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Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain


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This conception of object of perception has been a subject of criticism, especially with the Buddhist logicians. The Vijnanavada, an extreme form of idealism which is propounded by the Sautrantika and Yogacara schools, asserts that there is no causal (yadakaram jnanm) world of external (reality. In its opinion reality is only the Vijnana (idea).

Thus the Vijnanavada denies the external world by denying the atoms. It says that the heap of atoms or a single body cannot be said to be in the external world. Both the Pratyaksa and Anumana are unable to prove their existence because ordinary mortals have never seen atoms even in a dream. As regards the Pratyaksa of Yogi, it demands great faith. The Anumana also is not helpful in this respect; Because for want of pratyaksa of atoms now can we get at the hetu (reason) and the sadhya (to be proved). Nor does the external world consist of bodies. When the atom itself could not be proved, how can we hope to prove a body which consists of many atoms. It is thus nothing but only a superstition caused by a hypothesis of vasana due to avidya or ignorance.108

Acarya Santaraksita also denies the existence of atoms. He refutes the view of Sumati stating that one object cannot have two qualities. Otherwise the object also will be consideed as two. Another argument is raised that if the two qualities are not defferent from each other, why do you say that the special quality of the atoms is perceived by the emancipated only ?109 By denying the existence of two qualities in one object, Santaraksita tries to refute the view of Sumati.

The above criticism is based on the Vijnanavada, which asserts that there is no existence of the external world. We see it only on account of the hypothesis of vasana. This criticism is answered by Jaina philosophers in latter works. Hemachandra tries to reply that the existence of the world cannot be refused, since knowledge is the action (kriya) in which the object is supposed to be directed. Without the external object there can be no perception. Therefore, Jainism admits the existence of both, the atoms and the body (avayavi).

As regards the criticism that the atoms of the body would be conflicting with one another, Jaina philosophy admits this fact, but it tries to solve this problem through Anekantavada. As Hemachandra says, `criticism' of atoms, therefore, cannot affect those who believe in Syadvada,110 according to which a body is one and yet manifold.


Paramarthika Pratyaksa (Trancsendental Perception)

The Paramarthika Pratyaksa is the outcome of the destruction of Jnanavaranakarma (knowledge obscuring karama). It springs forth from the purified soul itself without the assistance of sense-organs or any other external internal instruments. That is the reason why it is called the perfect lucid perception (visada pratyaksa). It is of two kinds: Sakala pratyaksa (complete direct knowledge) Kevalajnana (perfect knowledge or omniscience) comes under the former, and the Avadhijnana (visual knowledge), Manahparyayajnana (mental knowledge) under the latter.



Avadhi Jnana, as its name indicates, is limited by dravya (substance), Ksetra (place) Kala (time) and bhava (emotion). It is of three kinds--desavadhi (partial visual knowledge), paramavadhi (high visual knowledge), and sarvavadhi (full visual knowledge). Viewed from another aspect it is divided into Bhavapratyaya (birth-born visual knowledge) and gunapratyaya (acquired by merit). The former is possessed by those in heaven and hell by birth,111 while the latter can be secured by human beings as well as five-sensed sub-human beings after destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant karmic veil (Ksayopasama-nimitta).112 Only the forms having shapes (rupin) can be known by avadhijnana.113 The formless, such as soul (jiva), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest). akasa (space), and Kala (time) are not within its scope of perception. It can penet rate infinite, number of cycles, both past and furure.

Manahparyaya jnana reveals the thoughts of human beings. It is of two kinds, viz. rjumati (simple direct or mental knowledge) and vipulamati (complex direct or mental knowledge). Umasvami distinguishes them on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting, while the former has less purity and infallibility.114 Pujyapada,115 and Akalanka116 support his view. But Jinabhadra is of somewhat different view viz. that manahparyaya jnana knows the states of mind directly by intuition, but the external objects thought of by the mind can be inferred.117 Later Acaryas followed both these views.

Umasvami makes a distinction between avadhi and manahparyaya. He says that (i) the former is less pure than the latter, (ii) the former can extend to the whole universe, while the latter is limited to the centre of the middle world. (iii) The first can be secured by all beings possessed of mind; while the other only by saints bhaving supernatural powers, and (iv) the subject matter of the first is gross, while that of the latter is very subtle. But Siddhasena Divakara does not recognise any distinction between avadhi and manahparyaya, since "subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs are also found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of manahparyaya to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate manahparyay as a separate category of knowledge.118 It can however, be considered a specific type of Avadhijnana.



Kevalajnana is perfect knowledge of all substance and their modifications. It is generated after complete destruction of the veil of the Mohaniya karma (delusing) which is the most powerful in the Karmic mater. Hence the soul comes to perceive all things past, present and future. When a person achieves perfect knowledge, he is called Omniscient.

According to Jainism, no one can be a teacher (Tirthankara) without being omniscient. This perfect knowledge can be obtained by the purified soul which has consiousness (cetana or upayoga) as its sole characteristic.119 The term Upayoga is used to denote the darsana the jnana which are the main features of the soul. Darsana is perception and jnana is knowledge.120 Soul, its knowledge, and its intution all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as nonself.121 Akalanka is of the view that when the soul cognises the object, it is called Jnana; and when the soul perceives itself, it is called Darsana.122

It is apparent now that at the destruction of Jnanavarana, Darsanavarana; Mohaniya, and Antaraya, the soul obtains inner illumination and becomes omniscient.

According to Jaina philosophy, each and every entity is somehow related to all other entities in the univers. Such relations are called modes or paryayas of the entity. If one knows an entity completely, these modes will also be known completely. That is why it is said that one who knows one, knows all, and one who knows all, knows one. In the Pravacanasara, Kunda-kunda saya: One who does not know simultaneously the realities of past, present and future, and the three worlds, cannot know even a single object with its fnfinite modifications, if one does not know all objects, how will he be able to know one ? For instance, if one is inclined to have a knowledge of ghata, he should have knowledge of its intrinsic nature as well as ghata itself, since knowledge reveals all the objects. As the soul has infinite capacity to know all the objects, when one attains such power, he has to know all the objects.124 severe penance with Right vision, Right knowledge, and Right conduct is required to attain such purified stage of soul.

The early Pali Canon as well as the latter Buddhist philosophical literature criticised the view of Jainas that their Tirthankaras were omniscient. In the Majjhima Nikaya the Buddha says to Sandka Paribrajaka that "Some teacher, all-knowing (sabbanna), all seeing (sabbadassavi) claims all-embracing knowlledge and vision (apariseam nanadassanam), Saying whether I am walking or standing still or sleep or awake, knowledge and vision are constanly and perpetually (satatam samitam) before me." Further the Buddha says, "he enters an empty place, and he does not receive alms and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a village or market town and the way". So if any one asks him why he need question in this manner if he is omniscient, then he replies this: "I had to enter an empty place, therefore I entered.125"

At another place the buddha says to Mahanama that he had seen the Niganthas performing severe penance at rajagaha on the Isigili kalasila. He then asked them "why do you people do so ? They replied that the Nigantha Nataputta was omniscient and he had said that by severe penance all past deeds would be destroyed and the new deeds would be prevented. In this way, they would attain salvation. then the Buddha asked them "Do all of you know the past and the future of yourselves and your deeds. He went on to say "You do not know whether you did an evil deed like this or that. You do not know the getting rid of unskilled states of mind, the uprising of skilled states." Getting the reply "no" from them the Budha remarked "these beings, revered Niganthas, do those who are born again among men in the world, and are wrathful (luddha), blood handed (lohitapanino), dealing in cruelty (kururakammanta) do these go forth among the Naganthas."126 Likewise Udayi Paribrajaka says to Gotama the all-knowing omniscient (Nigantha Nataputta), on being asked a question by me concering the past, shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness, (purimani, bhante, divasani purimatarani, sabbnnu sabbadassavi......so maya pubbantam arabbha panham puttho samano annenannam paticari, bahirddah katham apanamesi, kopam ca dosam ca appaccayam ca patvakasi).127

The Dhammapada Atthakatha presents a very interesting story regarding the dialogues that took place between Sirigutta and Garahadinna, the followers of the Buddha and the Nigantha Nataputta respectively. Garahadinna, a follower of the Nigantha Nataputta said to Sirigutta that the Niganthas are omniscient; they know the past, present and future. Afterwards, Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha decided to try the boastful claim of the naked ascetics (Niganthas). He got a ditch dug between two houses and had it covered. Niganthas were then invited to alms. When the Niganthas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud and filth. Then it is said that he had beaten them with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. After a similar trial he proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient.128 It may be noted here that all the Niganthas are not said to be omniscient, but only a very few who could attain the perfect knowledge after performing the required duties. This story, however, refers to the Jaina tradition that its Tirthankaras and some prominent monks were omniscient.129

Likewise, later Buddhist philosophical literature also referred critically to the Jaina conception of omniscience or Kevalajnana. Dharmakirti, in the course of establishing the "Dharmajnatva" in the Buddha, points out the superfluity of Jaina view of omniscience and says that the anusthanagatajnana (a knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice is more importast, than having a knowledge of the number of bacteria (kitasankhya), which is of no use at all for human beings. The real tattvadrasta (knower of scripture) in the opinion of Dharmakirti is one who knows what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted and not everything. It is immaterial whether one knows everything or not, but what matters is whether he knows the essentaial thing, that is what he ought to know. If the mere range of knowledge was valuable in itself, without its bearing on life, why not worship vultures who soar in to the atmosphere and thereby get a long range of sight.130 Thus he asserts the view that a absolute purity in life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic of a Teacher.

Prajnakaragupta, the commentater of Dharmakirti also supports Dharmakirti's view, but he goes one step further and establishes the omniscience of the Buddha. He also says that it can be attained by any spiritual aspirant, who masters the art of subduing passions.131

Thus it is only for the sake of argument that this conception of omniscience had been recorded in the Pali Canon as well as in later Buddhist philosophical literature, since no Jain view regarding this problem is correctly and completely mentioned. It was therefore not possible to give an accurate picture of the Jaina theory of omniscience. This much, however, we can say that the conception of omniscience in Jaina Tirthankaras is not a new one. It might belong to Parsvanatha or the period prior to that tradition, since the Niganthas, who the Buddha saw performing severe penance on Risigiri Kalasila at Rajagaha would be the followers of Parsvanatha or an earlier tradition.

The whole Jaina literature seeks to establish the fact that Jaina Tirthankaras are omniscient, while denying the omniscience of any other. The Bhagavati Sutra (9.32) says that the Nirgranthas who belonged to the Parsvanatha tradition did not accept the Nigantha Nataputta as a porphet or head of a Jaina sect unless it was proved that he was all-knowing and all-seeing.132

Later * caryas such as Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Vidyananda try to establish omniscience on the basis of inference. We have already mentioned Kundakunda argument in this connection. Then Samantabhadra says that there are three kinds of entities, viz. the subtle (suhsma), proximate (antarita), and remote (duravarti). They must be perceived simulataneously by somebody, since all objects are to be perceived. Hence there must be some one omniscient.134

Virasena presents another argument in support of omniscience. He says that Kevalajnana (omniscience) is innate in the soul. Due to destruction-cum-subsidence of karmas, it functions as matijnana. The self-cognised mati implies the fractional kevala jnana, just as the observation of a part of a mountain leads us to the perception of the mountain itself.135

The Jaina philosophers did not emphasise Dharma jnatva like Dharmakirti or early Buddhist tradition, but they endeavoured to point out that a person is omniscient when he is both Dharmajna as well as Sarvajna, because Dharma jnatva depends on sarvajnatva.

Akalanka presents another argument which is also referred to by Dharmottara, a Buddhist philosopher in the Dharmottara-pradipa.136 His argument is that if we deny supersensorial knowledge, how can astrological divinations be made ? Hence, it must be accepted that there is a faculty of super-sensorial knowledge which is nothing but Kevalajnana or omniscience.137

After the destruction of the evil of karmic bondage one can attain the inherent capacity of his own soul, and perceive all things.138 They very progressive gradation of knowledge implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attained by man. If one has no capacity to know or perceie all things at once he will not be able to do so even by means of the Veda.139 Hence we have to accept that one can become omnisceint. Impossibility of omniscience cannot be established unless one has knowledge of persons of all times. Consequently, one who rejects omniscience for all times must himself be omui scient.140 Presenting the positive arguments in this way, Akalanka relies on the negative arguments that there is no contradictory pramana141 to reject the established omniscience and therefore it is certain. He then substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory pramanas.143

Dharmakirti and his commentator, Prajnakargupta, think that the Jaina conception of omniscience cannot be accepted for want of Sadhaka-badhakapramana145 (assisting and contradicting evidence). Akalanka replies this criticism by saying that one cannot establish the non-existence of omniscience without being omniscient. He further says that there is no badhaka pramana to refute omniscience in Jainism, and the absence of badhaka pramana is itself a sadhakapramana.145

As regards Anusthanagatajnana urged by Dharmakirti. Vadiraja, a commentator of Akalanka, questions "By which pramanas does the Buddha perceive the Anustheyagatavastu ? Neither can Pratyaksa Pramana be helpful in this respect, otherwise what will be the use of Anusthana ? Nor will be Anumana (inference) pramana will solve our problem, because it depends on the pratyaksa. Thus the Anustheyagata Jnana in itself has no importance.143

So far as Kitasankhya-parijnana and its purusathopayoga are concerned, he says that it is essential to include Kitasankhya-parijnana as an integral part of omniscience, as caturaryasatya implies the Duhkhasatya of creatures living around. If the Buddha has not grasped the Caturaryavedanatva, how could he preach to his disciples convincingly? He then remarks that if the Kitasankhya-parijnana serves no useful purpose, what then is the use of Bhiksu-sankhya-parijnana in Buddhism.146 ?

Thus the Jainas established the theory of omniscience, whereas the Buddhist refuted it in Nigantha Nataputta. According to Jainism its adherents could aspire to be omniscient. But it was only Nigantha Nataputta who attained this spiritual height at that time. However, the masses considered all Niganthas to be omniscient, because some of them gained various powers of insight. The Buddha, apparently under the impression that this was the actual claim of Jainism, criticised it. The later Buddhist philosophers also followed him. Latern, on the imitation of Jainism, the Buddha is also made an omniscient in Buddhist Literature.147


2. Paroksa Pramana (Indirect Knowledge)

Non-distinct (avisada) knowledge is paroksa, and it unlike pratyaksa, dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, smarana, pratyabhijnana, tarka, anumana and agama. Out of these pramanas in Jaina logic, only the anumaua pramana has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramanas also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramanas in Jaina logic, only the anumaua pramana has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramanas also, since the Jaina and the buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramanas on account of the different stand-points they had adopted.


Smrti pramana

Smrti is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on Pramana by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept it as an indeplendent pramana on the ground that it depends on the validity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva).148 The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumarila.149 and rejected the validity of smrtt.150 Their main argument, like that of the Mimansakas or the Vaisesikas, is that the validity of smrti is conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on experience.151 As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated as a pramana does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (vikalpa jnanamatra) is considered no pramana.152

On the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of smrti pramana. Their main argument is that the Sam skaras recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gainend through senses. Therefore smrti is declared to be a Pramana, since it is true of facts samvadin just as perception. The validity of pramana cannot be ascertained merely by relation to its depedence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted even pramaua will cease to be a pramana, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emprical perception.135

While examining smrti pramana, we may also discuss Dharavahika pramana (continuous cognition). The Dharavahikajnana is accepted as a pramana by the Nyaya-Viaisesikas154 and the Mimamsakas.155 In Buddhist tradition only Aracata accepts it.156 He says that only the Yogin's dharavahika Jnana is pramana, because it involves awareness of Suksmakalakala (minute divisions of time), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is not a pramana, because it does not involve such awareness.

The Jain logicians have two traditions regarding dharavahika Pramana. According to the Digambara tradition,157 it is valid provided it produces a visista pramana (a knowledge of special objects), while the Svetambara tradition accepts the dharavahika jnana as a pramana without any conditions.158


Pratyabhinana

Pratyabhijnana (recognition) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature is of tadevedam (that is definitely this), tatsadrasam (it is similar), tadvilaksanam (it is somewhat dissimilar), and tatpratiyogi (it is different from that), which are avisamvadin (non-discrepant) and therefore are pramanas themselves.159

Kumarila160 as well as Jayanta161 includes pratyabhijnana in pratyaksa. But the Buddhists do not accept it as a separate pramana. In support of their theory, they advocate the idea that pratyabhijnana is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary (ksanika) if it dismisses the permanence of entities that are corelated with pratyabhijnana.162

The Jainas, on the other hand, uphold the view that because the pratyabhijnana presupposes an entity in its antecedent and subsequent model condition, it should be recognised as a separate pramana, like smrti.163
Tarka pramana

Tarka or inductive reasoning is an essential feature to have the concomitance of an entity164 which is the instrument of inference. Partyaksa, smarana and pratyabhijnana are associative reasons to originate tarka. It decides the inseparabel connection (avinabhava sambandha) among the objects known through inference and agama. Akalanka is the first to fix the definition and subject of tarka in Jaina philosophy.

Mimamskas do not accept Tarka as a separate pramana. The word Uha used by them165 in the sense of reasoning is synonymous with the Iha of of matijnan of Jainas.166 The Buddhist, also deny its validity on the ground that tarka can only help one to know further on object which is already known through perception.167

Akalanka recognised tarka as a pramana, since concomitance cannot be known without tarks.168 If we do not accept the validity of tarka, we will not be able to accept either, as they both (inference and tarka) depend on the same basis for their validity as pramanas.169


Agama Pramana :

The words of an Apta are called agama. Apta means a person of superior intellect and character, who is non-discrepant (avisamvadin) in his respective subjects.170 The Jainas believe that their prophets were Aptas and therefore they accepted agamas as an independent pramana. The Jainas did not restrict the definition of Apta to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An Apta may, according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject.

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