The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

As a result of Sarit's anti-communist development initiatives, Thailand's annual growth rate was about seven percent annually throughout the 1960s. Rice exports were supplemented by expanding sales of tin, rubber, seafood, canned fruits, tapioca, and other natural resources. The industrial sector was developed with an import-substitution strategy.⁵³¹ The economy was further boosted by the flow of American military and development aid. Indeed, the economy benefitted tremendously from American military operations in Vietnam. Bangkok's entertainment industry flourished with the invasion of dollar-rich American soldiers on leave from the war.⁵³² The economy also profited from the political instability and dysfunctional economies of neighbouring countries -- Burma, Laos, and Cambodia.⁵³³ In short, Thailand was a growth area in the 1960s and 1970s.

Economic development in Thailand represented a deepening entrenchment of the capitalist market economy. The spread of capitalism effectuated a wide range of social-economic changes, most especially rapid urbanization, shifting employment patterns, population growth, land pressure in rural areas, and growing income disparities.⁵³⁴ These changes were accompanied by cultural changes. The Thai people -- especially the educated young -- became more assertive and less deferential. In particular, educated youth, the product of the rapid university expansion in the 1970s, began to question the status-quo and the supposed benevolence of the regime's paternalism.

After Sarit's death in 1963, his co-successors, Thanom and Praphat, continued ruling with the "Sarit system". However, the "Sarit system" without Sarit was quite different, as will be shown. As the theory predicts, it is the strongman-ruler, rather than the system, which is pivotal. In 1968, the constitution earlier promised by Sarit was finally promulgated. An election was held and won by the regime-sponsored UTPP (United Thai People's Party). Thanom was selected as the non-elected Prime Minister, as allowed by the new Constitution. The new constitution signalled a return to the "Pibul system". However, as in 1957-1958 when he ruled temporarily, Thanom again proved unable to manage his own MPs. Thus, in 1971, he staged a coup against himself. He immediately dissolved Parliament and banned political parties. In short, he re-established the "Sarit system".

The Sarit system, however, no longer "met the needs of the present, and certainly did not promise to meet those of the future".⁵³⁵ Economic development had changed the socio-economic landscape. The inflexible political structure of Thanom’s regime, like Ne Win's rigid BSPP structure, only fueled resentment. The middle classes, which had attained a comfortable lifestyle in the new economy, were particularly disenchanted. Educated youth, in addition, were increasingly troubled by dismal employment prospects. They also became skeptical of the "Nation, Religion, and King" formula that the regime continued to propagate. Youth disenchantment with the regime in Thailand paralleled the disillusionment felt by their counterparts in neighbouring Burma with state socialism.

At the same time, conservative elites became concerned with the prospect of an indefinite power monopoly by the Thanom-Praphat clique. The grooming of Thanom's son, Narong, as successor, was seen as a possible non-royal dynasty in formation. This prospect was regarded as a presumptuous challenge to the monarchy. Military men were also alienated by the Narong factor. They believed that their careers were being blocked by Narong's ambitions and the rise of his clique.⁵³⁶ Thanom's regime was unable to manage these contending factors. The regime began to unravel in October 1973 when the left-leaning and quite radical National Students Centre of Thailand (NSCT) organized protests against despotic rule. The students demanded the termination of military rule and insisted upon the adoption of a democratic constitution. In short, they called for the fulfillment of the ideals of the 1932 Revolution.

The student's protest precipitated a violent confrontation with the regime. Much blood was shed but the violence was mercifully cut short when King, in effect, exiled the tyrants.⁵³⁷ Thanom's fate was sealed when Krit Sivara and Prasert Ruchira-wong, the commander of the army and the chief of police respectively, refused to repress the protests. After the crisis, the King appointed Sanya Thammasak, a former supreme court justice, as interim Prime Minister.

The above account highlights the themes discussed in the theoretical chapters concerning the possible outcomes of protracted military-authoritarian rule. When the state becomes too autonomous from society, it may become less able to resolve the challenges posed by economic change. The emergence of new social groups resulting from economic development may place new demands on the state that the regime is unable to meet. Over time, furthermore, intra-elite tensions and rivalries may develop. Thanom and Praphart were not unifiers as Sarit had been, and the military was increasingly divided.

After 1973, the military was, as Chai-anan observed, like a firm without "its president and executive vice-president".⁵⁴⁰ It was divided into factions: the Krit faction; the Air Force-Navy faction of Admiral Sangad (and Air Chief Marshals Dawee Chulasap and Kamol Dechatunga); Thanom-Praphat loyalists led by Yos Thephasdin; and the Supreme Command faction of Kriangsak and Saiyud Kerdpol. The military, however, was in disrepute after years of corrupt rule and it now found itself excluded from politics. It was in no position, especially with the reduced American presence after the withdrawal from Vietnam, to assert its dominance openly.

The task of maintaining order fell on the shoulders of the monarchy -- in particular -- and royalist leaders, the civilian bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of the Interior, the police and special military-security agencies. All of these agencies were linked to various palace factions. The realignment of global forces in the region complicated the task of maintaining order. After the Americans lost the war in Vietnam, Thai conservatives feared that communism would triumph throughout the region. Conservative fears were heightened when the King of Laos was forced to abdicate and was imprisoned and slain by communist leaders. They were convinced that Thailand would be the next domino to fall to communism. As these fears were raised, the Thai economy worsened. American aid fell from $39 million in 1973 to $17 million in 1975. The withdrawal of American troops stationed in Thailand during the Vietnam war also adversely affected the economy.⁵⁴¹ The global oil crisis further hurt the Thai economy. The economic recession precipitated a drop in foreign investment and capital outflow.⁵⁴² Conservative royalists, the military, and bureaucrat-ic and business elites blamed student radicals, labour unions, peasants, and democratic politics for the economic downturn.

In the aftermath of the toppling of the "Sarit system", the hitherto subordinated forces took advantage of their entrance in to the political system to press their demands. The subordinated forces were led, or encouraged, by university students, especially the NSCT. Student activists were iconoclastic, and sceptical of the prevailing "truths" imposed upon Thai society by the ruling elite. They were inspired by ideals of a society free of exploitation and corruption,⁵⁴³ and embraced the thoughts of Jit Phumisak, an early Thai Marxist.⁵⁴⁴ They were pivotal in enlarging access to the political arena to previously excluded groups.

With the military sidelined and discredited, the monarchy was forced to become in active political player in the political arena. The monarchy's main concern during those uncertain years was to prevent the rise of communism. Its most crucial task was to win over the middle classes and the peasant masses. This was vital in view of the challenge posed to the state by the emergence of radical student and peasant organizations^.548 In those precarious years, the King and Queen toured the country widely to touch base with the peasants. The King also worked closely with the civilian bureaucracy and the less visible agencies of the armed forces, especially the Internal Security Operations Center (ISOC) and the BPP (Border Patrol Police, a paramilitary police force), and made effective use of military-owned radio and television stations. The King consequently succeeded in rallying the "patriotic silent-majority".

The royal palace, furthermore, sponsored or sanctioned the formation of right-wing mass organizations dedicated to the defense of "Nation, Religion, and King." These organizations included the Nawaphon, the Red Gaur, and the Village Scouts.⁵⁴⁹ The Village Scouts were the most important of these organizations. Its role was to mobilize the peasant masses in support of the state -- or as put to the peasants, in defence of the monarchy. Village Scouts units were organized and supervised by the Ministry of Interior, and led by village headmen, the rural elites, and rural school teachers. The organization was unabashedly nationalist. It promoted Thai culture, and endeavoured to eliminate foreign communist influences. Most notably, it warned of the dangers of Chinese-Vietnamese-Khmer communism and other treasonous lackeys or nak-phendin, i.e., "those uselessly weighing down the earth".⁵⁵⁰

The upper segments of society, with much to lose from the political intrusion of subordinated forces and the strengthening of the left, rallied around the King and the "Nation, Religion and King" formula. Under royal leadership, military and bureaucratic elites orchestrated a mass mobilization campaign to win back the populace. Their campaign relied upon jingoistic, anti-communist slogans which, as noted above, portrayed students and other activists as communist dupes and anti-monarchical (and hence, anti-Thai).

The mobilization of society by elites and counter-elites gave rise to a highly polarized political environment. This political polarization, coupled with sporadic violence, provided the military another opportunity to intervene in the political system. In January 1976, Krit, the leader of the dominant military faction, demanded that Kukrit call new elections. Kukrit capitulated and after the elections, Seni formed a new government with Krit as the Minister of Defense. Krit appeared to be position-ed as the emergent strongman, but he unexpectedly died. In October of 1976, Seni was deposed by Admiral Sangad Chaloryu after a bloodbath at Thammasat University precipitated by Thanom's return from exile.

Seni had been placed in an untenable situation by Thanom's return. On the one hand, the King had granted Thanom, now a Buddhist monk, royal refuge. On the other hand, however, student activists demanded his immediate expulsion. The students organized a protest at Thammasat University. It was alleged that the students were communists or communist dupes, and some of the top leaders were Marxists. The tension was exacerbated when pictures portraying a young man dangling on a noose -- whose features quite closely resembled the Crown Prince -- appeared on the front pages of almost all the newspapers.⁵⁵¹ For the conservatives, especially Village Scouts contingents (selected from units from all over the country) which had encamped outside the campus, this was the last straw. Led by Border Patrol Police detachments, they stormed into the campus, and brutally attacked the students gathered there.⁵⁵² At that point, Admiral Sangad moved to restore order. Seni was deposed, and Thanin Kraivichien, an ultra-conservative royalist, was installed as Prime Minister.⁵⁵³ The intrusion of subordinated segments into politics thus came to an abrupt end.

The above analysis demonstrates that the collapse of the Thanom-Praphart order in 1973 was quite different from the regime changes in Burma in 1988 and Indonesia in 1965. As discussed, Ne Win and Suharto were in control of their respective armed forces, the former from behind the scenes. This enabled the military to restore authoritarian rule quickly, albeit with much blood and violence. In Thai-land, the military did not have a strong leader after 1973. The task of maintaining political order fell on the shoulders of the King and Kukrit, supported by civilian officials and conservative elements, after the collapse of the "Sarit system".

The military intervention in 1976 was an attempt to restore order and authoritarian rule. However, the 1976 coup was supported by radical Young Turks, who, as field grade officers, were not part of upper echelon of the military hierarchy. Because they did not control the armed forces, they were unable to re-establish the military's political dominance, nor re-establish the "Sarit system" -- as suggested in the theoretical analysis. The best they could do was play the role of "king-makers", as will be shown below.

In March 1977, Chalard Hiransiri attempted to topple Thanin, and remove Admiral Sangad's faction from the dominance it enjoyed. Chalard's failure, however, did not deter others who were disillusioned with Thanin. The Young Turk officers, who were instrumental in putting Thanin in power in 1976, were now determined to oust him.⁵⁵⁶ They constantly lobbied their military superiors to remove him. In October 1977, they finally staged their own coup and installed Kriangsak as the new head of government.

The Young Turk phenomenon represents quite a fundamental change in the power configuration of the Thai military. After 1973, the balance of power gradually shifted downward to regiment and battalion commanders, while general officers became less powerful.⁵⁵⁷ As Chai-Anan notes, this change was a result of a fragment-ation of power at the apex of the military and the politicization of field grade officers. The Young Turks, furthermore, were generally impatient and less subservient officers. They had served in counter-insurgency campaigns and fought in Laos under American special forces. They were dynamic and tended to play by their own rules, and did not hold their military superiors in high esteem except, ironically, Prem -- eventually their nemesis. In the words of their leader, Manoon Rupekachorn, the top brass had "allowed themselves to be subservient to the rotten political system just to live happily with benefits handed to them by [corrupt] politicians".⁵⁵⁸

The ideology of the Young Turks was quite contradictory, which explains their rude impact on politics. They shared a purported concern for the underdog. Their radicalism, however, was subverted by their structural position -- and conviction -- as special guardians of the state. They believed the state stood above politics and they accepted the sacred Trinity of "Nation, Religion, and King". They also believed that military intervention in politics was a normal part of their professional duty. Thus, the politicization of the Young Turks⁵⁵⁹ and their perceived duty to enter politics to sweep away corruption, made them a force to be reckoned with in this time of political uncertainty. They were particularly prominent for about a decade, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. They acted more as king-makers and spoilers rather than as rulers.⁵⁶⁰ They were instrumental in putting Thanin, Kriangsak, and Prem in power. However, they failed to dislodge Prem in 1981 and 1985, when he was perceived as betraying their ideals. The political role of the Young Turks was complicated by their reverence for the monarchy, and by the fact that Prem was their mentor.⁵⁶¹

Thai politics in the 1980s was dominated by a conflict between the monarch and Prem on one side and the Young Turks on the other side. The conflict was not so much about basic values -- Nation, Religion, and King -- but about the organization of political power and the methods to bring about political change. The Young Turks were firmly wedded to the notion of political change via coups, despite their supposed loyalty to the crown. By contrast, the crown increasingly preferred orderly change by constitutional means.⁵⁶²

In the early years of his reign, though, the King was unable to uphold the constitution or to prevent coups. He often legitimized coups by recognizing strongmen-rulers after they seized power. However, by the 1970s, the King and Queen had survived many military strongmen and numerous constitutions.⁵⁶³ In the October Uprising of 1973, the King finally had sufficient influence to intervene and resolve the crisis. The King's interventions in 1973 and 1976 greatly boosted his stature and reinforced the impression that monarch was the nation's saviour.

The monarchy also played, as noted, a pivotal role in rallying the state stratum and the socio-economic elite in the years following the collapse of the "Sarit system". The King skillfully guided Thailand through the turbulent post-Vietnam war era, a time characterized by the rude and noisy entrance of repressed forces onto the political stage. The King consequently gained immense stature and enormous power, although he usually refrained from exercising it openly. Thus strengthened, the King was able finally to express his preference for constitutional rule,⁵⁶⁴ and to act against military elements that attempted to bring about political change by violence. For example, the King was able to foil, as will be discussed, an attempted coup against Prem by the Young Turks in 1981 by declaring support for his Prime Minister.

As mentioned, the monarchy by itself could not always prevent coups or oppose extraconstitutional actions. The king has had to accept many political actions of the military as fait accompli. The limitations of the King's power in this respect were evident with Suchinda's coup against Chatichai Choonhavan in 1991, and the toppling of Suchinda's technically constitutional government by extra-constitutional mass action in May 1992.⁵⁶⁵ The monarch's ability to guarantee the constitutional order is also, to a quite large extent, dependent upon the availability of a leader who understands intra-military politics. Prem, who became prime minister in 1980, was precisely such a man. Although a military man -- in fact, a defacto military strong-man-- and very soft-spoken and seemingly apolitical, Prem was a superb politician. He successfully juggled the diverse interests of contending political parties, various parliamentary coalitions, cabinet cliques, and competing military factions during his eight-year tenure as Prime Minister.⁵⁶⁶ He also remained loyal to the crown, which earned him full royal support.

It was precisely Prem's skill as a politician which caused the Young Turks to turn against him in 1981. The Young Turks were disturbed by what they viewed as political instability flourishing under Prem's leadership, especially allegations of government corruption surrounding sugar and oil purchases.⁵⁶⁷ They were also highly displeased by the extension of Prem's tenure as Army Commander (Prem was re-appointed by the King at the request of General Arthit Kamlangek⁵⁶⁸). They were further angered by the appointment of Sudsai Hasdin to the cabinet -- Sudsai was a personal friend of Prem, the godfather of the ultra-rightist Red Gaur, and regarded by the Young Turks as a corrupt opportunist. In short, the Young Turks believed that they had been sidelined from the political process.

On April Fool's Day 1981, the Young Turks staged a coup with a force strong enough to vanquish any opponent they encountered. However, the Royal family, with Prem in tow, flew to Korat, leaving the Young Turks in precarious occupation of Bangkok. The King's departure and his open support for Prem changed the strategic calculus of the coup. The Young Turks could either repudiate the King, and under-mine their image as defenders of the Nation, Religion and King, or they could admit that they had been out manoeuvred. As the Young Turks contemplated their options, they were dislodged by a bloodless counter-coup, launched from Korat by Arthit with the support of Suchinda's Class Five Group.⁵⁶⁹

The above account lends strong credence to the theoretical observation which holds that military intervention will be unsuccessful in the absence of political cohesion forged by a military strongman-unifier. The Young Turks were the most dominant, most cohesive, and most dynamic military faction to arise, and for a while were able to "enthrone" the leader of their choice in the seat of power. But they were unable to reorganize power as the military in the past had been able to do. The difference was that the military under authoritarian leaders, such as Pibul and Sarit, was unified. The man chosen by the Young Turks, Prem, as their mentor and leader, proved, however, to be a different kind of strongman -- as will be shown below.


Prem and the Politics of Military Factionalism
Prem regained power after the counter-coup, but the military continued to believe it had a duty to assume the reins of political power to protect the nation in times of crisis. The military's political views are contained in orders No.65/2523 (1980) and No.66/2523 (1982)^.570 The line drawn in the West between civilians and soldiers was viewed as artificial. As in Indonesia, the Thai military viewed themselves as being of the people. They therefore believed that military intervention was proper. Indeed, they contended that military involvement in politics was part of the march toward perfect Thai-style democracy and socioeconomic justice. As the military had been engaged for decades in coup politics and in various development-security projects, its claim to a special place in politics was not all that extra-ordinary.⁵⁷¹

The defeat of the Young Turks in 1981 was not interpreted by the military as a significant watershed in state-military relations. Instead, it was understood by Suchinda's Class 5 group in a conventional manner. They viewed it as an opportunity to fill positions vacated by the Young Turks. Indeed, after saving the regime, they believed it was their turn to shape politics. Suchinda's group, unlike the Young Turks, were conventional soldiers and they cultivated linkages with the phu-yai. By 1984, its members controlled all key divisions, while some served in the upper echelon of the state apparatus, for example, as top aides in the Prime Minister's Office and the ministries of interior and defence. In short order, the Suchinda group became indispensable to the top military brass, especially Prem and Arthit, but also to Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth and Pichit Kullavanij.

In addition to having to deal with the "Young Turks", Prem also had to maintain control over the military as a whole. Prem's tenure was made more difficult by the rise of Arthit, the hero of the 1981 counterattack against the Young Turks. By 1983, Arthit was Army Commander and concurrently Supreme Commander. Sarit and Thanom were the only men who had previously held both positions concurrent-ly.⁵⁷² For Arthit, a soldier of humble background, this was a remarkable achievement. Many people expected that Arthit, a strongman-in-the-wing, would become the next prime minister. There was wide speculation that Arthit was being groomed for such a role by a palace faction. This impression was reinforced by his daily television appearances, often with members of the royal family.⁵⁷³ Arthit was not the only big man lurking in the wings. Prem also had to contend with veteran leaders Kukrit, Chatichai, Kriangsak, and Parmarn Adireksan, among others. While he was fending off potential rivals, Prem also had to manage the normal political instability generated by squabbling parliamentarians and politicking cabinet ministers. Severe economic problems were also emerging, such as a chronic government deficit, a balance of payment problem, falling commodity prices, sluggish investment, and a global economic downturn.

In September 1985, Prem was challenged by a coup attempt by Manoon Rupekachorn, a cashiered colonel and a leader of the Young Turks. Manoon timed the coup superbly: Prem was on a visit to Indonesia, Arthit was in Europe, and the Royal family was touring in the south. The coup attempt was extraordinary in that it was led by an ex-colonel. Manoon was easily defeated by Suchinda's group after a short battle.⁵⁷⁴ This coup is interesting, however, because it highlights the complexity of military politics. The details of the coup were not satisfactorily clarified in the subsequent trial of the alleged plotters which included former Prime Minister Kriangsak, former Supreme Commander Serm Na Nakorn, and the Air Force Chief Praphan Dhupatemiya. None of the key plotters was sentenced and all the defendants, including Manoon, in quite typical fashion, were granted parliamentary amnesty by the Chatichai government in 1988.⁵⁷⁵

The Manoon coup is thus, like Indonesia's Gestapu, still shrouded in mystery. In particular, there is the question of how Manoon, who was cashiered in 1981 and was exiled abroad until the coup attempt, was able to carry out a complex military operation. The involvement of Ekkayudh Anchanbutr, a wealthy businessman, remains intriguing. Ekkayudh operated a five billion baht pyramid scheme, along with Mae Chamoi, properly known as Chamoi Thipso, the wife of an Air Force officer. The beneficiaries of this scheme were mainly military officials and their families, including the alleged coup plotters.⁵⁷⁶ Mae Chamoi enjoyed the support of top military officers, including Arthit, members of the royal entourage,⁵⁷⁷ and Kittivutho Bhikku, a powerful ultra-rightist monk.⁵⁷⁸ One month before the coup, the government moved to ban the pyramid scheme established by Ekkayudh and Chamoi. The latter was formally charged with fraud. Although no link has been established between actions of Mae Chamoi and Manoon's coup, it must be noted that the government's crackdown on the pyramid scheme angered many members of the military and left them feeling ill-disposed towards Prem.⁵⁷⁹

Prem displayed an uncanny ability to foil the military and to prevent soldiers from assuming power. He also managed to govern without employing the military to solve problems (although his government included some appointed military and civilian members). Prem proved to be a particularly skilled player of intra-military politics. Although he owed his position initially to the Young Turks, he subsequently cultivated close ties with their main rivals, Suchinda's Class 5 group, and he also successfully controlled Arthit's ambition to become the next Prime Minister.

Political developments in Thailand after 1973 shed much light on the dynamics of intra-military politics and the politics of democratization. The analysis shows that when the military was divided, it was unable to intervene in politics successfully. Moreover, the fact that Prem did not use the military as a political instrument to accomplish his objectives, diminished the military's dominance. Indeed, his refusal to use the military to reorder politics in an authoritarian direction may be considered the decisive variable in removing the military as an effective force in politics. In short, Prem's relative autonomy served to reduce the hegemony of the military.

In the Thai case, the reorganization of political power in a democratic direction was accomplished by two actors with different but complementary political resources. Prem, on the one hand, had the ability to manipulate and control various political factions in the military. On the other hand, the King, who worked closely with Prem, provided the source of legitimacy. His distaste for coups and a general preference for parliamentary politics, coupled with Prem's ingenuity, increased their autonomy from the military. This enabled the King and Prem to foil the military's attempt to re-assert itself and reorganize political power in an authoritarian direction.

As shown this far, the trajectory of politics in Thailand -- and, correspondingly, its state-society configuration -- took a very different path from that in Burma and Thailand, despite its experience of frequent coups. At this point, the unique variables of the Thai case should be stated. The monarchy is obviously the most salient feature. It is an institution which is of the state, but which neither the military nor its strongmen can effectively dominate after they seize power. The monarchy thus has a certain degree of inherent autonomy. Although the Thai King has not always been able to exercise his autonomy, the balance of power has turned in his favor over time. Having outlasted various military strongmen, his autonomy has increased. With enhanced autonomy, the King has been able to reorganize politics in his preferred direction, towards constitutional democracy.

Chatichai's free-market policies were appreciated by big business and industry, but long-term issues were ignored, however. Education and health services were not improved. Problems related to land tenure, rural dislocation, and environmental degradation were allowed to accumulate. Industrial pollution, chaotic traffic, floods, and overcrowding in Bangkok were similarly neglected. Chatichai's relationship with the military was also unstable.⁵⁸⁷ In February 1991, when Arthit, who the Suchinda's group had helped oust from command in 1986, was given the defence portfolio,⁵⁸⁸ the military, led by Suchinda, once more entered the political arena. Suchinda claimed that he acted to bring an end to the rampant corruption of civilian politicians.

The public, tired of political corruption, welcomed the coup, but Suchinda's position was evidently not very strong. For one thing, there was some doubt about Suchinda's standing with the King.⁵⁸⁹ The coup leaders felt compelled, with the King's urging, to appoint a civilian prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, who was adamant that soldiers not be involved in politics. Anand also vetoed a request for a large arms purchase, and ensured that fresh elections were held in 1992 as promised.⁵⁹⁰

Suchinda's downfall came soon after the 1992 elections. After promising that he would never accept the prime ministership, he did so on being nominated by a pro-military parliamentary coalition. Suchinda's acceptance violated the broad consensus established following Prem's tenure that a Prime Minister should be elected. Although Suchinda was appointed by Parliament, it did not sit well with the public, especially in Bangkok. Suchinda's public credibility was further eroded when he appointed eleven ministers from the corrupt Chatichai cabinet to his own cabinet. Some of these men -- Banharn Silpaarcha, Montri Pongpanich, and Sanoh Tientong, for example -- were already under investigation for corruption.⁵⁹¹ Worse still, the top military posts were monopolized by Suchinda's Class 5 cronies. He even appointed his brother-in-law, Issarapong Noonpakdee, as the Chief of the Army.

Suchinda seemed to be undoing the democratization process previously initiated by Prem and the King. Anti-Suchinda forces soon coalesced and widespread protests broke out in May 1992. The protests gathered strength when the former governor of Bangkok, Chamlong Srimuang, a former Young Turk -- a faction which Suchinda's group had displaced -- staged a hunger strike. Suchinda responded with harsh repression, which was captured on video and seen worldwide. This action was condemned globally, and the King intervened to remove Suchinda from power.

The military's intrusion into politics under Suchinda's incompetent leadership was a disaster. The military was further humiliated by Anand during his second stint as caretaking Prime Minister in 1992-93. He swiftly dropped the four top Class 5 leaders from their positions.⁵⁹² The military's acceptance of Anand's appointment by the King also suggests the military may have finally realized that the King is opposed to its participation in politics.⁵⁹³ Also, the fact that the public accepted the King's choice of a non-MP, Anand -- after mass demonstrations against a non-elected Prime Minister -- shows the credibility and esteem accorded to the King, and indicates the extent to which the King has become a pivotal political force.

Thailand has clearly experienced, unlike Burma and Indonesia, a substantive re-alignment of political power. It is likely that the foundation of democratic politics, laid by the King, with assistance from Prem and Anand, will grow stronger. With the monarchy actively involved in promoting democratic constitutionalism, it will be difficult for the military to dominate politics. If the military wishes to regain full political control, it will probably need to stage a republican revolution, or at the very least wait for the passage of the present King from the scene.⁵⁹⁴
The King has now truly become a "father-of-the-nation" figure and, for most Thais, stands as a sacred symbol of the Thai state and nationhood. He has become a force with whom almost all groups and actors in society -- the military, the bureaucracy, political parties and their respective leaders, social leaders, business-financial elites, religious figures and leaders, peasants, students, even reformers -- are linked. He represents, and tries to speak for, all Thais. In this respect, one might say that the King has gained a position of pre-eminence to which all military strongmen everywhere aspire, but rarely attain. In an ironic way, the decision of the "revolution-ary" Promoters in 1932 to retain the monarchy as a powerless, legitimating device, and Sarit's rejuvenation of the institution in the late 1950s and early 1960s, has served to undermine the system of rule by military strongmen, and military-authoritarianism, the subject of this study. Unless the King for some reason wants it (for example, to save the monarchy from a republician reformer), it is now very unlikely that another strongman like Sarit or Pibul, or the kind of system which they employed, will emerge again in Thailand.


The Consolidation of "Thai Democracy" and the Politics of Business Elites
It seems that a state-society order based on democratic electoral politics has been stabilized in the 1990s, as can be seen from the constitutional, albeit frequent, changes of government. A coalition led by Chuan Leekpai and the Democrats governed without much disturbance from the military, until it was replaced, via an election in 1995, by a new coalition headed by Banharn's Chart Thai. The Banharn government was replaced after an election in 1996 by a coalition headed by Chaovalit, a former military chief, and his New Aspiration Party (NAP).

Although the ghost of military intrusion has possibly been put to rest, the expectations of further democratization engendered by the May 1992 "people's power" uprising have not been fulfilled, in the opinion of Kusuma Snitwongse.⁵⁹⁵ Chai-Anan even argues that the victory of the middle class over the military cannot be interpreted as a fundamental break with authoritarianism. Rather, the realignment of politics in a more open democratic mold represents a compromise between the military-civilian components of the state, on the one hand, and top elements of the capital-holding elites, on the other hand.⁵⁹⁶

Benedict Anderson's thoughts on "Thai democracy" are illuminating.⁵⁹⁷ He argues that Thai democracy is a system that mostly serves the interest of "the all ambitious, prosperous and self-confident bourgeoisies".⁵⁹⁸ Electoral politics "maximizes their power and minimizes that of their competitors" and best protects their interests against both the state and popular forces. Moreover, the democratic system gives provincial businessmen the opportunity" to short circuit the Ministry of the Interior's powerful, territorially-based hierarchy" by becoming MPs and ministers.⁵⁹⁹ Finally, since the most crucial resource in democratic politics is money, a commodity that the capital-holding elites hold in abundance, they can hope to buy political power.

Thai politics has become a politics of spoils, with political entrepreneurs jockeying for power and for the benefits that accrue from the control of ministries and state projects. Political reforms have been blocked by deeply entrenched bureaucratic forces.⁶⁰⁰ Indeed, the bureaucratic elite has forged profitable linkages with the business community. A new, and potentially insidious, governing arrangement seems to have developed. The business elite, which controls the Thai economy, now dominates the open political institutions, parties and Parliament, and this elite rewards its allies in the bureaucracy from private payrolls.⁶⁰¹ Politics has become, as Sulak Sivaraksa, a veteran human rights leader and long-time democrat, puts it, kanmuang turakij, which means roughly "politics for businessmen, by businessmen",⁶⁰² which may be an exaggeration, but not too far from the truth either.