Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

Santaraksita first establishes the Jainistic view on the nature of reality. He says that according to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. Universal and Particular. Just as different colours can exist in a lustous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.35

We find two kinds of existence in an entity, viz. existence of own nature (Svarupastiva) and existence of the similar nature of others (Sadrasyastitva). The former tries to separate the similar (sajatiya) and dissimilar (vijatiya) substances and indicates their independence. This is called Vertical Universal (urdhvatasamanya), which represents unity (anugatapratyaya) in pluralitv of different conditions (vyavrttapratyaya) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called urdhvatasamanya.36 Sadisyastitva, the so-called Tiryaksamanya (horizontal), represents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class.37 The word cow is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the same class, because of similarity.38 Likewise, Visesa is also of two kinds, Paryaya and Vyatireka. The former distinguishes the two modes of same entity, while the latter makes a distincition between the two separate entities.

Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularzed (samanya-visesatmaka) along with substance with modes (dravyaparyayatmaka). Here dravya represents the universal character and paryaya represents the particular character of a thing. The adjective Samanya-visesatmaka indicates the apprehension of Tiryaksamanyatmaka and Vyatirekasamanyatmaka, while Dravyaparyayatmaka points out the urdhvatasamanyatmaka and Paryayavisesatmaka character of a reality. Though the qualily of samanyavisesatmaka is included in the dravyaparyayatmaka, its separate use indicates that no entity is beyond the limitation of dravyaparyayatmakatva of utpadaryayadhrauvyatmakatva. While Samanyavisesatmaka indicates the character of reality, the dravyaparyayatmaka shows its dynamic nature. Thus in Jainism an entity is of a dual nature. Both these types of samanya have been dealt with by Santaraksita, Karnakagomin and Arcata. They take the traditional example of a jar (ghata) made of gold which can be changed into several modes, while preserving gold as a permament substance.39

Another example has been given by Buddhist philosophers on behalf of Jainas. They say that the identical-in-difference (bhedabheda) between the substance and the modes is accepted by the Anhrikas as the nature of reality.40 When a substance is spoken of as one, it is with reference to space, time and nature; when it is spoken of as different, it is with reference to number, character, name and function. For instance, when we speak of a jar and its colour and its other attributes, there is difference of number, and name; there is also also a difference of nature, inasmuch as an inclusiveness or comprehensiveness is the nature of the substance of the jar, while exclusiveness or distributiveness is the nature of successive factors in the form of colour and so forth. There is also a difference of function; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different. Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors.41

Kamalasila explains the Jaina view as to why it stresses on the universal-cum-particular character. He says, as the Jainas assert: "If the above doctrine is to be denied, all things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower (i. e. sky-flower is a thing that does not exist at all-hence an absurdity (akasa-kusuma)). Like-wise a thing that is always differentiated from all other things, can have no other state save that of the sky-flower. Consequently, the general character in shape of universal entity, has to be admitted.42

Kamalsial further explains the Jaina conception of the particular characters of an entity. He says that if the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of this is jar, that is cloth, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality.43

As the Buddhist do not admit the universal character of an entity, the Jainas endeavour to convince them that the universal character is merged in the particular character of an entity. They set forth the argument that if any entity is not similar to other things, it ceases to be entity. For, that which is excluded from an entity, could have no position, but non-existence, as in the case of a sky-flower.44

In support of the aforesaid view, another argument is presented, on behalf of the Jainas, that is, if an entity were not similar to or different from every other entity, how then is it possible that the common idea of "being an entity" is found to appear only in connection with the jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth. It is so because the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in their natures. Though, according to Jainism, all things in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required "commonality. This is also called the Niyatavrtti. Without accepting this limitation anything could be transformed into any-thing else.

Later the Jainas dealt with the difference among things. They say that if a jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to those other things, then there being no difference between them, the jar could not be anything different from those things. This would involve a self-contradiction. When one is ready to accept some sort of difference among things, he has also to accept dissimilarity as a particular character.46

Thus according to the Jainas' view, like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects. Of these, some are apprehended by inclusive notion,s and others by exclusive notions. Those that are apprehended by inclusive, and hence spoken of as Common, while others, which are apprehended by exclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be Particular. The inclusive notion appears in the non-distinctive form of "This is an Entity", while the exclusive appears in the distinctive form "this is jar, not cloth".

Vastvekatmakamevedamanekakaramisyate.

Te canuvrttivyavrttibuddhigrahyataya sthitah.

Adya ete' nuvrttatvatsamanyamiti kirtitah.

Visesastvabhidhiyante vyavrttatvattato `pare.47

The nature of an entity is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyaylikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation (samavaya sambandha). Conjunction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. Samavaya is said to be eternal, (nitya), one (eka) and all-pervasive (sarvavyapaka).48

The Vedantins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyayikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of relations. A relation, according to Dharmakirti, is a conceptual fiction (sambandhah kalpanakrtah), like universal, and hence it is unreal. He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (paratantrya sambandha) and interpenetration (rupaslesa sambandha).50

On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyayikas and the extreme illusionism or idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely an inferable but also an indubitaly perceptual fact. WIthout recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atams would be existing unconnected.51

As regards nayabhasa, the Nyaya-Vaisesika systems are called in Naigamabhasa, as they hold the absolute distincition in the characters of a thing. The Sankhya and the Advaita schools are enumerated under the Sangrahabhasa, the Carvaka under the Vyavharnayabhasa, the Buddhist conception of Ksanabhangavada in the Rjusutranayabhasa, the Samabhirudhanayabhasa and so on.

Pali literature indicates some of the characteristics of Nayavada, The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kalamas. The ten (i) anussavena, (ii) paramparaya, (iii) itikiraya, (iv) pitakasampadaya (v) bhavyarupataya (vi) samano na guru, (vii) takkihetu, (viii) nayahetu, (ix) akaraparivitakkena, and (x) ditthinijjhanakkhantiya.58 Out of these, the eighth way, viz. Nayahetu is more important for our study. Here Naya is a method of statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgment.59 The Jataka says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint.60 In about the same meaning. Naya is used in Jaina philosophy, as we have already seen. This Nayahetu of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jaina influence of Naya, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of Saccas, viz. Sammutisacca and the Paramatthasacca,61 which are used in about the same sense as Paryayarthikanaya and Dravyarthikanaya or Vyavaharanaya and Niscayanaya. The words Sunaya and Dunnaya are also found in Buddhism used in identical way.62

The Suttanipata indicates that the Sammutisacca was accepted as a common theory of Recluses and the Brahamanas,63 and the Paramatthasacca was treated as the highest goal.64 These two Saccas are characterised as Nitattha (having a a direct meaning) and Neyyattha (having an indirect meaning).65 The Commentary on the Anguttara Nikaya says that there is no third truth (tatiyam n'upalabbhti). Sammuti (conventional statement) is true because of convention and Paramattha is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realties :

Duve saccani akkhasi Sambuddho vadatam varo.

Sammutim paramatthanca tatiyam n' upalabbhati.

Paramatthavavanam saccam dhammanam tathalakkhanam.66

On the other hand, it is also said that there is only one truth, not second (ekam hi saccam na dutiyamatthi).67 This contradictory statement appears to give the impression that even in Buddhism the nature of things is considered through some sort of relativistic standpoint which is similar to the theory of Nayavada of Jainism,

Buddhlsm was aware of the conception of the Nayavada of Jainism, since the Anguttara Nikaya refers to the several Paccekasaccas (individual truths) of the several recluses and Brahmanas. If it is so, the conception of Paccekasacca (Partial truth) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the Nayavada of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism.

We have observed in our discussion on Nayavada that it is not an absolute means of knowing the nature of relaity. The further examination of truth is attempted by the theory oi Condtional Dialecitc or Syadvada. The Nayavada is analytical in character, while the Syadvada is a synthetical in metho. The latter investigates the various standpoints of th truth made possible by naya and integrates them into a constent and comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta describes the relation between these two methods as follows: "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is, therefore, this, that for any judgement according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by Syadvada..69"

The prefix Syat in the Syadvada represents the existence of those characters which, though not perceived at the moment, are present in reality (nirdisyamanadharmavyatirikta' sesadharmantarasamsucakena Syat yukto vado bhipretadharma-vacanam Syadvadah). Syadvada reveals the certainty regarding any problem and not merely the possibility or probability. It is a unique contribution of Jainism of Indian Philosophy. Syadvadin is a popular appellation given by later philosophers to Jainas. Dharmakirti, Arcata and Santaraksita used this term for the Jainas in their respective works.

Syat is generally rendered into English as "may be" or "perhaps" which is far from appropriate. As a matter of fact, there is no appropriate word for Syat in English, but we can translate it with the term relatively which is closer and more suitable to convey the significance of the theory. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of relatively as "having mutual relations, corresponding in some way, related to each other".70 H,G.A.71 Van Zeyst writes: "When a function indicates some difinite relationship in which the object stands to some other object, the term must be described as "relative". There is a word Kathancit in Sanskrit literature which is used as a substitute for Syat by Jaina as well as non-Jaina philosophers. These connotations tally with the inner meaning of Syat.

Further Syadvada makes an effort to respect other doctrines by warning us against allowing the use of eva or only to proceed beyond its prescribed limits and penetrates the truth patiently and non-voilently. The uniqueness of Syadvada as the most peaceful and non-violent means of arriving at the Truth through argumentation is emphasised by Tatiya in his assessmetn of Syadvada in Jaina Philosophy: "It is the attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsibel for the origin of the doctrine of non-absolutlsm (anekantavada). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. OUt of cautiousnes of speech was born the habit of explaining a problem with the help of Siyavaya (syadvada) or Vibhajjavaya. This habit again developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality."72

It would be helpful to remember that the nature of reality is determined in Jainism by refering to the dravya (matter), Ksetra (place), kala (time) and bhava (state). This is the positive factor. The negative factor is that of refering to the negative counterpart (nisedha-pratimukha) or a particular object such as the absence of ghatatva (jarness) in cloth and vice versa. This negative factor constitutes the full-fledged nature of the Jar as the positive one.

According to the conception of Syadvada, both identity and difference must exist in reality. But opponents categorically deny this claim on the ground that a dual character can never exist in an entity. The critics of Syadvada object to it on the basis that Syadvada gives rise to the following erroneous results73 : (i) Virodha or self-contradiction, like hot and cold, (ii) Vaiyadhikaranya or absence of a common abode, (iii) Anavastha or regressus ad infinitum, (iv) Sankara or confusion, (v) Vyatikara or exchange of natures, (vi) Samsaya or doubt, (vii) Apratipatti or non-apprehension, and (viii) Uvayadosa or fallacies on both sides. Out of these defects Virodhadosa is considered by them to be the most glaring. The Jainas do not accept that there is any self-contradiction in Syadvada. They put forth three possible forms in which virodha can occur :

(i) Vadhyaghatakabhava or destructive opposition, like mongoose (nakula) and the serpent (ahi).

(ii) Sahanavasthanabhava or the non-congruent opposition, like syama and pita in a ripe mango.

(iii) Pratibadhyapratibandhakabhava or the obstructive opposition, like the moonstone which protects the sun's rays. And they maintain that these forms of virodhas cannot effect their theories of reality. They also say that an entity is anantadharmatmaka (having innumerable characters) which cannot be perceived at once by ordinary men until and unless, we conceive the problem through negative and positive aspects (bhavabhavatmakatattvena), identity-in-difference (bhedabhedena) eternality-in-non-eternality (nityanityatmakena), universal-cum-particular elements (samanyavisesatmakena), or substance-in-modes (dravyaparyayatmakena). Each and everything is related to the four-fold nature of itself (svadrayacatustaya) and is not related to the fourfold nature of the other-than-itself (paradravyacatustaya). For instance, the jar is the jar in itself, but it is not the jar in relation to others, as cloth, fruit, etc. No one can deny this dual characteristic of a thing, otherwise its negative aspects or non-existing characteristics would disappear and their modes would commingle.74

According to the Jainas, the non-existences (abhavas) are of four kinds, viz. Pragabhava, Pradhvamsabhava, Itaretarabhava and Anyonyabhava.

(i) Pragabhava means the non-existence of an effect in the cause.75 The substance is eternal which can neither be newly created nor completely destroyed.76 The effect accordingly does not exist before its own existence, which is a result of causes. The substance in itself is an effect and the modes are the causes. That means the pre-modes are the pragabhava of post-modes. The clay or the curd is the Pragabhava of jar (ghata) and butter (ghrta). If this previous negation were not there, the product clay or curd would always exist in their effects jar or butter.

(ii) Pradhvamsabhavr means the non-existence of an effect after destruction.77 Pragabhava is the Nimitta (determining cause). The first destroys then the other originates. If this negation were not in an entity, milk would still be there in curd.

(iii) Itaretarabhava or Anyonyabhava means mutual non-existence. Each entity exists in its nature which cannot be transferred to others. The cow cannot possess the form of the horse.78 If this mutual negation were not in entities, the horse would become every other thing.

(iv) Atyantabhava means the absolute non-existence of an entity. As for instance, the sky-flower (akasa-kusuma) or Sasa-visana (horns to the hares), which have no existence at all.79

On the basis of above exposition, the Jainas endeavour to answer the objections raised by opponents through the different aspects of the nature of reality. They are dealt with below :
The Identity-in-difference (bhedabhedatmaka)

The identity-in-differnece is the main figure which guards the Jaina standpoint against the attacks of opponents. The exposition of this central idea has been a necessary talk to the Jaina Acaryas. They postulate a theory that a substance is neither absolutely different than other things, nor absolutely alike. Otherwise how could the quality (guna) and qualified (guni) be distinguished ?

An entity is charactersied by birth (utpada), death (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya). All entities are included in this definition. Sat or substance is abheda and gunas are bheda. Apart from gunas or paryayas, there is no existence. There-fore, reality is called the identity-in-difference.
Eternal-cum-non-eternal aspects (nityanitatmaka)

In the same way the substance can be nither absolutely eternal nor absolutely non-eternal, but it is eternal-cum-non-eternal. If we do not accept this, causal efficiency (arthakriya) would not be possible with an entity and all the transaction would fail due to the static or perpetual fluxive character of thing. Pre-existence would be dis-connected with the post-existence. How then could the doer and enjoyer be recognized ?

Likewise, reality is universalized-cum-particularised, one-cum-innumerable, etc. from real and practical standpoints. There is no self-contradiction in this recognition, since the nature of reality is conceived relatively.
Saptabhangi or a theory of Sevenfold prediction

Saptabhangi or the theory of sevenfold predication is a method of cognition to apprehend the correct nature of reality-through a sevenfold relativist dialectic method. It is treated as complementary to the Syadvada doctrine. Akalanka thinks of it as a way which considers the modes of a thing in a positive (vidhimukhena) and negative (nisedhamukhena) manner without incompatibility in a certain context. The sevenfold predications are as follows :