The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

545
^ Prominent labour leaders during those years included Prasit Chaiyo, Therdphum Chaidee, Jittisak Chumnummani, Paisan Thawatchainand, Saad Chandi, and Arom Pongpangan. For a history of labour in Thailand from the 1940s, see Morell and Chai-Anan, Political Conflicts, pp. 181-204.

546
^ The minimum wage was officially raised from 16 baht in 1972 to 20 baht in 1974, but real wages remained was much lower than the official figure. There was an over-supply of labor due to a large pool of rural unemployed. Meanwhile, the average profit rate in the industrial sector averaged 117 percent yearly, and in some industries, notably textiles, beverages, and oil refining, it was as high as 1000 percent. See Morell and Chai-Anan, Political Conflicts, pp. 193-195.

547
^ An account and analysis of the conditions of the peasants and their political activism after 1973 is provided by Morell and Chai-Anan, Political Conflicts, pp. 205-233.

548
^ The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and its allies in neighhbouring countries had less altruistic objectives than the student activists. While the students genuinely desired political reform, the main goal of the CPT was to obtain power. The CPT clashed with the students and their allies, organized labour and peasants. Many student radicals and their allies fled to the "jungle" after the 1976 Thammasat massacres. The CPT collapsed in the early 1980s, mainly due to the Chinese-Vietnamese split. After the collapse of the CPT, the urban radicals felt it was safe to return from the jungles, due partly to the government's lenient treatment of defecting former rebels. For a fuller account of the clash between the young idealists and the dogmatic CPT, see Yuangrat Wedel, The Thai Radicals, pp. 23-49.

549
^ Nawapol was composed of businessmen, urban elites, and state officials. The Red Gaur was made up of ex-mercenaries from the anti-communist campaigns in Laos and rural Thailand, unemployed youths, school dropouts, and vocational students. They were used as shock troops by security units against students, labour, and peasants unions. The Nawapol was allegedly behind the assassination of 21 peasant leaders of the FFT between March 1974 to August 1975. For a discussion of the Nawapol, see E. Thaddeus Flood, The United States and the Military Coup in Thailand: A Background Study (Washington, D.C.: Indochina Resource Center, 1976), p.6-7. On the Village Scouts, see Majorie A. Muecke, "The Village Scouts of Thailand", Asian Survey, Vol.XX, No.4 (April 1980), pp. 407-427. The Village Scouts and Nawapol enjoyed royal patronage, or at least the support of palace factions. The former were more directly linked to the crown in that its main pillar was the Border Patrol Police, whose patron was the Princess Mother. Among the urban elites, it was considered an honour, not to mention being useful, to belong to the Nawapol. The Village Scouts were oriented toward the common folks. These organizations operated on a stand-by basis, and were activated only when a show of support was needed. This above is based, in part, on personal experiences as a Village Scout in Chiangmai and involvement with a village development project supported by palace officials.

550 Included in the "nak-phendin" category were radical students, communists, labour union leaders, peasant leaders, and left-leaning intellectuals. The term was quite effective in de-humanizing and demonizing these groups. Peasants from Northern Thai villages who took part, as Village Scouts, in the 1976 Thammasat University massacres, were quite proud of their exploits. They felt that they had directly helped to "save" the "Nation, Religion, and King", from "nak-phendin" elements (in the pay of the Vietnamese, in particular). Some even complained of being constrained by Border Patrol Police officers. Those who had not been selected were quite envious. I was then living in Chiangmai, and I had many dealings with the BPP and other intelligence agencies, and by extension, the Village Scouts.

551 I recall that the authencity of the picture of the "Crown Prince" (depicted as being hanged) was questioned by many Thais. Quite a few security-intelligence officer accquaintences had their doubts, but were quite cynical about the matter of its authencity. It so happened that the student who was "hanged" in a skit -- representing a victim of military brutality -- slightly resembled the Crown Prince. As with everything connected with the Royal family, however tenuous, there has been no discussion about or inquiry into the matter.

552 For accounts of rightist violence and the Thammasat massacre, see Benedict Anderson, "With-drawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 9:3, 1977, pp. 13-30; "The Toll of Terror", FEER, 12 March 1976, pp. 8-9; "Clampdown on the Left Begins", FEER, 23 April 1976, pp. 25-26; "Thanom: The Unwanted Catalyst", FEER, 15 October 1976, pp. 12-14; "October Revolution Part II", FEER, 15 October 1976, pp. 10-11. Also, "A Nightmare of Lynching and Burning", Time Magazine, 18 October 1976, p.44-45; and Samutpharp Duan-Tula (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1988); translation, A Picture Book of the Month of October.

553 Thanin was a judge who also dabbled in astrology. I was told by Dr. Kraisri Nimmanahaeminda, who was closely accquainted with Thanin, that he was frequently consulted by a member of the Palace.

554
^ Harvey Stockton, "Fuel for Doom and Gloom", FEER, 23 July 1976, p. 10.

555
^ Likhit, Demi-Democracy, p.204. For analyses of the Thanin interlude, see Montri Chenvidyakarn, "One Year of Civilian Authoritarian Rule in Thailand: The Rise and Fall of the Thanin Government", in Social Science Review (Bangkok 1978), and Kamol Somwichien, "The Oyster and the Shell: Thai Bureaucrats in Politics", Asian Survey, 18:8, (August 1978), pp. 829-37.

556
^ The Young Turks were informally organized as the "Young Military Officers Group". They formed in late 1973 around six officers, graduates of Class 7. (Classes are designated around graduating groups officers according to the West Point system introduced in 1951. Class 1 graduated in 1953. General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth was a Class 1 officer.) The officers who founded the Young Turks were Manoon Rupekajorn (4th Cavalry), Chamlong Srimuang (Supreme Command Headquarters, later Governor of Bangkok, and leader of the 1992 "Bloody May" anti-military uprising), Choopong Matavaphand (1st Cavalry), Chanboon Phentragul (1st Infantry), Saengsak Mangklasiri (Engineers), and Pridi Ramasoot (Directorate of Personnel). For short bio-datas of the above named, and Prajak Sawangjit who joined the group later, see Chai-Anan, The Thai Young Turks, pp. 27-30.

557
^ Ibid., p. 36.

558
^ Colonel Manoon Rapekachorn, quoted in Chai-Anan, The Thai Young Turks, p. 31, from an address to his Young Turk followers, 27 June 1980.

559
^ It is widely believed that the Young Turks had prepared a hit-list of big capitalists to be eliminated in the 1981 coup attempt.

560
^ The Young Turks numbered about 50 officers in total, including 12 regiment commanders, 11 battalion commanders, and some staff officers. See Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-1986 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p. 13.

561
^ Prem was a staunch royalist but he was not part of the Bangkok military establishment. He was a cavalry officer who had served mostly in the northeast region of the country. See, Chai-Anan, The Thai Young Turks, p. 39.

562
^ The King stated in 1977 that he did not wish to have Thailand labelled as a "banana monarchy", and he expressed his preference for "smooth and constitutional changes of government." See, "The Two Year Solution", FEER, 4 November 1977, pp. 10-12.

563
^ Morell and Chai-Anan, Political Conflicts, p. 68.

564
^ See, "The Two Year Solution", FEER (4 November 1977), pp. 10-12.

565
^ Suchinda was nominated by legislators from a coalition of pro-military political parties. Suchinda's prime ministership was therefore "legal" and procedurally correct. It was the legitimacy of the constitution drafted by the 1991 coup-makers that allowed his nomination was in question. See William A. Callahan, "Astrology, Video, and the Democratic Spirit: Reading the Symbolic Politics of Thailand", Sojourn, 9:1, (1994), pp. 102-34.

566
^ The relevant military factions in the early 1980s were the Young Turks; the Class 5 group of Suchinda Kraprayoon; the Democratic Soldiers, mostly staff officers in counter-insurgency planning; and the top brass, such as Generals Arthit Kamlangek and Pichit Kullavanij, both with close ties to the palace, and Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, a Prem loyalist.

567 The rivalry was between coalition partners, the Social Action Party (led by Boonchu Rojana-sathien, a tycoon-banker) and Chart Thai (led by ex-Generals, Chatichai Choonhavan, a tycoon, and Praman Adireksan, a tycoon-industrialist). The former accused the latter of receiving kickbacks from a sugar purchase and sabotaging an oil deal with Saudi Arabia negotiated by Chatichai as Industry Minister. See, "Sugar: A Year of Bitter Memories", Economic Review (a supplement of the Bangkok Post), 31 December 1980, pp. 107-109.

568
^ Arthit supported Prem's extension as military chief as a strategy designed to keep more senior officers from filling the post until it was Arthit's turn. In short, Prem agreed, at least tacitly, to hold the post for Arthit. In exchange, Arthit would ensure that the military stayed out of politics. The Young Turks were aware of Arthit's calculations, and they were furious with Prem for indulging Arthit's ambitions.

569
^ The Young Turks wanted Prem to lead the coup against himself. However, the Queen, on Arthit's advice, summoned Prem to the palace. He then flew with the Royal family to Korat, the stronghold of Arthit and Suchinda's Class 5 faction. This sealed the defeat of the coup.

570
^ This order is associated with General Chaovalit and the counter-insurgency, national security wing. See, Suchit, The Military; Appendix 2 contains excerpts of Prime Minister's Order No.66/ 2523, "Policy of Struggle to Win Over Communism", p.90-93; and Appendix 3 contains excerpts of Prime Minister's Order No.65 /2525, "Plan For Political Offensive", pp. 94-99.

571
^ For the military's nationwide developmental-security and political mobilization activities, see Suchit, The Military, pp. 49-67. See also, Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Government Response to Armed Communist and Separatist Movement", in Chandran Jeshurun, ed., Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 247-272.

572
^ Suchit, The Military, pp. 19-20. For an account of Arthit, see "The Rise and Fall of 'General Sunday'", The Nation (Bangkok), 28 May 1986. In Thai, "Arthit" means both "Sunday" and the "sun".

573
^ I was living in Chiangmai when Arthit's star was on the rise. Television was inundated with images of Arthit escorting the Queen or the Crown Prince to various royal events, or the Queen and the Crown Prince honouring him by their presence at functions sponsored by him. There were also rumours about Arthit and various palace factions which cannot be revealed at this time. There were also rumours of friction between Arthit and Prem.

574
^ About a dozen people were killed in the ill-fated 1985 coup attempt, mostly non-combatants, including two foreign journalists. For accounts of the coup attempt, see "Battle for Bangkok", Asia-week, 20 September 1985; "Manoon's Wild Gamble", FEER (19 September 1985), pp. 14-15; "Anger and Punishment", FEER (26 September, 1985), pp. 19-20; "The Coup's Who's Who", FEER (24 October 1985), p. 48.

575
^ Journalists and scholars were informed by the government that there would be serious repercussions if further inquires were made concerning the trials of those accused in the 1985 coup attempt. This information was obtained and confirmed during interviews in March-April 1993 with the following people: Anusorn Thavassin (editor); Singhadej Pengrai (businessman), Damnoen Garden (lawyer); Kanit Wanakamol (civil servant); Kamsing Srinawk (writer); Sulak Sivaraksa (writer); Kusuma Snitwongse (academic); Suchit Bunbongkarn (academic); Chai-Anan Samudavanija (academic); Maheson Kasemsant (former General), and Bangkok-based correspondents for Asiaweek and the Far Eastern Economic Review.

576
^ The Mae Chamoi fund offered an annual 78 percent dividend, and claimed to be based on an "oil importing" scheme. For accounts of the fund, see "The Pyramid Chits", FEER (20 September 1984), pp. 54-55; "Crumbling Pyramids", FEER (25 April 1985), p. 120; "High-risk Re-Financing", FEER (16 May 1985), p. 81; "The Lady Reappears", FEER (27 June 1985), p. 92.

577
^ The "Mae Chamoi" affair was a national event and there was considerable speculation about who was protecting her. I was living in Chiangmai at the time, and the "Mae Chamoi" affair was an enormous media event. It was talked about everywhere, by almost everyone. Also see, "Arthit Beats the Retreat", FEER (22 November 1984), pp. 14-17.

578
^ Kittivutho preached that it was not a demerit to kill communists. An account of Kittivutho is given in Charles F. Keyes, "Political Crisis and Militant Buddhism in Contemporary Thailand", in Bardwell Smith, ed., Religion and the Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Burma and Laos (Chambers-burg, Pa.: Wilson Books, 1977), pp. 147-164.

579
^ An intriguing aspect of the 1985 coup plot was the puzzling action of General Pichit, a strong Arthit supporter closely linked to the royal palace, or a palace faction. On the day of the coup, instead of going to the counter-coup command, he went to a camp near the coup headquarters. This fact, however, has been glossed over in official accounts of the coup. In 1983, Pichit was involved with Arthit in an unsuccessful move to amend the 1978 constitution. They attempted to extend a temporary clause which permitted officials to be concurrently nominated as prime minister and to the cabinet. However, as in the "Mae Chamoi" case, no links were established between Pichit and the coup. For Pichit's actions during the 1985 attempted coup, see Wright, The Balancing Act, pp. 294-95. Although Arthit was never implicated in the coup, Prem dismissed him as Army Chief in May 1986. Prem was apparently concerned by Arthit's close involvement with anti-Prem parliamentarians and his mobilizat-ion of army voters for the forthcoming elections. Arthit's acceptance of his dismissal suggests that Prem was supported in this matter by the King, and that Suchinda's Class 5 group, Arthit's former ally, had deserted him. Prem replaced Arthit with Chaovalit. See Suchit, The Military, p. 45.

580 For an account of intra-military rivalries and Prem's skill at intra-military politics, see Wright, The Balancing Act, pp. 293, 308

581
^ For details of the politics of military factionalism during Prem's tenure as Prime Minister, see Likhit, Demi-Democracy, pp. 212-230.

582
^ Yos Santasombat, "Leadership and Security in Modern Thai Politics", in Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, eds., Leadership Perceptions and National Security (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Study, 1989), pp. 83-109.

583
^ See "That's Rich", The Economist, 25 April 1992, p. 38. The following accounts of Chatichai's tenure, policies, and corruption are based on, "On the Defensive", FEER (8 March 1990), pp. 20-21; "Vested Interest", FEER (11 October 1990), p. 19; "Muck and Brass", FEER (6 December 1990), p. 12. For a brief overview, see Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Troubled Waters", FEER (6 December 1990), pp. 18-20.

584
^ Banharn, heading the Chart Thai party, became the Prime Minister of a coalition government after the 1995 election. However, in September 1996, he resigned after he was abandoned by many of his parliamentary supporters (or coalition partners). It is generally believed that Banharn and Chart Thai owed their triumph to vote buying. As such, not much was expected from Banharn's government of tycoons except bigger scandals and more corruption. This expectation was largely fulfilled.

585
^ Montri was the Minister of Communications and the leader of a coalition partner, the Social Action Party. Sanan was the Minister of Agriculture and the leader of another coalition partner, the Democrats.

586
^ The following ministers in Chaovalit's cabinet also figured prominently in Chatichai's cabinet (1988-1991): Montree Pongpanit, Snoh Thienthong, and Korn Danaransi. All three men were branded "unusually rich" by the military, with the implication that they had amassed their wealth by corruption. With few exceptions, ministers in the present Chaovalit's cabinet have served in at least two of the four governments since Prem's resignation in 1988, including Suchinda's short-lived government. For a list and profile of Chaovalit's cabinet, see The Nation (Bangkok), November 30, 1996, pp. A6-A7.

587
^ For example, Suchinda, who succeeded Chaovalit as Army Commander in March 1990, was rebuffed by both the government and the lower House when it passed a social security bill despite his objections. Chaovalit, then Minister of Defence, angrily resigned in June 1990 after being accused of corruption.

588
^ On Arthit's dismissal by Prem, see Suchit, The Military, p. 45. Arthit was Suchinda's mentor and ally. Together they defeated the Young Turks in 1981 and 1985. Arthit, however, fell out of favour in May 1986; see note #106.

589
^ "Generals Outflanked", FEER (6 December 1990), pp.10-11.

590
^ See "Civilian Clout", FEER (13 June 1991), p. 22; and "Class Warrior", FEER (23 April 1992), pp.11-12. Suchinda's military rival was the ambitious Air Force Commander, Kaset Rojananil; see, "Thailand Inc.", The Economist, 4 January 1992, pp. 31-32.

591
^ Suchinda's willingness to appoint shady characters to his cabinet indicates the extent of his weakness vis-à-vis the influential tycoon-politician cliques. See, "That's Rich", The Economist, 25 April 1992; "Win Some, Lose Some", FEER (30 April 1992), p. 17.

592
^ Key Class 5 men included, Air Chief Marshall Kaset Rojananil (Supreme Commander), General Issarapong Noonpakdi (Army commander), Viroj Sangsanit (deputy Army commander), and Chai-narong Noonpakee (head of the strategic Capital Command). See, "Anand Takes a Sweep For Democracy", The Economist, 8 August 1992, pp. 27-28.

593
^ Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and Society in Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?", Asian Survey, 33:9, September 1993, pp. 879-893.

594
^ Many things can go wrong in politics, especially in the Third World. The King, as a constitutional monarch, cannot openly determine political outcomes. He may have to sanction a military coup as a fait accompli at some future time. Nonetheless, the failure of the Young Turks to restore the Sarit system in 1981, and 1985, not to mention Suchinda's failure in 1992, suggests that future attempts by the military to restore full authoritarianism will not be successful.

595
^ Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thailand in 1993: Politics of Survival", Asian Survey, XXXVI, No.2, (February 1994), pp. 147-152. A number of critical democratization reforms have been blocked by the Senate, comprised largely by conservative military figures and civilian bureaucrats. Some of the reforms blocked include the election of local administrative officials, the development of autonomous local government, and the creation of an elected Senate. The King is formally responsible for appointments to the Senate but, in fact, the Prime Minister decides who will be appointed. The Prime Minister usually consults with the military brass, palace factions, senior bureaucrats, coalition partners, and party bosses before he approaches the King with his Senate nominations.

596
^ Chai-Anan, "Thailand", p. 334.

597 Benedict Anderson, "Murder and Progress in Modern Siam", New Left Review, 181, (May/ June 1990), pp. 33-48. Although written a few years ago, this article is still a relevant analysis of the middle-classes in Thai politics.

598 Ibid., p. 40.

599
^ Ibid., p. 41.

600
^ The police system, for example, is in dire need of reform. Rampant corruption and criminality of the police has not been curbed. This is highlighted by the five year-old Saudi Arabian jewel-theft case. The case began in 1990 when jewelries worth US$20 million belonging to the son of the Saudi King were stolen. This sordid affair now involves the killing of three diplomats, the disappearance of a Saudi businessman, and the murder of the wife and son of a witness. The slow police investigation has fueled rumours that "influential figures" much higher than police generals are involved. Top police officers have been officially implicated in the case. In July 1995, some of the jewelry was recovered and returned, placating the Saudis to some extent. See, "Curse of the Jewels",