24. "The military officer said that the plotters would have cars similar to those in QADAHFI's security entourage with fake security number plates. They would infiltrate themselves into the entourage in order to kill or arrest QADAHFI." This confirms details that I have already disclosed about the plot.
25. I have disclosed that Sirte was the site of the attack on Qadhafi in February or March 1996. This has been stood up also by the Panorama investigation into the plot.
26. "One officer and 20 men were being trained especially for this attack." By this point, TUNWORTH had already met MI6 at least once. Were these officers already being trained with British money or by British personnel for the specific task of assassinating Qadhafi?
27. In August 1998, I disclosed that the group were linked to a rag tag group of Libyan Islamic extremists.
28. On Newsnight, Tom King, chair of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, tried to argue that because the plotters had already tried to assassinate Qadhafi and they already had weapons, it didn't matter that the government might have provided further supplies of ammunition. By this reasoning, any supplier of arms to, for example, the IRA could insist that his support didn't really matter just because the group already has weapons and explosives. It is not an argument which stands up in law.
29. This matches exactly the timing of the plot as I have related it.
30. "The officer was disclosing this information in the hope that if the coup was successful, the new government could enlist HMG support." This at least establishes the principle that the group of coup plotters were looking for support from the government.