The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

216 The claim of military Thakins and the present military that nationalist armies fought both the Brit-ish and the Japanese has also become a "fact" through repetition, and has been repeated by those writing about Burma. For example, see Moshe Lissak, Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma (London: Sage Publication, 1976), pp. 155-156. Taylor also gives credence to the story that the Thakin resistance group killed nearly 800 Japanese, including two generals: see Taylor, Marxism, p. 35. The claim is disputed by Lewis Allen, who interviewed Japanese officers and examined their files. See Allen, "Leaving a Sinking Ship", p. 70. Those who actually fought the Japanese – the Rakhine, Karen, Kachin, Chin, Shan, and to some degree Bama communists – did not reap the fruits of victory.

217 See Foreign Relations of the United States.

218 Ne Win’s weakness for women is well known, and is frowned upon by the somewhat prudish Bama. In Thailand, he would have been admired, as Sarit Thanarat was for his many wives. Tales of Ne Win’s womanizing ways were related to me by one of his erstwhile "playboy" companions, the late Bo Setkya (one of the famed "Thirty Comrades"). It was recently confirmed by a well-known lawyer, a contemporary and former friend of the top military brass. Maung Maung claims that Ne Win’s hedonism was a strategy to "assure the people that all was well [!]". Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, p. 221.

219 See Richard Butwell, "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma", in Robert K. Sakai, ed., Studies on Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 74-85, esp. p. 74. Buttwell quotes Brigadier Maung Maung as saying, "[It is] irksome to find those who could not hold their own in the army becoming [our] superiors". Contempt for civilians and democratic politics is, as noted, a major characteristic of Third World soldiers.

220 F.R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way To Socialism", Asian Survey, Vol. III, 3 (March 1963), pp. 129-35 (quote, p. 131). See also Taylor, The State, p. 292; Maung Maung, Burma, p. 296.

221 The period when democracy was "taking root" has not been positively assessed, but rather smothered in anti-communist anxieties. Trager portrays it as a time of unruly politics, incompetence on the part of both U Nu and the AFPFL, and the infiltration of parliament by (in his words) "crypto-communists". Trager, Burma, pp. 173-75. Even Butwell, an admirer of U Nu, devotes only a para-graph to the 1956 elections, which were pivotal in persuading a significant number of rebels to give up the armed struggle (Butwell, U Nu, p. 139). Maung Maung also devotes only a short paragraph to the 1956 elections, portraying them as the “writing on the wall” for the AFPFL. Maung Maung, Burma p. 226. There is still no work on the democratic interlude in Burma comparable to Herbert Feith’s study of The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

222 Taylor, "Government Response", p. 111, and Aung-Thwin, "The British ‘Pacification’", pp. 248-249.

223 See Shan State Government, Memorandum,The Constitution Revision, and Shan State Govern-ment, Taunggyi Conference, Meeting Records.

224 In the summer of 1961, I recall reading a Burmese language daily, Bama Khit, alleging with ref-erence to the Yawnghwe prince (my father) that someone "as prominent as the sun and the moon" was behind a plot to dismember the Union. The newspaper was shut down in the 1960s, and it is imposs-ible to trace the issue in question. However, many people I interviewed recalled those headlines.

225 See Moshe Lissak, Military Roles, p. 157; also American University, Area Handbook For Burma (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.339-40; and Walinsky, Economic Development, p. 261.

226 The DSI began as a post-exchange cooperative, then expanded into books and stationery (the Ava House), government contracting (the International Trading House), and, with Japanese partners, pearl and fisheries (Burma Fisheries). In time, its subsidiaries dominated banking, the import business, trade in coal and coke, construction, shipping, consumer retailing, tourism and hotels, the service and sales of automobiles, and the assembly and manufacture of cars, radios, shoes and boots. Accounts of the DSI are found in all standard works on modern Burma and the military.

227 Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-72.

228 Aung Gyi made this statement 26 years after the coup in the now-famous Open Letter which fuell-ed the "people’s power" uprising in 1988. He claims that he refused to lead the coup and wept on the morning it began, because it meant "cremat[ing] the whole democratic system". Although the letter is self-serving, its value lies in the light it sheds on the personalities concerned (including, unwittingly, his own), as well as the inner workings of the military at the time of the coup. The letter reveals that after the coup, the majority of the top brass, though jubilant, did not know what to do next – every-thing was in Ne Win’s hands. See Aung Gyi, "The Truth Revealed: An Open Letter to Ne Win, May 9, 1988" (Falls Church, VA: Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, 1988).

229 Aung Gyi, "The Truth Revealed", p. 4. It also did not fit in with his image, especially in Rangoon society, as a playboy and political lightweight. Noteworthy is that the socialist goal that Ne Win decreed was contrary to his caretaking image as an anti-leftist, pro-free market, development-oriented leader. There was also his personal disdain for socialism, which Aung Gyi says he once expressed after "studying and discussing it for about three days [!]". So low was public esteem of Ne Win that the general opinion at the time of the coup was that his military regime would not last. This skepticism survived well into the 1970s.

230 Lissak, Military Roles, pp.166-67. For a less skeptical, more mainstream analysis that sees the SCME doctrine as a synthesis of Buddhism and socialism, see F.R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism", Asian Survey, Vol.III, 3 (March 1963), pp. 129-35.

231 Prior to the July 7th Massacre -- as it is now known -- many Burmese adopted a neutral, "wait-and-see" attitude. But after the killings, and especially after the demolition of the Students Union building (a "home away from home" for Aung San and other leaders who led the country to independ-ence), it became morally impossible for prominent figures to support the regime. The July 7th Massac-re was the first of many coercive responses from the regime and Ne Win, its strongman-ruler, to the disaffection and discontent of societal forces. For an excellent account of the July 7th massacre and other urban protests, including the largest and bloodiest ones in 1988, see Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., 1989).

232 An alliance between the regime and the Stable AFPFL was out of the question, mainly because the latter was closely connected with Aung Gyi. Ne Win did not trust Aung Gyi, and had him sacked shortly after the coup. For details of intrigues leading to his expulsion, see Aung Gyi, “The Truth Revealed,” pp. 14-15, 17-21.

233 According to Karen and CPB sources, China (represented by Liu Shou-chih and Chen Yi) recom-mended an RC-CPB coalition. This is lent some credibility by the RC’s willingness to talk with CPB leaders who had been living in China for the previous seven or eight years (they actually flew in from Kunming). Source: Skawler-Htaw, a leftist Karen leader, and Sai Aung Win, onetime personal assistant to Thakin Than Tun and former alternate CPB Central Committee member. (Aung Win was Khin Nyunt’s classmate at Rangoon University, and was given a shop in a Rangoon mall when he defected after the CPB’s collapse.)

234 Josef Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 117-118.

235 The 1980 amnesty offer was the most successful, taken up by U Nu from his exile in India, and by his former followers in the PDP (Parliamentary Democracy Party) -- an anti-military armed movement which U Nu founded in 1971. It had no effect on non-Bama "armies" or the CPB, however.

236 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

237 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, pp.143-145, 234-240.

238 San Yu’s speech at the Hmawbi Officer Training School as reported in The Guardian (Rangoon), 18 Oct. 1964. See also Union of Burma, Party Seminar: Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), February 1966, pp.132-138.

239 Mranmah is a variation of Mranmaa or Myanmar. They are all literary forms of Bama/Burman, a term denoting the "majority" ethnic group.

240 For a comprehensive analysis of the military’s Lanzin or BSPP establishment, its structures and formal power relationships, see Silverstein, Military Rule, esp. Chs. 4 and 5 (pp. 80-147).

241 On the SACs, see Silverstein, Military Rule, pp. 93-94. SACs were headed by military men, with civilian functionaries attached for gloss. The SAC formula was replicated in SLORC, in that Law and Order Restoration Committees (LORCs) at all levels are headed by military officers.

242 They were purged probably because they were his followers, or were seen by Ne Win and the military-BSPP leaders as insufficiently loyal. As in Thailand, Indonesia and other polities pervaded by patrimonial connections, it was not uncommon in Ne Win’s Burma for hundreds to be purged when a top military or political figure was dismissed. The official reason for Tin U’s dismissal was that he was aware of a plot by Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint to assassinate Ne Win, San Yu, and top BSPP leaders, but failed to inform on the plotters. He is now co-leader of the democratic movement, together with Aungsan Suukyi.

243 For accounts of the BSPP’s powerlessness and the various purges, see David I. Steinberg, Burma’s Road Towards Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 70 (on the Taze township purge), 74. See also Jon Wiant, "The Political Symbolism of the Taw-hlan-ye-Khit", in F.K. Lehman, ed., Military Rule in Burma: A Kaleidoscope of Views (Sing-apore: Institute of S.E. Asian Studies, 1980), pp. 59-72; John Badgley and Jon Wiant, "The Ne Win-BSPP Style of Bama-Lo"; J. Silverstein, "From Soldiers to Civilians", in Silverstein, ed., The Future of Burma, pp. 43-62 and 80-92, respectively; Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., 1989), p. 79; Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese Politic-al Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism (New York: Praeger, 1983).

244 Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese Political Values, p. 194. For a good journalistic account of the decay of government bureaucracies and institutions, see "Masses in Revolt Against Stifling Authoritarian Grip", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 25 August 1988. For analyses of the highly privileged and patrimonialized military, see Bruce Matthews, "Fortunes of Politics and Culture in Burma", Annual Meeting of Canadian Council of Southeast Asian Studies (CCSEAS), Halifax, Nova Scotia, November 1988; and "Under the Light Infantry Yoke: Burma and its Destiny", Joint Conference of CCSEAS and Northwest Consortium of Southeast Asian Studies, Vancouver, B.C., November 1989.

245 Interviews in Chiangmai and Bangkok with former members of the Prithu-Hluttaw and state legislatures, both Shan and Bama, February-May 1993.

246 Mya Maung, "The Burma Road to Poverty: A Socio-political Analysis", Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 1989), pp. 271-294.

247 "Em-I" Tin Oo had grown so powerful by the late 1970s that he was regarded as the real power in the military hierarchy (and thought of as an annointed "heir").

248 Lintner, Outrage, pp. 92-93.

249 Ne Win’s psychopathic behavior is common knowledge among the Burmese. For example, on Christmas night in 1975, in the presence of diplomats, he stormed into a hotel and beat up members of a rock band. He also assaulted an academic on a golf course who had accidentally touched Daw Khin May Than, the dictator’s wife, at a reception. Ne Win is also reported to have kicked a diplomat in a rage.

250 This was the fate of "misfit" Bama officers. For non-Bama officers, however, it was the rule. The highest rank the latter could aspire to was captain. A Shan officer who (in 1948) held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army, and had been awarded the Military Cross, was never promot-ed, and was retired in 1963 with the same rank.

251 Interview with Bo Hla Tint, Member of Parliament and member of the government-in-exile; also, interviews with two former MIS-personnel-turned-gem-traders and other gem and jade traders in Chiangmai and Bangkok (March, 1993).

252 The institutional decay and corruption within the Tatmadaw is so widespread that it is common knowledge in Burma, and even regarded as "normal". Talks on this topic in Bangkok, Chiangmai, Singapore, Washington, D.C., and Vancouver with Khin Maung Nyunt, Zaw Oo, Zarni, Khin Than Nu, Sai Sai, Ko Aung, Bo Hla Tint, and a host of others who served (or have family members serving) in the Tatmadaw, have been informative and beneficial.

253 Ne Win’s personal dominance of the military and the BSPP order is widely acknowledged. In the early years of BSPP rule, he was often portrayed as an austere, Cromwellian, "warrior-king" type (see Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win). For a more balanced and adequate analysis of his leadership role, see John Badgley, "Burmese Ideology: A Comment", in Silverstein, ed., Independent Burma, pp. 63-79.

254 These passages are based on conversations in Washington, D.C. in 1989 with U Kyaw Win, a Burma-born American officer of the USAID agency, and with the son and nephew of former BSPP ministers. Information was also gleaned from an interview with a former civil servant once close to Ne Win (Bangkok, 1993).

255 For example, Major Charlie Thein Shwe, a former No. 2 man in the MIS, was so badly tortured in prison that he lost his sight. The son of Bo Ba-Htoo (a BIA/BDA martyr) was similarly tortured and blinded. Sources: communication from Tin Maung Win, a prominent opposition figure.

256 Interview with a relative of the present head of the Northern Command, General Saw Lwin (who was made SLORC’s Minister of Labor in mid-1996). According to this source, during the BSPP years the general lived in constant fear of the MIS. Often, he would communicate with trusted family memb-ers only on paper, which he destroyed immediately afterwards.

257 So powerful was this image that Burmese in Canada, beyond the practical reach of the MIS, were and are fearful of talking politics, even among themselves.

258 They include houses belonging to current top military bosses (Khin Nyunt, Abel, Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, etc.), former top brass (Tin Pe, San Yu, Kyaw Htin, Aye Ko, Saw Maung), and even the disgrac-ed (for example, "Em-I" Tin Oo was given a plot of land and a "loan" to build a house, after his release from jail in 1989). Needless to say, the houses and land were not Ne Win’s to give away: they were either state-owned or "nationalized" property.

259 Burma Watcher, "Burma in 1988: There Came a Whirlwind", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (February 1989), pp. 174-80.

260 Atrocities, primarily by Bama soldiers, have been endemic in non-Bama areas since 1948. How-ever, they tended to be dismissed as rebel propaganda until Amnesty International’s report on Burma in 1988. See Burma: Extrajudicial Execution and Torture of Members of Ethnic Minorities (London: Amnesty International, May 1988). Also see, Marc Weller, ed., Democracy and Politics in Burma (Manerplaw: NCGUB Printing Office, 1993), esp., pp. 280-281, 350-361, 374-384 (Interviews with victims and reports on atrocities by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and NCGUB/the Government-in-Exile of Burma). It is quite likely that Bama soldiers have committed atrocities against the Bama population as well, but these do not seem to have been systematic until 1988. The most widespread atrocity is the coercion of civilians to serve as frontline "porters". Victims are used as beasts of burden, human shields, and human mine-detectors; women porters are often the victims of gang rape. On forced labor, see "Burma’s Road of Shame", Asia Inc., Vol.2/10 (October 1993), pp. 36-43.

261 From personal experience while serving with the Shan State Army/SSA, 1963-1977. Medical items such as drugs, needles, morphine, and bandages, along with ammunition, uniforms, ponchos, and boots, were all obtained from black-market middlemen.

262 Silverstein, Military Rule, pp. 49, 141.

263 Steinberg, Burma’s Road, pp. 79, 128. Also, Nobuyoshi Nishizawa and Mya Than, "Agricultur-al Policy Reforms and Agricultural Development in Myanmar", in Mya Than and Joseph L.H. Tan, eds., Myanmar Dilemma and Options: The Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).

264 In this respect, SLORC’s ceasefire offer can be seen as a slight improvement. However, it is at best a stopgap measure. Such issues as the military’s monopolization of administrative and political power, military atrocities, and the shape of future relations between centre and states have yet to be resolved.

265 From the mid-1970s to 1988, however, the regime did successfully exploit the opium-heroin problem, enabling it to buttress its external legitimacy and obtain aid, loans, and grants. Despite anti-narcotics aid from the U.S. and others, opium production increased from 400 to almost 2000 tons, according to the estimates of international anti-narcotics authorities. See United States General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Enforcement Efforts in Burma are Not Effective (Washington D.C., 1989). Martin Smith argues that there has been no reduction in opium output despite U.S. anti-narcotics aid (to the tune of US $18 million a year) and cooperation between the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the current junta (worth US $4.1 million). See Martin Smith, "Recurrent Trends in Burma’s Ethnic Drug History", paper at the U.S.State Department Conference on Narcotics in Burma, Washington D.C., 17 September 1993.

266 The Revolutionary Council, The Burmese Way to Socialism: The Proclamation of the Revolut-ionary Council (in Burmese). Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 30 April 1962.

267 The KKY, or homeguards, were local militias led by an ethnic Chinese leader like Lo Hsing-han, the "heroin king" of the 1970s. They were usually backed by mafia-like, pan-Asian, ethnic-Chinese drug and trade "syndicates". The KKY supported the regime in exchange for a free hand in cross-border trade, military protection for heroin refineries and opium convoys, and use of military vehicles for transport. At one time (until 1971), Khun Sa was the unofficial head of all KKYs in Shan State. The KKY program was scrapped in the mid-1970s, when the regime secured U.S. anti-narcotics aid. But after 1988, ex-CPB warlord armies, again led or backed by Chinese drug and trade groups, came to enjoy the same status as the KKY armies under the ceasefire agreements. For a well-researched account of the pan-Asian, ethnic-Chinese drug and trade network, its key personalities and dealings with local power-holders, see Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Over-seas Chinese (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995).

268 Besides restrictions on foreign travel and censorship, including a ban on foreign publications, regime actions against the people included frequent harassment by MIS agents, soldiers, and party officials. In addition, citizens were required to carry identity cards wherever they went, obtain permits even for domestic travel, submit to searches at numerous checkpoints, report overnight visitors to authorities, and fill out forms at party and government offices (to buy a tin or two of condensed milk from the people’s stores, for instance). Except for the last, these restrictions remain in place.

269 Unarmed protests occurred in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1987, and 1988. They are familiar to those who follow events in Burma, and are mentioned in all works on the country’s post-1962 history. For brief but comprehensive accounts of various uprisings, see Lintner, Outrage.

270 For typical analyses that record the familiar woes inflicted by the regime, but underestimate the depth of resentment and ignore the pressure then building, see Hugh C. MacDougall and Jon A. Wiant, "Burma in 1984: Political Stasis or Political Renewal?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (February 1985), pp. 241-248, and "Burma in 1985: Consolidation Triumphs Over Innovation", Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (February 1986), pp. 186-195; Robert O. Tilman, "Burma in 1986: The Process of Involution Continues", Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (February 1987), pp. 254-63.

271 For accounts of the March-July protests and the brutality of Sein Lwin’s riot squad (lon-htein), see Aung Gyi’s second Open Letter. His exposure of the atrocities outraged the people of Rangoon, and made them more determined to overthrow the BSPP regime. Aung Gyi, "The Day the Blood Flowed on the Inya Embankment: The Second Letter, 6 June 1988" (Falls Church, VA: Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma [CRDB], 1988).

272 According to a few Burmese with inside contacts, Sein Lwin, as head of a "hardcore" faction, opposed Ne Win’s multi-party proposals. This led to the latter withdrawing in a huff from the BSPP, and taking his men with him -- including San Yu and his cabinet. Thus Sein Lwin was left "holding the bag", and became President for about a month. According to some Burmese interviewed, they believe that Sein Lwin is, like Ne Win, still influential behind the scenes and quite powerful. He is believed to be the "patron-godfather" of hardliners and the USDA -- an outfit nicknamed by a Rangoon wit as "SLORC generals' private street-mobs".

273 These were U Nu, Mahn Win Maung (third Union President), Bohmu Aung, Thakin Soe (Red Flag leader), Aung Gyi (former No. 2 in the military brass), Tin U (ex-defence minister), and other former top brass (including Kyi Maung, Maung Shwe, Aung Shwe, Chit Khaing, and Sein Mya).

274 For an excellent journalistic account of the “coup” and its bloody aftermath, see Stan Sesser, "A Rich Country Gone Wrong", The New Yorker (9 October 1989), pp.55-64, 96. The "coup" was well covered by regional newsmagazines such as FEER and Asiaweek, and also by global ones like Time and Newsweek. An example is Melinda Liu, "Inside Bloody Burma", Newsweek (3 October 1988), pp. 30-32. For an account of the 1988 uprising, based on interviews with participants and witnesses, see Bertil Lintner, Outrage.

275 The core of SLORC’s argument is contained in its Announcement No. 1/90, July 27, 1990. See also International Human Rights Law Group, Post-Election Myanmar: Popular Mandate Withheld, Washington, D.C., 31 October 1990, pp. 7-10.

276 This does not mean that Ne Win is now irrelevant. Like Singapore’s "Senior Minister", Lee Kuan Yew, his influence is still pivotal. He is the main factor cementing the military together. SLORC’s top two leaders, Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt, are both Ne Win’s "sons", figuratively speaking. As far as can be ascertained, they are tolerated by other general-ministers and regional commanders mainly because they enjoy Ne Win’s support, and also because of Than Swe’s and Khin Nyunt’s tolerance of the economic independence (that is, corruption) of regional commanders and LORC heads. Source: U Rewata, the British-based Burmese monk who arranged a series of informal talks between Aung San Suukyi and the Than Swe-Khin Nyunt team in early 1995.

277 To name just a prominent few "generals-entreprenuers": Kyaw Ba (former head of the Northern Command), Tun Kyi (former head of the Central Command), and Maung Aye (current army comm-ander and aspiring strongman) have all reportedly accumulated fortunes. The usual avenues include deals with foreign partners and local investors for natural resource extraction ventures (teak, mineral ores, gems, precious metals, fish, etc.), along with rice exports, hotels, tourism, heavy construction (roads, airports, seaports), real estate development, and commercial projects (shopping malls, depart-ment stores, and so on).

278 For example, Ne Win’s daughter, Sanda Win, and her husband, Aye Zaw Win, are among the top "entrepreneurs". His other daughters, Kyemon and Thawda, along with their husbands and in-laws, are thriving by brokering foreign deals. SLORC chairman Than Shwe’s son and wife are likewise occupied. These individuals have been labelled by local wags "capitalists without capital", since their only capital is their famous fathers and uncles, and their links with the top military brass.

279 The point that USDA may be transformed into a future Golkar-like party is also discussed by David I. Steinberg, "The Union Solidarity Development Association: Mobilization and Orthodoxy", Burma Debate, Vol.IV, No.1 January/February 1997, pp. 4-11.

280 The particulars about Maung Aye were obtained from talks in Bangkok in January 1997 with Burmese businessmen connected to the military. I am also indebted to several Burmese academics and friends in Singapore; Dr. Mya Maung, Zaw Oo, and Zarni in the United States; Karen leaders and activists in Maesot and Mae Ta Raw Hta; Shan monks and activists in Bangkok and Chiangmai.

281 Khin Nyunt is officially the No. 2 man in the SLORC hierarchy. But as the "Old Man’s" protege, formal head of the MIS, and often SLORC’s prime spokesman, he is in many respects No. 1.

282 Some of the early and influential overseas "Burmese" entrepreneurs include: Kyan Kin (ethnic Chinese, based in Hong Kong and Singapore); Motiwallah (Bama-Muslim, Singapore); B.P. Win (Chinese, Hong Kong); Sein Tun and Sappan (Chinese, Bangkok); Kyaw Zin (Chinese, Singapore); Zaw Win (Chinese, USA); Tin Tut (Chinese, USA); R. Tun Maung (Rakine, Canada); Michael Myo Nyunt (Bama, Australia).

283 For example, China and Singapore have taken a "hands-on" role in supporting SLORC. They have encouraged their businessmen to become major investors in Burma. The volume of Burma-China trade was at US $800 million, and while Singapore’s investments in Burma totalled US $500 million in late 1995. All figures are in U.S. dollars. See Lee Kim Chew, "Changes in Myanmar’s Policies Spell New Openings for Investors", The Straits Times (Singapore), 19 September 1995; and John Stackhouse, "Investment Boom Strikes Burma", The Globe and Mail (10 April 1995). Firms doing business with SLORC are monitored by Burma Alert, a publication of the Canada-based ADDB (Associates to Develop Democratic Burma). It also publishes and periodically updates a list of foreign firms that invest or do business in Burma. In early 1997, SLORC's Directorate of Investment and Company Administration claimed that foreign investment in Burma has increased (from $1.4 billion in 1993). It reported that there were 226 foreign projects worth $5.27 billion. Of these, $1.5 billion was, it was claimed, in Oil and Gas, $1 billion in manufacturing, $731 million in Hotel and Tourism, and $500 million in Mining -- totalling $3.8 billion only (no account was given of the remainder). Major investors were, reportedly: Singapore, with $1.17 billion; the United Kingdom, $1 billion, and Thai-land, $960 million. Burma Alert, Vol.8, No.2 (February 1997), p. 7.

284 Only in 1988, it seems, did the military realize that the real threat to its power resided in the Bama majority. Before that, its attention had been focused almost entirely on the non-Bama. The military was for a long time able to sow confusion among the Bama majority with allegations that, for example, Shan princes and Karen rebels were plotting to dismember the union.

285 Source: communications with KIA chairman Brang Seng, now deceased (1992); with E.M. Marta of the Karen External Affairs office in Bangkok (1993); and with Aung Tet, a CPB cadre now in exile in Yunnan (1994).

286 Source: Brang Seng, Kachin (KIO) chairman, and M. Jala, a Kachin activist and confidential aide to Brang Seng (Interview in 1993).

287 The abuses and atrocities suffered by the vast majority of people, especially the non-Bama, are dealt with in Martin Smith and Annie Allsebrook, Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democ-racy, and Human Rights (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994).

288 Her image among the Bama is that of a refined, beloved daughter or younger sister of high moral calibre and intellect. From this perspective, it can be said that support for Aung San Suukyi, and revulsion towards SLORC, is emotionally entrenched, and hence difficult to counter. Her popularity and legitimacy have been boosted by the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize and other international awards. Other awards she has received include: the Thorolf Rafto Award (Norway, 1990), the Sakharov prize (European Parliament, 1991), the Humanistas Human Rights Award (United States, 1991), the Marisa Bellisario prize (Italy, 1992), the Simon Bolívar prize (UNESCO, 1992), Les Nouveaux Droits award (France, 1992), the Premio Mujer Progresista award (Spain, 1993), and the Victor Jara International Human Rights Award (United States, 1993). See Burma Affairs, Vol. 3/1, January-March 1993, p. 10. For some of her own thoughts, see Aung San Suukyi, Freedom From Fear and Other Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1991). How deep her democratic convictions run remains to be seen, however, especially if and when she attains power.

289 It is also alleged that the release took place without Khin Nyunt’s knowledge. Source: Confident-ial communication (August 1995) from a person with links to SLORC higher-ups, especially Kyaw Sein, the DDSI’s No.2 man. According to this source and others, the military is divided at the time of writing (1997) into three major factions. One consists of Khin Nyunt and his allies, which enjoys the blessings of Ne Win or his daughter, Sanda Win. Another is led by Maung Aye, an ambitious hard-liner, under the patronage of Sein Lwin, "The Butcher of Rangoon". A third revolves around Than Shwe, SLORC’s chairman. In addition, there are a number of "floating" or "fence-sitting" cliques, including several military-intelligence cliques; cliques of general-ministers (the "business generals"); cliques in the navy and the airforce; and smaller cliques of officers, formed for self-protection, which attach themselves to major factions as expediency or circumstances dictate.

290 In addition to problems associated with the grave state-society dysfunction, additional problems that discourage long-term development include widespread corruption; unsettled politics; the lack of physical and other infrastructure; an overvalued kyat; and the flood of cheap outside manufactures, especially from Yunnan, which have undercut the viability of local industries. See Mary P. Callahan, "Myanmar in 1994: New Dragon or Still Dragging?," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 201-208. See also Khin Maung Kyi, "Mynanmar: Will Forever Flow the Ayeyawaddy?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1994, pp. 209-230; and Mya Maung, "The Burmese Approach to Develop-ment: Economic Growth without Democratization," Economics and Politics Series, No. 7, July 1995, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii. Almost all economists analyzing SLORC’s policies and actions agree that its "open-market" economic strategy is not geared towards real growth, and benefits only a few at the top, along with their families and investment "bed-fellows".

291 The Indonesian Armed Forces is currently known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI). Its forerunners were the Volunteer Force for the Defence of Java (PETA), formed by the Japanese in October 1943; the People’s Security Agency (BKR), formed in August 1945; the People’s Security Army (TKR), formed in October 1945; the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI), formed in 1946); and the Indonesian National Army (TNI), formed in May 1947. ABRI’s various incarnations were clarified by General Soedibyo of the National Defence Institute in an interview in Jakarta (June 1993).

292 For a discussion of the changes that Dutch colonialism wrought on the loosely linked "inland-states" and "harbor principalities" of present-day "Indonesia", and the resulting "distorted" form of capitalism, see Mochtar Pabottingi, "Nationalism and Egalitarianism in Indonesia, 1908-1980", unpublished doct-oral dissertation, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1991, esp. pp. 58, 138-179. See also David J. Steinberg et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), esp. pp. 146-154, 184-187; J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of the Plural Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1944).

293 Steinberg et al., In Search, pp. 80-86. See also Theodoor G.T. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Cent-ury (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962); Soemarsaid Moertono, The State and Statecraft in Old Java (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); Soedjatmoko et al, ed., An Introduction to Indonesian Histor-iography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965).

294 For a discussion of the symbiotic relationship between the Dutch and native rulers (together with the indigenous aristocracy), see Pabottingi, "Nationalism and Egalitarianism", pp. 38-70.

295 In the 17th century, the Dutch were the "diligent servants of a great merchant company". In the 18th, by contrast, they were "uninterested in governance" and were "essentially alien war bands, extracting what they could from conquered territories by the most expedient means". In the 19th century, "they gradually became civil servants of a colonial state". See Steinberg, et al., In Search, p. 146. The twists and turns of Dutch colonial policy and its consequences are covered in such classic works as Furnivall, Netherlands India, and Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

296 The administrative machinery was controlled by the Dutch to the extent that only 221 high-ranking positions were held by "natives" out of a total of some 3,000. Moreover, the Volksraad or People's Council, established in 1918, was merely an advisory body. See Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 5-6.

297 For comprehensive works on nationalist and radical movements, see George McT. Kahin, Nation-alism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952); Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1959); and Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).

298 Benedict Anderson explores the creation of a common "nationhood" under colonial rule, the incipiently-nationalist class of "native" functionaries and elites, and the birth of the “national imagination” in his Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). Although the details may be debated, the importance of an imagined affinity between strangers to the formation of a common "national" identity must be recognized.

299 Pabottingi, "Nationalism and Egalitarianism", p. 188. For Budi Utomo, see Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1960), and Akira Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of Boedi Oetomo (Tokyo: Institute of Develop-ing Economies, 1972). It is also discussed in McVey, The Rise.

300 McVey, The Rise, pp. 96-97. It advocated a state accountable to the people, common ownership of wealth, the distribution of products and profit by a popular assembly, and other radical measures. Accounts of Sarekat Islam are found in all works on nationalism and revolution in Indonesia, e.g., Kahin, Nationalism; Noer, The Modernist; Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); and James L.Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Re-formist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

301 It was founded by H.J.F. M. Sneevliet (a Dutchman, and member of the Dutch Social Democratic Workers’ Party, or SDAP). The best and most comprehensive work on the PKI is McVey, The Rise. See also Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx, and Marhaen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). In 1926 the PKI launched an ill-prepared, poorly-coordinated "inglorious revolution", which was easily and harshly crushed, ending its activities for a time. See McVey, The Rise, pp. 230, 289, 305-303, 342. See also Mintz, Mohammed, p. 33. Over 13,000 communists and participants were arrested. Many were interned at the notorious Boven Digul camp in New Guinea, some for over a decade.

302 Sukarno’s life is well covered in the scholarly literature. See John D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1975); Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno’s Indonesian Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Willard A.Hanna, Bung Karno’s Indonesia (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961); Louis Fischer, The Story of Indonesia (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959); C.L.M. Penders, The Life and Times of Sukarno (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974); Dahm, Sukarno; and Cindy Adams, My Friend the Dictator (Indiana-polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

303 A good analysis of Sukarno’s contribution to Indonesian national identity is found in Pabottingi, "Nationalism and Egalitarianism", pp. 240-277.

304 The term was coined by Sukarno to denote the "little people". These included peasant farmers and street-stall operators, who were not proletariats because they owned the means of production – land, buffaloes, ploughs, etc. Nor did they sell their labour; but this did not keep them from facing grinding poverty. See Legge, Sukarno, pp. 72-73.

305 He never had "close contact with the masses, but regarded them, when mobilized, as a political tidal wave". Pabottingi, "Nationalism and Egalitarianism", p. 257. On Pancasila, see endnote #21 below.

306 The imposition of the "family" in things political apparently aims to assert the hegemony of pater-nalistic authoritarianism. At best, it represents an overly simplistic equation of a larger and more compl-ex socio-political-economic formation with the family – a basic social unit. It also romanticizes and overemphasizes the family’s role in promoting the welfare of its members. However, Third World power-holders have been quite successful in manipulating "family values" and "community" to perpet-uate a paternalist, authoritarian "political culture". Part of their success derives from the fact that the family and patrimonial networking are often effective in ensuring survival and upward mobility. Such patrimonialism is by definition particularistic, however; it is also private, not public.

307 For Dewantoro’s and Supomo’s thoughts, see Reeve, Golkar, pp. 9-25. See also Herbert Feith and Lance Castel, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-65 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

308 David Reeve, Golkar, pp. 9-20 (Dewantoro’s thoughts), 20-25 (Supomo’s), 25-36 (Sukarno’s). Their views have much in common with those of Mihail Manoilesco, regarded by Philippe Schmitter as the pioneer of "state corporatism". Manoilesco sees a state-society relation as a complete system of political domination, articulated by a nationalistic-statist, corporatist hierarchy of authority, whereby "artificial [and] circumstantial" class differentiations and antagonisms would be replaced by a spirit of "national solidarity". His vision takes into account the underdevelopment of the peripheries, the delay-ed-dependent capitalism, and the pervasive resentment of their populations in the face of their own "inferiority". His solution is a "defensive, nationalistic modernization from above" via the division of the polity into vertical units of interest-aggregation. See Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still The Century of Corporatism?", in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., The New Corporatism: Social and Polit-ical Structures in the Iberian World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 85-131.

309 On Sukarno’s conception of the state, see Reeve, Golkar, pp. 25-36. See also Sukarno, National-ism, Islam, and Marxism, trans. Karel H. Warouw and Peter D.Weldon, with an introduction by Ruth McVey (Ithaca: Cornell Indonesian Project, 1970); Legge, Sukarno; Dahm, Sukarno; Feith and Castel, Indonesian.

310 For details of these "armies", see Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1958).

311 Sukarno formulated Pancasila (the Five Principles: Nationalism, Internationalism or Humanitarian-ism, Consensus or Democracy, Social Justice and Belief in God) as a "common denominator of all ideologies and streams of thoughts". See Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1900s (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), p. 10. However, the Five Principles have changed over time: "Nationalism" has been replaced by "National Unity", "Internationalism" has been dropped, and "Democracy" has been replaced by "People's Sovereignty". See Adnan Buyung Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante, 1956-1959 (Jakarta: Sina Harapan, 1992), p.547.

312 These were the Hizbu’llah, Barisan Banteng (the Buffalo Corps, formerly Barisan Pelopor), the socialist-led Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia), the communist-led Laskar Rakyat (People’s Army), remnant units of the disbanded PETA, and a host of others outside Java (in Sumatra, the Celebes, etc.). For this period of militia politics, see Benedict R.O’G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occup-ation and Resistance1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); also, Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia", in J.J.Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military (Princeton: Princeton Univ-ersity Press, 1962), pp. 185-230.

313 The Dutch refused to recognize the "Republic of Indonesia", but were forced to negotiate with the “government” of Sutan Sjahrir (a socialist). Under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement (November 1946), the Republic’s de facto authority over Java and Sumatra was recognized, and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union was tentatively agreed upon. In late 1947, however, the Dutch sprang a military offensive, and soon controlled most major towns. At that point, the United Nations intervened. The Renville Agreement was signed in August 1947.

314 Among those who fought, apart from the military, were militant Muslims of the Darul Islam move-ment in West Java. Darul Islam was led by a Muslim politician, S.M. Kartosuwijo, whose aim was to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia. (He was captured and executed in 1962.) See Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1900s (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 169 -170; also Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road To Power: Indonesian Military Politics,1945-1967 (Kuala Lum-pur: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 43. For some feeling of the intense but confused conflict and rivalries among nationalist groups and leaders during the formative period, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution.

315 For an analysis of the early Indonesian military and its factional composition, see Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 13-18.

316 This was actually an "interim or provisional government". Independence had not yet been achieved, in that the Dutch still opposed it and few countries internationally had recognized it.

317 Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 18-40.

318 General Sudirman was regarded as the father of the armed forces. For a study of his role and attitudes, based largely on Indonesian sources and documents, see Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992).

319 Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968), p. 36. Also see Sund-haussen, The Road,, pp. 20-21. The Sultan, however, became Minister of Defence, 1948-53.

320 Tan Malaka was a veteran communist who broke away from the PKI because of a disagreement over the armed uprising of 1926-1927. He formed the Partai Murba (Proletarian Party), and also led the PP (the United Struggle), a front that opposed negotiations with the Dutch. He was killed in the confusion of the War of Independence in February 1949, four months before the Dutch military with-drawal.

321 The "Madiun Affair" was essentially a fight between army units slated to be disbanded, which were allied to PKI laskars, and the Siliwangi Division, the key unit of the new army, allied to Tan Malaka’s laskars. See Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 39-40. For details, see Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 272-303. See also Oey Hong Lee, Power Struggle in Southeast Asia (Zug, Switzerland: Inter Documentation Co., 1976), pp. 64-65. Musso, the veteran PKI leader, was killed; Amir Sjarifuddin, a provisional Prime Minister who signed the Renville Agreement in 1948, was captured and executed by the army.

322 The democratic framework was advanced by the political parties, and in particular by Hatta and Sjahrir, who looked askance at the traditional collectivism of Dewantoro, Supomo, and Sukarno. See Reeve, Golkar, pp. 9-25. Feith suggests the parliamentary framework was adopted despite the fact that the leaders did not understand how it worked, or what it really meant. Rather, it was settled on because it was at the time a "universal" convention: all former colonies, including Indian and Burma, adopted it. Besides, there was not even a rough agreement on any other constitutional arrangement. See Feith, The Decline, pp. 38-45.

323 Ibid. Sukarno’s advocacy of an authoritarian system – embodied in the 1945 Constitution – was opposed by Vice President Hatta, who favored a mix of Western parliamentary forms with "indigen-ous" village democracy. Sjahrir and other socialists strongly opposed Sukarno’s emphasis on an all-submerging kind of unity. After independence (in 1949), Sjahrir, with Hatta in support, pushed for a system of multi-party parliamentary democracy. For an analysis of the early debates among leading figures over the shape of the political system, see David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), esp. pp. 58-107. Also, Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government.

324 Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy and Political Culture (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989), pp. 2-3.

325 For an analysis of how the rulers of the New Order, the military, portray the parliamentary years of the 1950s, see David Bouchier, "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics", in David Bouchier and John Legge, eds., Democracy in Indonesia: the 1950s and the 1990s (Clayton, Victoria: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), pp. 50-62.

326 A very detailed account of politicking in the pre-Guided Democracy years is offered by Feith in The Decline.

327 They were the Natsir government (a coalition led by Masjumi, lasting from September 1950 to March 1951); Sukiman (under Masjumi, April 1951 to February 1952); Wilopo (led by the PNI, April 1951 to June 1953); Ali Sastoamidjojo (also under the PNI, July 1953 to July 1955); Buhanuddin Harahap (led by Masjumi, August 1955 to March 1956); and Ali’s second cabinet (PNI-led, March 1956 to March 1957). Frequent changes in government, though, may not have been the key factor in the dangerous instability that developed. Such instability may have stemmed more from struggles between military factions, the military rebellions against civilian control, and Sukarno’s flaming rhetoric, than from democratic politics. In democracies, moreover, "instability" is plainly visible, while the instability inherent in authoritarianism is "invisible" to those outside. We hence observe the unexpected collapse of seemingly invincible, stable authoritarian orders

328 The politicians were Zainal Baharuddin (Socialist), Zainul Arifin (NU/Nahdatul Ulama), Arudji Kartawinata (PSII/Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia), and Iwa Kusumasumantri and Mohammed Yamin from Murba, the fringe communist group founded by the late Tan Malaka --a veteran nationalist and an unorthodox communist. He numbered among his followers Adam Malik (who served under Sukarno, became a supporter of the staunchly anti-communist Suharto, and was rewarded with cabinet posts and the vice-presidency).

329 Those opposing Nasution were mostly Javanese ex-PETA officers, including Colonels Bambang Supeno (close to Sukarno), Bambang Suseng, Zulkifli Lubis (Chief of Intelligence), and others. They sometimes sided with politicians against Nasution, and sometimes with Nasution against politicians. Later, Lubis played a prominent part in the anti-Nasution revolts of regional military commanders, generally known as the "regional revolts".

330 But without seeking exclusive domination, according to Nasution. See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 39.

331 The account given here is only a very simplified account of the affair. For details of the convoluted intra-military politics leading to the "17 October Affair", see Feith, The Decline, pp.259-269. It began as a military move against "interference" by parliament and politicians. But it soon deteriorated into jockeying between pro- and anti-Nasution military cliques when Sukarno, offended by the demonstration by tanks and troops outside the palace, took a firm stand. According to Feith (p. 262), Sukarno initially favoured the military plot, but changed his mind after disagreement arose over the officers and politic-ians to be arrested following the coup.

332 As the above events suggest, the "civilian-military" crisis did not stem from fights between discrete bodies over principles. Rather, it illuminates the nature of Third World politics, with its personalism, shifting alliances, and uncertain loyalties. See Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 85 (based on Order of the Day No.1/KSAD/ PH/55, 8 July 1955).

333 After his dismissal, Nasution sponsored a military-supported political party, the IP-KI (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence) to contest the first general elections, held in 1955. Significant-ly, it fared poorly, as did pro-military parties in Burma in 1960 and 1990. It won only 1.4 percent of the popular vote, and 4 out of 267 seats. The PNI won 22 percent of the vote (for 57 seats); Masjumi, 21 percent (for 57 seats); and the NU, 18.4 percent (for 45 seats). The PKI also made headway, winning 16.4 percent of the vote and 39 seats. See Suryadinata, Military Ascendancy, pp. 135-136 (Appendix B). For a detailed study of the 1955 elections, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971). What is interesting is that the IP-KI’s platform largely reflect-ed the military’s anti-democratic stance. It called for a return to the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and for the scrapping of "Western" democracy. It blamed the "deplorable state of affairs" on the corruption and excesses of political parties. On the other hand, the IP-KI’s dismal electoral performance can be considered politically insignificant: it did not signify popular rejection of the milit-ary’s anti-democratic platform. One might suggest that rural voters, especially, tend to vote according to parochial or patrimonial considerations. The controversy over whether Third World electorates under-stand or appreciate democratic politics has raged on for decades. The pessimistic view, that Third World masses are easily misled and culturally incapable of appreciating political democracy, is dominant.

334 For a discussion of Sukarno’s manipulative relationship with successive prime ministers and cabin-ets, see Legge, Sukarno, pp. 273-276.

335 These were Simbolon (the North Sumatra Command), Warouw (East Indonesia), Kawilarang (the Siliwangi Division), Bachrum (Diponegoro), and Sudirman (Brawijaya). See Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 97.

336 On the opposition to Nasution’s "rationalization" plan, which led to the military-regional revolts, see Crouch, The Army and Politics, 32-33.

337 Ibid., pp. 104, 106.

338 They included Sjafruddin Prawiranegara ("Prime Minister" during the War of Independence), Mohammed Natsir (Prime Minister, 1950-1951), Burhanuddin Harahap (1955-1956), and Sumitro Djojohadijusumo (a veteran socialist).

339 There is a significant difference between a "secessionist government", and a "counter-government". Although regional dissatisfaction with Jakarta did exist, the main players were military opponents of Nasution, those dissatisfied with Sukarno, or both. A regional component to the military revolts is also evident. The export-oriented Outer Islands were disadvantaged under Jakarta’s trade and foreign exchange regulations. This gave rise to the perception that Java was colonizing and milking the Outer Islands. On the other hand, the regulations resulted in lucrative, large-scale smuggling overseen by Div-isional commanders and senior officers in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Minahassa, and elsewhere. Suharto, allegedly, was among them. Since centralized trade regulations indirectly benefitted military officers, the grievances of the Outer islands per se probably were not core issues, at least for the soldier-rebels. For accounts and interpretations of “regional” revolts, see J.M. van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (April 1957), pp. 49-62; D.W. Fryer, "Economic Aspects of Indonesian Disunity", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXX, No.3 (September 1957), pp. 195-208; John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961); Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army", Indonesia 11 (April 1971), pp. 131-176 (Part 1), 147-181 (Part 2).

340 For an account of Nasution’s masterly handling of rebel officers, see Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 107-111. The PRRI apparently did not win over many military units, in particular the key Siliwangi Division. Also, neither side wished to fight to the end: they still faced strong rivals, including the politic-al parties (the re-emergent PKI especially) and the formidable Sukarno. Thus, Nasution adopted a flex-ible response. Negotiations were held with the rebels, and about 300 million Rupiah were freed up for Outer Islands reconstruction and the rehabilitation of ex-rebels. By June 1958, all rebel "capitals" on Sumatra, Sulawesi, and outlying areas had been captured. Thus the "regional" revolts by rather incom-petent soldier-rebels were effectively defused, although low-level guerrilla warfare continued in many areas until 1961. They continue in Aceh to this day.

341 Reeve, Golkar, pp. 112-113.

342 The 1945 Constitution, in force since 1959, was ratified in August 1945 after extensive debates over issues such as the family principle, people’s sovereignty, and group representation. However, a number of factors led to the 1945 Constitution being shelved. These included the need for external legitimacy and outside support, which the rejection of democracy and parliamentary politics would have damaged; the push by the political parties for a multi-party, parliamentary system; Hatta’s espousal of individual rights and rejection of the collectivism inherent in the family principle; and the rise of Sutan Sjahrir, who opposed the family principle with its authoritarian connotations. In November 1945, Sjahrir, as Prime Minister, proclaimed the adoption of a parliamentary, democratic system. This change, which amounted to a rejection of the 1945 Constitution, was meekly accepted by Sukarno. For details, see Reeve, Golkar, pp. 65-86.

343 Legge, Sukarno, p. 243.

344 This formulation was among the many "unifying" creeds proposed by Sukarno. Another important emblem of Sukarnoism was Manipol/USDEK – the Political Manifesto. It consists of the 1945 Constit-ution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, the Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity: togeth-er, USDEK.

345 Recall that in the 1950s and 1960s, Communism seemed to many leaders, intellectuals, and political activists to be an inexorable tide, or at least a viable alternative system. This was true in both the Third and First Worlds.

346 Daniel S. Lev, "The Role of the Army in Indonesian Politics", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 1963/ 64), pp. 349-364; also, Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1966), pp. 185. Nasution’s "Middle Way" was the basis of ABRI’s Dual Function doctrine, which has been used to justify the military intrusion into politics and the state.

347 One could say that Sukarno’s brand of personal rule approximates Jackson and Rosberg’s ideal type of the "prophetic ruler" – a visionary who is ideologically motivated to reshape society (pp. 79-80, 182 -186). See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), esp. pp. 77-78, 83-84, 143-145.

348 Legge, Sukarno, pp. 282-284. Sukarno also owed his success in implementing his Konsepsi agenda to the discrediting of leaders who could potentially challenge it, such as Hatta, Natsir, and Sumitro Djojohadijusumo, along with leaders of the Masjumi and PSI. All were implicated directly or indirectly in the regional revolts. See Feith, The Decline, pp. 588-589.

349 The story of the politics of constitutional changes is, like most things in Indonesia, complicated. The 1945 Constitution currently remains in force. It was restored in 1959-1960 by Sukarno, with Nasution’s support. Actually, it was adopted in August 1945, but was "shelved" by Sutan Sjahrir and political parties in November 1945. Sjahrir and Hatta installed a cabinet system responsible to "Parliament" (the KNIP). In 1949, a federal Constitution of the "United States of Indonesia" (the type favoured by the departing Dutch) was adopted. But it was replaced in 1950 by a provisional constitut-ion establishing a parliamentary form of governance. A Constituent Assembly (the Konstituante) was appointed in 1956 to draw up a more "permanent" constitution, but it was dismissed by Sukarno (with Nasution’s support) in 1959. Soon after, Sukarno decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution, which forms the basis of both the Guided Democracy state and the New Order.The best work so far on constitutional changes and arrangements is found in David Reeve, Golkar. See also Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government..

350 By 1960, all the structures of the Guided Democracy state were in place: the Presidential Karya (Work) cabinet; the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), composed of representatives of the parties along with regional and functional groups; the National Planning Council; a provisional Majelis