The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

In 1933, Bhahon and Pibul, respectively the commander and deputy command-er of the armed forces, staged a coup, signifying the ascendancy of the military Prom-oters. Pibul's position was further strengthened when he put down Prince Bowaradet's coup attempt later that year. Pibul held the real power in the Bhahon regime from behind the scenes. He assumed de jure power when he was named Prime Minister by the new assembly in the elections of 1938.⁵⁰⁰ With the military as his power base, he proceeded to consolidate his position. He purged a number of potential rivals, impris-oned real or imagined foes, including several princes, and executed a few suspected plotters. After 1938, he was so powerful that he was widely regarded as an uncrown-ed monarch.⁵⁰¹

Pibul was very much influenced by ultranationalistic, authoritarian European regimes and Japanese militarism --as were the young military Thakins in Burma. He strove to emulate the "great leaders" of the time, especially Mussolini and Hitler.⁵⁰² Thus inspired by fascism, he introduced measures to instill a nationalistic, militaristic spirit in the Thai people and to socialize them in the ways of modern nationhood. In typical nationalist fashion, Pibul changed the name of the country from Siam to Muang Thai or, more formally, Prathet Thai, the land of the Thai, hence Thailand in English.⁵⁰³ He also decreed a set of "cultural mandates", the Rath Niyom, which compelled Thais to learn the national anthem, buy domestic goods, eat healthy food, wear hats, and dress in Western garb, among other things. He employed the mass media and educational system to popularize a new history. It was filled with prideful ethnonational rhetoric, and tales of great savior-kings, ancient empires, and glorious wars. This history was plotted by Luang Wichit Wathakan, Pibul's cultural czar and later Sarit's intellectual mentor.⁵⁰⁴ It deliberately emulated contemporary Western history books which aimed to provide the nation with an organic-historical link to its "golden past".⁵⁰⁵ They also promoted tradition, fabricated from obscure folkways, such as the verbal greeting sawasdi, the ramwong songs and dance steps, and a variety of other practices. Many of these "traditional" national ceremonies are today accepted as authentic⁵⁰⁶ -- although, it might be added, many were not invented; they had just fallen into disuse, as had the monarchy until Sarit.

Pibul's cultural reforms and nation-building efforts were very successful because signs of it are still evident today. Indeed, he contributed immensely to the modern national identity. He inculcated a sense of "Thai-ness". On the other hand, as Chai-Anan notes, the creation of national identity is, analytically, more than a benign sangchart or "nation-building" exercise. The ordering of state-society relations -- the relative degree of state autonomy, the distribution of power, and the structure of political relationships -- involves the questions of who defines national identity and how it is defined. Thus, the creation of a national identity cannot be divorced from the ideological location of the state and the ruling or official stratum. As Chai-Anan argues, Pibul's nation-building exercise represented a project by military and bureaucratic elites to impose a form of nationhood based on supposed ethno-cultural "qualities" of the Thai "race" and to marginalize the democratic principles and the state-society order promised in the 1932 revolution.⁵⁰⁷

Pibul's nation-building strategy made the Thai "race" the centerpiece of the state. Bureaucratic officials were regarded as the vanguard of the Thai nation-state and they were thus elevated above ordinary citizens. The nation, state, rulers, and the bureaucracy became merged into a single mystical entity. This fabricated entity, along with the political-cultural elevation of the state and its leaders, legitimized and normalized the authoritarian order. Political decision-making became an exclusive prerogative of the national vanguard.⁵⁰⁸ In short, Pibul's national formula, rather than being merely a scheme of a copycat Fuhrer or a statesman-like bestowal of Thai-ness, served to provide the bureaucratic elite, including the military, with a convincing ideology for the exercise of power, however unaccountable. Politics was once more, to quote Ruth McVey, "relocated in the state sphere, making it the main theatre of politics".⁵⁰⁹

Pibul's projection of himself as a warrior-leader of a "martial race" invariably led him to translate his militaristic-nationalistic postures and drum-beating into action. His first incursion into modern war was in 1941, when he challenged French claims to disputed territory along Thailand's borders with Laos and Cambodia. France was a good enemy to fight as it had already been trounced by Hitler in Europe, and by the Japanese in Tonkin. In a treaty brokered by Japan after a four-day Franco-Thai war, Pibul regained some "lost" territories in Cambodia and Laos, in return for financial compensation.

Pibul's second military escapade was less fortunate. As World War II spread to Southeast Asia in December 1941, he allied himself with Japan. He probably did not have much choice in the matter given the impressive Japanese victories in the region. The Japanese rewarded his loyalty with more "lost territories" from Malaya and Burma. Pibul should be credited with sparing Thailand the extensive war damages suffered by neighbouring Burma and Malaysia. Thailand also avoided the wholesale displacement of its old elites, a fate suffered in Burma and Indonesia. His alliance with Japan, however, was personally costly. With Japan's defeat, Pibul and his supporters in the military were displaced, albeit only temporarily. Meanwhile, the hitherto eclipsed royalists and their conservative allies regained influence in the post-war state.

The above indicates that the state in Thailand under Pibul was, with reference to the theoretical discussion, relatively autonomous from society but highly responsive to the dominating personality of Pibul. Unlike Ne Win in Burma, however, Pibul --and other military rulers -- have had to be sensitive to the quasi-democratic principles associated with the 1932 Revolution while exercising their quite considerable personal power.⁵¹⁰ There was some space in the "Pibul system" for rigorous politics, at least among elites within the bureaucracy and, to a limited degree, outside the bureaucracy. Indeed, the system was characterized by considerable competition among elite factions and, as will be discussed, frequent coup attempts.

Pibul was ousted by a coalition led by Pridi in 1944 and a new government headed by Khuang Aphaiwong was established. By the end of the war, the Free Thai were, as Thawee Bunyaketu claimed, able to field a -- more or less "invisible" -- 12,000 man guerrilla force.⁵¹² The anti-Japanese stand of the Free Thai movement (and assistance given to Allied agents) and the post-war support of the United States allowed Thailand to escape from its war time alliance with Japan relatively unscathed. After the war, with Seni as Prime Minister and Pridi as the leading light of a new era, it seemed that Pibul was doomed to obscurity, and that a fundamental shift to a democratic and parliamentary framework of governance was at hand.

The post-war Free Thai civilian rule represented an incipient opening for subordinated forces to participate in politics and the affairs of the state. Pridi's Free Thai followers were less state-oriented, and many of the post-war politicians were from the northeast region of Isan, who were regarded with some derision by the Bangkok elite. The years 1944-1947 were, according to Thak Chaloemtiarana, the "apex of civilian rule".⁵¹³ However, democratic development was not considered desirable by the hitherto dominant segments, soldiers and bureaucrats. The military, as the theoretical analysis would suggest, became increasingly disturbed by the reordering of the traditional political hierarchy. Soldiers feared that the opening of politics would give rise to disorder, lawlessness, strikes, and protests, and thereby endanger the stability of the state.

The move towards democracy and parliamentary rule was particularly vexing to the military leaders who fell with Pibul at the conclusion of the war. These leaders were known collectively as the "Young Lions". They played pivotal roles in the authoritarian reorganization of the state and restoration of military dominance. They were, to name the prominent ones, Phin, Phao Sriyanon, Sarit and his proteges, such as Thanom, Praphart, and Krit. They, like soldiers in Burma and Indonesia, had no use for the "undignified politics to which constitutionalism gave rise".⁵¹⁴ They hoped to replace it with a more "dignified" system of politics. The Young Lions were particularly disturbed by the 1946 Constitution, which provided for an elected House and forbade officials and soldiers from sitting in the legislature. It also sanctioned the creation of political parties for the first time. The recognition of political parties amounted to an acceptance of societal autonomy and the legitimacy of opposition, as discussed in the analytical framework. The Young Lions, furthermore, viewed the subordination of the military to civilian rule as an affront to their self-respect as soldiers.⁵¹⁵

While civilian leaders were grappling with the complex tasks of post-war reconstruction and lawlessness resulting from the demobilization of soldiers of Pibul's army and Seri Thai fighters, disgruntled officers plotted coups. They were aided by an unexpected national trauma -- the death of young Rama VII (King Ananda) in June 1946. Rama VII died from a gun-shot wound but it was not clear if the King had been murdered or had committed suicide. Pridi, who became prime minister after the 1946 election, was unable to solve the mystery -- although eight years later, three of the King's servants were executed for his death.⁵¹⁶ Pridi's reputation as a communist did not help, and he resigned amidst charges of regicide.⁵¹⁷ The Young Lions were furth-er aided by the nature of democratic politics. Strikes and public protests supported their contention that democracy produced instability and placed the state at risk.

In November 1947, the military staged a coup, led by Phin, Phao and Sarit. The coup ended the short interlude of democracy and spelled the beginning of over two decades of military dominance. The coup-makers announced that they stood for "Nation, Religion and King." They claimed to have acted only to uphold military honour, solve the assassination of the king, and rid the country of corruption and communism. Pibul, who escaped being imprisoned as a war criminal because of Pridi's refusal to humble a fellow Promoter, was installed as Prime Minister by the coup leaders. Pibul was this time not the "Great Leader", but a ruler squeezed between powerful rivals, namely Sarit and Phao. His position, however, was enhanced when the United States accepted him as a staunch anti-communist leader.

Despite his collaboration with Japan, Pibul gained considerable leverage in the post-war, bi-polar world. The late 1940s was a time when the United States was worried about communist expansion. Communist-inspired revolutions in emergent states were viewed by the Americans as threats to the "free world". Communist revolutions in China, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines raised fears that the Soviets might break through the Western line of containment in Southeast Asia. They also feared that once one country in the region fell to communism others would follow. This is the well-known "domino theory" believed by American foreign policy experts in the 1950s. The prescribed antidote to the communist movement was to strengthen "free" nations by identifying with fiercely anti-Communist leaders and helping them accomplish the tasks of state and nation-building.⁵¹⁸

Pibul's friendly relations with the United States endeared him to the Thai military, which desired American armaments. However, as seen from the Navy's 1951 "Manhattan" coup attempt, his indispensability was not total. While Pibul was being held hostage on the ship "Sri Ayuthia", Sarit and Phao ordered the ship bombed. Pibul swam to safety, but the trauma may have caused him to seek a new constituency by espousing democracy in 1955. Pibul's democratization experiment, however, did not go as well as expected. His encouragement of free speech, as a move toward democratic politics, not only resulted in attacks on Phao's terror tactics, but on him as well. For example, there were allegations that he won the election in February 1957 by fraud. Moreover, Members of Parliament, despite being dependent on Pibul, Phao, and Sarit, became more assertive. When university students protested, Pibul declared an emergency. However, Sarit, the appointed keeper of the peace, used this opportunity to polish his image as a just leader and boost his popularity. Instead of suppressing the students, he allowed them to march peacefully.

In addition to the election scandal, there were others: the Phin faction was allegedly involved in a one-billion baht timber concession linked to the Bhumipol Dam project; the government was accused of covering-up a serious drought in the Isan region by attempting to bribe Isan MPs with 53 million baht; and there were articles criticizing the monarchy in a newspaper financed by Phao. The public was disillusioned by the arbitrary use of power displayed by the governing elite, the unfettered competition for the spoils of office, and their constant obsession with money. In September, Sarit resigned as the Defence Minister and disassociated himself completely from Pibul and his regime. Sarit was thus astutely positioning himself to assume office by exploiting the public disenchantment with the political system.

The above analysis indicates that military's incursion into politics in 1947 was, as suggested in the theoretical discussion, propelled, as in Burma and Indonesia, by the military's perception that disorderly elements and forces (usually portrayed as communist), were endangering the stability of the state. This perception was height-ened by the suspicious death of King Ananda. The incursion of the military was aimed, as suggested in the theoretical framework, at "saving" the state, restoring order, and reestablishing military dominance.

Sarit was better able to gauge the public mood than his rivals. He knew what he wanted and he obtained it by manipulating the public's anti-regime sentiments. He attempted to legitimize his usurpation of office by claiming that he acted on the behest of the media and in the people's interests. He also claimed to be defending the constitution and democracy from the corrupt phu-yai, the political big men. Finally, he presented himself as the man best able to stop communism, which he warned endangered the monarchy, Buddhism, and Thai values -- the usual "Nation, Religion, King" formula. In effect, he echoed the promises of the 1932 Revolution to bolster his position.

Before he was ready to seize power, Sarit cunningly left the task of restoring public order to Phao, his arch rival and the chief of police. Phao's support base was the powerful paramilitary police force, whose strength rivalled that of the army, largely as a result of American aid.⁵¹⁹ Phao was pivotal in the regime's consolidation of power: he destroyed the Seri Thai, eliminated potential rivals, repressed the opposition, and generally struck fear in the populace by police terror. Hence, Phao reaped popular hatred and scorn, but not Sarit.

Sarit was adept at exploiting, but also enhancing, the crown. Soon after coming to power, Sarit obtained a royal appointment as "Defender of the Capital". In contrast to the 1932 generation, Sarit had genuine respect for the monarchy.⁵²⁰ He also correctly assessed that it was, as a fount of legitimacy, an asset rather than a threat. Sarit created an aura of glamour and romance by associating his rule with the pomp and ceremony of the monarchy. His task was made easier by the presence of the dynamic young King, Bumiphol Adulyadej, and his vibrant consort, Queen Sirikit.

After seizing power, Sarit was content to leave the Pibul system of state-society relations in place for a time. After purging Phao's followers and reorganizing the Navy and Air Force, he left the country for an entire year to receive medical attention abroad. In his absence, he left the task of ruling the country to his protege, Thanom Kittikachorn. Thanom, however, proved unable to cope with Parliament, both on the government and opposition sides. His government, Sarit's clients in particular and the military in general, was in danger of being dislodged from power by Parliament.

In October 1958, Sarit returned to Thailand and staged a coup against his own government. His primary objective was to weaken the increasingly assertive Parliam-ent. He proceeded to reorganize power in a more authoritarian and autocratic mold. Like Ne Win, he placed the constitution aside, banned all political parties, cracked down on the press and the opposition, and arrested or executed alleged communists and/or sympathizers, which included labor leaders.⁵²¹ Social forces were consequently almost completely suppressed. In Sarit's new order, like Ne Win's, the political arena was highly circumscribed and power was concentrated in the hands of a strongman, whose support lay primarily in the military. Sarit held all the major posts of the state -- prime minister, supreme commander, army commander, minister of national development, head of police and fourteen other agencies.⁵²² Despite holding dictatorial power, Sarit appreciated the need for the support of civilian bureaucrats. In this respect, he was much like Suharto. He obtained their support by respecting their expertise and operational autonomy. He selected civilian officers to attend the prestigious National Defence College, which raised their morale and created a sense of solidarity among members of the state stratum.⁵²³

Sarit was deeply conservative, obsessed with order, neatness, spiritual and physical cleanliness and propriety. He regarded democracy, with its contending parties and politicians, competing thoughts and conflicting prescriptions, as untidy and dangerous. His vision of political order was hierarchical. The nation and govern-ment, chart and ratthaban respectively, were located at the apex of his worldview, followed by the official or Kharatchakan class, and the people, the Prachachon, at the base.⁵²⁴ In this paternalistic vision, rulers and officials were like wise parents who, for the sake of order, were obliged to promote the well-being of their children, the people. This pattern of rule -- the Ramkhamhaeng model -- was based on Luang Wichit's reconstruction of Ramkhamhaeng's kingdom of Sukhothai. Luang Wichit portrayed the ancient kingdom of Sukhothai as the genesis of Thai culture, uncontaminated by Hindu-Khmer concepts of sacred kingship and the caste-like divisions of the later Ayuthian kingdom.⁵²⁵

Sarit was a true believer of the Ramkhamhaeng ideal. He toured the country frequently and he became conversant with the concerns of "the people", the phu- noi or the small people. He strove to alleviate their hardships. For example, he lowered electricity, water, telephone rates and school tuition fees and he abolished fees for other social services. He tried to improve public transit and he provided free textbooks and health care. He ordered the navy to supply consumers with cheap coconuts and he encouraged the development of open-air markets in Bangkok for the benefit of both consumers and producers. By responding to the immediate needs of the people, he gained an image among the populace as a strict but benevolent father-ruler.

Sarit also pledged to eliminate a plethora of socially undesirable elements. He made it a point to be on the scene of big fires and personally "investigated" their causes. In consequence, he had five Chinese publicly executed for arson. His fixation with fires may have stemmed from a personal quirk, but it also successfully portrayed him as a protector-avenger of the people. In addition to arsonists, Sarit identified a number of groups as undesirable -- hooligans, drug-pushers, addicts, prostitutes, pedicab peddlers, beggars, lepers, unrepentant politicians, supposed Isan separatists, non-conforming intellectuals, critical thinkers or writers, alleged commun-ists, hippies and stray dogs. Undesirable elements were often arrested and many were dealt with decisively.⁵²⁶

The success of Sarit's leadership formula can be gauged from the fact that a yearning for a Sarit-like leader still prevails in some quarters. Sarit is remembered fondly by many people as a firm leader who cared for the phu-noi, despite posthum-ous revelations of his corrupt ways. After his death, it was learned that he had accum-ulated a fortune of over $20 million, owned shares in forty-five enterprises, possessed vast land-holdings, and maintained a harem of wives.⁵²⁷

The most important contribution Sarit made to Thai politics was, what Thak calls, "a dualistic type of leadership": the King (and the monarchy) was elevated as a sacred embodiment of the nation and its glorious past, while the strongman exercised real power.⁵²⁸ As the monarchy remained popular in many segments of Thai society, Sarit's ability to reconcile the monarchy with non-monarchical personal rule provided him with a significant degree of legitimacy. In this regard, he was much more successful than Pibul. It was very difficult for the opposition to mobilize the people, especially the peasantry, against a regime identified with the monarchy.

The promotion of the monarchy as a unifying symbol situated above politics was a brilliant strategy which allowed Sarit to exercise power as if he were a king. But the use of the monarchy has also had its disadvantages for would-be strongmen. Over time, the monarchy has increasingly come to be associated with constitutional rule -- as opposed to military dictatorship. The notion of a constitutional monarchy, especially the notion that soldiers, including military strongmen, are servants of the crown, subverted the military's claim to a monopoly of power. This constrained them from pushing aside other servants of the crown, particularly the civilian bureaucrats, and also other subjects of the King. It may even be argued that the monarchy, paradoxically, kept the quasi-democratic promises of the Revolution alive. This eventually led to the political eclipse of the military when the monarchy over time accumulated much de facto power and the King became, as will be discussed, the savior of the country at a time of great turmoil and communist victories in adjacent countries to the East.

The above account supports the suggestion offered in the theoretical analysis regarding the pivotal role of ruling strongmen in shaping the contours and structures of military-authoritarian regimes. The centrality of military strongmen will yield -- because of differences in strategy adopted, personal character and agenda, styles -- different kinds of military regimes. The regimes established by Pibul and Sarit were vastly different. Although they both accepted and honored the constitutional monarchy, they manipulated it in different ways, just as Sukarno and Suharto worked with the 1945 Constitution in different ways. Although Pibul ruled as the chief officer of the King, he did not rejuvenate the monarchy, as did Sarit. However, Pibul's late regard for constitutional principles when he was losing power provided social forces a certain degree of autonomy from the state and consequently a certain ability to influence the state. In short, the state was somewhat malleable during Pibul's tenure. This is the crucial feature of the "Pibul system".

By contrast, Sarit ignored democratic forms of governance. His regime was personalistic and dictatorial, perhaps even despotic.⁵²⁹ His power base was the official stratum, the kharatchakarn, both armed and unarmed, especially the former. Sarit projected himself as a father-ruler of the phu-noi, and they consequently revered him. One might even say that, in many ways, he usurped the role of the monarch. He could not, however, and did not want to, eliminate the monarchy because he relied upon it to boost his legitimacy and sanction his grip on power. The pattern of state-society relations that emerged during Sarit's rule was mixed. On the one hand, his state was highly repressive; social forces were provided no space to articulate their concerns. In this regard, Sarit's state may be considered highly autonomous from society. On the other hand, Sarit was also responsive to the needs of the business class and the underprivileged segments of Thai society, albeit it in the most paternalistic manner.