Definition: Debates on immigration policies include a wide range of views, from those who think that any country may legitimately decide to admit or exclude immigrants as it pleases

A key reason some people become interested in learning more about migration is that they find themselves confronted with a compelling political and ethical question: to what extent is it legitimate for a country to close its borders to immigrants? Most people believe that a country has the right to prevent non-citizens from entering, and/or to determine whom to admit. A minority view holds that restrictive borders are illegitimate and unjust: migration is seen as a human right – particularly migration of the poor to the world’s wealthiest countries, given the vast inequalities that characterize our world.

In a context shaped by modern nationalism, the idea that countries have a right to exclude immigrants is taken for granted by many, as a matter of common sense (“England for the English”). This idea is, apparently, taken for granted in certain instances of political theory as well: John Rawls constructed “a theory of justice” (1971) without any reference to migration, and The Law of Peoples (1999) considers “peoples” as having fixed membership and conveys his view that even justice considered at a global level does not require accommodation for migration.

Arguments in support of migration restrictions often point to a wide range of negative consequences for natives. These consequences fall into two categories. The first is economic: immigrants from poor countries are said to undercut wages for native workers, to the point that employers prefer to hire immigrants and natives end up unemployed. In the US, an important variant of this argument focuses on racial dimensions of economic consequences: Beck (1996) argues that mass immigration, with roots in legislation passed during the Civil Rights period of the 1960s, has undercut attempts to redress the disadvantages faced by African Americans, whose presence in the US can be traced to a particularly cruel form of forced migration. Another variant considers the possibility that mass immigration undermines the social solidarity underpinning the advanced welfare states of western Europe (e.g. Entzinger 2007).

The second major consequence relates to culture and identity. Some natives believe that immigrants, particularly in large numbers, “dilute” or threaten the destination country’s culture and sense of identity (Glazer 1994). This concern is perhaps more keenly felt in an era where expectations of assimilation are arguably weaker. Walzer’s classic statement of the argument asserts that immigration restrictions are justifiable as a means for preserving “communal independence” and “communities of character” (1983: 62 – though he also says there are inescapable obligations to admit refugees). The self-determination rights of democratic nation-states would arguably be undermined if they were unable to exercise control over membership (Miller 2007). People are not mere individuals, they are embedded in cultures which in the modern period are typically constructed in part as nations; the nation-state might be essential not only for democracy as a process but for the (eventual?) realization of liberal egalitarian goals at least internally (Kymlicka 2001).

A notable feature of some restrictionist arguments is that they rest on the presumption that negative consequences for natives amount to a sufficient justification for immigration restrictions. In this perspective, the interests of natives count more than the interests of outsiders (if the latter count at all). This assumption – or at least the manner in which it is sometimes left implicit – is becoming increasingly untenable. A more cosmopolitan perspective on justice requires that the interests of potential migrants – indeed, of all “foreigners” – be given weight. A right of exclusion can no longer be assumed, it has to be argued (Booth 1997, Carens 1999). Some restrictionists do argue it: Blake (2002), for example, develops the view that we have lesser obligations to outsiders than to compatriots, because the former are not subject to the coercive power of our own state (cf. Nagel 2005). But for much public/political discourse on migration, the identification of negative consequences is the end of the argument.

For some, a cosmopolitan perspective leads directly and easily to the view that borders and immigration restrictions are artificial, arbitrary and unjust. The fact of being born in a particular country has enormous consequences for one’s life chances. One cannot “earn” the consequences of one’s place of birth, and the attempt of people living in wealthy countries to preserve their standard of living by excluding immigrants originating in poor countries cannot be justified, in this view (Isbister 1996). In a watershed article, Carens (1987) argues that a Rawlsian perspective, in search of the choices people would make under the “veil of ignorance” (i.e., without knowing in advance what the consequences would be for oneself), leads to the conclusion that individuals would choose to live in a world of open borders: not being able to count on birth in a wealthy country, people would prefer opportunities for mobility for themselves over the right to exclude others. Liberal societies, in particular, cannot endorse liberal ideals for their own citizens and then hold that those ideals are irrelevant when considering the interests of “outsiders” (though Meilaender [1999] suggests that this argument might have nothing useful to say about immigration restrictions of societies that do not start from liberal premises).

Other open-borders arguments focus less on the interests of migrants than on the idea that there is a fundamental human right to free mobility (e.g. Sutcliffe 1998, Hayter 2000). Some draw an analogy between internal freedom of movement and (external) immigration, though Bader (2005) argues that this analogy is not very convincing. Others simply dispute the notion the consequences for natives are mostly negative, holding that receiving societies benefit from the fact that those who choose to migrate typically have high levels of initiative and ambition (Riley 2008, Legrain 2007). In addition, efforts to control migration are very costly (Martin 2003), not only economically but in the way they generate tensions and feelings of insecurity as well as the inevitable “illegality” of unauthorized immigration (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2006, Wihtol de Wenden 2007).

The normative terms of debates regarding immigration restrictions are not always well specified. The implicit philosophical orientation of most ethical discussions about migration is “consequentialist” (though some arguments about culture are rooted more in “perfectionism”) – but what kinds of consequences matter? Many contributors emphasize economic and cultural consequences, as noted above, but here as well a great deal is assumed instead of argued. Why do economics and culture figure so prominently? An easy answer is: because most people consider them important. But the question bears pressing: why?

An intriguing argument emerges from the possibility that economic (and perhaps other “objective”) factors are not intrinsically valuable but are only means towards the more fundamental end of happiness (“subjective well-being”). The empirical study of happiness suggests strongly that increases in income do not reliably lead to increases in happiness (e.g. Easterlin 2001). Perhaps, then, economic migration does not generally result in greater happiness for the migrants (Bartram 2010). The widespread belief that migration is beneficial might be mistaken, if the benefit is specified as happiness. There is no shortage of mistaken beliefs about paths to happiness (Gilbert 2006).

Does that possibility undercut the open borders view? Perhaps, to a degree – though care is required here. One can hardly argue that immigration restrictions contribute to the well-being of those who are excluded; the paternalism of such a conclusion would be absurd. Even if some migrants have mistaken beliefs about life in the destination country, perhaps a proper conception of freedom includes the freedom to make mistakes (in the course of trying to make things better). Additionally, a great many migrants have non-economic reasons for choosing migration, and there would be no practicable bureaucratic way of distinguishing between different types in admissions decisions. Even so, a consideration of migration and happiness suggests that the open borders view might entail excessive optimism about the notion that migration can lead to greater happiness in the lives of significant numbers of people. Improvement in objective well-being might be a more reliable consequence of migration to a wealthy country, but it is not obvious how to value objective vs. subjective outcomes.

Even on objective measures, the impact of open borders might be limited and poorly distributed, with the benefits going mainly to people whose relative position is quite good in comparison to those who would still lack the resources to move (Bader 2005). Migration might also be an inferior strategy for addressing the problems that lead some people to choose migration (Seglow 2005, Carens 1992).

In practice, states adopt immigration policies that occupy a diverse middle ground between open borders and complete closure. Borders and restrictions are regularly breached and regularly reinforced, and no wealthy country tries or even wants to exclude immigrants altogether. A sharp review of the literature (Bader 2005) notes that arguments for closure become convincing only when receiving countries are otherwise meeting their “global moral obligations” – a condition that is by no means satisfied to a measure that justifies existing restrictions (cf. Tan 2004). It is not obvious that debates about the ethics of migration restrictions have a significant impact on the evolution of policies. Politicians negotiate a balance (different for different countries) between the desire of many voters for greater closure (though some significant subgroups oppose this) and the demands of employers for greater openness. Mostly the relevant decision-makers pay attention only to the interests of domestic actors, though the cosmopolitan idea has found increasing expression in court rulings and international institutions.

References

Bader, Veit (2005) 'The Ethics of Immigration', Constellations 12: 331-61.

Bartram, David (2010) 'International migration, open borders debates, and happiness', International Studies Review 12: 339-61.

Beck, Roy (1996) The case against immigration: the moral, economic, social and environmental reasons for reducing U.S. immigration back to traditional levels, New York: Norton.

Blake, Michael (2002) 'Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy', Philosophy & Public Affairs 30: 257-96.

Booth, W. J. (1997) 'Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders and the Ethics of Membership', Review of Politics 59: 259-92.

Carens, Joseph H. (1987) 'Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders', Review of Politics 49: 251-73.

Carens, Joseph H. (1992) 'Migration and morality: a liberal egalitarian perspective', in Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin (eds), Free movement: ethical issues in the transnational migration of people and of money, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 25-47.

Carens, Joseph H. (1999) 'A Reply to Meilander: Reconsidering Open Borders', International Migration Review 33: 1082-97.

Easterlin, Richard A. (2001) 'Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory', The Economic Journal 111: 465-84.

Entzinger, Han (2007) 'Open borders and the welfare state', in Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (eds), Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People, Paris/New York: UNESCO Publishing/Berghahn Books, pp.

Gilbert, Daniel (2006) Stumbling on Happiness, New York: HarperCollins.

Glazer, Nathan (1994) 'The closing door', in Nicolaus Mills (ed.), Arguing immigration: are new immigrants a wealth of diversity ... or a crushing burden, New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 37-47.

Hayter, Teresa (2000) Open borders: the case against immigration controls, London: Pluto Press.

Kymlicka, Will (2001) 'Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective', in David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi (eds), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 249-75.

Legrain, Philippe (2007) Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them, New York: Little Brown.

Martin, Philip L. (2003) Bordering on Control: Combating Irregular Migration in North America and Europe, Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Meilaender, Peter C. (1999) 'Liberalism and Open Borders: The Argument of Joseph Carens', International Migration Review 33: 1062-81.

Miller, David (2007) National responsibility and global justice Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, Thomas (2005) 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs 33: 113-47.

Pécoud, Antoine and De Guchteneire, Paul (2006) 'International migration, border controls, and human rights: assessing the relevance of a right to mobility', Journal of Borderland Studies 21: 69-86.

Rawls, John (1971) A theory of justice, Cambridge: Belknap Press.

Rawls, John (1999) The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Riley, Jason L. (2008) Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders, New York: Gotham Books.

Seglow, Jonathan (2005) 'The Ethics of Immigration', Political Studies Review 3: 317-34.

Sutcliffe, Bob (1998) 'Freedom to move in the age of globalization', in Dean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin (eds), Globalization and progressive economic policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 325-36.

Tan, Kok-Chor (2004) Justice without borders: cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and patriotism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality, New York: Basic Books.