The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

351 After 1948, the ABRI was organized into Troop and Area Commands (KODAM). Although the Siliwangi Division no longer existed from that point, the West Java Command was for some time still referred to by this appellation. Likewise, the Central and East Java commands were known as the Diponegoro and Brawijaya "Divisions". See David Jenkins, Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 88 (n.#75).

352 Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 144-145.

353 On the Nasution-Yani rivalry and Sukarno’s manipulations, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 79-82. The fact that there were other more senior officers like Sungkono, Soeprajogi, and Suharto made Yani more dependent on Sukarno for legitimacy and authority within the military. As such, he was an ideal client and supporter. See Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 165.

354 Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 59, 69-75. The military supported the move against Malaysia as a means to shore up its political-administrative role and circumvent a planned budget cut. It even hoped for a return to martial law. Later, it had second thoughts and did what it could to obstruct the Air Force Chief, Omar Dhani, who held overall command. As Yani instructed, intelligence men such as Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani established clandestine contacts with Malaysian leaders. According to Murdani, though, the initiative came from Suharto, with Yani’s blessings. See Julius Pour (trans. by Tim Scott), Benny Moerdani: Profile of a Soldier Statesman (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993), p. 270.

355 See Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1965); also Guy Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management (Rand Memorandum, 1963).

356 For analyses of the military’s position in the Guided Democracy state, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 34-42, 45-51; and Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 152-153, 168, 173-175.

357 Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp. 5-7.

358 Reeve, Golkar, p. 269.

359 They included the armed forces’ in-house organizations, a host of labor and civil servant unions (including SOKSI), and bodies representing students, intellectuals, women, the mass media, fishermen, farmers, etc. For a general overview of the multitude of bodies that composed these military-sponsored groups, see Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp. 163-174 (Appendix G). The military also formed two other fronts, KOSGORO (Cooperatives for Mutual Assistance Efforts) and MKGR (the Family Mutual Help Association). The fronts also ran economic enterprises; like SOKSI, they were linked to and supported by the Ministry of Defence and Security (HANKAM). See Suryadinata, Military Ascen-dancy, pp. 10-15.

360 For an analysis of the politics of "mass" organizations (ormas) and "fronts" involving the military, the PKI, political parties, and above all Sukarno himself, see Reeve, Golkar, pp. 208-262 (Ch.5).

361 Ibid., pp. 87-94.

362 Reeve, Golkar, pp. 194-197; Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 526-7, 584; McVey, “The Post-Revolut-ionary,” pp. 131, 151, 176 (Part 1), and 148, 152 (Part 2).

363 Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 95..

364 Ibid, pp. 94-95.

365 Rex Mortimer argues that the PKI’s position was weakened by the absence of pronounced class cleavages (and thus class awareness) in Indonesia. The PKI thus opted for an alliance with Sukarno, a self-professed Marxist, to gain strategic footholds in the state and governmental machinery, including ABRI. See Rex Mortimer, "Class, Social Cleavage, and Indonesian Communism", in Benedict Anders-on and Audrey Kahin, eds., Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1982), pp.54-68. For the PKI’s attempt to infiltrate the mil-itary, which met with some success in the Air Force and to a degree the Army, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 82-86.

366 A typical position on the Sukarno-PKI relationship is Legge’s, in Sukarno, pp. 231, 254, 307, 324, 327, 353, 378-79, 381, 383, 384; Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Polit-ics of Domestication", American Political Science Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (December 1962), pp. 915-926; and Ewa T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?", Asian Survey, Vol.IV, No.9 (September 1964), pp. 1058-1070. For additional analyses of the Sukarno-PKI relationship, see Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1967); J.M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965).

367 Sukarno’s committment to Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, Communism), his promotion of "revol-utionary" forces, his anti-West stance, the invitation he issued to Khrushchev, and his frequent consult-ation with Mao and other Chinese leaders, all serve as good indications of his Marxist orientation. Even though his Marxist slogans can be interpreted as tactics of self-promotion, it is possible that he may genuinely have been committed to a PKI-led revolution, one aimed at "end[ing] the centuries of oppress-ion". This, anyway, is Brian May’s thesis, in The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 86-89. Feith also argues that Sukarno, like Cuba’s Castro, might have been moving towards a Marxist state with the PKI in control and Indonesia in a position of dependence on the comm-unist bloc. See Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape", Asian Survey, Vol.IV, No.8 (August 1964), pp. 968-980. Most Indonesianists, however, take the conventional view that Sukarno manipulated both the military and the PKI in order to maintain his grip on power.

368 On the Democratic League, see Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 343-344; Rex Mortimer, Indones-ian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 112; Roeslan Abdulgani, Nationalism, Revolution and Guided Democracy (Perth: Monash University Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), p. 48; Reeve, Golkar, pp. 164-165.

369 For an account of the exceedingly slow implementation of the land reform laws and the PKI-led unilateral peasant actions, see Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 204, 284-91, 309-28.

370 Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 93. See also Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 192-194.

371 Sukarno made this accusation, which was probably unsubstantiated, at a meeting of army comm-anders, 28 May 1965. See May, The Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 125-128. With regard to the “Council of Generals,” Crouch’s view that it was based on "political intuition rather than hard evidence", which seems essentially correct (The Army and Politics, pp. 106-107).

372 For a comprehensive analysis of the Gestapu Affair, see Ulf Sundhaussen, Golkar, esp. pp. 192-207; also Crouch, The Army and Politics, esp. pp. 107-134. Other sources include Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971); W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX, No.1-2 (Spring/Summer 1966), pp. 115-127; and Daniel S. Lev, “Indo-nesia 1965: The Year of the Coup”, Asian Survey, Vol.VI, No.1 (February 1966), pp. 103-110.

373 Suharto once commanded the Diponegoro Division, and had personal and professional ties with Untung and other "Young Turk" radicals. Hence Wertheim’s speculations as to Suharto’s possible involvement cannot be lightly dismissed. See Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup: The Missing Link", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 1, No.1 (1970), pp. 50-57, and "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1979), pp. 197-215. Crouch’s view is that the coup plotters might have seen Suharto as a potential friend, though he does not enter into why this might have been so. See Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 123-125.

374 Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 197.

375 The real story may not be known for quite some time, given the opacity of politics in authoritarian states, and the attitude of all states as far as sensitive information is concerned. For analyses and inter-pretations of Gestapu, see Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis; Legge, Sukarno, pp. 386-96; Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 196-207; Lev, "Indonesia in 1965"; Crouch, "Another Look at the Indo-nesian Coup", Indonesia 15 (April 1973), pp. 1-20; J.M. van der Kroef, "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIII, No.4 (Winter 1970-71), pp. 557-577; John Hughes, The End of Sukarno (London: Angus and Robertson,1968); Tarzie Vittachi, The Fall of Sukarno (New York: Deutsch, 1967); Arnold C.Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1967); and Jerome R. Bass, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 96-105.

376 This is based on the plotters’ "confessions", and no doubt is tainted with the self-interest of both those charged and their accusers. See Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the “September 30 Movement” in Indonesia (Jakarta: Pembimbing Masa, 1968). According to Crouch, the PKI was "completely unprepared [and] offered almost no resistance" when inflamed mobs and Muslim militias attacked it (The Army and Politics, p. 155). This casts real doubt on the depiction of Gestapu as a PKI masterplan for succession and the elimination of the military. It could, instead, have been an unforeseen turn of events resulting from the impatient radicalism of Untung and Diponegoro and Brawi-jaya "Young Turks"; miscalulations by some PKI cadres; and perhaps a flawed assessment of the balance of forces by the ambitious Air Force Chief, Omar Dhani. The pros and cons of the PKI involvement are discussed in detail in Bass, "The PKI".

377 See Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup", p. 52.

378 Actually, the coup group commanded a substantial force: at least one unit of the Presidential Guards, five battalions from Diponegoro, one from Brawijaya, the Air Force and its ground troops, and the PKI militias, including a women's detachment (Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 196, 215). Had the coup forces been less inept and more willing to fight it out, they might have succeeded. The failure of this and earlier coups (including the botched coup in November 1956 directed at Nasution, and the "regional" revolts of 1958-1959) indicates the poor coup-staging skills of ABRI officers. This may partly account for Suharto’s long grip on power, a point Michael Vatikiotis notes astutely: see his Indonesian Politics Under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 19.

379 According to a government report from 1978, 13 years after Gestapu, Sukarno went to Halim as part of a "pre-arranged plan to disperse the national leadership in the event of trouble". He may not have known that the base was the coup headquarters. See Hamish McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia (Honolu-lu: University Press, 1980), pp. 46-47.

380 Hughes, The End , pp. 159-60, 175; Amnesty International, Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report (London, 1977); Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 77-78.

381 Hughes, The End, pp. 142, 181; May, The Indonesian Tragedy, p. 122.

382 The former figure was the one cited in the first official report submitted to Sukarno before he was deposed in February 1966. According to Crouch, Admiral Sudomo estimated the number of those killed at about 500,000. In addition, 200,000 were arrested throughout Indonesia. See Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 155; also Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, p. 72, Amnesty International, Indonesia,; and Hughes, The End, pp. 185-6.

383 Among the victims were many ethnic Chinese, resented for their economic influence. But according to Schwarz, the Chinese were not the primary victims, since many of them had been forced to leave the rural areas from 1959 onwards after a law was introduced prohibiting them from operating rural retail stores. In 1960, over 130,000 Chinese returned to China. Schwarz contends that anti-Chinese violence in Jakarta was relatively minor. See Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 105-106.

384 Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, p. 79. The authors divide post-1965 Indonesian society into three groups: the Dominators (Suharto groups); the Collaborators (state functionaries, soldiers and officers, parliamentarians, journalists, lawyers, students, etc.), some of whom could be termed "Critical Collaborators"; and the Victims (those labelled "enemies and subversives" by the Dominators – the Chinese minority and the poor, depoliticized majority) (pp. 52-63).

385 For details of Sukarno’s comeback attempt, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 158-178.

386 The MPRS rejected Sukarno’s explanation, which was that Gestapu stemmed from the blunders of PKI leaders, the cunning of Nekolim forces, and individuals who were "nuts". Legge, Sukarno, p. 407. Untung and his Diponegoro radicals were certainly that -- they shot from the hip and ignored the very person who had the means to thwart them, Suharto.

387 Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 79. Yani's personal relationship with Sukarno was warm. He treated Sukarno like a sultan who could not be forced out of power, and preferred to keep close to Sukarno and thus influence him, and counter the PKI's influence with Sukarno.

388 For a discussion of the 1945 Constitution, see Reeve, Golkar, pp. 69-74. It is important to note that Sukarno was not directly deposed by Suharto, as U Nu had been in Burma by Ne Win, and Pibul in Thailand by Sarit.

389 The People’s Consultative Congress (MPR), which meets every five years, is composed of 1000 members, drawn from the DPR and regional DPRs, with some appointed members. Of the 500 DPR members, 100 are appointed by the President, with 75 seats reserved for ABRI. The DPR meets several times a year to approve government-initiated legislation. See Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 211 (fn.73).

390 Sukarno was responsible not only for reviving the 1945 Constitution (which Hatta and Sjahrir had bypassed in 1950), but for the "discovery" of Pancasila. See Harold Crouch, "Introduction" (to Part II: State Control), in Arief Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, 1988), pp. 115-120. See also Schwarz, A Nation, p. 10.

391 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p.13.

392 The passages concerning the military’s position in Golkar are based on Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp. 19-28, 43-61, 125-132. See also Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 48-50.

393 David Reeve, "The Corporatist State: The Case of Golkar", in Arief Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society, pp. 164, 168 (and 151 -176).

394 See John McBeth, "Party Patron: Suharto’s Party Picks First Civilian Leader", FEER (4 Novem-ber 1993), p. 14.

395 Schwarz, A Nation, p. 275.

396 For an excellent journalistic study of the PRI and its role in arranging a smooth transfer of power from one personal ruler to the next, see Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), esp. pp. 66-75. A limitation on presidential tenure (to one term in the Mexican case) seems crucial to the smooth transfer of personal power in a one-party presidential system.

397 Source: Notes from talks with a well-known scholar and many businessmen, Jakarta, 1993. Informed speculation is that Suharto wants someone, like Habibie, who is close to his children to be the next President. However almost all those interviewed agreed that Habibie’s dominance is not assured, because it depends so heavily on Suharto’s favour. Habibie has been compared to Subandrio, Sukarno’s protégé, who served as the leader’s link to the PKI. Likewise, Habibie serves as Suharto’s link to a pol-itical Islamic segment which soldiers regard as hostile to them.

398 See Allan Samson, "Indonesia 1972: The Solidification of Military Control", Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (February 1973), pp. 127-139.

399 The People’s Consultative Congress (MPR) meets every five years. It also "elects" the President (and head of state). See Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p. 211 (fn.73).

400 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory, Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publish-ing Company, 1975), pp.265-66.

401 It should be recalled, however, that Sukarno had already disposed of or "tamed" all the political parties other than the PKI during the "Guided Democracy" years. Suharto moved to emasculate the already weakened political parties by "restructuring or simplifying" them through the Political Parties and Golkar Bill (1974), the Election Law Amendments Bill (1979), the Presidential Decision No. 3 /1982 (on electoral campaigns), and five other bills passed in 1984: the Amendments of the Election Law Bill, the DPR/ MPR Bill, the Political Parties and Golkar Amendment Bill, the Referendum Bill, and the Mass Organization Bill. See Suryadinata, Military Ascendency, pp. 69-73, 92-94, 101-107, and May, The Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 249-264, 281-288. See also Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections", Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 1 (January 1972), pp. 56-68; R.William Liddle, "The 1977 Indonesian Elections and the New Order Legitimacy", Southeast Asian Affairs (1978), pp. 175-185; and Benedict Anderson, "The Last Days of Indonesia’s Suharto?", Southeast Asian Chronicle 63 (July-August, 1973), pp. 2-17.

402 Regarding civil servants, in addition to having to join KORPI, theirs wives are compelled to join Dharma Wanita, the official women’s body, always headed by the wives of senior officers. See Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre, "Politics", in Hal Hill, ed., Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 1-53 (esp. p. 27).

403 In fairness, it must be said that over time, a few ministries – finance, home, and industry – have grown more professional, thanks to the efforts of dedicated technocrats. See Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", p. 21. On the other hand, the customs service was so corrupt and unprofessional that it was deemed beyond reform; in 1985 it was placed under the supervision of a Swiss inspection agency for a time.

404 See John A. McDougall, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureau-cracy", Indonesia 33 (April 1982), pp. 89-121. In a polity where the military is dominant, the question of whether or not soldiers actually occupy posts in ministries and the civil administration is not terribly relevant. It is also misleading to argue that, because the military presence in the administrative sphere has decreased, the administrative machinery is increasingly independent of the military.

405 In 1988, Benny Murdani was "retired" as head of KOPKAMTIB, and the agency was dissolved. It was replaced by BAKORSTANAS (the Agency for Coordination for Support of National Stability), which was directly responsible to Suharto. See Pour, Benny, pp. 419-420.

406 Repression may have increased recently (1996) due to a resurgence of labour militancy, along with regime fears of the growing popularity of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s democratization message among some subordinated segments. Incidentally, it is intriguing that most of the acknowledged champions of democracy in Southeast Asia are women -- Cory Aquino, Aung San Suukyi, and Megawati.

407 On the recent situation in East Timor, see Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 194-229, 233-234, and 246-249 (on repression and intimidation in other parts of Indonesia, including Aceh).

408 Ibid., pp. 238-247 ("The Press: More Responsible than Free").

409 An insightful account of regime-press relations is given in Nono Anwar Makarim, The Indonesian Press: An Editor’s Perspective (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974). See also Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 107-108; Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, pp. 84-89.

410 Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", pp. 23-24.

411 A theoretical discussion of the military and state elites’ commercialization of positions and power is found in Olle Tornquist, "Rent Capitalism, State, and Democracy: A Theoretical Proposition", in Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society, pp. 29-49. See also McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 116-119. For an excellent account of military involvement in business, state enterprises, "welfare foundat-ions", and the general corruption, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 272-303.

412 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, p. 50; also pp. 4-5, 14-15, 43-45, 50-51, 152-154. Schwarz gives Suharto’s total family fortune as US$30 billion (A Nation, p. 144). For further accounts of Suharto’s business interests, see Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 71, 76-77, 166, 169, 177-178. On the Suharto-cukong connection, see May, Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 219-228.

413 On Ibnu Sutowo, head of Pertamina (the National Oil and Gas Mining Agency), see McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 143-165, and May, Indonesian Tragedy, pp. 215-219. Even critics of Suharto like Sukendro, Jasin, and Dharsono, grew dependent on government linkages. As punishment for critic-izing the regime and Suharto, they had permits and credit lines withdrawn and were blacklisted from government contracts. See Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 70-72, 183-184.

414 See Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 355. An important player like Sutowo's aide Haji Thahir had $80 million in personal accounts in Singapore alone when he died. On the Thahir scandal and Mur-dani’s attempt to recover the money, see Pour, Benny, pp. 433-448.

415 Schwarz, A Nation, p. 16.

416 The figures for civil servants are from 1991-1992, cited in Vatikiotis (Indonesian Politics, p. 51).

417 Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, "Introduction", in Hal Hill, ed., Indonesia’s, pp. xxii-xxxv, and also communications received from Chris Dagg, Simon Fraser University. On the Dharma Wanita and P4 indoctrination, see Julia I. Suryakusuma, "State Ibuism: The Social Construction of Womanhood in the Indonesian New Order", Nav, Vol.6:2, June 1991, pp. 45-71. In many Third World countries, civil servants – even university professors, public school teachers – wear military-style uniforms, badges, insignias of rank, etc. There is a conscious and sustained effort among Third World states to create a distance between state officials and the general population, in order to impress the former’s superior status upon the latter.

418 I refer here to, for example, tensions between Suharto and ABRI; between ABRI and civil or Golkar bureaucrats; and among bureaucratic cliques, Golkar factions, presidential cliques, and military fact-ions.

419 See Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia (Sydney, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1991).

420 Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", pp. 6-7, 14. See also Karl Jackson, "The Prospects for Bureau-cratic Polity in Indonesia", in Lucien Pye and Karl Jackson, eds., Political Power and Communications (Berkeley: University Press,1978); Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia", World Politics 31, 4: 571-87; Herbert Feith, "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities", Prisma 19 (1980), pp. 39-55; Dwight King, "Is the New Order a Bur-eaucratic Polity, a Neopatrimonial Regime, or a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime? What Difference Does it Make?", and Ruth McVey, "The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia", in Interpreting, pp. 104-116 and 84-91, respectively.

421 Suharto figured prominently in the famous "general attack" on Jogjakarta in 1949. In 1957-1959, he commanded the Diponegoro Division in Central Java; in 1960, he was First Deputy (Intelligence) to the Army Chief of Staff and commander of KOSTRAD (this was a move by Nasution to counter Yani). He headed the Anti-Dutch "Mandala" command that captured West Irian in 1962. And in 1965, while still in command of KOSTRAD, Yani appointed him deputy to Omar Dhani at the Anti-Malaysia "Alert Command" – an attempt to sabotage the campaign. Thus he cannot be considered a nonentity, but he was consistently underestimated by his seniors and contemporaries, and even by his juniors – for example, Untung and his Brawijaya "radicals" in 1965 (if he was not somehow linked to them). By contrast, Nasution, who was generally highly rated before 1965, was constantly outflanked by Sukarno and easily shoved aside by Suharto.

422 The forces that emerged included New Order "radicals" – army officers, intellectuals and techno-crats, sectors of students – who wanted a clean break with the recent past. They were not a homogen-eous grouping: some wanted a restoration of parliamentary rule, while others desired a more disciplined, corruption-free order under the leadership of "no-nonsense", modernizing soldiers. Others included Islamic forces which wanted to "drown the PKI in a sea of blood", and aspired to introducing a more Islamic society and state.

423 MacIntyre, Business and Politics, p. 32.

424 As two respected Indonesianists have noted, neither the DPR nor the MPR has the capacity to constrain the president, the bureaucracy, or the military. See Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", pp. 19-20. Also, Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, p. 105; Schwarz, A Nation, p. 272.

425 MacIntyre, Business and Politics, pp. 33-35. Also, see John McBeth, "Loyal House: But Parliament is Becoming More Animated", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) (8 September 1994), pp. 32-35.

426 See Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 20-24. The most prominent Suharto loyalists were Generals Ali Murtopo, Ibnu Sutowo, Benny Murdani, Sudharmono, Sumitro, Yoga Sugama, Sudjono Humardhani, Mohamm-ad Jusuf, Amir Machmud, Marden Panggabean, Darjatmo, Bustanil Arifin, Sutopo Juwono, and Alams-jah, along with Admiral Sudomo. Members of the "inner core group" were Ali Murtopo, Sudomo, Humardhani, Alamsjah, Yoga Sugama, Ibnu Sutowo, and Benny Murdani.

427 For details, see Ibid., pp. 20-30.

428 Nasution seems to have been quite severely traumatized by his daughter’s death and his harrowing narrow escape in Gestapu. This could explain his unassertive behavior in the early years of the New Order. Based on an interview with a foreign “consultant” close to Nasution, Jakarta, June 1993.

429 It was relatively easy for Suharto to impose his personal stamp on the military because of the power vacuum created by the deaths of Yani and other generals. Another key factor was Nasution’s lack of ambition and, perhaps, ingrained professionalism. Suharto obviously understood the military mind. Contrary to the layman’s view that it is dangerous to dismiss general officers, this often proves to be untrue, mainly because such figures tend to lose their air of authority quite soon without a swagger stick to wield. The secret to the longevity of a military strongman is that he understands and skilfully exploits factionalism in the military.

430 These included Hugeng, Ishak Djuarsa, Jasin, Sumitro (a "palace general"), Sutopo Juwono, Sajidiman, and Widodo. Later, Ibnu Sutowo and Benny Murdani (the most powerful man after Suharto) were removed. Sutowo was dropped on account of the mess he made of Pertamina, the oil monopoly. Murdani was abruptly removed as ABRI Commander and pushed upstairs to the defence ministry in 1988. He was replaced by Try Sutrisno, a former military adjudant to Suharto, and was also retired from KOPKAMTIB. The latter was replaced by a new agency headed by Try. This may have been a routine step, as Pour insists (Benny, p. 413); but it certainly stripped Murdani of the extraordinary power he had held for fifteen years.

431 Suharto’s strategy for keeping key military players in check was more sophisticated than that of Ne Win, who sacked anyone who in his view had gained excessive power or importance. See Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 20-27, 134-156, for a fuller treatment of Suharto’s "divide-and-rule" approach to loyal generals and aides. Jenkins’ work is based on extensive interviews with Nasution and disenchanted former generals, and is surely one of the best sources available on the politics of politicized military.

432 Inkopad is the army’s cooperative body, Berdikari the army’s trading firm, and Perhutani the forest-ry corporation. The proportion of soldiers in the state apparatus has varied over the years. Early on, they predominated, but at present less so. Nonetheless, apart from Suharto, there is no other force within the state that dares to offend ABRI in any way. Given the fact that ABRI is, after Suharto, the most powerful force, the number of governmental posts held by soldiers seems rather irrelevant. Comp-ared to Thailand, soldiers are more prominent in Indonesian governmental agencies, but less so than in Burma. It would be misleading to assess the military’s dominance in Third World states (so long as they are ruled by a military strongman) simply, or solely, by tallying the number of bureaucratic-administrat-ive posts held by soldiers.

433 For an overview of the economic and commercial partnership between Chinese entrepreneur-financiers and ABRI/Suharto, often in ventures tainted by corruption, see McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 118-124; and May, The Indonesia Tragedy, pp. 215-234 (Ch.7, "Corruption and Beyond"). On corruption, see Jamie Mackie, "The Report of the Commission of Four on Corruption", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3 (November 1970), pp. 87-101.

434 Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 34-35.

435 Other distinguished ex-generals who joined Nasution were Djatikusumo, Sudirman, Mohammed Jasin, and Subiyono from the Brawijaya "Division"; Iskandar Ranuwihardjo, Munadi, and Broto Hamidjojo from the Diponegoro Division; Mokoginta, Sugih Arto, Sukendro, Daan Jahja, and Alex Kawilarang (Siliwangi Division); Hugeng, an army general and ex-police chief; Ali Sadikin of the Marine Corps, and ex-Governor of Jakarta; and Admiral Nazir. See Jenkins, Suharto.

436 These included Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Prime Minister during the "war of independence", who later joined the "regional revolts"), Natsir, and Burhanuddin Harahap (Prime Ministers under Sukarno; they too joined the "regional revolts"); Sunario (former foreign minister); and Slamet Bratanata (former minister of mines). Others were Nuddin Lubic, head of the PPP faction in the DPR; Sanusi Hardja-dinata, general chairman of the PDI); and Mochtar Lubis, a prominent editor and writer.

437 Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 66-72, 77-84, 90-112. See also Ulf Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis in Indones-ia: Facts, Fiction, Prediction", Asian Survey, Vol. XXI (August 1981), pp. 815-837; and Leo Surya-dinata, "Indonesia Under the New Order: Problems of Growth, Equity, and Stability", in Leo Surya-dinata and Sharon Saddique, eds., Trends in Indonesia II (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), pp. 3-51.

438 The accusers were Generals Hugeng and Jasin, who had been dismissed because of their knowledge of corruption in the palace. See Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 164-167, 174-182, 243 -245; and McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 126, 235 (on General Hugeng’s knowledge of Madame Suharto’s corrupt deals).

439 See David Jenkins, "Adam’s Heavenly Warning", FEER (29 June 1979), pp. 30-31.

440 The figures named -- Adam Malik, Generals Alamsjah, Jusuf, and Widodo -- were, respectively, the Vice President; the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory body (DPA); the Defence Minister and ABRI chief; and the Army Chief of Staff. Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 113-125.

441 Jenkins, Suharto, pp.157-158. The threat was made by Suharto in a speech at Pekanbaru in March 1980.

442 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 82-83.

443 Ibid., pp. 84-87 (ABRI's dislike of, and opposition to Sudharmono). Also see, Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p. 178.

444 Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 285-286. As Schwarz notes, Try Sutrisno was probably Suharto’s choice anyway. ABRI’s announcement pre-empting Suharto’s seems to have been an attempt to assert its independence. This is Suhaini Aznam’s contention in "The Guessing Game", FEER (4 March 1993), p. 19.

445 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 82-83. See also Schwarz, A Nation, p. 283; and Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", pp. 8, 16, 18.

446 Ramage provides a detailed discussion of the complex, multi-layered political manoeuvres in 1990 involving Suharto, ABRI, and rival Islamic segments. The Islamic stream is divided into Muslim "intellectuals" of the ICMI, led by Habibie and "legitimized" by Suharto; the followers of Wahid (the NU leader, a "neo-modernist" who is close to Murdani; and those who support Madjid (a democratic "neo-modernist"). The latter two and ABRI are suspicious of ICMI and Habibie, but ABRI is also wary of the neo-modernists who favour democratization. For an excellent and thoughtful discussion of the Suharto-ABRI-Islam equation (or the Pancasila-Democracy-Islam triangle), see Ramage, Politics in Indonesia.

447 Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 162-193 (Ch. 7, "Islam Coming in from the Cold?"). Schwarz’s view is that by supporting the ICMI (led by his protégé, Habibie), Suharto has encouraged "modernist Islamic elements" who are anti-military. Meanwhile, Suharto has alienated "neo-modernist" elements led by Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, who have better relations with the military (or at least with Benny Murdani, who is privately critical of Suharto). Habibie’s strength is that he is close to Suharto. This is also his liability. Source: Notes from confidential interviews in Jakarta, June 1993, with a retired general close to Murdani, a prominent academic at a research institute, and several foreign businessmen.

448 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 132-133, 159-160. See also John McBeth, "The Muslim Ticket: Suharto Courts Islamic Intellectuals", FEER (20 December 1990), pp. 32-34.

449 John McBeth, "Succession Talk Recedes: Suharto Could Lead into the 21st Century", FEER (18 May 1995), pp. 48-52.

450 Ibid.,The extent of Suharto’s hold on the military can be seen from the fact that the ABRI chief of staff, Soeyono, was a presidential adjutant in the late 1980s, as was Wiranto, the Jakarta region comm-ander. The commander of Kopassus, Subagio Hari Siswojo, headed the President’s security unit for four years.

451 Ibid. On Raden Hartono and his close relation with Habibie and Tutut (Suharto’s daughter), see Ajay Singh and Keith Loveard, "A Successor in Waiting?", Asiaweek, 5 April 1996, p. 44.

452 See Robert H.Jackson and Carl G.Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 77-79.

453 R.William Liddle, "Regime in Crisis?: Presidential Succession, the East Timor Massacre, and Prospects for Democratization in Indonesia", The 44th Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., 2-5 April 1992, pp. 13, 14, 25.

454 The international community and international bodies like the United Nations tend to ignore the fact that the public-private distinction is non-existent in most Third World states. Thus those Third World rulers who pursue private gains and personal power are able to present themselves as leaders exercising power for the "public" good and in the "national" interest. This is not to say that no public good is ever served, but it tends to be both minimal and incidental.

455 Liddle, "Regime in Crisis?", p. 15.

456 Ibid., p. 18.

457 As Mackie and MacIntyre put it, the regime has become a "self-perpetuating patronage system from top to bottom, rewarding those who [are] in it and penalizing all those who are excluded". It will hence be difficult for reform movements to "open [the system] up in more democratic or pluralist directions". Mackie and MacIntyre, "Politics", p. 45.

458 Jenkins, Suharto, pp.13-14. A concise exposition of Suharto’s personal dominance is "In Suharto’s Shadow", The Economist, 9 May 1992, pp. 33-34. There is a temptation to downplay the personalistic nature of Suharto’s rule due to his low-key style. The existence in the New Order of bureaucratic "empires" (Habibie’s, for example), power centers (ABRI and Golkar), political parties (the PPP and PDI), and legislative-representative assemblies gives the impression that power is quite widely diffused. But it is misleading to portray a personal dictatorship as a system devoid of other centers of power and influence, especially in the state sphere.

459 This is also the conclusion Sundhaussen reaches in "Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters With Democracy", in L. Diamond, J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (3) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1985), pp. 423-474.

460 See J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Indonesia in 1994", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 226-233.

461 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, p. 85. Although Try Sutrisno, the current vice-president, is an ABRI man, he does not hold an active ABRI post. The background and status of the previous vice-president, Sudharmono, were similar. Earlier vice-presidents were civilians: the Sultan of Jogjakarta 1973-78 and Adam Malik 1979-1988. As for Golkar, all its chairmen have been loyal "political gener-als": Sokowati, Amir Murtopo (two terms), Sudharmono (who rose to the vice-presidency in 1988), and Wahano. The present Golkar head is Harmoko, a civilian who is regarded with suspicion by ABRI, and widely viewed as building a civilian "empire" within Golkar.

462 Tales of the economic-commercial activities of Suharto’s children and their in-laws, clients, and cronies are heard everywhere in Jakarta. They regularly cropped up in conversations with both local and expatriate businessmen. They have also been widely researched. See Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 75 (on the children’s debts to Bank Suma); pp. 133-134 (on Tommy’s soybean monopoly); pp. 141-142 (on Bambang and Sigit’s involvement in the Bimantara Group, worth US$1.4 billion); pp. 142-43 (dealing with the role of Tutut and her two sisters in the Citra Lamtoro Gung Group); p. 143 (on Tommy and Sigit); pp. 143-144 (on Suharto’s half-brother Probosutedjo and cousin Sudwikatmono); pp. 144-145 and 147-153 (discussing Suharto and his various cronies); and pp. 153-157 (on Tommy and his cloves monopoly).

463 These views are commonly expressed in Jakarta. Source: notes from interviews with a well-known Islamic scholar and activist; a renowned Indonesian academic, consultant, and entrepreneur; young academics in Jakarta and Singapore; an American consultant with links to U.S. diplomatic circles; and several journalists (two British, an American, and an European), all in Jakarta in June 1993.

464 There have certainly been structural changes in the economy, as evident from new industries and the rise in production (which has grown several hundred percent since 1966). However, the question of who has benefitted most is a matter of considerable debate. Anwar Nasution stated (in 1991) that those living below the official poverty line have fallen from 40 percent in 1976 to 20 in 1987. He contends that real wage may have declined due to high inflation and wage freezes. The real-estate boom has either driven the poor out of the cities or concentrated them in overcrowded slums. Existing regulations and new deregulation measures have benefitted mainly individuals and groups with strong links to the regime. See Anwar Nasution, "The Adjustment Program in the Indonesian Economy Since the 1980s", in Hal Hill, ed., Indonesian Assessment 1991 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), pp. 14-37. A positive appraisal of the economy is given in Hal Hill, "The Economy", in Indonesian New Order, pp. 54-122. Hill deems as not very damaging to economic development the rampant nepotism in Indonesia, chronic corruption, the scandals, ideological and policy rigidities, ineffective fiscal and environmental management, and high external indebtedness. Successful economic development in Indonesia is attributed by the author to economic and political stability, respect for property rights, re-entry into the international community, market-based prices and exchange rates, and the political will to take unpopular decisions. For a brief analysis of the role of foreign aid in propping up the economy and regime, mainly through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of Western donors, see McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 68-86. Also Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 46-48.

465 For accounts of the conflicts between technocrats and the "palace generals", bureaucratic interests, and Suharto’s cronies and family, which made economic liberalization and reforms an uphill fight, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, pp. 318-330; Schwarz, A Nation, pp. 71-97; and Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 39-40, 43-45, 50-52, 171-172, 173-174, 176-178.

466 MacIntyre, Business and Politics, esp. pp. 6-21, 22-65 (Chs. 2 and 3). He argues that the New Order state is not as monopolistic and stifling as many Indonesianists make it out to be. But the author admits (p. 247), industry groups have had to wrest concessions from the state, the "corporatist" struct-ure of which "obstructed demand-making". He also emphasizes that his research does not mean "the whole state-sponsored corporatist network" is becoming more inclusionary. In reviewing McIntyre's work, R. Stephen Milne notes that the earlier views may also be valid, since the Indonesia of the late 1980s differed markedly from previous eras. For R. Stephen Milne’s review of McIntyre’s work, see Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 3, Fall 1992, pp. 439-441.

467 For accounts of "charitable" foundations in general and Suharto’s in particular, see "Charity Begins at Home: Indonesian Social Foundations Play Major Economic Role", and "The Cash Conduit", FEER (4 October 1990), pp. 62-64. Some foundations are genuinely concerned with relief for the poor, while others are set up as fronts for employee-welfare schemes, pension funds, hospitals, private schools, universities, and religious institutions. Eighteen charitable foundations are run by Suharto, Madame Suharto, and/or their extended family.

468 On free trade unions and their activities, see Michael Vatikiotis, "All Rights Reserved: Free Trade Unions Strains Government Tolerance", FEER (6 December 1990), pp. 15-16; and Adam Schwarz, "Pressures of Work: Growing Labor Unrest Triggers Government Reaction", FEER (20 June 1991), pp. 14-16. On NGOs, see Margot Cohen, "High Anxiety: Government Proposal Could Crimp NGO Activities", FEER (29 September 1994), p. 32; and Colin McAndrews, "Politics of the Environment in Indonesia", Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (April 1994), pp. 369-380.

469 R. William Liddle, "Indonesia’s Democratic Past and Future", Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 443-462.

470 J.A.C. Mackie, "Property and Power in Indonesia" and "Money and the Middle Class", in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds., The Politics of the Middle Class In Indonesia (Victoria, Australia: Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd., 1990), pp. 71-95 and 96-122. Mackie contends that whatever influence they have is based on personal ties and obtains in particular decision areas only.

471 Ibid. Also, see Liddle, "Regime in Crisis?", pp. 17-18. Liddle states that the Indonesian middle class is disproportionately bureaucratic; and many are clients of state patrons. The entrepreneurial sub-class, meanwhile, considered "a critical group in much analysis of democratization", is largely Sino-Indonesian.

472 For a discussion of the hegemonic imprint of traditional and neo-traditional values in "modern" Southeast Asian societies, see Niels Mulder, Inside Southeast Asia: Thai, Javanese and Filipino Inter-pretations of Everyday Life (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1992).

473 On the fear and suspicion of political Islam among the military and New Order elites, see Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics, pp. 120-138 (Ch. 5, "Toward an Islamic Identity?"); Jenkins, Suharto, pp. 6-12, 31, 36, 248; and Ramage, Politics in Indonesia. This work is a comprehensive analysis of Islamic political actors and their complex attitudes towards Pancasila, the New Order state and its dominators. It also addresses the interaction and conflicts among Islamic factions and leaders.

474 Two comments on Thai names are necessary. First, there is no standardize transliteration to English of Thai names. For example, Bhahon Yothin is also spelled Pahol Yothin, and Pibul may be spelled as Phibul or as Bibul, even Pibun or Phibun. I will thus choose one spelling and adopt it throughout the thesis. Second, following Thai usage, after the mention of his/her full name, I will use the first name only.

475
^ David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudvanija note that Members of Parliament were in the 1930s, and even more so in the 1960s, unwilling to observe party discipline, were quite assertive and often voiced the interests of their constituents, thereby causing trouble for the government. The legislature was frequently abolished as a result. The military closed the legislature eight times between 1933 and 1991. See David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Political Conflicts in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 5.

476
^ Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi-Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), p. 174.

477
^ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 1-2.

478
^ Ibid., p. 3.

479
^ An autocracy is a state-society arrangement where the non-elites are excluded from politics, and where "decision making is concentrated and unlimited at the apex" of the political system. See, Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 8.

480 As Riggs puts it, "the major transformation of the polity was not the 1932 revolution, but the bureaucratic reorganization" of the reforming monarchs; Fred W.Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 379. Also see John L. S. Girling, The Bureaucratic Polity in Modernizing Societies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981). It should be noted that the term "bureaucratic" does not, in this case, connote the impersonal legal-rational bureaucracy associated with Max Weber's well-known formulation. As Riggs indicates, the orientation of the Thai bureaucrat is such that inefficiency, indecision, and ambiguity are not so much signs of an inability to master Western methods, as a reflection that the Thai bureaucracy is a political arena in which struggles for advantage and power among civilian and military occur; Riggs, Thailand, pp. 328-61.

481
^ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Demi-Democracy", Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (3) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 305-346.

482 The coups that failed were Prince Bowaradet's royalist counter-coup in October 1933; the 1949 directed "Grand Palace" counter-coup by Pridi's supporters, and the 1951 "Manhattan" coup by the Navy at the Phin-Phao-Sarit clique. In 1977, there was a coup attempt by Chalard Hiranyasiri against Thanin (aimed at Admiral Sangad's clique). In 1981 and 1985, the Young Turks attempted to topple Prem, their former mentor, but they were foiled. In the first instance, they were thwarted by an overt show of royal support for Prem, and on the second occasion by a rival military faction, the Suchinda group.

483 For a critical analysis of premodern Southeast Asian kingdoms, see Renee Hagesteijn, Circles of Kings: Political Dynamics in Early Continental Southeast Asia (Dordretch: Foris Publications, 1989). For Siam, see Charnvit Kasetsiri, "Thai Historiography from Ancient Times to the Modern Period," in Anthony Reid and David Marr, eds., Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Heineman Educational Books, 1979), pp. 156-170; Charnvit Kasetsiri, The Rise of Ayudhya: A History of Siam in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976); also see Riggs, Thailand, p.65-88. Some pioneering works were less critical in their interpretations of dynastic histories: they are W. A. R. Wood, A History of Siam (Bangkok: Siam Barnakich Press, 1933); H. G. Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (New York: Paragon Books, 1965); K. P. Landon, Siam in Transition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1939). Some later scholars have also portrayed the early Siamese states as possessing a centralized government with bureaucratic organizations; see, Walter Vella, The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand, p. 322; James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behaviour", in William J. Siffin, ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 287; and David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 95. Some prominent Thais have contributed to the entrenchment of a nationalistic history; see Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, The Fundamentals of History, Society and Politics (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 1973); Prince Chula Chakrabongse, Lords of Life: A History of the Kings of Thailand (London: Alvin Redman, 1967).

484
^ For account of the transformation of the political economy of Siam under the earlier kings of the current (Chakri) dynasty, see Hong Lysa, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution of the Econ-omy and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 38-74. Hong's book provides an insightful analysis of the pressure applied by colonial powers for free trade. For the role of Chinese immigrants in the Thai economy, see G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957).

485
^ Although so-called "objective conditions" do shape the histories of states and polities, the personal-ities and qualities of individual rulers cannot be ignored. This is especially true in systems of personal rule. For example, Burman kings -- Bagyidaw, Mindon and Thibaw, contemporaries of Nangklao, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn -- all faced the same "objective conditions", i.e., British and French press-ure for trade access. Yet the response in Burma was different from that in Siam. For a comparison, see Riggs, Thailand, pp. 15-64.

486
^ The opening of Thailand to the West had a number of consequences: it led to the monetarization of the economy; it linked peasant producers to the global market economy, and it created an incipient pool of free labour; it opened up the economy to foreign, mostly Chinese, traders and entrepreneurs, thus creating a Chinese commercial stratum; and it led to the creation of a new tax system. For an analysis of these changes, see Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 116-26; also, Hong Lysa, Thailand, pp. 38-110.

487
^ The Bowring Treaty treaty has been hailed as a diplomatic triumph that "saved" Siam from colon-ialism and ushered it into the community of states as a sovereign nation; see Hong Lysa, Thailand, pp. 111-133. Also see James Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Manich Jumsai, Popular History of Thailand (Bangkok: Chalermit Press, 1972); Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915, The Ministry of Interior Under Prince Damrong Rajanuphab (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Walter Vella, Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1851 (New York: J. J. Augustin Inc., 1957). The Bowring Treaty, however, was an unequal treaty which restricted Siamese sovereignty through clauses which granted extra-territorial rights to foreign (mainly Western) states and placed limits on import-export taxes. These restrictions were only removed only in 1938; see Wilson, Politics in Thailand, p. 18. For analyses of the reforms initiated by Rama IV (Mongkut), see Vella, Siam; A. B. Griswold, King Mongkut of Siam (New York: The Asia Society, 1961); A. L. Moffat, Mongkut: King of Siam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961); John Blofeld, King Maha Mongkut of Siam (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1972).

488
^ The reforms initiated by Rama V (Chulalongkorn) are mentioned in most works on Thailand; see Wilson, Politics in Thailand; Riggs, Thailand. Also see, in Thai, Prince Damrong Rajanubharp The Royal Chronicles of the Bangkok Dynasty, Fifth Reign (Bangkok: n.a., 1950); Walter Vella, The Impact of the West; William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); David K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). Also in Thai, see Likhit, Demi-Democracy, pp. 90-120. For a very critical appraisal of Chulalongkorn's reforms, see Benedict Anderson, "Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies", in Eliezer B. Ayal, ed., The Study of Thailand (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978), pp. 193-233.

489
^ Thongchai Winnichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of a Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: Univers-ity of Hawaii Press, 1992), pp. 1-19, 81-94. He argues that territorial identity, or the possession of a "geo-body," essential to Thai nationhood, dates only from the end of the 19th century when France and Britain settled boundary ambiguities of the states in Southeast Asia (as elsewhere) by applying Western concept of international borders. For a dissenting view regarding Thongchai's argument, see Gehan Wijeyewardene, "The Frontiers of Thailand", in Craig J. Reynolds, ed., National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand, 1939-1989 (Victoria: Aristoc Press, 1991), pp. 157-190.

490
^ The unification of the kingdom also meant that the sub-rulers of local principalities lost power, if not their semi-royal status. For accounts of Bangkok's extension of power over Northern Thailand, see M. R. Rujaya Abhakorn, "Changes in the Administrative System of the Northern Thai States, 1884-1908"; and Suthep Soonthornpasuch, "Socio-cultural and Political Changes in Northern Thailand: The Impact of Western Colonial Expansion (1850 -1920)", papers presented at the Seminar on Changes in Northern Thailand and Shan State, 1886-1940, Payab College, Chiangmai, June 20-25, 1983.

491
^ There were more than 300 foreigners employed by Chulalongkorn in the last years of his reign; see Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy, pp. 96-98.

492
^ Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Political History", p. 22.

493
^ Prince Chula Chakrabongse, Lords of Life, p. 261.

494 After Chulalongkorn's death (1910), there were demands from the official class to widen the base of power. These were manifested in a coup attempt in 1912 against Rama VI (Vajiravudh, 1910-1925); a memorandum in 1917 from Prince Chakrabongse, the King's brother, urging the adoption of a con-stitution; and discussions in higher circles about the need for further reforms and democracy. Democ-ratization was opposed in the turn of the century for a number of reasons. It was argued that the peasant majority were not interested