Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

Thus the above mentioned references to Acelaka's practices in Pali literature are related in many respects to the practices of Jaina monachism.
Supernatural Powers

Supernatural powers of Jaina monks are referred to in Jaina literature.100 But they were prohibited to show them in public for such purposes as obtaining food.101 Later on, certain occasions the Jaina monks were allowed to make us of such powers.102 Acarya Smantabhadra103 and Siddhasena Divakar104 are famous for displaying such supernatural powers.

The Vinaya Pitaka105 mentions that the six heretical teachers including Nigantha Nataputta approached a great merchant of Rajagaha to get a bowl. But all of them failed and Pindola Bharadwaja, a follower of the Buddha, fetched it down. Likewise, the Digha Nikaya refers to an incident where a Nigantha failed in manifesting the supernatural powers which he claimed. How far these references are correct, we cannot say. But the Jaina literature, does not preserve any record of such incidents which could tally with these references in Pali literature.
Daily routine

As regards the routine of a Jaina monk, he is supposed to spend more time in study and meditation. He gets up early in the morning and pays his homage to the Pancaparamesthins during Samayika or Kayotsarga. Besides begging and preaching he engages himself in the performance of duties without transgressions. His duties are to observe the Pancamahavratas, pancasamitis, Sadavasyakas Pancendriyas Dvadasanupreksas, twenty two Parisahas, Pancacaras, and Triguptis. References to them as found in the Pali literature are as follows:

rere as follows:

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The Samannaphala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya mentions the Catuyamasamvre are as fre as fore asre as follows:

The Samannaphala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya mentions the Catuyre as followre as follows:

Thre as re as followsre as follows:

The s avoided.

This is undoubtedly a very faint picture of Nigantha Nataputta's doctrine. Buddhaghosa's Sumangalavilasini also does not help much in this respect. Jacobi remarks: "This is certainly, neither an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Jaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it and successfully imitates the language of the Jaina Sutras." He further says that "The Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nataputta Mahavira's doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Parsva. This is a signiflcant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Niganthas creed unless they had heard it from followers of Parsva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahavira had already been generally adopted by the Niganthas at the time of the Buddha."108

There are several versions of the Samannaphala Sutta different from each other. For instance, the Tibetan Dulva retains Nigantha Nataputta's authentic teaching of wiping and karma by penance, while in one of its Chinese versions date 412-13 A.D. Nigantha Nataputta claims omniscience, and in another Chinese version dated 381-395 A.D., he is mentioned to hold the view of karma.109 Basham thinks that SamannaphalaSutta shows a completeness and consistency lacking in the rest, and perhaps represents the original source of the other references"110 This, however, does not seem to be quite correct. As a matter of fact, the Caluyamasamvara followed by Parsvanatha tradition comprised: (i) Sarvapranatipataveramana, (ii) Sarvamrsavadaveramana, (iii) Sarvadattadanaveramana, and (iv) Sarvabahiddhadanaveramana. Here the Maithuna (sexual intercourse and Parigraha (worldly attachment) were included in the last vow, that is Sarvabahiddhadanaveramana.

In course of time its real meaning was forgotton and the followers of Parsvanatha tradition or Pasavaccijja considered the Sarvabahiddhadanaveramana (Parigraha) as concerned only, with wealth, and not sexual desires. As a result, they did not consider the Strisamibhoga to be a falt if it is done for getting a son.113 This is the reason why one was advised not to have contact with them.114

Observing this slackened conduct, Nigantha Nataputta separated the last into two vow viz. Brahmacarya (celibacy) and Aparigraha (non-attachment to the worldly enjoyment), and made it into five. Since then the Jainas are called the followers of five great vows (Pancamahavratas).115 It seems, as we have already seen that the Pali Canon was also familiar with Pancamahavratas.

The Majjhima Nikaya111 describes the kind of language which should be used by a Jaina monk. It is said there that "Nigantha Nataputta sent Abhayarajakumara to the Buddha to ask a question whether he (the Buddha) utters a speech that is disliked by others, or disagreeable to them. If he speaks so, what is the difference between him and a common man." This indicates that according to Nigantha Nataputta no monk should speak harshaly.117

Among the Sadavsyakas, only the Kayotsarga * is referred to in Pali literatute. In the Majjhima Nikaya118 the Buddha told Mahanama that while he was staying at Rajagaha, he had seen a number of Niganthas on the Isigili Kalasila standing erect, refraining from sitting, and experiencing acute, painful, sharp and bitter sensations.

This reference indicates the Kayotsarga or Samayika as prescribed for the Jaina monks. It should be performed without movement of or attachment to the body (sthitasyasinasya sarvangacalanarahitasya subhadhyanasya vrttih Kayotsargah,119

Loca or Kesaluncana

One should pull out his hair of head and beard in five handfuls with intervals of two, three or four months following a upavasa and Pratikramana.120 Before the attainment of Buddhahood, Prince siddhartha had himself observed this rule. He says, "I was one who plucked out the hairs of head and beard intent on the practice of doing so (kesamassulocako hoti, kesamassulocananuyogamauuyutto).121
Acelakatva

Acelakatva (nakedness) with non-attachment to anything is essential to attain salvation.122 According to the Majjhima Nikaya123, the Buddha, too, followed this rule before attaining Buddhahood.
Triguptis

Trigupti is the essence of a monk's creed to which he should thoroughly adher to destroy karmas.124 The Niganthas, who were engaged in severe penance on Gijjhakutapabbata at Rajagaha said to the Buddha that according to Nigantha Nataputta, the past deeds could be destroyed by preserving the proper control over the mind, body, and speech (yam panetha etarahi kayena sambuta; vacaya samvuta, manasa samvuta tam ayatim papassa kammassa akaranam.......). As its corollary it is said that the kayadanda, vacidanda and manodanda are said to be the causes of sins.125

Meditation126 (dhyana) and concentration (samadhi) are fundamental obligations of a Jaina monk. Meditation is of four kinds, namely Artadhyana (painful concentration) Raudra dhyana (wicked concentration), Dharmadhyana (righteous concentration) and Sukladhyana (pure concentration). The first two are the causes of bondage to the karmas, while the last two lead to salvation,127 The severe penance observed by the Niganthas at Rajagaha was to attain the last two dhyanas, for which the self-realization was essential. The regular study, the right conduct, right attitude, and non-attachment, are the factors which pave the way to Dharmadhyana.128 The Sukladhyana contributes to the steadiness of the mind which ultimately results in the attainment of omni science.

Thus the reference to Jaina ethics as found in Pali literature are, though meagre and sometimes defective, very important. From our survey of these references, we may conclude that:

(i) Catuyamasamvara was followed by the Parsvanatha tradition, and not Nigantha Nataputta tradition, and the Buddha and his followers were not perfectly aware of this difference in the two traditions.

(ii) Nigantha Nataputta separated the last vow of Catuyamasamvara into two Brahmacarya and Parigraha, which was known to the Pali Canon,

(iii) The Gunavratas and Siksavratas were so popular among both the monks and the laity that their nature and implications were well known to Buddhist circles.

(iv) Acelakatva and other severe forms of penance were put into practice in Jaina community during that period, and Jainism had already acquired a fame for the severity of its vows and observences.
CHAPTER IV

JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

1-Pratyaksa Pramana (Direct Knowledge)
Logical discussions

Epistemology evolved as a result of logical discussions. Such discussions and debates as the sceptics and sophists engaged in, in ancient Greece, were prevalent in Ancient India. They aimed at defending their own theories while refuting those of their opponents.

The Sutta Nipata, which is supposed to be one of the earliest parts of the Pali Scripture, states that such debates took place among the Sramanas1 and Brahamanas2. Sometimes the Titthiyas (including Ajivikas and Niganthas)3, the so called Vadasilas (habituate in the debate), have also been associated with these debates.4

All these debates are named takki5 or takkika.6 In Pali literature the ten possible ways of claiming knowledge have been criticised by the Buddha in addressing Kalama.7 One of them is called "takka-hetu" which has been explained in the Commentary as "takka-gahena" (addhering to reason)8. This takki-hetu appears to be closely realated to pramana or epistemological or logical ground, which is perhaps used first by Umasvami, Jaina Acarya of about the 1st century A.D.9 The word hetu is also referred to in this sense in the Bhagwati Sutra (336) and the Thanangasutra (309-10).

Such discussions were held for the sake of gaining triumph in arguments or to defend religions. The debaters used the vada, jalpa and vitanda forms which are teh classifications of katha or discussion in the Nyaya tradition. Pali literature also makes similar references to this classification. The Sutta Nipata mentions the vada12, katha13 and vitanda.14 Buddhaghose associates this vitandasattha with the Brahmanas, while the Saddaniti refers to the Titthiyas. It shows the vitanda was utilized at that time by all schools of thought, since the term Titthiya was applied to both the samanas and the Brahamanas.

The discussion through which knowledge is gained about doctrines is called the Vada; that which is only for gaining victory over the opponents is Jalpa; the debate where the quibbles (chala) analogues (jati) and respondent's failures (nigrahasthana) are utilized to vanquish the opponent is called vitanda in Nyaya system and was used to defend their own views by right or wrong means.15

The Buddhist tradition also could not escape being influenced by this practice. The old logical compenda like the Upayahrdaya, Tarkasastra, etc. appear to have allowed the use of quibbles analogues etc. for the specific purpose of protecting the Buddhist order, but Dharmakirti, realising that it was not in keeping with the high standards of truth and non-violence, completely denied their usage in the Vadanyaya. Hence, Dharmakirti refers the qualities of the debater who speaks more or less than necessary. Therefore he acepts only the two Nigrahasthanas, Asadhananga and Adosodbhavana for vadi as well as prativadi.16

The Jainas, on the other hand, lay more stress on truth and non-violence. They think of the Vitanda as Vitandabhasa.17 Akalanka rejects even the Asadhananga and Adosodbhavana in view of the fact that they are themselves the subjects of discussion. He then says: a defendant should himself indicate the real defects in the established theory of a disputant and then set up his own theory.18 Thus he should consider each item from the point of view of truth and non-violence.

The above fact is supported by Pali literature which contains references to the logical discussions of that period. Some adherents of Jainism had also participated in such discussions. Saccaka, Abhaya and Asibandhakaputta Gamini are the main characters who took an active part in them.

Saccaka is described in the Nikayas as one who indulged in debate, a learned, controversialist, who was highly esteemed by the common people.19 He is said to have debated with all the six teachers, including even Mahavira (Nigantha Nataputta), although Saccaka was a staunch follower of Nigantha Nataputta. This may imply that he was a follower of the Parsvanatha tradition. But as Nigantha Nataputta became a Tirthankara of Jainism, Saccaka would have examined him through discussions and then accepted his religion, which was nothing but the refarmation of the Parsvanatha tradition. Saccaka boasts about his dialaectical skillin magniloquent language and speaks to the Licchavis at Vaisali: "To-day there will be a conversation between me and recluse Gautama. If Gautam takes up his stand against me, even as a powerful man, having taken hold of the fleece of a long fleeced ram, might tug it towards him," Further it has been mentioned there that the Buddha had asked a question which could not be replied by Saccaka. And the result was that he became a follower of the Buddha.20

Another reference is recorded in the Abhayrajakumara Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya21 to the effect that Abhayarajakumara was sent by Nigantha Nataputta to ask a question from the Buddha about his speech, as to whether the Tatha. gata utters unpleasant words and is unkind to others.

The statement that "Abhaya was sent by Nigantha Nataputta" is not supported by Jaina literature. Whatever its reason, the fact is evident that the Jainas participated actively in discussions and tried to indicate the defects of others religious utterence made about the future of Devadatta. Abhaya then went to inquire as to how far he was correct in his view. He does not appear to have questioned merely with the idea of imputing faults to his opponent's theory. This seems to be the first and most fundamental principle of Jaina conception of logical discussions of that period. The propositional question put by Abhaya Rajakumara to the Buddha is as follows:

(i) Would the Buddha make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others? (bhaseyya nu kho......Tathagato tam vacam ya sa vaca paresam appiya amanapa).

(ii) If so, how is he different from the ordinary individual who also makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others? (atha kincarahi......puthujjanena nakaranam, puthujjano pi hi tam vacam bhaseyya, ya sa vaca paresam appiya amanapa).

(iii) The Buddha would not make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (na Tathagato tam vacam bhasati ya sa vaca paresam appiya):

(iv) Then why has he pronounced about Devadatta that he is doomed to hell......that he is incorrigible (atha kincarahi.....Devadatto byakato: a payiko Devadatto vyakato; apayiko Devadatta atekicco Devadatto)?

Here Abhaya tried to show that the Buddha made a self-contradictory statement. Likewise, Asibandhakaputta Gamani22 a follower of Nigantha Nataputta made the following remarks about the Buddha as he understood him:

(i) The Buddha in various ways speaks showing compassion to people (Bhagava anekapariyayena kulanam anuddayam vanneti).

(ii) The Buddha during a famine......goes about with a large number of disciples and behaves in a way detrimental to the interest of people (Bhagava dubbhikkhe......mahata bhikkusanghena saddhim carikam carati, ucchedaya Bhagava kulanam patipanno).

The questions asked by Abhaya Rajakumara and Asibandhakaputta Gamani are based on such type of framed questions: If he qestioned thus and he answers thus, we shall join issue (vadam) with him thus."23 They are called "dupadam penham or "ubhayatokotikam panham" (dilemmas)24 As a matter of fact, these are the conditional questions, which would have been thought out or taught before embarking on a dispute.

The Jaina attitude to these debates and discussions was that they were meant only to investigate the real defects in opponents theories. There were not allowed to gain a victory through evil means, like quibbling, analogues, power and so on. That is why Vitanda is considered Vitandabhasa in Jainism.25 The Buddha himself appreciates the attitude of such Panditas and agrees with them on other matters.26 He called them Vinnu or intelligent persons who are supposed to be hypothetical rational critics.27 They used to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of the relative worth of conflicting theories.28 On the basis of the above view the later Jaina philosophers established the definition and means of debates. Akalanka is perhaps the first to point out clearly such definitions. He says that if one is capable of establishing his own view (paksa) through right devices, it is Jaya (victory) for him and Parajaya (defeat for the other.29

The Buddhist philosohical literature which developed later, has not mentioned any discussions and refutations of Jaina conception in this connection. This may be due to the fact that both philosophies had similar rules and regulations regarding such dabates, except for a few differences (especially in the case of Nigrahasthanas).

Epistemology and Logic are mainly concerned with the validity of knowledge and have been subjects of controversy among philosophers from time immemorial.

The Buddha classified such thinkers into three groups in a Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. It is said there that a Brahmana student went to ask the Buddha "in which category he stands". The Buddha replied "there are some recluses and Brahamanas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight (ditthadhammabhin navosonaparamippatta) into this life. "where does the venerable Gorama stand among them?" The Buddha replied "I say that there is a distinction among those who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life. There are some recluses and Brahmanas who are traditionalists (anussavika), who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life, such as the Brahmanas of the three Vedas (tevijja). There are also some recluses and Brahamanas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life on mere faith alone (kevalam saddha mattakena) such as the reasoners (takki) and metaphysicians (vimamsi, lit. speculators). There are some other recluses and Brahmanas who profess their dogmas after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by assimilating a higher knowledge (ditthadhammabhinnavosanaparamippatta) personally (samam Yeva) of a doctrine (dhamam) among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. Now I am one of those who profess the basis of their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before"30.

This reference seeks to classify the pre-Buddhist and contemporary thinkers into three groups: (i) the Traditionalists (anussavika), who obtained knowledge on the basis of their scripture and interpreted it according to them. The Brahmanas or the followers of the Vedas are enumerated in this group. (ii) The Rationalists or Reasoners (takki) who gained knowledge through reasons. Sceptics, and Materialists come under this group, and (iii) Experientialists, who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience (Samam Yeva). Jainas, Buddhists, and Ajivikas would fall into this category.

Like the Buddha, Nigantha Nataputta is said to have professed his doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight by gaining a higher knowledge personally, not traditionally heard of before. That is why he emphasised more on knowledge rather than belief. (Saddhaya kho Gahapati jnanam yeva panitataram).31 It is reported that he claimed to have perfect knowledge (sabbannu) and vision (sabbadassabi). This insight can be obtained after attaining Right Vision (Samyagdarsana), Right-Knowledge (Samyagjnana), and Right Conduct (Samyagcaritra).32 Right view in the seven principles (Jiva or soul, Ajiva or matter, Asrava or inflow of karmas, Bandha or bondage of karmas, Samvara or checking of karmas, Nirjara or shedding of karmas, and Moksa or complete liberation from karmas) is the Samyagdarsana, which is the basis of Right knowledge (Samyagjnana). Purification of the attitude is regarded as the sine qua non of the purification of knowledge and conduct. While Darsanamoha (delusion of vision) destroys, immediately after Right Vision and Right Knowledge emerge. Then through Right Conduct one can attain the Perfect knowledge, the so-called Kevalajnana or Sarvajnatva in Jainism.33
Knowledge and Vision (Jnana and Darsana)

In Jainism, knowledge and vision or jnana and darsana or omniscience are the result of penance (tapa) and contemplation (dhyana).33 That is why Nataputta is called Jnanavadin in the Anguttara Nikaya (aham anantena nanena anantam lokam janam passam viharami).34

According to Jaina literature, Jnana or cetana (consciousness) also called Upayoga, is the main characteristic of soul in Jainology.35 This upayoga is of two kinds, viz. sakara (determinate) and anakara (indeterminate). The former is called janana, while the latter is darsana. Sakara upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge, viz. Matjjnana (sensitive knowledge), Srutajnana (scriptural knowledge), Avadhi jnana (visual knowledge), Manahparyaya jnana (mental knowledge) and Kevalajnana (perfect knowledge). Anakara upayoga is divided into four classes, viz. Caksudarsanavarana (non-obscuring), Acaksudarsanavarana (non-ocular-obscuring), Avadhidarsanavarana (visual-obscuring), and the Kevaladarsanavarana (perfect-conation-obscuring). Consciousness develops into the two forms, knowledge and vision (jnanakara and Jneyakara).36 We can say that jnana is determinate knowledge (sakara jnana) and darsana is indeterminate knowledge (anakara jnana). This is the distinction between jnana and darsana. According to the Prajnapana Sutra also both upayoga and pasyatta can be sakara as well as anakara.

Acarya Kundakunda mentions the view of his predecessors that vision reveals the self (ditthi appapayasayaceva). Hence, he considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint37 and concludes that the soul and its knowledge and vision are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.

Virasena considers reality as a complex of universal-cum-particular and says in his commentary called Dhavala on the satkhandagama of Puspadanta that jnana comprehends external meaning of the nature of reality, while darsana is the comprehension of the true form of that nature.39 That means jnana reveals the external reality while darsana intuits its internal characteristics. Siddhasena Divakara defines vision (darsana) as an apprehension of samanya and knowledge (jnana) as an apprehension of visesa jam samannaggahanam damsanameyam visesiyam nanam).40 By this time the defination of darsana had been developed to mean the apprehension of samanya of an entity.