Book Jainism in Buddhist Literature Author Dr. Hiralal Jain

The well-known reference of the Majjhima Nikaya to the severe panance of Jainas indicates the state of moksa according to Jaina philosophy. The Buddha says that...by severe penance all the sufferings will be destroyed (sabbamdukkhamnijjimmam bhavissati). The means the freedom from all karmic matter is moksa or Salvation according th Jainism.⁹¹ Kundakunda says: that if the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. When the springs of karmas thus get blocked the dravay karmas get repulsed. When the dravay karmas completely disappeat. the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of lite:

Hedumbhave niyama jayadi nanissa asavanirodho.

Asavabhavena vina jayadi kammassa bu nirodho.

Kammassabhavena va savvanhu savvaloya dassi ya.

Pavade indiyarahidam avvavaham suhamanantam ⁹²

Nature of Universe

The common topics, which ate said to have been debated by th Samanas Brahmanas and Pariabajakas, are referred to in Pali literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of Universe also appears to be recorded in the Brahmhjala sutta. The four different propsitions maintained by contemporary teachers in this connection are as follows ⁹³:
(I) This world is finite and circumscribed (antava ayam liko pariyanto)

(ii) It is infinite and without limit (anantava ca ayam loko apariyanto)

(iii) It is both finite and infinite (antava ca ayam loko apariyanto)

(iv) It is neiter finite nor infinite (nveayam loko antava na panananto)

The third theory appears to be the view of Nigantha Nataputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests on!y that the limited or unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the eontemplator in his mently perception ro vision,⁹⁴. Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the stand-ppoint of wubstance (dravua) and place (^ksetra), the world is limited and from the standpoint of kala and bhava it is wnlimited.

Records of theories held at the time have been repeated severla times in pali literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been mentioned ferore. The later Buddhist provides us with more data in this respect. It indicates a development of the concept under discussion.

Santaraksita refers to a view of Acarya Suri, a Jaina philosopher, in the course of refuting the doctrine of the "thing by itself" (svabhavavada), which thrown light on the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know first the contezt on which it is based. It provides a common grund to the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of Svabhavavada. According to this doctrine, as shown in the Tattasangraha and other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any other things. They ate not dependent on causes. To prove this theory the holder of this view queries, "Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filament? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created. Such arguments can be raised about other things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn of any other thing must be regarded as nunaused, since they are around us due to the influence of nature.⁹⁵

Against this view, Santaraksita argues that if you do not postulate any cause, your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Acarya Suri. He says that Acary Sure, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same objection in the theory of "thing by itself", as he says, "One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion, it he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained by mere assertion? ⁹⁶

Here the wiew of Suri refereed to by Santaraksita appeats to be in coformity with Jainism. The theoty of Svabhavao vada is accurate as far as the opposition to the theoty that a God controls the universe is concerned, but if it carries the meaning of ahetukavada, it cannot be admitted by the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other material also. For instance, the alay can produce the jar, but it also depends on the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotus comes out of mud, which is a cauwe of its fragrance and beauty. Therefore, the view that only nature (svabhava) is responsible for the origination of thins, is inadmissible to the Jainism. The Sutrakrtanga also criticises the view of Svabhavavada:
Kah kantakanam prkaroti taiksnyam,

Vicitrabhavam mrgapaksinan ca.

Svabhavatah satvamidam pravrttam,

Na kamacarosti kutah prayatnah 97

The main ground for establishimg this principle is that the perception of a thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, asstated by Acarya Aryadeva in his philosophical work Catuhsataka, "the corpse of a woman is considered in varius forms, The sage considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the other hand. perceives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world is nothing but only the fiction of imagioation. If it is not so, reality should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole wniverse without any sort of sankeka or samskara,

In this context Santaraksita refers to the view of sumati and then fefutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Acarya Sumati ⁹⁸ argues accordimgly that Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms,viz the common and wucommon. Of these the common form is apprehended by the senses and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be held to be amenable to mystic perception." That means the compendium of atoms, the so called Skandha is the univeerse, which we perceive, and the atoms, which are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by us are perceived by the ommiscient.

Thus the external world in the view of Jainism is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception fo an entity which represents the external world is based on knowlege of feeling. since an entity has different names it can be fictitious but its existence cannot be ignored. The entity is paramartha sat like knowledge or vujnanas. Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on knowledge. The ordinary man, but it does not mean that they ate not tn existence. ⁹⁹.

Santaraksita does not agtee with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumpti0ons of some dull witted persons (durmatayat) He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be differdnt from each other. It cannot, therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the nost towching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely defferent from the universatl form, there would be a possibility of the fromer being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could not be the cleat cut distinction that "The common form is anenable to sense cognition and the wneommon form is amenable to mystic cognition."¹⁰⁰

The above objections are met by the jaina philosophers. They say that from the point of view of dravayarthikanaya, reality is the same but from the paryayarthikanaya standpoint its modes are differednt from each other. On the basis of the conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for selfconteadiction.¹⁰¹

The Nature of word

Santaraksita in the Tattvasangraha refers to a view of the Mimamsakas regarding the nature of the word with the idea of establishing his own theory. The mimamsakas hold the view that the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Vede. Therefore it is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin (apauruseya). In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of werd Among them the Jainas are said to have hele the view that the word is atomic in character (audgalo Digambaraih) ¹⁰² Inthe following karika two types of words are mentioned, vez Universal (Samanya) and particular (visesa) which ate the main features of the Jaina conception of reality.

While the establishing of his own viewm Santaraksita criticised the mimamsakas' conception, but he ded not refute the Jaina conception separately. He proved the falsity of the common types of words while criticising the view of the Mimamskas. He set up a theory that the Veda is not an authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in chatacter and non-eternal in form.

As regards the divine origing of the Veda (apauruseyavada) both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers of noe and the same path. The arguments against the Mimamskas' view are based on their own fundamental principles, and therefore, they differ in some places.

The Buddhists say that words are not representative of their meanings, because they are used even for denoting the past and future realities. If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think that the word signifies only the inaginary universalised reality ¹⁰³

In the other hand, the jainas postulate a theory that words are of two kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the existence of the external world, the6y would be meaningless and therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible.¹⁰⁴ Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects, viz,Skandhas, skandhadesas skandhapradesas, and paramanas, Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom which constitus the other three classes. ¹⁰⁵ The atom cannot be divided (paramanu ceva avibhage).¹⁰⁶ Sound is generated by skandhas when they strike against one another.The sound produces by skandhas may be natural (svabhavika) or artificial (prayogika.)¹⁰⁷ Thunder of cloud and the roar of the sea are natural sound while the artiflcial sond is purposeful which is divided into two types, bhasatmaka (language) and abhasatmaka (non-language). The languate sound again may be aksaratmaka (articulate) and anaksaratmaka (inarticulate). The aksaratmaka sound is made up of alphabetical sounds while the anaksaratmaka is the language of animals. Anaksaratmaka sounes are of four kinds, viz. (i) tata sound produced by musical instruments covered by leather, (ii) vitata sound produced by vina etc, (iii) ghana produced by metallic instruments like tala, etc, and (iv) sausire produced by wind-instruments. ¹⁰⁸ These sounds can be heard and recognized as they are paudagalika.

(3,4,6) Dharma, Adharma, and Kala Dravyas

There are no references to dharma, adharma, and Kala Dravayas in Pali literature. The Darmastikaya is almost similar to the paticcasamuppada (dependent origination) of the Buddhists, but the adharmatikaya is quite unknown to them the kala dravya is recognized in Budhism in the form of prajnaptimatra in the Atthasalim. ¹⁰⁹

(5) Akasa Dravya

A reference is made to the jaina conception of akasa in the Tattvasangraha by the Mimamsaks. Santaraksita raised a question against the Mimamsakas' view regarding the eternality ot works like ghata (jar). They say that if the auditory organ is akasa, several objections could be brought against this theory. For instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the basis of the auditory organ? The Mimamsakas try to reply that akasa cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therfore it is the auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the Sankhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ consisting of parts (jainairarhataih Sankhyaissca miravavayavasya vyomah nisiddhatvat110).

Santaraksita and Kamalasila refute this view. They urge that if the divisible akasa is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view "the indivisible akasa is eternal" would become applicable.¹¹¹ The defects pointed out by Santaraksita in this theory are as follows. If akasa is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form "this is the same. Another argument, in support of thid idea, is presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need to the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from the etetnal source, should all appear simultaneoulsy. Therefore, he concludes that akasa is neither eternal nor consists of parts.¹¹² In the Abhidharma-kosa akasa (1.5) is enumerated in the asamskrta dharmas and described as "without covering" (tatrakasamanavrttih).¹¹³ According to Buddhaghosa, akasa is inflnite.¹¹⁴

The Jainas are of veiew that akasa is eternal and consists of parts (savayava) and having infinite parts or pradesas it provides to Jiva and ajiva. The etymology of akasa itself indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or penetrate itself.¹¹⁵ This entering or peneteration is expressed by the word avagaha.¹¹⁶ Different places occupy different locations of akasa. Its mani foldness connotes, as in the case of matter itself, its possession of parts.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

This brief account of the Jaina phiosophy as found in Buddhist literature shows us that:--

(i) the six dravyas and seven Tattvas of Jainism were known to early Pali literature and further refuted in Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.

(ii) Among the sixty two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the Brahmajalasutta and some other places in the Pali Canon. The Jaina view is described as both Ucchedavada and sassatavada.

(iii) According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of consciousness.

(iv) Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in arelationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation.

(v) Kayadanda is more heinous that Manodanda, if a wrong deed is committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.

(vi) The destruction of karms depends on triyoga and severe penance with right understanding.

(vii) Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms.

(viii) Word is atomic in charcater, and

(ix) Akasa (space) is eternal and consists of parts.

These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jaina Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.

CHAPTER III

Emanicipation through the removal of karmic matter from the soul is attainable only through righteous living according to ethical discipline. One should abstain from the five faults (pancapapa) viz, injury (himsa), falsehood (asatya), stealing (steya), unchastity (abrahma) and wordly attachment (parigraha)1. These vows are of two kinds: Partial vows (Anuvratas) or limited abstention from the five aforesaid faults and Full vows (Mahavratas) or total abstention from five faults. The former is prescribed for house-holders and the latter for ascetics. Five kinds or training (bhavana) have been prescribed for each of these vows for the sake of securing stability in them2.

The above-mentined five vratas have been unanimously accepted by the Acaryas, on the basis of Pratimas of Vratas or Paksa, Carya and Sadhana. The difference of opinion is only with regard to the Gunavratas, Siksavratas, Mulagunas and Pratimas. The great Acarya kundakunda described house-holder's duties on the basis of Pratimas. He simply presented the names of Gunavratas e. g. dik parimana, anarthadanadavarjana and Siksavratas e. g. samayika prosadha, atithipuja and sallehana. Svami Kartikeya followed his line but placed desavakasika in place of sallekhana-Vasunandi included sallekhana in Siksavratas. These Acaryas described neither Astamula gunas nor aticaras of vratas.

Acarya Umasvami and Samantabhandra are prominent figures among those who described the house-holders duties on the basis of twelve vratas. Umasvami divided Vrati into two e. g. Agari who follows anuvratas and Anagari who follows Mahavratas. He took pains to describe the aticaras of each vrata but did not refer to Astamulagunas and pratimas. He might have followed the tradition of Upasakdasasoutra. Umasvami could not recognize the names of vratas given given by Kunda-kunda. He changed them into Di gvrata, desavrata and anarthadandavrata in Gunavratas and samayika, prosadhopavasa, upabhogaparibhogaparimana and atithisamvibhaga in Siksavratas. Desavakasika has been included into gunavrtas and bhogopabhogaparimana into Siksavratas. Samanatabhadra borrowed his views from kundakunda, Kartikeya and Umasvami and put them in a reviewed ways. He regarded desavakasik as a part of siksavrtas and placed Vaiyavratya in place of sallekhana. He is perhaps the first Acarya who presented Mulagunas in the Ratnakarandakasravakacara.

Jinasena represents those Acaryas who described the house-holder's duties on the basis of paksa. carya and sadhana in the Adipurana. Later Acaryas followed either of these three traditions. The pali literature does not mention any of these controvertial names of vratas. We can therefore come to the conclusion that at the time of parsvanatha or Nigantha Nataputta no such tradition was in force.

The five faults are the causes of recurrent births and therefore they are personified as "Dukkha" (pain) itself. For the sake of removing such dukkha, one should meditate upon the benevolence (maitri) for all living beings, delight in looking at better qualified beings (promoda), compassion (karunya) for the afflicted, and indifference to both praise and blame (madhyastha avinayaesu).3

The Samannaphala Sutta of the Dighanikaya refers to the Catuyamasamvara as a ppart of the doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta. This is not an accurate record, for Catuyamasamvara is of Parasvanatha, and not in the doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta We shall discuss this matter later on. The four vows of Parasvanatha were revised by Nigantha Nataputta who found it necessary to specify Brahmacarya as a separate vow in view of the laxity he observed among the followers of Parsvanatha. Nigantha Nataputta, thus, established a discipline based on five vows as opposed to that a Parsvanatha4. The Buddhist circles were apparently unaware of this innovation by Nigantha nataputta.

Asibandhakaputta Gamini, a Jaina house-holder, goes to see the Buddha at Nalanda. In response to a question of the Buddha he says: Nigantha Nataputta teaches a doctrine to his laymen (Savaka) according to which a slayer of living creature (panam ati pateti), one who steals (adinnam adiyati), one who indulges in sensual pleasures wrongly (kamesu miccha carati, and one who tells a lie (musa bhanati), would go to the purgatory (so apayiko nerayiko). In short his destiny depends on the life he leads.5

The above reference deals with the vows of house-holders who are said to be followers of Nigantha Nataputta, but the vows recorded are four and not five in number. Another remarkable point is that "Kusila" which was separated from parigraha in the form of Kamesumicchacarati in Pali is referred to individually here. This shows that the Buddhists were aware of the reformation made by Nigantha nataputta in the Parsvanatha'a religion, but the fact that Kusila was not postulated in place of Parigraha but in addition to it was apparently not understood.

A reference to five vows of Jainism is found in the Anguttara Nikaya;6 this mentions the five ways of falling into sin as taught by Nigantha Nataputta. The five ways are:

(i) destruction of living beings (panatipati hoti).

(ii) taking what is not given (adinnadayi hoti).

(iii)passionate enjoyment of evil (abrahmacari hoti).

(iv) speaking lies (musavadi hoti).

(v) taking liquor and intoxicants (suramerayamajjappamadatthayi hoti).

This, again, in only partially accurate. The first four kinds of sins are referred to correctly, though not in the Jaina order. As to the fifth, it is "Parigraha" which should have been mentioned. According to Jaina ethics, "Suramerayamajjappamadatthana" is an aspect of Himsa and not vseparate category. This list omits Parigraha altogether.

These references lead us to two observations: (i) According to the Parsvanatha tradition, there were four vows, and (ii) Nigantha Nataputta formulated five vows dividing the last into two Akusila and Aparigraha. The defects in these references are: (i) they do not follow the traditional Jaina order of precedence, and (ii) the Parigraha, which is placed as the last way of falling into sin, is ignored in Pali Literature. The compilers of the Pali Tipitaka either were not well acquainted with the reformation of Nigantha Nataputta or they did not eonsider it very important.