The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961

The military claimed -- with some validity, unlike in Burma -- that it fought for and won independence. But there were other armed units involved. By contrast with Burma, where the British transferred power to the AFPFL in a relatively peaceful and orderly fashion, Indonesia’s colonial masters, the Dutch, sought to reimpose colonial rule. The result was an extremely unstable, confused period of fighting between the Dutch and the various nationalist forces, and among the nationalist forces themselves, including intra-armed force clashes. Intra-military conflicts also arose over the organization, role, and function of the armed forces in the post-independence era.

During the early life of the independent state, politics were complex and turbulent. There was dissension over how the new state was to be organized politic-ally; how state-society relations were to be ordered; and who would do the ordering. There was very little consensus on these questions: the military had its vision, but so did the PKI, the Islamic forces, the socialist, and various prominent elites.

This examination of the military in Indonesian politics will highlight some of the key themes of military interventionism discussed in the theoretical chapters.

By the mid-1600s, Mataram had fallen apart. By the early 1670s, it had been replaced as the dominant power by the Dutch East India Company (VOC). By the 1760s, the VOC was supreme. The remnants of the divided Mataram were constituted as vassals, along the lines of the princely states in British India; a part of Java was ruled indirectly by regents (bupati, the "bureaucratic" nobles or former sub-lords who formed the aristocratic priyayi class).²⁹⁴ In Batavia (later Jakarta) and its environs, the Dutch ruled directly. For the remainder, they recognized the authority of local regents, vassals, and military allies. The arrangements varied widely, epitomizing the untidy political-administrative complexity of colonialism.

The Dutch occupied the Netherlands Indies for over 180 years, and their policy evolved along with local conditions and changes in the mother country.²⁹⁵ With the VOC’s collapse at the end of the 1700s, a series of Governor-Generals set about "defeudalizing," rationalizing, and modernizing the colony. They established a net-work of inter-island transport, including railroads, and introduced a modern infrastruct-ure in areas like banking, telegraph communications, and newspapers. The result was a more vigorous, efficient export-based commercial economy. Entering the twentieth century, the Netherlands Indies was, speaking in general, a single administrative-political-economic unit, and an integral part of the world economy – but as a colony.

Dutch rule was not as direct as British rule in Burma. Nor did the Dutch, unlike the British, introduce any form of meaningful representative government.²⁹⁶ From 1918, there was modest, although unsatisfactory, participation in a half-elected Volksraad, whose powers, however, were only advisory and whose recommendations were often ignored. The colonial state was paternalistic and more highly autonomous from local society than was the case in British Burma. The ruled were shut off from access to the state, and lacked intermediary institutions through which to make demands and voice their aspirations.

Still, colonial modernization brought radical change in its train. Administrative unification, together with the influx of Western ideas of freedom and democracy, national independence, and popular sovereignty, soon gave rise to nationalist sentiments.²⁹⁷ A "national" society had indeed been created, one that spawned among the elites a sense of belonging and togetherness^.298

The earliest nationalist stirring was spearheaded in 1908 by the Budi Utomo organization, an advocate of Javanese nationalism and traditionalism. Led by "progressive" priyayi, it took a moderate line in opposing the Dutch.²⁹⁹ Next came Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912, with roots in the Islamic Trade Association and an agenda aimed at undermining the economic dominance of the Chinese. It grew into a sort of mass movement, and by 1918 claimed almost half a million members.³⁰⁰ Also prominent among the more radical groupings was the PKI, formed in 1920 -- making it one of the oldest communist parties in Asia.³⁰¹

More significant in this early associational life was the Indonesian Association, founded in the 1920s by students in Holland. Its members called for an "Indonesian" identity that transcended ethnic differences. The person most responsible for imbuing this idea of "Indonesia" with a true romanticism was the future "President-for-Life", Sukarno. Even in these early days his charisma was undoubted, as was his ability to mesmerize the masses and move men to action.³⁰² In 1927, Sukarno founded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI); later he led a broad front, the Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (PPPKI), which comprised the Sarekat Islam, the PNI, Budi Otomo, and other forces. Sukarno would leave his stamp on Indonesian politics for another four decades, pushing a leftist-populist amalgam of "Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism", oriented towards "the people" (rakyat). It was Sukarno’s thoughts and general charisma, as Pabottingi comments, that buttressed the psychological-cultural meaning of "nationhood" in the minds of both elite and masses. He demystified colonialism and also, one might add, mystified nationalism.³⁰³

Despite the populist orientation embodied in his Marhaen ("little people") doctrine³⁰⁴ and Pancasila (Nationalism, Humanitarianism, Democracy, Social Justice, and Belief in God), Sukarno was not a democrat.³⁰⁵ He subscribed to the ideas of nationalists such as Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (an educator-nationalist and prince of the royal house of Jogjakarta) and Raden Supomo, a legal scholar. These figures preached the superiority of "Eastern" values to Western materialism. Dewantoro’s idea of the proper relationship between ruler-ruled was a benevolent and paternalistic one: the "family principle" equated the nation with the extended domestic unit. That meant individual rights were to be subordinated to the "demand of the collectivity": the family, the nation, and by extension the state.³⁰⁶ He advocated "democracy with leadership".³⁰⁷ For his part, Supomo drew on Javanese adat (customary law) to advance an organic, communitarian vision of nationhood, with individuals bound by bonds of duty and devotion to the common good. Here, too, there was no place for individualism or rights transcending those of the collectivity.³⁰⁸

The attraction of a nationalist-statist ideology for anti-colonial leaders is under-standable, the more so for someone like Sukarno who had to fight for sovereignty and, at the same time, acquire and hold onto power. He favoured a political order in which the ruled were represented by functional groups, "guided" by leaders (or a leader) who knew best what the true national interest was.³⁰⁹ As in so many other instances, it is ironic that a movement that promised the ruled a greater voice in politics and the state should give rise instead to authoritarianism, first Sukarno’s, then Suharto’s.


The Military and the Politics of the Struggle for Independence, 1945-1949
As in Burma, World War II had a profound impact on Indonesia. The war years witnessed the wholesale displacement of the ruling stratum and established elites -- Dutch administrators and their Eurasian, native collaborators. Unlike in Burma, however, the Japanese only promised independence; but they did allow the formation of organizations that became part of a very active political sphere. Among these were the Masjumi, or Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations; militant youth groups (the pemuda), and armed bodies -- including PETA, the Heiho corps, and Hizbu’llah ("Allah’s Army", under Masjumi).³¹⁰

In 1944, a nationalist umbrella body was formed, the Indonesian Preparatory Committee for Independence (PPKI). Sukarno was its head and Pancasila its guiding principle.³¹¹ This later was transformed into the Central Indonesian National Comm-ittee (KNIP), which acted as a quasi-parliament until the elections of 1955.

The most serious task for the new "government" led by Sjahrir and, nominally, Sukarno,³¹⁶ was constructing a national armed forces out of the patchwork of politicized armed bodies. Again, there was little agreement between civilian and military leaders, and within the military itself, as to how the institution was to be organized. Civilian control was another sticking point.³¹⁷ The conundrum was deepened by the fact that the leadership of the nascent armed forces consisted largely of Japanese-trained PETA officers. Like Burma’s military Thakins, they had by no means reconciled themselves to the notion of the military as the apolitical servant of the government of the day. PETA was nationalistic, but it was also created and controlled by the Japanese. The "government" of Sjahrir – a socialist who did not collaborate with Japan – was distrustful of PETA for this reason. Its unease was only deepened by the army’s decision, in late 1945, to choose Sudirman as its chief.³¹⁸ Moreover, the army elected, and proposed that Jogjakarta’s Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX be included in the cabinet as Minister of Security (i.e., Defence). This Sjahrir viewed as an act of rank insubordination. To clarify, it was the practice for the Japanese military to elect the ministers of the Army and the Navy to the cabinet. Sjahrir, who considered himself a staunch "anti-fascist", was deeply suspicious of PETA officers who were trained by, and served with, the Japanese. He therefore rejected the army's recommendation, and appointed Amir Syarifuddin as Minister of Security (1945-46) instead.³¹⁹ In 1946, in an attempt to assert civilian control, Amir Syarifuddin attempted to post political officers (the equivalent of political commisars) to divisional units. The above actions by civilian power-holders alienated the army from Sjahrir's government in particular, and "politicians" in general.

It was fortunate that the Dutch chose not to go on the offensive at the time of the Affair. They did so in December, however, capturing Jogjakarta together with members of the "government." Despite Sudirman’s pleas, Sukarno refused to leave the Republican capital to lead the resistance. Thus, when the Dutch were finally forced to cease military actions in mid-1949, the army – which had fought some engagements with the Dutch – was able to claim that it had brought about independence, not the politicians who had refused to fight.

Indonesia’s military rulers have presented this period of parliamentary rule as promoting a dangerous instability,³²⁵ a testament to the military’s powerful distrust of politics and mass political participation, as discussed in the opening theoretical chapt-ers. The military's depiction of the parliamentary system as unstable is not entirely groundless, however. Seven years of parliamentary rule saw the rise and fall of five governments, which can indeed be viewed as symptomatic of serious instability.³²⁶ A closer look, though, reveals that these governments in fact were dominated by two parties, the Masjumi and the PNI.³²⁷ Nonetheless, constant squabbling flared within the cabinet, in parliament, and within individual parties. There was corruption, though nothing comparable to the military-dominated New Order, along with smouldering secessionist rebellions in Aceh, South Moluccas, South Sulawei, and West Java (the Darul Islam rebellion). More seriously, the military involved itself in several power-plays and regional revolts, including the "17th October Affair" in 1952, the "27th July Affair" in 1955, and the revolts of 1957-58. The significant point is that the military disliked the parliamentary system, and favoured the more authoritarian, paternalistic order embodied in the 1945 Constitution, advocated by Dewantoro and Supomo, and backed by Sukarno himself as President of the Republic.

Just when Nasution seemed doomed to obscurity following his dismissal and electoral humiliation in the 1955 voting,³³³ Sukarno appointed him Chief of Staff in November 1955. Each seemed to recognize that he needed the other to attain a comm-on goal: the abolition of parliamentary politics and the establishment of a more "Indo-nesian" political order.³³⁴ Their relationship proved mutually beneficial. Nasution’s support secured for Sukarno a power base that he could personally command, and use to establish the Guided Democracy order. Sukarno’s support boosted Nasution’s legitimacy and gave him a firmer grip on the military. This he consolidated in a round-about, complex fashion by eliminating military rivals and challengers.

Upon his reappointment, Nasution embarked on a scheme to professionalize the military structure, which meant transferring those who were "setting themselves up as warlords."³³⁵ This stirred further opposition to Nasution within the military.³³⁶ The most serious challenge took the form of a series of regional revolts, led by all the Sumatra commanders (North, Central and South) together with the Kalimantan and East Indonesia commands. Rebel soldiers declared themselves in favour of "firm and revolutionary measures" to realize the ideals of the 1945 Independence Proclamation, including less-centralized control of the outer regions, regional representation, a presidential system, a Sukarno-Hatta dwi-tunggal (joint leadership), and changes to the top brass of the military.³³⁷ The rebels were joined in their campaign by a number of prominent politicians.³³⁸ They set up a counter-government (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, PRRI), though not a secessionist one as such -- in hindsight, a strange tack for "secessionists" to take.³³⁹

The revolts exploited widespread anti-Jakarta sentiments which coexisted with a strong sense of "Indonesian-ness." This enabled leaders like the Sultan of Jogjakarta (a Javanese) and Hatta (a Sumatran) to band together to isolate the extremists. It also assisted Nasution (a Batak) in maintaining contacts with rebel leaders which, in turn, helped to moderate secessionist demands.³⁴⁰ Overall, the revolts proved a blessing in disguise for Nasution, ridding him of troublesome officers. Furthermore, Sukarno’s nationwide declaration of martial law (imposing a State of Siege, or SOB) concentrat-ed more power in the hands of Nasution and the military. The military, in alliance with Sukarno, now became a dominant presence in politics, and a crucial pillar of support for the Guided Democracy state.

Of theoretical relevance here is how the military’s lack of cohesion inhibited its ability to intervene in politics and undermine parliamentary rule. The "17th October Affair" resulted instead in Nasution’s dismissal by Sukarno, who was adept at manip-ulating disunity within the military. The "27th June Affair" also failed to change the system substantially. Paradoxically, it was the concerted effort by dissidents -- military, regional, and political – to oust Nasution via the string of regional revolts that ended up strengthening his hand. The revolts turned him into precis

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