Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

The refutation of Syadvada in Buddhist literature

The Buddhist Acaryas at different times criticised the Syadvada conception of the Jainas on the grounds of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The main arguments of the foremost Buddhist logicians were as follows:

Nagarjuna and Syadvada

Acarya Kundakunda and Umasvati were among the earliest who established clearly the theory of the triple character (produchion, destruction, and permanence) of reality in Jainism. Nagarjuna (about 150-250 A.D.), the propounder of Sunyavada made the charge that the theory of triple character is itselg a self-contradictoy formula, as it cannot be associated with reality, since such a thesis is faulty on account be associated with reality, since such a thesis is faulty on account of anavasthadosa (regressus ad infinitum).=¹¹⁵

Dharmakirti and Syadvada

In the Pramana-Vartika (svavrtti) Dharmakirti remarksthat the Anekantavada is mere non-sensical talk (pralapamatra). He asys in the course of refuting the Bhedabhedavada theory that the Digambaras (Jainas-Anhrikas), who present their doctrines in a fantastic way, could be refuted in the same way as the Sankhya philosophy, which thinks of the nature of reality as sbsolute difference (atyantabheda). He then mentions that the Jainas hold a view: "All is one, and all is not one (sarvam sarvatmakam na saram sarvatmakam).¹¹⁶

Dharmakirti tries to clarify his remark by presenting a traditional example of the Jainas. The Jainas explain their theory of the nature of reality with the illustration of a golden jar (svarnaghata), where gold is considered the general, and not the particular, character. Here Dharmakirti points out why the jainas do not recognize the jar or pot itselg as a general character, since Dravyatva is in all of them according to Jainism

Dharmakirti is of the view that the Jaina theory of dual character, viz universal and particular, is so formulated that the character of particularity is relegated to the background and made less significant. He explains this with reference to the famous example of camel and curd. If the particularity which disting camel from curd or vice verse is not an important factor, he says one may as well eat a camel when he wants to eat curd. He tries by this argument to demolish the Jaina theory as he understood that cure is not only curd by itselg (Svarupena) but also camel in a relative sense (pararupena) According to Dharmakirti, there cannot be a universal character between camel and cure and even if such a character exists, theit mutual difference or particularity is all that matters for both identification and use.¹¹⁷

Againat the Jaina conception of the universal character of a thing, he says: if all realities are sat (being or isness), there would be no difference between knowledge and word (^dhi and dhvai) that imparts a Knowledge, which is quite impossible. Therefore Syadvada conception in Dharmakirti's opinion is defective. ¹¹⁸

Prajnakaragupta and Syadvada:

prajnakaragupta(660-720 A.D.), the well known commentator and a pupil of Dharmakirti, also refutes the Jain theory of reality. His criticism is very similar to the criticism of Nagarjuna. Prjnakara says: origination, destruction, and permanence cannot exist together. If is destroyed how can it be a reality; if it is permanent, If is destroyed and if it is permanent, it should always be in mind. He then argues that the reality cannot be realised as both eternal and non-eternal. It should be accpeted as either eternal or non-eternal.¹¹⁹ Here Prajnakara pointed out that the triole character of a thing is a self-contradictory theory.

Arcata and Syadvada:

Samantabhadra's view mentioned in the "dravyaparyayayoraikyam" and "samjnasamkhyavisesasca" has not been refuted by Dharmakirti. Whatever may be its reason, it is criticised by his commentator Arcata (about the seventh century A.D.) who follwoed the arugments of Nagarjuna 120 He says: origination and destruction cannot exist together in one dharmi, since they ate contradictory in character. The argument "they take place relatively" would not solve the question, because in the course of origingation and destruction, permanence would be there, and likewise in the presence of a permanent character the other two would be absent Therfore, a triple-charactered nature of reality as the Jainas assert, is not possible accoble according to Arcata's way of thinking. ¹²¹

An another place he tries to refute the Bhedabhedavada (identity-in-difference) conception which means the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic stendpoing, but they ate different in name, number, nature, place, etc from a practical viewpoint. It appears as if he does not see much difference between ubhayavada of Vaisesikas bhedabheda of jainas, That is the reason why he conceives the substance as being completely defferent from its modes.

He refutes the view first in prose under the heading "Anhrikadisammatasya dravyaparyayah bhedabhedapaksasyanirasah"

and then the same arguments are repeated in fourty-five stanzas, The gist of them is as follows:

The difference between substance and its modes by the name, number, etc and unity of them into one by place, time, and nature, is not possible as the nature of reality, since an entity cannot assume more than one character. 122

He further points out that samjna is the cause of an intimation (sanketa) which depends on desites. How then can one differentiate it by name, since it is also one, not two? Words are fictitious, the difference therefore, would be imaginative Sankhyabheda also is not possible as there is a difference between vacya (to be spoken) and vacaka (speaker), which is also kalpita .(imaginative).

Further he points out that without the destruction of a substance there would be no destruction of its modes. Hence, they can be identified neither as bheda nor as abheda. If the modes are different from the substance, words would not be connected with them. If they are accepted as non-different, their natures would be one. How then could the Laksanabheda be applied? Karyabheda is also not possible as there is no difference in nature. ¹²⁴

The theory "substance and its mondes are not different (abheda) in place, time, nature" is also defective in Prajnakara' sviews. He saya: "position, the form, smell, juice, touch etc. are different in modifications. If the nature stays with substance and nodes in the form of destruction and otherwise, the substance would be two as ghata and pata, not one which removes abhedatva with them. Further he says, if the bhedabheda is accepted, the bheda (dfference) would be fictitious due to not leaving the abheda (identity), would be abheda would be proved as false in character. Here Arcata thinks in terms of ubhayavada that if the substaance and mode ate completely defferent, all the evils of both the "identityview and difference-view" will lay upon this conception.¹²⁴

Arcata refers to the jaina's view that they analyse reality through sui-generis (Jatyantara) which exposes the combination of identity and difference, although it makes a distinction between the particular and general character of reality. For instance, Narasimha is a combination of man and lion, which is not self-contradictory because of the theoty of sui-generis.

Opposing this theory, Arcata points out that Narasimha is a compendium of atoms which cannot be transtormed into narasimha. Due to a combination of the forms which is called sabalarupa, a place of existence of diverse naturas. How then could a unity in nature be proved/ Arcata finally remakrs that this is the philosophy of block-heads (darsanakrto'yam viprayaso mudhamatinam):

This criticism is based on the understanding that the nature of reality is completely in two different forms. This is the view of vaisesikas, not Jainas. This criticism nade by Aranyakas is answered by the later Jaina philosphers such as Vadirajasuri, Anantavirya, Prabhacandre.

Santaraksita and Syadvada

Santaraksita examined the Syadvada doctrine of the Jainas in a separate chapter of his Tattvasangraha. The main defects, according to him, are as follows:

if the oneness between substance and modes is real (agauna), then the substance also should be destructive like the form of the successive factors or those successive factors themselves should be comprehensive (anugatatmaka) in their character, like the nubstance. Therefore it should be admitted that either there is absolute destruction of all characters or it consists of the elments of permanence, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, which can-not exist in any single thing.¹²⁶

Hence he turns to the wuniversal and the particular character of an entity. He says: there would be a comingling (sankarya) and a confusion (Sandeha) in the dual nature of teality, the result of which would not be helpul to decide which is general and which is particuloar (parasparsvabhavatve syatsamanyavisesayoh sankaryatattvato nedam dvaiupyamupapadyate) ¹²⁷

If the generat and the particular are regarded as non-different from one and the sane thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of these two characters? And being non-different why should it not be regarded as one? ¹²⁷

The diversity of properties (dharmabheda) also cannot be accepted there, since the diversity or plurality cannoto be one. As regards the potencies (saktnam), their diversity is merely a creation of the speakers' desire to speak. As it is crystal clear that both, affirmation and denial, cannot exist in one thing. we hava to regard the self-contradiction between unty and plurality. Hence, he observes that any diversity of properties of a single entity can only be a creation of fancy (kalpita) ¹²⁸

In diversity (stage of an entity which is excluded from several like and unlike things to this and that) even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms; but in reality no single thing thing thing can reasonably have two forms.

Santaraksita further gives a traditional example of Narasimha. He says; such entities as narasimha nad others which have been described as possessing dual characters are also not real but conceptual (kalpita). These arguments of Santaraksita resemble those of Arcata. ¹²⁹

Thus he arrives at the conclusion that duel character of a thing is figment of mere inagination.

Karnakago min and Syadvada

Karnakatomin in the Pramanavartikasvavrttitika refers to the Digambaras' theory of relativity, according to which they accept the mutuual negation (anyanyabhava) to distinguish the realities, so that they should not be confused. He then starts to criticise the view that the distinction among things, cannot be inentifedn by mutual negation, which is possible in entities produced by non-different causes. If they originate from different causes, how does anyonabhava come into existence? ¹³⁰

Further he tried to show the defects in the Jaina's theory of universal-cum-particular character of urdhvatasamanyatmaka and tiryakaamanyatmaka vastu. He then rejects the theory saying that there should be either abhheda or dyantabheda.Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the urdhvatasamanya could be destroued because thing are not permanent.

As regards tiryaksamanya, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says: if the unicersality were in the substance, the ghata (pot) and pata (pata (linen) or dadhi (cure) and ustra (camel) would be identical, Hence a shape or a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curdeater should consume a camel ¹³¹ Therefore Syadvada doctrine is false (^mithyavada) in his opinion.

Thus Karnakatomin makes his refutation following Dharm. akIrti's arguments, and tries to prove that the dual characteristic of an entity is not possible as it invites serious defects in the theory.

Jitari and Shadvada

Jitari, another Buddhist logician wrote a complete book Anekantavadamirasa to refute the Anekantavada. Padmaraja summarizes its arguments as follows;-

When the Anekantavadin maintains that dravya and paryaya are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (ekarupataiva) Difference, based on (the secondary consideration) number etc (sankhyadi), will then be fictitious (Kalpanamatrakalpitah syat). For, a real difference (paramarthikobhedah) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of theit nature (na hi yayoh svabhavabhedah tayoh anyatha paramarthiko bhedah sambhavati). ¹³²

Or conversely, when the anekantavadin pleads that dravya and paryaya are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified differnce. Identity will then be ictitious. for real identity (svabhavabhedah) cannot proceed from the differencc which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitare, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature (na ca tenaiva svabhavena bhedascabhedasca).

Padmarajan then says: "the entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhist dictum: "It cannot be right to affrm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictout,"¹³³

Likewise the same arguments are fund in the Vijnaptimatratasiddhitika According to that both the affirmative and negative aspects cannot exist in one thing.134

Evaluation

To sum up in very ancient days there was a three-fold or four-fold common predication to satify the burning philosopical questions of mind. Pali as well as Jain Prakrt literature, mention them as Scepticism of agnosticism. The Anekantavada (non-absolustic standpoint) which strives to incorpoate the truth of all systems, has two main organs that of Nayavada (the doctrine of standpoints), and Syadvada (the dialectic of conditional predication). The whole theory is more renowned by the name of Syadvada and its apprehenders ate called Syadvadimah or Jainas.

The nature of reality is the main problem of philosophy. On the basis of ^Syadvada the Jainas established the dual character of reality. In the medieval period of logic the non-jaina philosophers, especially the Byddhists, such as Nagarjuna, Dharmakirti, Prajnakara, Arcata, Santaraksita and Jitari attacked the theory and blamed the Janinas for several defects and ultimately called their theory Mithyavada and Jalmakalpita.

The jaina philosphers tried their best to explain the theories which these critics held to be defective. Akalanka (720-780 A.D.), wjp can be hailed as the propunder of the Jaina tradition appeats to have more or less followed him in their Jaina tradition appears to have more or less followe him in their endeavaurs to refute the objection brought against Jaina conceptions

The main arguments of the Buddhists to reject the Syadvada doctrine, as we have already mentioned is that the two characters cannot exist rotether in one reality. Otherwise there would be a self-contradiction of affirmative and negative characters. Other defects to be mentioned are confusion adn commingling that follw self-contradiction.

As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosophers misunderstood the theory of Syadvada, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each ofther. This theory originally belonged to the vaisesikas, anhd not the Jainas. The theory of the vaisesikas, called Ubhayavada is criticised by the Jaines themselves, who observed in it the defects of selg-contradiction commingling, doubt, etc. The Buddhist philosophers have found the very same defects in the Jainas' theory of Syadvada.

The foremost afgunent against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and "not be" cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula in toto. They say that the validity of of experience (samvedana) and not by pre-conception. Experence certifies that the dual chatacter of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outsitde this nature (sarvamasti svarupena pararupena nasti ca), as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being, can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.

As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence) of reality, the Jainas support it through anyathanupapannatvahetu as explained before. The Buddhists themselves are of the view that a thing perishes immediately after its origination, and this continuitynevger ends. The continuity of moments or similar moments (sajatiyaksanas) is considered the material cause (upadana karana).This is in fact nothing but only dhrauvya or a permanent feature of the jainas and the Santana (continuity of the Buddhists.Without accepting dhrauvya or santana, memory (Smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana), bondage-salvation (bandhamoksa), etc wpi;d dosappear frpm fidle of experience. Therefore, the permanent element is essential for the circulation into the modes.

The permanent element possesses the character of indentity in-difference (dhedabhedavada) Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic standpoint, and difference in the sense that they ate different in name, number, etc from a practical viewpoint.¹³⁵ In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance as in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. with past reflections the substance is transformed into present moeeds and proves itselg as a cause of tuture modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity. To understand the difference between Gunas and paryayas, the terms sankhya, laksana, etc are used. From a realistic standpoint there is no such difference which could indicate the separation between them. After refuting the objections of Arcata, Vadiraja comments that the latter is not capable of finding defects in the Syadvada by his powerful voice. ¹³⁶

To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jainas assert an element which is called Jatyantary (sui generis or unque). They maintain that a reality is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and each syntheses is Jatyantary.¹³⁷ This is illustrated by the instance of Narasimha which is criticised by the Buddhist philosophers. Prabhacandra says in response to the Buddhist criticism about narasimha that it is neither nara nor simha, but becausof their similarities they are called Narasimha. While having mutual separation they exist non-differently in relation to substance and like waves in water they emerge and sink in eavh other.138 Thus there is no self-contradiction in dual charactars of an entity in relative sense, as the Jainas assert.

Dharmakirti urged with regard to the universal-cumparticular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious middle term (hetvabhasa) Akalanka points out that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jainas on the basis of invalid argumaents (Mithyajati).¹³⁹ For instance, Dharmakirti ignores the form ula sarvobhavastadatatsvabhavah and tries to establish equality between curd and camel. Hence he questions why one who intends to eat curd, does not go to eat a camel in place of curd, since according to Jainism, bth have the universal character, ¹⁴⁰

Akalanka tries to disarm critics like Dharmakirti by ponting out the deffinition of samanya and visesa. Vadiraja, a commentaror of Akalanka, explains that the similar transtormation of a thing into its modes (sadrasaparinamo hi samanyam) is called Samanya 141 According to this definition, the modes of curd and camel ate not similar, they are really completly different, as well as similaf. How is it then possible that these elements are mixed?

Another argument used for the refutation of the Buddhist standpoint is that the identity is only among the modes of curd, as hard, harder, hardest, etc. but they have never any sort of relation with the nodes of camel. Hence, they can never be mixed with each other. Vadiraja refers to a traditional fiction that Dharmakirti proved himself as a Vidusaka (jester) because he did not possess a good knowledge of the opponents theory. ¹⁴²

Akalanka again crticises the view of Dharmakirti saying that if the argument that "the atoms of curd and camel may have been mixed sometimes before and the atoms of curd have still the capacity to be transfered into the modes of camel" is to be raised, it would not be advisable. For the past and the future modes of an entity are different, and all transactions and transformations run according to present modes. The curd is for the purpose of eating, while the camel is for riding. The words for them are also completely different from each other. The word "curd" can be applied only to curd, not camel. It is the same case with the word "camel" too.

Akalanka further points out if in relation to past modes the unity between curd and camel is derived, then Sugata was mrga (deer) in his previous birth and the same Mrga became Sugata. Why then should Sugata only worshipped and Mrga be considered edible? ¹⁴³

1. sugato'pi mrgo jato mrgo'pi Sugatah smrtah,

Tathapi Sugato vandyo mrgah khadyo yathesyata.

Tatha Vastubaladeva bhedabhedavyavasthiteh

Codito dadhi khadeti kimustramabhidhavati

Thus he tries to prove that as the transformations of sugata and Mrga are quite different, and their being worshipped and eaten are related to theit modes, all substamces have the capacity to be transformed only to their possible modes, not to others. Therefore the identity between the modes of cure and camel cannot laead to the truth. Their transformations do not have the Tadatmyasambandha and Niyatasambandha.

In fact, Akalanka and other Jaona Acaryas tried to meet the arguments of the Buddhist philosophers in forceful words. The innumerable examples of scathimg attacks against Buddhists can be seen in Akalanksa's and other Jaina Scaryas' works. The caustic remerks' such asJadyahetavah, ahnikalakaanam, pasulaksanam, etc made by Dharmakirti himselg on opponents' views ate criticised by Akalanka in tbe Pramana-sangrath. ¹⁴⁵

Thus the Jaina Acaryas do not accept any self-contradiction in the Syadvada conception. Likewise, the which are based on the selgcontradiction, are also proved as "mithyadosaropana". And according to them. the criticism made by the buddhists or others is not effective in this ccontext. As a matter of fact, in their opinion, Syadvada has no defects provided it is clearly understood.

conclusion

From these comments we mey conclude that:-

(i) The rudiments of syadvada conception of Jainas can be gleaned from early Pali literature.

(ii) Syadvada conception originally belonged to Jainas and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it in a somewhat different way as a common approach to conceive the mature of reality.