Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

It is clear that vision or darsana was originally considered to be the revealer of self (atma-prakasaka). That is the reason why matijnana, srutajnana and the avadhijnana, which reveal external nature of reality, can be wrong if they are viewed from the wrong angle, whereas caksudarsana, acaksudarsana and avadhidarsana, which come prior to them, are not so. If Visesa (particular) had been considered as having a meaning of general observation of an entity, the Samsaya (doubt), viparayaya (perversion), and the anadhyavasaya (indecision) would have existed in its perception made earlier, and darsana would have been divided, like janan, into darsana-adarsana etc. This defect would not arise if we define vision as a revealer of self. For, it always exists prior to, as well as at the time of knowledge.41

This idea was expressed in logical terms by Pujyapada Devanandi in his Sarvartha Siddhi.42 No endeavours had been made upto that time to consider darsana as a valid standard of knowledge (pramana). Whether it should be regarded as pramana or not was the main problem for the logicians. Abhayadeva Suri, a commentator on the Sanmati Tarka, expressed his view that Darsana, like Jnana, could be pramana (valid)43 while Manikyanandi and Vadideva Suri45 considered it as a Pramanabhasa (falsely valid). It may be that Nirvikalpaka darsana of Buddhism and not Darsana of Jainism was in their minds when darsana was declared a pramanabhasa.

Pali literature makes reference to the fact that Nataputta possessed "infinite knowledge and vision". The Jaina Agamas46 confirm the ancient view and say janadi passadi and "Janamane pasamane". This indicates that the activities of both, knowledge and vision in an object can take place together and reveal its knowledge and vision simultaneously.

In the later period, some of the Svetambara Acaryas tried to explain this original idealogy in a different way. They said that Jnana and darsana were conscious activities, and the two conscious activities could not occur simultaneously. But there is a controversy among them with regard to the case of one who is omniscient (Kevalin). Some stick to the Agamas, while others do not and assert either that a Kevalin's Jnana and darsana are simultaneous or that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. Siddhasena Divakara and Jinabhadra are the exponents of these views.47

On the other hand, the Digambara Acaryas unanimously hold that the jnana and darsana of a kevalin occur simultaneously Kundakunda, a great Digambara Acarya states that jnana and darsana of a kevalin occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.48 Umasvami49 and his follower Pujyapada Akalanka51, Vidyananda52 ete. also support this view.

Later, for the first time in the Jaina logical tradition it is analysed that knowledge and vision of an entity reveal its knowledge and vision simultaneously. A further explanation is given that an entity has two forms, viz. Universal and Particular. The former is the subject of vision and the latter of knowledge. Here knowledge and vision become separate. That is why perhaps Abhayadeva Suri accepted both as valid.

Another point may be noted here. The etymology of Pramana (pramiyate yena tatpramanm) points out that jnana is the more important cause of right knowledge (pramana) since it is an attribute of soul. Sannikarsa (contact of an organ of senses with its effect) and sense-organs cannot be pramana.53 Akalanka made a great coutribution towards the development of the definition of pramana. He maintains non-discrepancy (avisamvadin) as a test of pramana which adds one more characteristic, namely, tht of anadhigatarthagrahi (knowledge which is not cognised).54 Akalanka, therefore, recognised only the validity of knowledge which is determinative (nirnayatmaka), non-discrepancy (avisamvadin) and useful in samvyavahara (empirical stand-point). In this way, the savikalpakajnana (conceptual knowledge), not the nirvikalpakajnana (non-conceptual knowledge) is considered as perception. The concept that nirvikalapaka jnana could be regarded as perception is successfully refuted by Santaraksit in the Tattvasangraha.

Jainism classifies Knowledge in two wavs: (i) Canonical (Agamika), and (ii) Philosophical Darsanika. The five kinds of knowledge such as mati, sruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevalajnana are based on the former, while pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) are developments of the latter. The Pratyaksa is defined as knowledge obtained by self without the assistance of an external instrument.55

It is only to the Jainas that "aksa" means "Soul."56 Thus Pratyaksa in Jaina Agamika tradition does not mean empirical perception, i.e. Knowledge obtained through sense organs. According to this definition the Avadhijnana (visual knowledge), Manahparayaya jnana (intuition of mental knowledge) and Kevaljnana (pure and perfect knowledge) are comprised Pretyaksa, and Matijnana (sensuous knowledge) and Srutajnana (scriptural Knowledge) in Paroksa.57

The Jaina definition of pratyaksa was quite different from those of other philosophical systems. According to the latter, pratyaksa is aknowledge gained through sense organs. It created a serious difficult for Jaina philosophers. The rivals began to question their standpoint. Having examined the arguments, the later Jaina philosophers accepted pratyaksa as the knowledge produced by the sense-organs also. Jinabhadra and Akalanka designated it as samvyavaharika pratyaksa (empirical perception), while the real pratyaksa of agamika tradition was called paramarthika pratyaksa (transcendental perception).58 Indriyapratyaksa and manasapratyaksa accepted by the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas are included in the first category. Thus matijnana, which was put under paroksa in the Agamika tradition, came under the category of pratyaksa in philpsophical tradition. Likewise smrti, sanjna, Cinta and abhnibodha, which were synonymous with mati in the Agamic tradition59 are synonymous with smarana, pratyabhjnana, tarka, and anumana in the philosophical tradition. Therefore paroksa pramana, are five including sruta (agama).

As we have already observed Pratyaksa in Jainism is accepted as self-cognition. Umasvami60 presented this definition in the Tattvarthasutra. Samantabhadra.61 defined it as knowledge which is of self-revealing charactar. Siddhasena Divakara in his Pramana Mimamsa added to it one more characteristic, namely, "Badhavarjit" (admitting of no contradiction).

Akalanka developed the theory further by adding avisamvadi (non-discrepancy) and andhigatarthagrahi (knowledge of object which is not yet cognised) as characteristics of the validity of knowledge.62 This definition could remove several inner contradictions of the earlier definitions.

There are four sub-divisions of matijnana, viz avagraha (perception), iha (speculation), avaya (perceptual judgment) and dharana (retention)63.

They are dependent of their pre-knowlede, but the emerge from sense-organs and acknowledge the modes of a particular object. It is, therefore, considered Samvyavaharika pratyaksa.64

 Except Carvaka, all other systems65 have classified Janyapartyaksa (generated perception) as (i) Laukika (Empirical) and (2) Alaukika (transcendental). The nature of these perceptions is the same as the nature of Samvyavaharika and Parmarthika Pratyaksa of Jainas. Yogipratyaksa or Yogi-jnana of the Sankhya-Yogas,66 Nyaya-vaisesikas67, and the Buddhists68, Atmajnana of the Mimamsakas69, are synonymous with Transcendental perception (Parmarthika or Alaukika Pratyaksa which is the special competence of the soul visistatma sakti). According to Santaraksita in the Taitvasangraha, the Jainas70 called this knowledge name Yagi-pratyaksa or Yog-aja-pratyaksa.

The philosophers are not agreed on the question whether transcendental perception is determinate (Savikalpaka) or indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) or both determinate and indeterminate (ubhaya). The Buddhist tradition71 regards it as being only indeterminate, (Kalpanapodham), while the Nyaya Vaisesikas and Mimamsakas72 are of the view that it can be either determinate or indeterminata.

The Jainas, on the other hand, like the Sankhyas, think that determinate (savikal paka) is the only real perception73. Santaraksita74 refuted this idea. He referred to the view of Sumati who considered the Aksaja pratyaksa (sensory perception) as Samvyavaharika praiyaksa and Yogi pratyaksa (intuitive perception) as Parmarthika pratyaksa. He also added that according to the Jainas the determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa) is the real perception.75

Knowledge (Jnana) and vision. (Darsana), the two main characteristics of the soul which we had already discussed, are also called Darsanopayoga (indeterminate cognition) and Jnanopayoga (determinate cognition).76 The former is called the Nirvikalpaka while the latter is called Savikalpaka.77

Te Agamika tradition accepts both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka as valid due to spiritual considerations. According to the real standpoint in this tradition, a man obtains Right knowledge, is right in his cognition and a man who holds a wrong view (mithyadrsti), is wrong in his cognition, while from a practical standpoint both views are right. Therefore in the Agamika tradition, both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka are valid from relative stand-points. Acarya Umasvami divided cognitions into right and wrong ones. The Avadhidarsana, and Kevaldarsana are indeterminate transcendental perception, while Avadhijnana, Manahparyayajnana and Kevalajnana are determinate (transcedental perception).78

However, in the logical tradition the validity of pramana has been changed. To refute the opponents views, specially those of the buddhists, the Jaina Acaryas used in their respective definitions of pramana some words like nirnaya (detrmination) or jnana with a view to indicate that darsana or determinate cognition, which stands for cognition of the general (samanya-upayoga) falls outside the purview of these definitions.79

It may be noted here that the Buddhist philosophy accepts only the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa or indeterminate perception as valid knowledge. As regards the definiton of perception there are two Buddhist traditions, one is headed by Dinnaga who does not accept non-illusory (abhranta) nature of perception, and the otber headed by Dharmakirti who does so. Santraksita and his followers support the latter stating that Sense-perception is free from conceptual contents and hence not erroneous.80 We see a thing first; then realise its name. Thus the determinate knowledge (savikalpaka jnana) depends on indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka Jnana) and, therefore, only indeterminate knowledge is perception.81

In connection with establishing his own view Santaraksita refuted the view of Acarya Sumati. According to Sumati, both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyaksa should be recognised as valid as the first reflects the general form of a thing or, in other words, its existence as an indefinite thing, while the second (savikalpaka) reflects the special characteristic of an entity thus perceived.82

This theory appears to be in conformity with the Jaina Agamika tradition, but not with the Logical point of view. Abhayadeva, the commentator of the Sanmatitarka also took up the same position83. As we have already seen, the process of general perception commencing from avagraha (mere apprehension) and ending with Dharana (retention) passes from the indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) state of knowledge to determinate (savikalpaka).84

Kamalasila has explained the view of Sumati that a thing is amenable to non-conceptual perception in the form of mere observation, or purely sub jective ideation.85 But the Jaina philosophy does not accept it. Jainism asserts that a thing is perceived by Darsan or cognition, not by Alocana or observation,86 The visesavasyakabhasya criticises the view, viz. "kei dihaloyanapubbaamoggaham venti" which means a thing can be apprehended by a purely subjective ideation. In his commentatery Hemacandra Maladharideva referred to a karika by Kumarila "asti alocana jnanam prathamam nirvikalpakam" It is possible that the commentator thought this view was that of Kumarila and it is also probable that kamalsila misunderstood the view of Sumati.

Kumarila, a Mimamsaka philosopher, asserted two kinds of sense-perception. According to him, non-conceptual perception is purely subjective ideation as apprehending the "specific individuality of the particular (alocana jnanam nirvikalpakam vyaktisvalaksanam), and the conceptual perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa) is the apprehension of the universal (samanyavisayam tu savikalpakam).87

Acarya Sumati does not agree with this definition. He question: is the thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else ? or is it not so apprehended ? If kumarila answers: there is non-apprehension of the thing in a form distinguished from other things, then Sumati states that in this position either there would be apprehension of the thing itself only, or there would be no perception of the thing at all. He illustrated his theory by reference to the perception of a Jar. The Jar should be either apprehended without having the form of others or it should not be apprehended. There could be no escape from these alternatives89.

Kumarila's view is based on the definition of perception given in the Jaiminiyasutra90. It is refuted by all non-Mimamsaka philosophers, Vedic91 as well as Buddhist92 and Sumati appears to be the first Jaina Acarya to join them in refuting this view.

Having criticised the view of Kumarila, Sumati proceeds to criticise the view of Buddhist Acaryas, especially, that of Santaraksita. As we have seen, Santarksita, a follower of Dharmakirit, defines perception as knowledge free from conceptual contents and not erroneous.93 He tires to prove his theory by means of inference and establishes that the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa (indeterminte preception) is the only real perception. Santaraksita further clarifies his own view by citing examples. He says: in case a thing has no particular form, it cannot be accepted as a particular thing. For instance, the white house owing to different charactristics cannot be mistaken for a cow. It is the same case with the perception.94

Here in this definition the kalpana is the main figure which has been defined in various ways by Buddhist Philosophers. Santaraksita defined it as visistavisayavabodhah (knowledge of qualified object.) Sumati is said to be against this view. He argues that a thing cannot be qualified without having a eonnection-with the qualifications, as in the case of a stick (danda) and the stick-holder (dandin). Hence the cognition which apprehends the qualifications (visesata) is conceptual (savikalpaka).95 He again draws our attention to this defect of self-contradiction in this theory pointing out that if there is always the apprehension of the things as distinguished from homogeneous (sajatiya) and heterogeneous (vijatiya) things, then the apprehension would becom determinate (savikalpaka) for it can be conveyed "this is different". Otherwise how does it apprehend the difference between things.96

Sumati pointed out another defect in the Buddhist theory. He asserts that there is no particular (vises a) without a touch of the universal (Samanya). It cannot be argued in his opinion that the universal or "being" is not touched at all by the sense-perception at the time of apprehension, because in this position the particular would be devoid of existence and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by sense-perception, because it would be devoid of "being" and become like the sky-flower (akasakusuma).97 Thus Sumati is of the view that the particular is perceived with the character of the universal.

All Jaina logicians have tried to refute the Buddhist theory of sense-perception following in the footsteps of Sumati. Akalanka is the main figure to raise the question in this respect. Adding the adjectives anadhigatarthagrahin, arisamvadin, and visada to the existing definition of perception98 he established that the Nirvikalpaka pratyksa gets transormed into the savikalpaka is the pramana.99 Later on most of the Jaina logicians such as Acarya prabhacandra,100 Anantavirya,101 Vadiraja, Vidyananda,102 imitated him and elaborated his ideas to refute the opponent's views.102
Refutation of the Jaina conception of savikalpaka

Pratyaksa by Santraksita

The Jaina conception of Savikalpaka Pratyaksa has been refuted by the Buddhist philosophers. Santaraksita, even having defined perception as lucid knowledge without reflection (kalpana) criticised the view of Sumati on the ground that an entity does not have any particualr qualities by which it can be differentiated at the moment of apprehension. He thus sought to assert that there is no particular thing at all. But the particular characteristic of a thing is implicit in his classification of the universal (Samanya) into two types, viz. (i) distinguished by qualifications, and (ii) not distinguished by qualifications. The first is Nirvikalpaka, and next is Savikalpaka pratyksa (conceptual-preception). The former is the real pratyaksa while the latter is practical.

On this basis, Santaraksita presents two arguments to refute Sumati's theory. The first is that an entity does not possess any characters by which it can be differentiated. We see a thing first and then realise it as a pot or any particular thing. When the thing is apprehended, the nagation of all other things comes forth naturally. Hence, the non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) in the specific form of colour, shape, etc. appears and then there follows the conceptual content (vikalpatmaka jnana) associated with the words it is different.103

Here the words do not lead to cognition. The reason behind this is that the specific individuality (svalaksanavastutva) itself is independent of the words. The perception generated by them also should be deprived of the words. The words do not have any relation with the meaning. In the absence of words a thing exists, and in the absence of a thing we use the words, which are dependent on gestures and intentions. There is, therefore, no possibility of words in the Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. The second argument which Santaraksita puts forth is that in particular thing there should be no other characteristics except that of the "Particular".104

Thus, whatever cognition appears with regard to the "specific individuality" of things it beyond the range of words and is hence non-conceptual perception. In his opinion, the lucidity and determination in the savikalpaka pratyksa is not its own characteristic, but it really comes from nirvikalpaka pratpaksa. After a moment of nirvikalpaka pratyksa, the sarikalpaka pratyaksa is generated and the ascertainment and lucidity of a thing which comes from nirvikalpaka prataksa appears to be of savikalpaka pratyaksa. In this manner savikalpaka pratyaksa also determinates a thing and is called perception from a practical viewpoint (vyavahara), but the real perception is only the non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception.

In the above criticism Santaraksita's Main arguments are that the nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is the real pratyaksa and a thing cannot be both universal and particular. Both these arguments are met by the later Jaina Acaryas. They say that the nirvikalpaka jnana of the Buddhists is the formless perception which is not capable of determinating the nature of a thing. Therofore, it is determinate (Sakara) and lucid (visada), and could be accepted as a pramana.

It appears that to refute the validity of the Veda, the Buddhist philosophers denied the real relation between the words and their meanings. All sorts of knowledge gernerated in connection with words which are not supported by the nirvikalpaka, are declared to be invalid. As a matter of fact Buddhism also acccepts Savikalpaka Pratyaksa. In the Vibhanga.105 Knowledge (jnana) is divided into two types Cognitative (Savitakka) and Non-cognitative (Avitakka). Both these types are similar to Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyksa.
The object of perception

We have mentioned earlier that the pratyksa is of two kinds, viz. Samvyavaharika (knowledge obtained through the senses and mind) and Parmarthika pratyaksa (knowledge obtained by the sould itself, without the help of the senses and the mind). The object of perception is realted to both types of perception.

The validity of Pramana in Jain philosophy is based on the nature of things, It asserts that a reality is a multitude of atoms and possesses a characteristic of being substance-cum-mode (dravyaparyayatmakam). The permanence-in-change is its common nature, Out of six substances the jiva, dharma, adharma, akasa, and Kala are said to be perceived only by the omniscient who has the parmarthik pratyaksa while the mundane souls perceive the objects of inference, not of sense-generated perception. The rest pudgala dravya is a subject to be perceived by mundane souls through sense-generated perception (indriyajanya pratyaksa).

Jainism is absolutely realistic in nature. Each atom or reality, in its conception is quite indestructible and independent and always changes into different modes. This system is both natural and eternal. The whole universe continues in this way. There is no need to postulate a creator-god to explain the origin and evolution of the universe.

In connection with the examination of the external world, Santaraksita refers to the view of Sumati, He says the atoms have two qualities, General (Samanya) and Particular (Visesa.) The objects perceived by sense-organs possess the general character. These objects are conglomerations of atoms which appear as an entity with a shape and size. The true quality of atoms is known only by the emancipated one who attained the paramarthika Pratyaksa or Yogipratyaksa.106

This conception is made more clear in the Syadvadamanjari. It is said that atoms which are co-related generate paryayas. They have infinite and continuous changes which depend on the types of contact or relation with others. For instance, when the atoms of the soil come into contact with each other, they become compact and with their becoming compact produce a pot. This process does not come about due to external pressure but is the result of an internal connection with each other. Therefore Jaina philosophy does not assert the extra avayavidravyas.

As regards the existence of atoms, we have both, Pratyaksa and Anumana. We see the atoms in the form of a pot (ghata). The atoms, that cannot be perceived by ordinary men due to their minuteness, are perceived by the Yogins. By inference also the Jainas try to prove the existence of atoms. The body itself is a mass of atoms wherein they get combined by such forces as time and cause the gross body107.