Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

(i) syadasti or relatively it is.

(ii) syannasti or relatively it is not.

(iii) syadasti nasti or relatively it is and is not.

(iv) syadavaktavya or relatively is is inexpressible.

(v) syadastyavaktavya or relatively it is and is inexpressible.

(vi) syannastyavaktavya or relatively it is not and is inexpressible.

(vii) syadastinastyavaktavya or it is, is not, and is inexpressible.

Here the radical modes of predication are only three in number-syadasti, spayannasti and syadavaktavya which contruct other predications by combining themselves. The first two modes represent the affirmative or being (astitva), and the negative or non-being (nastitiva) characters of an entity. The third is a combination of both being and non-being. The fourth is inexpressible in its predicate. The remaining three modes are the combined forms of the first, second, and the third. The first two and the fourth predications are consequently the assertions of simple judgments, and the remaining four of complex judgments. According to the mathematical formula, the three fundamental predications make seven modes and not more than that.

The first mode represents the existence of the jar (ghata) and the non-existence of cloth (pata) in the jar. The second predication shows the negative aspect of jar that it does not exist as cloth or anything else. There is no contradication here, since the predication asserts the relative and determinate abstraction. The third mode offers a successive presentation (kramarpana) of negative and positive aspects of an entity, while the fourth one offers a simultaneous presentation (saharpana) of the two concepts. According to Jaina conception, one word represents one meaning. The relation between a word and its meaning is described by Jainas as Vacyavacakaniyama. The characters of being and non-being in the jar cannot be expressed at once (yugapat). Therefore this predication is designated as inexpressible (avaktavya). The remaining are the combined modes derived from bringing together the first, second and the third with the fourth one, which express the complex judgments.

Each of these modes contains one alternative truth while altogether contain the complete truth. Observing the importance of this method Padmarajiah says : "The whole mehtod, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions or reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge."80
Syadvada conception in Buddhist literature

The rudiments of the Syadvada conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of Syadvada are found in the different philosophical shcools.

Vedic literature records negative and positive attitudes towards problems. The Rgveda which is supposed to be of the earliest period, preserves the rudiments of this doctrine in the Nasadiya Sukta. It manifests the spiritual experience, of the great sage, who describes the nature of the universe as :

Nasadasinno sadasit tadanim nasidrajo no vyomaparo yat. Kimabaribah kuha kasya sarmannambhah kimasidgahanam gabhiram. Na mrtyurasidamrtam na tarhi na ratrya abhna asit praketah. Anidavatam svadhaya tadekam tasmaddhanyanna parah kim canasa.

"There was not the non-existent nor the existent : there was not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it contain ? where ? In whose protection ? Was there water, unfathomable, profound ? There was not the becon of night, nor of day. That one breathed, windness by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond".81 This indicates inexpressibility (anirvacaniyatva) about the nature of the universe.

The Upanisadic period presents this speculation in a more concrete form by taking positive steps. The Chandogyopanisad82 represents the idea that Being (sat) is the ultimate source of existence, while some Upanisads uphold the view that Non-being is the source of Being (asad va idamagra asit. tato vai sat ajayato).⁸³ On the other hand, some Upanisads assert that it is both, Being and Non-being (sadasadavarenyam),⁸⁴ and some later Upanisads maintain that Non-being cannot be expressed by using a particular name and form ( asad avyakrta namarupam ).⁸⁵

Thus the concept or Syadvada found in Vedic literature commences from polytheism and goes on to monotheism and is later replaced by monism. This indicates that the theory was not rigid. The later developed Vedic philosophical systems were also influenced by this idea and they concived the problems from different standpoints with the exception of that of complete relativism.

The Naiyayikas,⁸⁶ though they used the word anekanta,⁸⁷ could not support the Anekantavada entirely and they accepted the atoms, soul, etc. as having absolute unchangeable characters. The Vedanta philosophical attitude also runs on the same lines. Even considering a thing through empirical ( vyavaharika ) and real ( paramarthika ) standpoints, it asserts that all standpoints are inferior to the standpoint of Brahman.⁸⁸

The Syadvada conception is found in a more developed form in Buddhist literature. The Brahmajalasutta refers to sixty-two Wrong-views ( micchaditthis ) of which four belong to the Sceptics. They are known as Amaravikkhepika (who being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and eelwriggling) on four grounds.⁸⁹ The Commentary of the Dighanikaya present its two alternative explanations. According to first, Amaravikkhepika are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives meaning that like a fish named amara, the theory of Amaravikkhepika runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.⁹⁰

The first of these schools is defined thus: "Herein a certain recluse or brahmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good (kusalam) or this is evil (akusalam). It occurs to him: I do not understand what is good or veil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments,it would be wrong. And if I wete wrong, It would cause me worry (vighato) and worry would be a moral danger to me (antarayo). Thus, through feat of lying (musavadabhaya), and the abhorrence of being lying, he does not assert anything to be good or ebil and on verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say, "no no"). ⁹¹

According to this school, it is inpossible to achieve knowledge which is a hinderance to heavan or salvation (Saggassa c'eva maggassa ca antarayo). ⁹² The second and the third school of sciotics do not assert anything to be good or evil through feat of involvement (upadanabhaya) and a fear of interrogation in debate (anuyogabgaya).

The fourth school of Sceptics followed the philosophy of Sanhaya Belatthiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question tut to him. His foutfold scheme or the five-fold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which ate as follows: ⁹³

(i) evam pi me no (I do not say so).

(ii) tathapi me no (I do not say thus).

(iii) annathapi me no (i do not say otherwise).

(iv) no ti pi me no (I do not say no).

(v) no no ti pi me no (I do not deny it).

This formula is applied with regard to the answering of several questions as : ⁹⁴

(i) atthi paro loki (there is another world).

(ii) antthe paro koko (there is not another world).

(iii) atthi ca natthi ca paro loko (there is and is not another world).

(iv) Natthi na natthi paro loko (there is not another world).

The commentaty offers two explanations of the meaning of this formula. According to the first explanation, proposition (1) is an indefinite rejection or denial (aniyamitavikkhepo). Prorposition (2) is the denial of a specific proposition, e.g. the eternalism (sassatavada) when asked whether the world and the soul are eternal. Proposition (3) is the denial of a variant of (3) e.g. the rejection of the semi-eternal theory (ekaccasassatam), which is said to be somewthat diggerent from (annatha). Proposition (4) is the denial of the contrary of (2) e.g. the denial of the nitilist theory (ucchedavadam) when asked whether a being (tathagato) does not exist after death. Proposition (5) is the rejection of the dialectian's view (takkivadam) of a double denial. e. g. denying the position if asked whether a being neither exists nor does not exist after death.

According to the second explanation, Proposition (1) is the denial of an assertion e.g. if asked whether this is good, fh denies it. Proposition (2) is the denial of a simple negation, e.g. it asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what uou are stating is different from both (1) and (2) (ubhaya annatha) he denies it.Proposition (4) is a denial that uou are stationg a point of view defferent from the above e.g. it asked whether his thesis (laddhi) is different from the three eaflier points of view (tividhena pi na hoti), he denies, it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e.g. if asked whether his thesis is to deny everything (no no te ladhhi ti) he denies it. Thus he does not take his stand (na titthati) on any of the lpgical alternatives (ekasmim pi pakkhe).

Both these explanations show that the fifth proposition of Sanjaya's philositions of the theory remain. They can be compared with the first fout predications of the Syadvada theory of Jainas:

(i) Syadasti (relatively it is).

(ii) Syannasti (relatively it is not).

(iii) Syadasti nasti (relatively it is and is not).

(iv) Syadavaktavya (relatively it is inexpressible).

Observing this similarity, several scholars like Keith 96 are ready to give the credit to Sanhaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logca problems. On the other hand, some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of sanjaya, Mahavira has established Syadvada. Miyamoto asserts in his article "The Logic of Reality as the Common Ground for the development of the Middle Way" that Sanjaya's" system is quite close to the Buddhist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible."⁹⁷

These views ate not quite correct. As a matter of tact, the credit should not go only to Sanjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Silanka referred to four groups of such schools Kriyavadins. Akriyavadins, Ajnanavadins, and Vaineyikas. These are further sub-divided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (nava padarthas) of Jainism. ⁹⁸ These schools were mainly concerned with four quesitions. They areas foolws:

(i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psychological states? (Sati bhavotpattih ko vetti)?

(ii) Whp known whether there is no arising of psychological states? (Asati bhavotpattih ko vettih).

(iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no atising of psychological states? (Sadasati bhavotpattih ko vettih)?

(iv) Who knows whether the arising of psycholotical states is inexpressible? (Avaktavyo bhavotpattih ko vettih)?

These questions are similar to first four Syadvada predications. The main difference between the Predications of Sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they ate true to a certain extent,

Makkhali Gasala and Syadvada

Makkhal Gosala, the founder of the Ajivika sect and an earlier companion of Nigantha Nataputta, has contributed to the development of the Syadvada conception. He considered problems thrugh the three-fold standpoints, called Tritasis, ⁹⁹ a short version of sapta-bhangi.

On the basis of the Nandisutra commentary, Basham observes: "The Ajivika heretics founded by Gosala are likewise called Trairasikas, since they declare everytimg to be of triple character, viz. : liviing, not living, and both living and not living: world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreat, and both rreal and unreal, in considering standpoints (naya) regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus since they maintain three heaps (rasi) or categories they are called Traitaiskas". Further he says "the Ajivikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principal of Jaina epistemologi, as in the orthodox Jaina Syadvada and nayavada. "¹⁰⁰

This reference indicates that the Ajivikas were aware of the Saptabhangi of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilleka remarks on this reference: "But Judged by the fact that the three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the Sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven- fold schene of the Jainas, it would appeat to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jain schemes, with which the Ajivikas could not bave been acquainted when they evolved theirs," Further he says, "In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and jaina tests the very doctrine of the Trairasikas, which seems to have necessitated the three-fold scheme, is mentioned, thus making it highly probable that it was atleast earlier than the Jain scheme". He accounts for this view by saying that "while the earliest stratum of the Pali Nikayas knows of the four-fold scheme, one of the earliest Books of the Jain canon, the Sutrakkrtanga, which makes an independent reference to this Trairasika doctrine, does not mention the seven-fold scheme, although it is aware of the basic principles of Syadvada.¹⁰¹

Here Jayatilleke tries to prove that that thtee-fold schame appears to be earlier than the jaina scheme. He gives a reason in support of his view that the Satrakrtanga does not mention the Seven-fold scheme. I too hold the thtee-fold scheme. Dighanakha pribrajaka, who seems to be a follower of the parsvanatha tradition, also maintains, as we have already found, this scheme.

As regards the absence of the refernce in the Sutrakrtanga, it should be remenbered that it is not totally unaware of the basic princioles of Syadvada, as Jayatilleke himselg accepts. It is said that "the wise nan should not joke or explain without conditional propositions."¹⁰² He should "expound the analytical theory (vibhajjavayaym ca vyagrejja) and use the two Kinds of speech, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise. 103 Gurther it does not deal with the Jaina philosophy. It is a concise compilation of the Jaina doctrines as well as oters of that time. It was, therefore, not essential to deal with Syadvada in detail. Kundakunda, who flourished in the first century B.c.or in the beginning of the Christian ere, described to the Saptabhangi, himselg in the Pancastikayasara, He says that "Dravya can be described by the seven-fold predication: (1) siya atthi or syadasti, (ii) siya naya nathi, or syannasti, (iii) siya uhayam or syadastimasti, (iv) siya-avvattavva or syadvvaktavya (v) siya atthi avvatavua or syadastyavaktavya, (vi) siya atthi natthi avvattavva or Syadstinastyavaktavaya, amd (vii) siya atthi natthi avvattavva or Syadstinastyavakktavaya:

Siya atthi antthi uhayam avvattavvam puno ya tattadayam.

Davvam khu satta bhangam adesavasena sambhavadi. ¹⁰⁴

This means that the Syadvada and its predications were well known at the time of the Buddha, and upto the time of Kundakunda they were developed still further.

This Buddhe and Syadvada

During the Buddha's time there were certain philosophical points which became the subjects of violent debate. Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyist, like the Jainas. ¹⁰⁵ In the Dighanikaya the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his (anekamsika) assertions. =106 The thory of Four-Noble-Truths is an example of the former, and the theory of Avyakatas is of the latter.

Here the term ekamsika and anekamsika are very similar to ekantavada and anekantavada. The former is concerned with the non-Jaina philosophies and the latter with the Jaina philosophy. The differemce between the Buddha's and Nigantha Natputta's standpoints is that according to the former's conception the non-categorical assertions are not true or false, from some standpoint or another, unless we analyse them; while the latter upholds the view that all the statements are relatively (syat) correct,i.e.they contain some aspect of the truth. The theory of avyakata dose not consist of any such quality.

The buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as outlined below:

(1) atthi (it is).

(ii) nattha (it is not).

(iii) atthe ca natthi ca (it is and it is not). and

(iv) n've' atthi na ca natthi (it neither is, nor is not).

This four-fold scheme has been used in several places of the Pali Canon. For instance:

(i) Channam phassayatananam asesaviraganirodha atth'annam, kinci ti? (is there anything else after complete detachment from and cessation of the six spheres of experience?).

(ii) Channam...natth'annam kinci ti?

(iii) Channam...atthi ca n'athi c'annam kinci ti?

(iv) Channam...n'ev' atthi na n'atth'annam kinci ti?

Miyamoto observes that the seven-fold scheme of the jainas is equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner:

(i) Syadasti =I

(ii) Syannasti =II

(iii) Syadastionasti =III

(iv) Syadavaktavya

(v) Syadastyavaktavya

(vi) Syannastyavaktavua =IV

(vii) Syadastinastyavaktavya

But this obsrvation is not perfectly right, since the jainas pondered over the prblems nore profoundly than the Buddhists. It woule be more appropriate it we think of the first four propositions of th Buddhists, But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina scheme, all the seven prpopsitions could be true from relative standpoints, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true the propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism.

It is nore probable that the Buddha's Catuskoti formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sanjaya, although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of the Jainas. Such formylas, it must be remenbered, were commonly accpted at that time by teachers with differaent attitudes.

Nigantha Nataputta and Syadvada in pali Literature

The pali Canon considers Anekantavada or Syadvada a combination of bothe Uccedavada and Sassatavada. As we have already mentioned, Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigantha Nataputta presented his views in contradictory ways. ¹⁰⁸ We have seen how this was due to the fact that Buddhaghosa could not understand the real nature of Syadvada.

We know that Jaina Philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism not absolute nihilism, but erernalismcum- nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding Sassatavada and Uccedavada, there are no explict references to Syadvada in the pali Canon. The absence of direct references does not mean that the Syadvada conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nataputta at that time. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of Syadvada, which might have belonged to the tradition of Parsvanatha.

In the course of a discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Parsvanatha tradition and converted later to the Nataputta's religion, that his former statement is not keeping with the latter, nor the latter with the former (na kho te sandhiyati purimena pacchimena va purimani).¹⁰⁹ Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction (svaimavirodha) as an argument against Sydvada. This has been an oft-repeated criticism against Syadvada by opponents of different times.

Likewise in the course of a conversation held between Nigantha Nataputta and Citta Gahapati, the latter blames the former for his self-Contradictory comception. He says; If your former statement is true, latter statement is false, and if your latter statement is true, your primer statement is false. (sace purimani saccani, pacchimam te miccha, sace pacchimam saccam purimam te miccha).¹¹⁰

Another reference found in Pali literature helps us to understand the position of Syadvada. The Dighanahha of the Majjhima Nikaya mentions the three kinds of theories upheld by Dighanakha Paribbajaka. They are as follows:¹¹¹

(i) Sabbam me khamati (I agree with all (views),

(ii) Svbbam ma na khanati (I agree with no (views),

(iii) Ekhaccom me khamati, ekaccam me ma khamati (I agree with some (views) and disagree with other (views).

The Buddha criticises Dighanakha's views in various ways, and expresses his own views towards the problem. Dighanakha's views are similar to the predications of Syadvada, and represent its first three bhangis as follows:

(i) Sabbam me khamati =Syadasti

(ii) Sabbam me na khamati =Syannasti

(iii) Ekaccam me khamati; ekaccam me na khamati =Syadastinasti...

Now the problem is to consider to which school of thought Dighanakha belonged. According to the commentary on the Majjhima Nikaya, he is said to be a holder of the view of Ucchedavada, ¹¹² which is a part of Syadvada school in the opinion of Buddhaghosa. He might have belonged to Sanjaya's of Paribbajakas who were followere of Parsvanatha tradition converted later to Nataputta's religion before he joined the Buddha's order. ¹¹³ Dighanakha was a nephew or Sanjaya. It seems, therefore, that he was a follower of Jainism. This inference may be confirmed if Dighanakha can be identified with Dighatapassi of the Upalisutta of Majjhima Nikaya, who was a follower of Nigantha Nataputta.

In the above propositions of Saccaka Citta Gahapati and Dighanakha Paribbajaka, we can trace the first four predications (including Syadavaktavaya) of Syadvada conception of Jainism.

It is not impossible that the term Syat had been used by Jainas in the beginning of each predication Justify correctly the others' views on the basis of non-absolutism. The word Syat (Siya in pali), which indicates the definite standpoint towards the probelems, is also used in the Cula Rahulovadasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, where the two types of the Tejodhatu are pointed out in definite way. 114 It seems that the word Syat originally belonged to the Jainas and was later used by the Buddhists in a particular sense. The defect of self-contradiction in Syadvada conception of the jainas is a criticism levelled against it by the Buddhists. It happened so, only because of ignorance of the meaning of Syat. As a matter of fact, the Jainas had concentrated their attention on the controversial points in different theories of then philosophers and had tried to examine their views from different standpoints. By this method the Jainas could figure out the real nature of reality and consider the problem in a non-violent way.