The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

1 It is with great reservations that I use the term "Third World". But it is less problematic than terms like the undeveloped or underdeveloped world, the developing or transitional world, the non-West, the peripheries, etc. Although "Third World" is often considered pejorative, and is anyway ambiguous with the collapse of the "Second World", it at least avoids the implication of a linear trajectory of development. It is also generally accepted in academic discourse.

2 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory", in Charles Kennedy and David J. Louscher, eds., Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 1-10.

3 Ibid., p. 1.

4 Ibid.

5 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd.edn. (London: Penguin, 1975).

6 It should be noted that in both Burma and Indonesia, professionally-trained soldiers and officers did exist. They served in British units during the fighting in Burma. In Indonesia, they existed as the col-onial army (the Royal Netherlands Indies Army). In both cases, these were units comprising mainly ethnic minorities. After independence, the more professional officers were pushed out by the "political soldiers."

7 Although the claim is partially valid in the Indonesian case, it should be stressed that the independ-ence "war" also involved political and diplomatic struggles. A similar claim by soldiers in Burma is more of a myth (and a persistent one at that), in the view of Dr. Ba Maw – the supreme leader (Adipati) of war-time Burma and a leading mentor of the Thakins. See Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memories of a Revolutionary, 1939-1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). This will be discussed further in the relevant chapters.

8 Soldiers defended the new power-holders against challengers and those who rejected, or wished to change, the boundaries of the new states. Almost all "national" boundaries in the Third World were demarcated by colonial powers (as with the British-French demarcation of Siam). Hence, it is not surprising that the "modern" boundaries bequeathed to certain ethnic groups, demarcating certain countries as "belonging" to them, are disputed by others who find themselves arbitrarily incorporated as "minorities". For an iconoclastic, intriguing discussion of the making of "Siam" by Britain and France, see Thongchai Winnichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of a Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). This source also addresses the claims made by Thai leader Pibul Songkhram, the "modernizing" strongman-ruler – and by others – that Thailand (Siam) existed as a "nation-state" for centuries.

9 It would be rash to say that military intervention is a thing of the past in Thailand. In the 1980s, it was thought that soldiers had "permanently" vacated politics. However, in 1991, General Suchinda Kraprayoon overthrew the Chart Thai (Chatichai Choonhavan) government. After the 1992 "Bloody May" protest (when Suchinda was forced to step down), a coalition government led by the Democrat Party's Chuan Leekpai was installed by electoral means. Another election was held in 1995, and a coalition government headed by Banharn Silpa-archa (Chart Thai) ruled until it resigned in late 1996. Former General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth now heads a coalition government, following a general elect-ions in early 1997.

10 This phrase is borrowed from Eric A.Nordlinger's influential article on military intervention, where he discusses and refutes the "military-as-modernizer" argument. See Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States", American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970), pp. 1131-1148. A few notable examples that view soldiers as "modernizers", are: Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization", in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 69-90; Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade", in World Politics (April 1959), pp. 339-340; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964); Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review 60 (September 1966), pp. 616-626; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).

11
^ See Samuel E.Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Karbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasant and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Mod-ernizing Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 281-304 (281 and 301 esp.); Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 287-317 (esp., p.287, 314-315); Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 149.

12 The "cleaning up the mess" explanation is the standard justification of coup-makers. It has been quite effective in legitimating coups externally, especially those which took place in the 1960s. Such a claim is today less effective, because more is now known about military rule.

13 Works on military withdrawals are numerous. They include: Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power", Third World Quarterly, 7(1) January 1985, pp. 16-30; Claude E. Welch Jr., No Farewell To Arms (Boulder: Westview, 1989), esp., Ch.2, pp. 9-29; Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Random House, 1957); Talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal From Politics (Mass: Ballinger, 1987), esp., pp. xii, 80-89, 91-95, 99-102,209, 212; Paul Cammack and Philip O’Brien, Generals in Retreat (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1985).

14 The similarity between the "back to the barracks" and "democratization" literature is interesting. The military figures prominently in both. For examples, see Constantine Danopoulos "Intervention and Withdrawal: Notes and Perspectives", in Constantine P. Danopoulos, ed., From Military to Civilian Rule (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-18; and D. Ethier, "Introduction: Processes of Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical Indicators", in Diane Ethier, ed., Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 3-21.

15 Robin Luckham, "Introduction: The Military, the Developmental State and Social Forces in Asia and the Pacific: Issues for Comparative Analysis", in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 1-49 (p. 16). A typically confusing analysis of military disengagement focused on Southeast Asia, is found in Ulf Sundhaus-sen, "The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia", in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Civilian-Military Relations, pp. 269-286. The above is an unfortunate example as Sund-haussen is usually a perceptive analyst of the military. He states that the military will disengage only if "civilian forces group together, demand power for themselves, and offer policies that are acceptable to a majority of the people without antagonizing the military." This "solution", although theoretically plausible, begs the question: how are civilians to band together when political activities are circum-scribed by the military?

16 Crouch, "The Military and Politics".

17 Ibid., p. 311.

18 The term "post-coup" is in parentheses because authoritarian states established by soldiers need not always result from coups. For example, in 1958, Ne Win took over as head of the caretaker government of Burma upon being "invited" to do so by Prime Minister U Nu. This was not a coup; there was even a provision for it in the Constitution. U Nu was "persuaded" by "Young Turk" Brigadiers -- Aung Gyi, among others -- to hand over power to Ne Win to help set up elections. Suharto attained power in Indonesia in 1965 as head of the counter-coup force.

19 Crouch, "The Military and Politics", p. 315. Also, Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macro-political Theory, Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 175-411 (esp., p. 284).

20 For example, see Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 66-71, and Eric A.Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977), pp. 65-71.

21
^ Crouch, "The Military and Politics", p. 295.

22
^ For excellent works essential to the understanding of Third World politics, see Gerald A. Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974); Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Jr., Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler’s Imperatives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order; The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Clapham, Third World Politics.

23 See Claude, E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civilian-Military Relations (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1974), esp. pp. 34-80, 235-62. See also a special issue on civil-military relations in Pacific Focus, Vol. IV, No.2 (Fall 1982). Among the articles in the issue, see Chung-in Moon, "Democratization, National Security Politics and Civil-Military Relations: Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case", (pp. 3-22), and J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience" (pp. 99-147).

^ Amos Perlmutter, "Civil-Military Relations in Socialist Authoritarian and Praetorian States: Pros-pects and Retrospects", in Roman Kolkowicz & Andrzej Karbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats, pp. 301-331.

24

25 Perlmutter, "Civil-Military Relations", p. 318. The difference between a professional military force and a politicized one is highlighted by the recent disbanding of a Canadian Airborne regiment by a civilian government over atrocities in Somalia. Several top brass, including General Jean Boyle, the armed forces chief, were grilled by a civilian commission. In some Third World countries, in particul-ar, in the countries examined -- Burma, Indonesia, and even Thailand -- there would, in the first place, not likely be voices raised about military atrocities especially those occurring far away. And also, had civilians shown this much assertiveness, a coup would have been staged, with "political interference" in military affairs likely cited as the reason.

26 Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 192-198.

27
^ Clapham, Third World Politics, p. 139.

28
^ Ibid., p. 140.

29
^ Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", pp. 1136-1137.

30 Fitch, "Military Professionalism, National Security".

31 Ibid., p. 107.

32 See Odetola, T.O. Odetola, Military Regimes and Development, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 182-84., and Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18.

33 Robin Luckham, "Introduction, etc.," in Viberto Selochan, ed., The Military, the State, pp. 30-31.

34 See Odetola, Military Regimes and Development, pp. 182-84., and Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 18. Except in rare cases such as Prem Tinsulanonda in Thailand in the 1980s (to be discussed later).

35 For a discussion of the military’s strong distrust of politics, and its special dislike of the politics of diverse groups with conflicting interests, see also Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 109-112.

36
^ Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-83. Although the definition of the ideology of "national security" is derived from a discussion of soldiers in Latin America (Chile, in particular), it represents the mind-set of military-authoritarian rulers, and is applicable to other Third World areas.

37 Ibid., p. 69.

38 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

39
^ Ibid., pp. 70-72, 75.

40 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281.

41 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", p. 264.

42 Ibid., pp. 179, 264-265.

43 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-14. The authors’ use of the term "autocracy" and objection to the term "authoritarian" seems problematic, however. They say that it "rather misleading to speak of autocratic regimes as ‘authoritarian’" (pp. 9-10), because they define authority as residing in both power and legitimacy. They therefore assert that a constitutional democracy may be highly authorit-arian -- even more than an autocracy. Nonetheless, I will employ the commonly-accepted term "authoritarian regime", to denote not very democratic or dictatorial regimes, rather than "autocracy" or "autocracies", the terms used by the authors.

44 Ibid., p. 8.

45 Ibid., pp. 4, 8-9. However, the term "law and order" is a favoured slogan of coup-makers and authoritarian regimes, and is often used to justify repression. It is also effective in placating external audiences, since the fear of anarchy is universal. However, the term "law and order" poses a grave problem when the judiciary is not autonomous, and law itself is subject to "the rule of men" as opposed to it being impartially and equally applied.

46 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 4-5, 9.

47 See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillian, 1991), p. 232.

48 Ibid., pp. 228-236.

49
^ Ibid., p. 232.

50 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 265-266.

51 Ibid., p.266.

52 Ibid.

53 Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire Building in the New State", in World Politics, Vol. 20, No.2 (January 1968), pp. 94-206. Although written more than a decade ago, it is still pertinent today, validating the author's argument (pp. 205-206) that personal rule and patrim-onialism will not be easily swept away, as then expected (or assumed), by the advent of industrializ-ation in the Third World. Also, Clapham, Third World Politics, pp. 44-59 (Neo-Patrimonialism and its Consequences); and Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia", in World Politics, Vol.31, No.4 (July 1979), pp. 571-587. His expectation (over a decade ago) that the patrimonial-style stability will not endure owing to the development of the economy and greater bureaucratization, rationality, and regularity associated with economic development (p. 587), has not, so far, been fulfilled. Parimonial-style stability is still very much in evidence.

54


^ Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule", pp. 575-579 (on patrimonialism in Suharto's New Order state).

55 Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 253-255, 263-264. Also see, Ann Ruth Will-ner, "The Neo-Traditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia", in John T. McAlister Jr., ed., Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 517-541.

56 The phenomenon that O’Donnell points to in the Latin American context is applicable to most Third World societies as well. See Guillermo O’Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratization in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 17-56 (esp., pp. 21, 26, 34, 36). As S.N. Eisenstadt notes, moreover, post-traditional ("modernizing") orders are characterized by political-administrative fram-ings that exploit both traditional and modern symbols. They are bureaucratic political orders whose modern, legal-rational facade cloaks a neotraditional core -- social and political arrangements that are inegalitarian, particularistic, ascriptive, paternalistic, etc. By "inegalitarian" is meant not only the unequal distribution of wealth, privileges, and power, but the whole complex of social ordering when the essential relationship is a hierarchical one, with superior or inferior status based on ascriptive criteria (age, possession of power and office, status, position in the kin group, etc.). See S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Influence of Traditional and Colonial Political Systems on the Development of Post-Traditional Social and Political Orders", in Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., Modernization in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 3-18 (esp., p. 13). For a short but insightful exposition of the Third World’s patrimonial, anti-institutional style of politics, see Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics, pp. 44-60.

57 Clapham, Third World Politics, p. 153. On the subject of military re-intervention, which he dis-cusses pertaining to the "veto coup", see pp. 146-147.

58 The concept of personal rule is also well established in academia, especially in the context of Third World regimes and politics and studies of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. For example, see Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule,; Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy; Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., ed., Dictatorships in Spanish America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); and Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in our Age (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994).

59 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 117.

60 Finer, "The Morphology of Military Regimes", p. 281.

61 Ibid., pp. 301-302.

62 Ibid. For a discussion on the military, the bureaucracy, and supreme decision-making power, see pp. 297-301.

63 The phrase, "simple ancillaries and appurtenances" is Finer's. Ibid., p. 301. For a brief discussion on military regimes and parties and legislatures, see , pp. 287-291.

64 Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 121-148.

65 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 25-29. Shue speaks of looking at politics as a process, i.e., the "patterns of flux and flow" among elements that constitute and animate the polity itself, including interactions between elements of the state (bureaucracy, army, party, etc.) and elements of society (elites, village communities, families, and so on).

66 Cited in Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State (Chicago: Chicago Univ-ersity Press, 1983), p. 10.

67 Ibid., p. 4. A formulation more recent than Marx's in this vein is Moore’s thesis, whereby the posit-ion of the feudal class (the landowning class) vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie is posited as determining the two paths of capitalism: the parliamentary democratic path, or dictatorship. See Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lords and Peasants in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. Ch. 7 (pp. 413-432).

68 Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, pp. 4-7.

69 Ibid., pp. 5, 7-8. The authors, however, note that in most of his writings on the state, Marx aband-oned "the subtlety of his earlier arguments" and reverted to a mechanistic, reductionist vision.

70 Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

71 Ibid., p. 40. Officials achieve state autonomy by either transforming divergent societal preferences into non-divergent ones (what is termed Type II autonomy), or by ignoring, neutralizing or overcoming societal constraints (Type I autonomy). For Type II and Type I, see pp. 99-117, 118-143, 144-181. Type III autonomy occurs where there is no serious divergence between the preferences of the state (public officials) and society (see pp. 74-98).

72 Gianfranco Poggi, The State, Its Nature, Development and Prospects (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), esp. Ch. 8, pp. 128-144.

73 Ibid., pp. 131-32.

74 Ibid., pp. 134-36, 142, also 173-196 (Ch.10).

75 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37.

76 For a brief overview of the various positions on state autonomy, see Ibid., pp. 4-7.

77 At this point, a clarification is called for concerning the preferences of state officials, mentioned in (among other discussions) Nordlinger’s and Poggi’s presentation of the preferences and relative autonomy of state officials. Here, the underlying implication is that (a) state officials are public serv-ants as understood in the West and generally in academia; and (b) their preferences are related to policies in the public domain, not personal and private considerations. (Nor are they shaped by pat-rimonial relationships, structures, and modes of operation.) The authors are more or less silent about instances where state officials are only marginally "servants of the public" – as in the many Third World states – and where their preferences tend more towards the personal than the public.

78 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously", in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987), pp. 353-390.

79 Ibid,, p. 372.

80 Ibid., pp. 373-376 (on malleability).

81 Ibid., pp. 376-78 (on insulation and cohesion). Officials in a cohesive state can ignore societal support if they control abundant military, paramilitary, and police forces. These enable them to dis-suade opponents from actively challenging them, or to repress opposition. The author concedes that a less cohesive or "divided" state may also opt for repressive rule. Because it is divided, it will choose repression as a means of self-preservation.

82 Ibid., pp. 379-82 (on resilience)

83 Ibid., p. 388.

84 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In", pp. 14 and 16. In support of Skocpol’s point about state autonomy, it should be noted that in the Third World, the state is "insulated" ("separated") from society by a state stratum, as discussed later in the chapter. However, it is not autonomous from (and is highly responsive to) the interests of those who control and manage the state or are linked to the state – powerholders, officials, and those linked in turn to them by patrimonial bonds.

85 Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In", p. 25.

86 Ibid., p. 7.

87 Ibid., p. 7, 9.

88 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

89 "Embedded" is the term used by Skocpol (Ibid., p. 7).

90 The conceptual and organizational framework presented here as underlying democratic states and polities (despite numerous variations) is based on Poggi, The State, Its Nature, op. cit., and Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).

91 For a comprehensive discussion of social power (including political power), and an argument that political power is paramount in the state-society formation, see Poggi, The State, Its Nature, pp. 3-18 (Ch.1).

92 Ibid., p. 28. The notion that power legitimates itself, and can be used arbitrarily by those holding power, is anathema to notion of democratic governance and politics. As for legitimacy, a comment by Weber can be applied to most Third World states. According to Weber, a system of domination that is protected by the obvious community of interests among state elites -- and where the populace has no say -- is one where even the pretense of legitimacy is unnecessary. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 214.

93 Poggi, The State, Its Nature, p. 28. It must be noted, however, that the notions of democratic leg-itimation and citizenship are "universal" in the sense that they have, in one form or another, been adopted by all contemporary states, including authoritarian ones – at least formally, in that they are constitutionally enshrined in many authoritarian, even totalitarian, states.

94 Ibid., pp. 29-30. The state creates a separate, independent sphere of law and a legal process, to which all, including agents of the state, submit.

95 Ibid., pp. 55-6. Representation via free, fair, and competitive elections gives a concrete reality to the notion that power comes from the people as electors. It also gives meaning to the notion that the people somehow rule or govern themselves. The fact or perception that elected representatives are controlled by the party leadership, or are unduly influenced by monied or powerful interests, does not totally negate this notion: citizens are empowered periodically as voters to elect new representatives, or to put a new party in power.

96 Poggi’s concern about the trend towards reduced citizens’ participation in the public sphere, esp-ecially in elections, is quite valid. It stems, as Poggi also notes, from the emphasis of television and other media on "noise" rather than information; the reduction of issues to "sound bites"; "media circus-es" and sensationalized trivia; messages urging mindless consumption; and so on. In addition, job and family pressures, the complexity of policy decisions and problems (along with a lack of accurate infor-mation available to the public), and a variety of other factors have led to the increased "privatization of concerns" and decreased citizen participation in the public sphere. Poggi, The State, Its Nature, pp.136-138.

97 Since they are not "masters," politicians and government functionaries in democracies are nowadays not accorded reverence as superiors; indeed, they are regularly subjected to satire, usually with impunity (consider television shows such as "Saturday Night Live" and "Yes, Prime Minister", as well as cari-catures in newspapers). The deference and reverence that not only national leaders but the lowest bur-eaucrat may expect in non-Western countries is perhaps the most crucial difference between these soc-ieties and their Western counterparts. This may reflect both culture and its offshoot, "political culture." One should not underestimate the success that Third World governments and elites have had in social-izing the ruled into a superior-inferior relationship, and the extent the political-socioeconomic elites have benefitted from neo-traditional values and structures. For an insightful portrayal of the successful "re-traditionalization" of society in Southeast Asia, see Niels Mulder, Inside Southeast Asia: Thai, Javanese and Filipino Interpretations of Everyday Life (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1992).

98 To clarify: although state officials operate in the public domain, they also have private preferences. In many non-democratic states, or states that are pervaded by patrimonial norms and structures, there arises a situation where (a) officials’ preferences are often more private than public; (b) the state’s public offices and power structures are used by state officials (especially those at the apex of the hierarchy) to advance their private agenda. This leads to a situation where the private preferences of officials (especially the personal ruler or the military ruler) become policies of state – a situation that contradicts the "public" nature of the state, or the concept of the state as a public institution. In practice, there is no firm "boundary" (or strong institutionalized distinction), or at best a very fuzzy one, between state officials and the state in terms of the preferences they display. Private preferences effectively become state or public policies.

99 For a comprehensive account of ancient bureaucratic empires (Egyptian, Roman, Persian, Chinese, etc.), see S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Macmillan, 1963).

100 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory, Vol.3 (London: Addison-Wesley Publish-ing Company, 1975), pp. 175-411; David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991); and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1965). Friedrich and Brzezinski dispute Lenin’s claim to have created a "new type of state," and argue that although the Soviet state represents "a radical departure from the traditional and hereditary autocracy," it is only "a new species of autocracy" (p. 3).The authors use the term "autocratic" for non-democratic, authoritarian regimes. They include in this category, military dictatorships and related forms of emergency rule, and the modern personal regimes of Francisco Franco of Spain and Charles De Gaulle of France (op cit., p. 8).

101 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 4, 8-9.

102 Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966).

103 Ibid., pp. 197, 212, 326-361, 378-381. To better appreciate the relationships between (a) the state, (b) state elites (or officials and functionaries), and (c) citizens (or society), it is instructive to examine Riggs’ schema of the dynamics of four basic components of a polity – the people (society), state elites or officials (the state), political parties (power organizations), and assemblies (political institutions) – as they are configured in different polities. In a democracy, citizens (society) are the basis of rule, since they exert control over officials and policies (the state and its outputs) via parties (power organizations) and assemblies (political institutions). By contrast, in a party-tutelage system, essentially authoritarian in character, the single party (a specialized power organization) or its leaders, constitutes the basis of rule. The party controls assemblies, officials (the state), and society. In a bureaucratic tutelage system, which is also authoritarian, officials (the state) are the basis of rule; they control citizens/society via the manipulation or control of parties and assemblies (op cit., esp., pp. 181-182).

104 Friedrich and Brzezinski note that an autocracy need not be ruled by a single person. The rule may also be collective, as with rule by bureaucrats – including "armed bureaucrats." See Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 8. The term "armed bureaucrats," applied to soldiers, is found in Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Feit argues that military takeovers are propelled by a perceived threat both to order and to the state, by political interference in military affairs, and by the military’s principled interest or goal – to regenerate society and reconstruct the polity along "just" lines (p. 18).

105 Guillermo O’Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, & J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democratization in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 17-56 (esp. p. 39). The author also discuss similarities, in some respects, between contemp-orary authoritarian-patrimonial domination in Latin America and that in ancient patrimonial societies (pp. 36, 39, 50). See also Max Weber, Economy, pp. 774, 776, 784. On the patrimonialization of Third World bureaucracies and states, see Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 44-60.

106 In this sense, the state, its offices and agencies – for example, the military – are all transformed into semi-private (if not private) "property" of powerholders/officials, who "rent" it out. See Richard Tanter, "Oil, IGGI and US Hegemony: The Global Pre-Conditions for Indonesian Rentier-Militarization", in Arief Budiman, ed., State and Civil Society in Indonesia (Monash University: Monash Papers on South-east Asia, 1988), pp. 51-98.

107 See Poggi, The State, Its Nature, pp. 145-72. The above conceptual map of a state-society con-figuration where political power is not democratically institutionalized, is synthesized from Poggi’s discussion of the contemporary democratic state, and of what he calls "a new type of state", i.e., authoritarian (communist) states. My framework here is also derived from a more specific study of Third World authoritarianism: Clive Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Soc-ieties (London: Monthly Review Press, 1984), esp. pp. 49-112.

108 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 241-242.

109 Ibid., pp. 265-266, 269-274.

110 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp. 10-12 (the authors discuss the use of violence and terror and interrelated "autocratic cycle" and "violence cycle").

111 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

112 See Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, p.18-19. Feit argues that the military will be unable to achieve its goal of building "national unity". It can only build what he calls “cohesion without consensus,” owing to its inability to formulate a unifying ideology, and because of its distrust of other groups in society, and hence unwillingness to work with them, except on its own terms. However, there are, it might be added, rare military leaders, like Thailand's General Prem -- also perhaps, Chaovalit, a general-turned-politic-ian (and the current Thai Prime Minister) -- who deeply appreciates the need to bargain with and accommodate politicians and other interest groups, and do not feel the urge to impose the military's version of "unity" over the whole society. All societies are generally pluralistic, if not ethnically, then at least in terms of interest and concerns.

113 Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, pp.12-13. It might be added that the transition from a simple military regime to a more complex authoritarianism order is usually mark-ed by the "civilianization" of the military dictator and his close subordinates. This is often accompanied by the adoption of the military regime of a new constitution, and in some cases, the holding of "success-ful plebicites", (as in Burma in 1974) or a post-constitution "elections" (in Thailand in 1969 by the Thanom and Praphart military regime, Indonesia in 1971, after Golkar was formed).

114 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 117-118.

115 The term "state stratum" will be used interchangeably with "a stratum of state officials (or state managers)". Here, it describes a collectivity of officials and power-holders who are in more or less "permanent occupation" of the state’s structures of power. "State stratum" avoids the problems inher-ent in the terminology common among Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars: "state petty bourgeoisie" (Clive Thomas), "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (Issa Shivji), "state bourgeoisie" (Nicos Poulantzas), and so forth. The problem is that "bourgeoisie" is used to cover all those who are not peasants or the "proletar-iat". It is also an imprecise term that covers a range of population segment that own "property" (very widely defined). See Clive Thomas, The Rise, pp. 59-60; Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", in L. Cliffe and J.S. Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publish-ing House, 1973), pp. 304-330; and Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Class (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 334. The problem of "who rules" in Third World states, in class terms, has been much debated. The most commonly-cited works in this regard are Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, 71 (January-February, 1972), pp. 59-81; John Saul, "The State in Post Colonial Societies: Tanzania", The Socialist Register 1974, pp. 349-72; and Colin Leys, "The ‘Overdeveloped’ Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation", Review of African Political Economy (January-April 1976), pp. 39-48.

116 See James Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World", Development and Change, 8 (1977), pp. 1-17. Concerning the distinctiveness of the state stratum, in the Third World context (notably in South-east Asia, except Singapore), even the lowest state employees are regarded by the lower strata and peasants as "superior" beings. State employees, in turn, tend to view non-officials as "inferior", and often, as unrefined, ignorant. It is not uncommon to see peasants humbling themselves before a lowly township clerk, even in an unofficial social context. Moreover, in recruitment processes, those connect-ed to state employees by kinship or other ties are likely to do better in entry exams than those lacking them. As such, the state stratum is not as open and meritocratic as it would seem. Nor does it owe its cohesion to official functions or roles. The social and cultural context, especially patrimonial-kinship factors, are factored in.

117 Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: HJB Book, 1983), first published 1953.

118 The discussion of the state stratum in authoritarian Third World polities draws on Djilas’s analysis (The New Class, pp.37-48). Clive Thomas’s work on the "state petty bourgeoisie", is also referred to. See Thomas, The Rise.

119 Thomas, The Rise, pp. 61-2. As Djilas puts it, it is also a situation where necessary administrative functions may coexist with parasitic functions in the same person. See Djilas, The New Class, pp. 39-40. Tanter’s discussion on the “renting” of state and public offices by their holders for private gain is a good example of the parasitic nature of the state stratum. See Tanter, "Oil, IGGI".

120 They are socialized into, or ascribe to, a statist ideology (so that their prime loyalty is to the gov-ernment); speak the same "language" (although they may actually speak a variety of tongues); live in special housing estates; and enjoy better amenities, facilities, and usually enjoy a higher standard of life. In many Southeast Asian countries, officials even dress differently – in Western or military-like garb with badges, insignias, etc., in contrast (sometimes sharply) to the peasants, comprising the population majority, who wear traditional garbs. This suggests the need, consciously or otherwise, of many author-itarian rulers to awe the ruled with pomp and splendour, and to mystify both power and their hold on power. Or alternatively, the drawing of a sharp line between officialdom and the populace may be the legacy of colonialism in part, and in part inherent in the hierarchical traditional culture and political culture. Owing to the quite obvious distinction drawn between those belonging to the "state stratum" and those outside, it is more or less appropriate to attribute to the state stratum the same "distinctiveness" accorded to socio-economic classes or communal groups. Often, the shared "affinities" and interests between officials of different ethnic groups may be stronger than those they have in common with the majority of members of their respective ethnic groups. In many respects, the identity-formation process of most Third World "state stratum" are quite similar to those of national-identity formation, as discuss-ed by Benedict Anderson: a common "language," a shared space (or "territory"), a shared "history" and "tradition," regular contacts, communication, and so on. For an excellent discussion on the construction and birth of national identity, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

121 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), esp. pp. 5-8, 14-21, 22-31, 37-38, 64-65, 73-82. The authors’ examination of personal rule in Africa is broadly applicable to polities dominated by a paramount leader in other Third World areas. For analyses of personal rule in non-Third World polit-ies, focused mainly on "totalitarian dictators" like Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, see Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, esp., pp. 31-44. See also Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994).

122 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, pp. 11-12.

123 Ibid., p. 19.

124 Ibid., pp. 21.Examples the authors give of relatively "developed" Asian countries where "personal authoritarianism" is found, are Singapore, and Taiwan (in the 1970s). The modern, developed countries they cite are Italy, Germany, and Yugoslavia (before its partition in the early 1990s). However, as Linz points out and history shows, even regimes that might be regarded as firmly institutionalized such as Nazi Germany, experienced personal rule. In such instances, personal rule is, according to Linz, owed to a "committment to an indisputeable ideology that expresses inexorable laws of history". See, Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", p. 207.

125 Ibid., p.23-24.

126 Ibid., p. 24.

127 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 108.

128 In this respect, it might be noted that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was a party-man (of the Ba’ath party), not a military officer. The military became his power base and instrument of rule only after he attained power. Such instances are rare in the Third World -- though not so rare as in the Second or First World, where a party or a movement (rather than the armed forces) serves as a vehicle for the consolidation and maintenance of the dictator’s personal dominance.

129 In earlier analyses, military cohesion – or the lack of it – after the seizure of power was seldom attributed to the presence or absence of a unifying military strongman. For example, Martin Needler discusses the breakdown of military cohesion in terms of disagreements between hardliners and soft-liners. See Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (New York: Atherton, 1971), pp. 79-101 (esp. pp. 86-94). Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith also discuss military cohesion, and see low military cohesion as the cause of frequent counter-coup attempts, and unstable and ineffective military rule more generally, as in Thailand (1947) and Nigeria (1966). The authors view cohesion as a function of the social origins of the officer corps; the military socialization process; and the autonomy of the military, among other factors. See Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Persp-ectives on Civil-Military Relations (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 14-15, 240-41.

130 The inadequacy of most theorizing about changes in the relationship between the strongman-ruler and the military is understandable, since "men in green" are conspicuous in military-authoritarian states. Further confusion is sown by what could be called the "civilianization" phenomenon, whereby the strongman-ruler and governing or political generals take off their uniforms. As Heeger points out, at the other extreme this has given rise to contentions that the regime is no longer a military one [The Politics of Underdevelopment, p. 129 (fn.24)]. Heeger is, however, one of the few who discusses the establish-ment of primacy over the military junta by "a particular military leader". He appoints close aides, loyalists, friends to high military position, purges and transfers rivals, and occupy the position of president, defence minister, and armed forces chief (op cit., p.117). He is a military leader who, in this thesis, is termed the "strongman-ruler".

131 In some cases, the military will be returned to the barracks after the strongman becomes the ruler of the state. This was the case in Thailand under Pibul, Sarit, and Thanom and Praphart.

132 It must be noted that it is relatively easy for authoritarian rulers to obtain the loyalty, or at least the compliance and deference, of state personnel – regardless of where their real loyalties or preferences lie. Civil servants are, so to speak, the “captive audience” of whoever controls the state. They are dependent on it for their livelihood, sense of self-worth, identity, and so on. In interviews with active and retired civil servants, as well as retired military officers, in Burma, Chiangmai, Bangkok, Singapore, and Jakarta, I found that although many state officials may harbor a deep dislike for authoritarianism in general and military rule in particular, they were fearful of losing the privileges they enjoy, no matter how meagre. Most felt that there was no alternative but to support the regime in power, however personally distasteful they found it.

133 The constitutional facade may be fashioned out of a constitution drawn up by the new regime or drafted by a "constitutional convention" created by the military. This has been the case in Thailand and Burma, as will be shown. Alternatively, the existing constitutional framework may be modified or man-ipulated by the military strongman-ruler and his close advisors and loyalists -- as in Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution of Sukarno’s “old” order has been manipulated both to stabilize and to legitimize Suharto’s new order.

134 Needless to say, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The more politically sophisticated and skilful rulers will employ a range of strategies, perhaps using one more than others, depending on the strength and weakness of the opposition, the complexity of the situation, or the dictates of expediency.

135 The possible outcomes and scenarios will be outlined and discussed in the country chapters. Here again, the probable scenarios and outcomes are not mutually exclusive. This is all the more so since the strategy selected and implemented depends on a set of complex motives and situations.

136 See Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously", pp. 353-390, for an insightful discussion of state autonomy in highly-institutionalized polities where the preferences of state officials are related to public policies – that is, institutional rather than private interests.

137 See Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa", pp. 121-148, and the earlier discussion.

138 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 110, 112.

139 Ibid, p. 118.

140 Ibid, pp. 109-112. As Heeger notes, the military’s goal is to impose an "apolitical calm" and national unity, interpreted as a state of "one-ness" and the absence of social conflicts. For a similar view, see Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-72. For his part, Huntington sees political participation in rapidly-modernizing Third World societies in terms of societal groups that are mobilized into politics in the absence of firmly-established institut-ions that serve to lend order to political participation and politics more generally. Military interventions constitute both a form of direct military participation and a reaction to "praetorian politics" -- politics where, in Huntington’s words, "the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup." Huntington, Political Order, pp. 79-92, 195-196.

141 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp.121-22

142 Ibid., pp. 117, 122.

143 Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously".

144 Heeger, The Politics of Underdevelopment, pp. 116-118, 119, 122, 126-127. For observations of the "personalization of executive authority" and the spread of patrimonialism in West Africa – an analysis that can also be applied to other Third World states – see Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 110-111, 136, 141-42, 143-44. For Zolberg, these phenomena attest to the growing salience of traditional or neo-traditional relationship structures and practices. See also Alain Rouquié, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 29-35. Although Rouquié deals with patrimonial relationships and structures in the Latin American context, his analysis is likewise applicable to most Third World states, societies, and political cultures.

145 Charles Kennedy and David Louscher, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory," in Charles Kennedy and David J. Louscher, eds., Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp.1-10; and Harold Crouch, "The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 287-317.

146 Ne Win’s given name is Maung Shu Maung. He became "Thakin Shu Maung" when he joined the Thakin (Dobama) group. "Ne Win" or "Bo Ne Win" is the name he adopted while undergoing Japan-ese military training on Hainan Island with a group of Thakins and Aung San – a group now myth-ologized as the "Thirty Comrades." "Bo" is a generic term for military leaders. Ne Win is believed still to be calling the shots and keeping the current crop of military rulers together as his figurative "sons and heirs". Another factor uniting the military is fear of popular retribution and loss of their accumulated wealth. See Daniel Benjamin, "Burma: New Repression In A Country Under the Boot", Time, August 14, 1989; also Erskine McCullough, "Terror Continues Under Secret Rule of Ne Win", Bangkok Post, September 9, 1991. A flattering portrait of Ne Win is found in Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969). The author, a doctor of law and crony of Ne Win, was president for one month in 1988 (August 19 to September 18). The latest word from a recent visitor is that the "Old Man" is still pulling the strings, and has been pivotal in keeping the military together, and has kept military factions from fighting openly for power and advantages. Ne Win has reportedly designated Maung Aye as chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). No official announcement in this regard has however been made thus far.

147 "Bama" and "Myanmar or Mranma" are terms used by the majority ethnic group to identify itself. In English, and in most academic studies, the term "Burman" is used for this group. I will use the term "Bama", instead of "Burman", and the term "non-Bama" in general for other ethnic groups, such as the Mon, Rakhine, Shan, Karen, and so forth.