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The politics of authoritarianism: the state and political soldiers in burma, indonesia, and thailand by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe M. A., University of British Columbia, 1990 B. A., University of Rangoon, 1961


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The First Military Foray Into Politics: The Military Caretakers, 1958-1960
Politics in any democratic polity are complex. In a multi-ethnic state like Burma, it was all the more so. Although the AFPFL Thakins were beset by armed rebellions from the start, they managed more or less to cope within the framework of parliamentary politics. Democracy might have endured had they not split into the Stable (Swe-Nyein) and Clean (Nu-Tin) camps, with numerous additional cliques, in 1957-58.

The split stemmed from the fact that the AFPFL was a coalition of rival fact-ions led by AFPFL "bosses" like U Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein, Thakins Tin, and Kyaw Tun.194 The split stemmed basically from competition between AFPFL factions (or party "empires" and party "czars") over the spoils of office and power, and jockeying among top leaders to get their respective loyalists appointed to strategic party posts. Such intra-party conflicts are common to many political parties. What made them deadly was that U Nu, regarded as standing above the factions, ended up joining the Clean camp. The split paralyzed the government: all of the national and sub-national state machinery were filled by the AFPFL’s allies, clients, and supporters. Anyone of importance was sucked into the fray: politicians, civil servants, mayors, editors, businessmen, even the third Union President – U Win Maung, a Karen. With the ruling party and its member organizations split, the bureaucracy paralyzed, and even society-based institutions divided into Stable and Clean camps, it seemed the government and the state itself were in danger of splitting asunder.

In 1958, as the theoretical discussion of the previous chapters would predict, the military, feeling its privileged place in the state hierarchy threatened along with the state itself, intervened in the political sphere. The military intrusion was led by "Young Turks" Brigadiers like Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, Maung Maung, Than Sein, Hla Myint, and others. Well-informed Burmese with good military connections insist that the young Brigadiers who "persuaded" U Nu to hand power over to Ne Win -- did so without Ne Win's order or direct involvement.195 As such, the intervention took on the complexion of an "aid to civil power" operation by the military at the request of the Prime Minister, to restore stability and prevent the break-up of the country. It did not lead to the reorganization of political power -- which is in agreement with the theoretical discussion where I stressed the importance of a military strongman-unifier, who must transform the military into a cohesive political instrument.

The official -- and U Nu's and the military's -- version is that U Nu, worried by the party split which affected the whole country, especially the elite segments in government, politics, even societal associations, made use of a clause in the const-itution allowing for the appointment of a non-MP to the government, to invite the armed forces chief, Ne Win, to assume temporary control.196 There was, officially, no "coup". However, there were troops and armoured cars posted at strategic points in Rangoon for several weeks, and there were as well checkpoints manned by soldiers in full battle gear on the outskirts of the capital, again, for several weeks.197 The fact of the matter may lie in-between those who believe that the Brigadiers staged a coup, though indirectly, and the official version.

The situation was complicated by the struggle -- at its height then -- between two ruling factions, and Aung Gyi was close to U Ba Swe, the co-leader of the Stable faction that failed to oust U Nu from government. Moreover, U Nu's decision to "invite" Ne Win in as a caretaker was made soon after a visit by Maung Maung and Aung Gyi -- but not much is known, up to now, about what was actually said and what transpired. The decision to hand over power to the military was U Nu's, and his alone. It came as a surprise to most cabinet members.198 According to Richard Butwell, U Nu had no choice but to agree to hand over power: the choice was between inviting the military to power, or "inviting" a coup.199 It was, as Dr. Ba Maw, a very prominent Burmese former mentor of the Thakins, put it, a "coup by consent".200

Soldiers ruled as caretakers for two years. Compared with the second intervention in 1962, though, they performed well.201 Especially praised was the encouragement of capitalist development, as provided for in the 1959 Burma Investment Act. It offered domestic and foreign investors a 20-year guarantee against nationalization; looser restrictions on the importation and repatriation of capital and earnings; and exemptions for new investors from custom duties and taxes for three years. All of this was drastically reversed in 1962 -- when Ne Win gained undisputed control of the military and was able to reorganize the state in accordance with his "Burmese socialist" agenda.202

The soldiers-caretakers launched "annihilation" operations against insurgents, and as in Thailand after Sarit's takeover, soldiers cracked down on "subversives" (ethnic activists and "communists"), black marketeers, price-gougers, street-hawkers, slum-dwellers, squatters, and stray dogs. They cleaned up the streets and gave build-ings a fresh coat of paint. They also waged a relentless psychological war against leftist and communist philosophies via the National Solidarity Association (NSA),203 a creation of the military’s psychological-warfare department. The thrust of this initial military intrusion into politics was typical of the anti-communist, "can-do" mentality operative among Burmese soldiers, as in Thailand under Sarit, who seized power around the same time.204 The military appeared to be "getting the job done," building the state and the nation, and setting the stage for a free-market "take-off" by liberating the economy of the AFPFL’s "socialist" shackles.

What is of particular theoretical relevance about this first military intervention is how different it was from the second. It came more in the form of an "aid to the civil power," rather than a seizure of power. Parliament was only suspended; political parties were not banned. In fact, Ne Win insisted on obtaining a parliamentary mandate to rule as head of the caretaker regime.205 The administrative machinery of the state was neither seized nor subordinated to the military. And, importantly, the military caretakers chose to recognise (in form at least) the autonomy of the non-Bama states, as constitutionally provided. In the appointment of new heads for these states, for examples, they accepted candidates chosen by the state legislature. Unlike in 1962, there was almost no change in ministerial-administrative personnel at the state level.206

Further, as promised, Ne Win held an election in 1960, and handed power over to U Nu and his Union Party (formerly the Clean AFPFL), which had won a landslide victory. Ne Win thus gained fame as a "no-nonsense" statesman-soldier. He so impressed the outside world with his competence and professionalism that he was nominated for the prestigious Magsaysay prize, which he declined.207 His image as a constitutional, professional soldier was further boosted when he dismissed the "Young Turks" who figured prominently as military caretakers -- Maung Maung, Kyi Win, Aung Shwe, Tun Sein, Chit Khaing, and others. This also restored U Nu’s trust in Ne Win.208 Lulled by a sense that parliamentary democracy had been restored, legislators, politicians, and community-communal leaders went about their business as usual. No one then realized the magnitude of the change in the balance of power at the heart of the state that the AFPFL split had brought in its train. Surprise was thus the order of the day when, in the pre-dawn hours of March 2, 1962, the military seized power. Soldiers have remained as "permanent" actors in politics ever since.
An explanation of the differences between the first and second military inter-vention may lie in the actions that Ne Win took following the announced handover of power in 1958. He insisted on being "elected" by the parliament in October 1958, to effect a legal transfer of power for a year. Again in September 1959, parliament was convened to extend his tenure for a year further. His concern for constitutional legal-ity can be interpreted as actions of a politically unambitious professional soldier, or alternatively as those of a military chief unprepared to try to run the country -- the former interpretation contradicts his later actions.

Knowledgable Burmese maintain that the Tatmadaw was then dominated by "Young Turk" Brigadiers, who were ambitious, capable, and did not hold Ne Win in awe, as would those who followed them. They believe that had Ne Win been in undis-puted control in 1958, it is likely that military rule would have lasted much longer.209 That this is likely the case is reinforced by Ne Win's dismissal, before his 1962 coup, of the "Young Turks" who were prominent in the caretaker regime, and the dismissal soon after of Aung Gyi, one of the masterminds of the 1958 "handover", and leader of a strong Tatmadaw faction.

The analysis indicates support for the theoretical observation advanced earlier that effective, prolonged military intervention that results in the reorganization of political power depends to a large extent on the military being unified by a strongman; and if an undisputed strongman is lacking, the military will most likely restore civilian rule -- if only temporarily.

As shown, military intervention in 1958 did not lead -- as it would in 1962 -- to the reorganization of political power and the state. Ne Win had not at the time become what he was to become two years later: the undisputed, military strongman-unifier. Therefore, upon being handed power in 1958 by the "Young Turks", Ne Win -- most uncharacteristically -- played the role of a professional, constitutional leader and reluctant military ruler. He saw to it that elections were held in 1960 as he promised, and led his soldiers back to the barracks.


Ne Win’s Bama Tatmadaw: The Power Centre Within the State
Although the military seized complete control of the state only in 1962, its history is inextricably linked to politics. In this context it is worth noting that the notion of the military as a specifically-organized coercive arm of the state, subordin-ated to the civil power and led by an apolitical officer corps, is quite novel in many Third World polities. As Dorothy Guyot notes, the Tatmadaw was at its inception a "political movement in military garb": its founders and leaders -- the military Thakins -- were politicians first and foremost.210

The Tatmadaw’s history is shaped primarily by politics. It originated in the plan of a Japanese intelligence officer, Colonel Keji Suzuki (Burma’s "Lawrence of Arabia"), to raise a guerrilla force that would disrupt traffic on the Burma Road, an important logistic life-line of the Nationalist Chinese government in Chungking. It was with this in mind that his agents contacted Bama politicians such as Dr. Ba Maw, Thakins Tun Ok, Ba Sein, and even U Saw (Prime Minister of Ministerial Burma from 1940 to 1942).211 The irony is that Aung San, the "father of the Tatmadaw," was only vaguely aware of these links. He and a companion were in fact fugitives, stranded in Amoy, their plans to seek the help of the famed Eighth Route Army getting nowhere. When Suzuki learned of Aung San’s whereabouts, the latter was picked up and taken to Tokyo. In 1941, he returned secretly to Burma, hastily recruiting some Thakins (now known in the nationalist myth as the "Thirty Comrades'') for military training on Hainan island. Among these was Thakin Shu Maung (Ne Win).212

But the plan for a Burmese guerrilla force was shelved when Japan invaded Burma following its attack on Pearl Harbor. Still, Suzuki managed to raise a motley armed band for his Thakin "officers". Their first army, the Burma Independence Army (BIA), marched "victoriously" behind Japanese columns and "liberated" the country.213 In reality, though, the BIA fought only rarely; its chief Aung San admitted that he led no units, into combat or otherwise, but rather tagged along as Suzuki’s staff member.214 Some BIA units, however, did attack the Karen (loyal to the British), and committed various atrocities and massacres.

After a few months, the Japanese disbanded the BIA, now filled mostly with new Thakin recruits, many of whom were little more than drifters. Thereafter, the Burma Defence Army (BDA) was formed from selected BIA members. In 1945, when Aung San and the Thakins turned on their Japanese sponsors shortly before the Allied victory (after Upper Burma was recaptured), the army was renamed the Burma Nation-al Army (BNA). The BNA was recognized by the British as an anti-Japanese guerrilla force, and again renamed as the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF).215 This, too, was subsequently disbanded, with selected members and officers incorporated by the British into four Bama battalions of the re-formed Burma Army.

The above account of the various "armies" shows that from 1942 to 1948, mil-itary Thakins commanded or served in four differently-composed and -organized forces. Only a handful served in all of them; of these, only a few served in the post-1948 armed forces. As such, the conventional view of the Tatmadaw as a direct descendant of the "armies that fought for independence" is inaccurate. The current Tatmadaw is essentially the child of Ne Win and the Fourth Burma Rifles who stood by the AFPFL in 1948. Nonetheless, the military has persisted with its claim that it expelled both the British and the Japanese, "winning" Burmese independence, and therefore it is the rightful guardian of the state and nation.216

But there is no questioning the debt AFPFL power-holders owed to the military Thakins in the first fragile years of independence. It was the Tatmadaw, its ranks reinforced by Chin, Kachin, and Shan recruits, that blunted the offensive capabilities of both the communist Thakins and the Karen. In this it was assisted by friendly governments, including the United Kingdom, India, and the British Commonwealth.217

Even though the military quickly became an autonomous centre of power, one crucial to the survival of AFPFL Thakins prior to the 1958 AFPFL split, its chief and future strongman-ruler was apparently not very engaged politically. Ne Win led the high life of wine, women, and pleasure. He attended the races regularly; travelled abroad for the nightlife and horses; was involved in scandals with European callgirls and local starlets; broke up the marriage of Daw Khin May Than, a prominent social-ite, and then married her, though he was already married 218 As such, he commanded little in the way of public esteem, and almost no Thakin superior – not U Nu, not Kyaw Nyein, not Ba Swe – thought of him as a threat or rival.
On the other hand, top brass such as Aung Gyi, Maung Maung, and Tin Pe, those who believed in the Dobama creed and the founding myths of the military, resented the civilian Thakins. In their view, those who had not risked their necks in the independence struggle, civilian Thakins and others now enjoying the "fruits of independence", were necessarily less capable, less patriotic, and "unrevolutionary."219 As true believers, they were unhappy with two main features of the AFPFL state.

One was its underpinnings of parliamentary democracy, which they saw, like their Thai and Indonesian counterparts, as a dangerously unstable system that would only hamper the state’s ability to perform its tasks.220 Accordingly, the Burmese military hardly welcomed the outcome of the 1956 elections, which gave the moderate-left NUF a full 45 percent of the votes. The military was also deeply suspicious of U Nu’s "Arms for Democracy" program, which included the 1958 surrender of a number of rebel armies and their embrace of parliamentary politics. Soldiers (and analysts like Frank Trager) viewed this as "crypto-communist" subversion, and saw the need for the military to step in and "save" democracy and the nation.221 For the military, the years of democracy under the AFPFL were years of incompetence, corruption, and weakness that demonstrated the inability of the state to counter the communist threat.

The other aspect of the AFPFL state that fuelled military disgruntlement was the semi-federal arrangement between the centre, the Bama mother-country, and the non-Bama states. This constitutional arrangement was seen as encouraging "narrow" non-Bama nationalism. In Taylor’s view, reflecting the military’s, it was of Western derivation, the creation of colonial pseudo-scholars.222 Likewise, the military did not view the 1961-1962 "Federal" movement to reform the constitution as a reflection of non-Bama confidence in the Union and democracy. The movement was initiated and led by the governments of non-Bama states. Its aim was to re-negotiate the terms of incorporation in the Union, and gain a more equitable share of power, particularly in terms of taxation and defence. Defence was a thorny issue since the military, under the central government, was not in the least accountable to state governments and regularly perpetrated grave atrocities. In essence, the non-Bama leaders wanted the union of co-equal states that Aung San and AFPFL leaders promised at the Panglong conference a year before independence.223 Instead the military saw the movement as a secessionist scheme of Shan princes led by Sao Shwe Thaike, the first Union Pres-ident and regarded as the co-creator (with Aung San) of the Union in 1947.224

The military’s growing disenchantment with the AFPFL state, and its wider distaste for democratic politics, was matched by its growth as an autonomous centre of power, a "state within a state." First, military officers had usurped administrative-political power while conducting military operations in "insecure" areas of the non-Bama states and the Bama hinterland itself. They exercised wide administrative powers as heads of the SACs, and enjoyed authority over regular civilian administrat-ors. Second, the MIS, responsible for rooting out "enemies of the state," had grown very powerful thanks to its key role in the internal war. It was accountable to Ne Win alone; he personally supervised its staffing and operations. Third, not only was the military well-funded, and its members and their families well cared-for by the state;225 but it had also become, by the mid-1950s, an economic powerhouse. Its Defence Service Industry (DSI), headed by Aung Gyi, enjoyed non-profit status and ready access to foreign currency and investment capital (both foreign and domestic). It was also exempted from all fees and customs duties. Over time, it became an econ-omic empire dominating the "modern" sector – shipping, banking, imports-exports, hotels and tourism, and so on.226

The first military intrusion into politics, from 1958 to 1960, was a sign of things to come. However, although the AFPFL split and the "caretaker" interlude signified a radical shift, with power flowing from the hands of civilian power-holders into the hands of soldiers at the very core of the state, few seemed to grasp the deeper implications. After the 1960 elections, political actors continued to participate in "normal" politics, unaware of the vulnerability of the democratic arena itself. Non-Bama leaders, mistaking U Nu’s popularity for strength, came up with the Federal movement to redress imbalances between the centre and states. Worse still -- and foolishly, in hindsight -- U Nu went ahead with his most divisive election promise: making Buddhism the state religion. The non-Buddhist segments of society, including Christianized Chin, Kachin, and Karen, rallied in protest.

In politics, it goes without saying that what is "normal" depends on who defines what is "normal" and how it is defined. For soldiers, whose vision of a "normal" politics is a hierarchical order managed by those who know best (as Manuel Garreton notes227), parliamentary politics was abnormal and dangerous, and promoted and exacerbated social conflicts. Democratic politics in 1960-62 was decidedly "overheated." U Nu appeared directionless and often disengaged, his party wracked by internal squabbling. Widespread political disorder -- as perceived by the military -- gave it an opening to spring its political surprise on a March morning in 1962.

The analysis, above, highlights the observation in the opening chapters that military intervention is bound up with the the military's role in the state and its affairs, and that it is connected to its vision of how state-society relations is to be ordered and political power organized. The military in Burma viewed itself as the creator-guardian and protector of the state, and this self-image was reinforced by a wide range of non-military tasks that it performed. The military "saved" the AFPFL state from assaults on it by leftist-communist Thakins, and also fought the Karen (and their allies) who resisted being included in what they regarded as a Bama-dominated state. It also undertook the task of "planting the flag" in the non-Bama areas, i.e., imposing the Dobama's vision of "national unity". Its role was expanded when it undertook administrative responsibilities in "insecure" zones throughout the country. It further became an economic powerhouse that dominated the modern sector of the economy, thanks to the DSI and Aung Gyi's dynamic leadership.

The military's expanded role and dominance that resulted, reinforced not only the military Thakins' self-image as guardians and protectors of the state, but also their dislike and distrust of democratic politics. Likewise, they viewed the "Federal" movement as a threat to "national unity" and an attempt to dismember the country. U Nu's poor performance after the 1960 elections and the protests against making Budd-hism the official state religion, convinced the military Thakins that it was time to re-configure state-society relations and re-arrange the way power was organized.



Ne Win’s Military-Socialist Authoritarian State, 1962-1988
Ne Win’s coup ended fourteen years of parliamentary politics. It also trans-formed the status of the non-Bama states, from co-dependent and theoretically coequal entities to tightly-controlled units of a centralist state. The new state order was one in which political, administrative, and legislative bodies at all levels were occupied and controlled by military officers responsible only to their superiors in the chain of command. A politically closed, ethnically exclusive, highly authoritarian "socialist" state was imposed. The state-society arrangement was classically authoritarian, with power concentrated in the hands of officials (i.e., military officers, in particular), politics shut down, and dissent forbidden.

This second military intervention was clearly different in scope and direction. This time it was led by Ne Win, now the undisputed strongman. He not only dominated the armed forces, but had won his political spurs (along with international accolades) as a stern, effective military "modernizer" -- a leader who had outperform-ed the politicians. Ne Win was prepared, indeed determined, to take sole charge of the state. As Aung Gyi (second in the hierarchy in 1962) put it, "the Bogyoke" -- Ne Win himself -- "planned, manoeuvred troops, gave commands, and everything else."228

It has been suggested in the theoretical discussion that after the military captures the state, political centre of gravity shifts towards the one who unifies the military under his command and becomes the head of state. In keeping with this prediction, Ne Win set about reorganizing political power to conform to his own agenda, founded in part on the Dobama creed: a centralized, authoritarian "socialist" order, to be achieved by "Burmese methods" and cast in a "Burmese mode."229 Once Ne Win ordained a "uniquely Burmese" path to socialism, Aung Gyi’s rival, Tin Pe – advised by Ba Nyein, Chit Hlaing, and a monk, U Okkata – concocted the doctrine of Anya-Manya Th’bawtra (the System of Correlation of Man and his Environment, or SCME), on which ''Burmese socialism'' was to be built. Although touted as based on a non-Marxian "objective dialectical realism," it was in Moshe Lissak’s words, a "hazy elaboration," whose uniqueness rested on oversimplified generalizations of both socialist and liberal principles, and Buddhist principles as well.230

During the first few years of military rule, Ne Win and the Revolutionary Council (RC) seemed amply aware of their lack of legitimacy. Undoubtedly, the killing of protesting university students on July 7, 1962, three months after the coup, contributed to the regime’s unpopularity, as did the demolition of the historic Rang-oon University Students Union building the very next day.231 The coup-makers had alienated the AFPFL, the only political machine with a nationwide reach, first by deposing U Nu, and second by refusing to share power with the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein camp.232

In an effort to improve its image, the RC made periodic overtures to the armed opposition. In 1963, it invited Thakin Soe’s Red Flag communists and Thakin Than Tun’s White Flag communists (the BCP, later the CPB) for "peace talks." These proved unproductive when it became clear that Ne Win was interested only in the rebels’ surrender.233 In 1968, Ne Win released U Nu, Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein and other prominent political prisoners, and asked thirty-three of them to share their suggest-ions on national unity. The majority recommended a coalition government, the restoration of an open political arena, and negotiations with armed rebels. But Ne Win ignored the advice he himself had solicited.234 General amnesties were pro-claimed in 1963, 1974, and 1980, but were largely ignored by the rebels.235

The alienation from the regime of AFPFL leaders, civilian elites, and "under-ground" forces tells only part of the story, however. Another important consideration were Ne Win’s characteristics as personal ruler. He was an autocrat and a tyrant, as these terms are deployed by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg:236 an autocrat because he dominated the state completely and was able to prevent the emergence of rivals, and a tyrant because in addition to unrestrained power he also controlled the only viable instrument of rule – the military.237 Ne Win’s vision was of soldiers leading a vanguard party of the "uniquely Burmese" socialist revolution. The very idea of an apolitical, professional military was dismissed by the Vice-Chief of Staff, Sun Yu, as "most harmful to the people."238

Ne Win's "new" order was one where the political sphere was encapsulated with a single, military-run vanguard party. Reflecting the military’s aversion to democratic politics -- as suggested in the theoretical chapters -- the goal was to create "orderly politics" that denied participation to "unruly, divisive" elements. Justificat-ion for the military’s monopolization of power was found in the idea that, because of its "historic" role and "sacrifices," only the military could serve as the tried and tested guardian of the nation.

The Revolutionary Council (RC), employing the state’s coercive capacity, set out to exclude most of society from the political arena. It outlawed all political parties and organized groups; nationalized or shut down newspapers; imposed con-trols and censorship over all manner of publications; and imprisoned activists and politicians from the political right and left alike. After clearing the political decks in this fashion, the RC then established a ruling party, the Mranmah Sosheilit Lanzin party, or BSPP.239 Its function, in theory, was to control the articulation of interests and to aggregate demands deemed acceptable; to manage political participation; to mobilize the population; and to oversee the work of the organs of state.

In 1974, a constitution to enshrine the single-party state order was adopted after a symbolic plebiscite. In accordance with the theoretical premise advanced earlier, the constitution signified a shift in the centre of political gravity towards the military strongman-ruler. In form, the new order was a one-party edifice. In line with the principle of democratic centralism, the BSPP, claiming to represent the luptha-prithu (working people), penetrated and controlled all executive, administrat-ive, legislative, and judicial bodies right down to the level of the township councils.240 In reality, however, the BSPP was a hollow shell. Unlike Indonesia’s Golkar in which civilian bureaucrats and some civilians had a voice -- as will be discussed -- the organs of the BSPP were entirely controlled by military officers, beholden in turn to their military superiors. This meant in practice that the military chain of command was the only structure of command and control in the country.241 The BSPP party and the constitutional hierarchy of party and state, subordinating the latter to the former, was a fiction concealing the hard fact of military rule and personal autocracy.

To prevent the party from ever challenging the military and Ne Win, it was kept on edge by frequent purges. For instance, in 1974, when the Taze town party branch in upper Burma defiantly put forward its own men for elections to the local people’s council and parliament (Prithu-Hluttaw), all of its candidates and key cadres were arrested and dismissed. In 1976-77, over 50,000 party members were purged following the firing of Defence Minister Tin U, who had gained considerable stature within the armed forces.242 And in 1977-78, over 100 Central Committee members and over a thousand party members were expelled when San Yu and Kyaw Soe received more votes than Ne Win in a Central Committee election. Other measures included the dismissal of a BSPP official whenever there were signs that s/he was gaining influence within the party or with the population at large. The BSPP was certainly not a vehicle of upward mobility, or even of "getting things done." Nor was it intended to be. Disempowered, kept off-balance, it failed utterly to gain autonomy and institutional integrity; it decayed and atrophied. The BSPP became little more than a make-work project for baungbee-khyot, ex-military men, or a holding tank for military "misfits" – those who had displeased superiors, or sided with patrons who had lost out in court intrigues, or aroused Ne Win's suspicion.243

An even worse fate was visited upon civil servants. Instead of running the state administrative and regulatory machinery, they became the "errand boys" of under-qualified military placed above them. In this respect, Ne Win differs significantly from the Thai strongman-rulers and Indonesia’s Suharto, all of whom appreciated the bureaucracy’s importance to some extent at least, seeing it as a counter-weight to the military. In Burma, by contrast -- as Maung Maung Gyi notes -- Ne Win reduced state agencies to medieval fiefdoms. Civil servants lived by the "Three Don’ts" dict-um -- "Don’t perform, Don’t get involved, Don’t get fired" -- and the "Three Rules": "Go if Summoned, Do as Told, Never question Orders."244 As a consequence, the bureaucracy, like the party, withered. It responded less and less to rational-legal norms, and increasingly to the "logic" of opaque, patrimonial military politics and intrigues.

The legislative branch fared no better. The Prithu Hluttaw (parliament) and a hierarchy of people’s councils were never really invigorated. The top brass selected the candidates, mostly former military men. Ne Win, of course, stood at the zenith of this selection process. "Legislators" acted out their roles according to scripts written by the military men in control of the assemblies. In exchange, they could take advan-tage of various perks, including access to scarce goods that could be converted into small fortunes on the black market.245

With reference to the theoretical chapters of the new patterns of autonomy relations in military-authoritarian orders, the above analysis suggests the emergence in Burma of, as discussed, a highly-insulated and non-malleable order. With the military dominating all state structures and intermediary institutions, and with societal associations banned, the BSPP state exhibited, as theoretically observed and predicted, a very high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis society, and society's autonomy from the state was thus severely circumscribed. This was true to the extent that the state was inaccessible even to civilian officials in the administrative or BSPP (political) bureaucracy. The pattern of autonomy relations that resulted was one in which the state was unresponsive not only to social forces, but to non-military officials and other elites as well.

On the other hand, the BSPP state was not insulated from Ne Win and the military – in the sense that the state's institutions were highly malleable by Ne Win, and after him, by subordinate military power-holders, and in varying degrees, by military officers holding party or state positions. In other words, the BSPP state was almost solely responsive to the preferences of the ruler and the military. And being narrowly-based in this fashion, it was cohesive, and strong in its coercive capacity.




Ne Win: Personal Rule and the Politics of Authoritarianism
The BSPP Order, as Mya Maung puts it, was one where "an all powerful milit-ary elite [occupied] the top social layer, [with] some lesser elites clinging onto the coat tails of the military commanders, [while] simple folks survive[d] in the base layer as subscribers to the capricious laws and dictates of the military rulers."246 Notwithstanding the green uniforms at the top of the hierarchy, though, the military was neither all-powerful nor fully autonomous. Rather, it was highly submissive toward and dependent upon one man.

Like successful personal rulers in Thailand and Indonesia, Ne Win was a master at keeping his subordinates divided and mutually suspicious, and controlling potential rivals through regular purges. One of his first actions after the 1962 coup was the purging of Aung Gyi, an entrepreneurially-minded potential rival, with Tin Pe providing help. Next to go was Tin Pe himself, purged in 1968 with the aid of San Yu’s faction. In 1976, with San Yu again on side and joined by "Em-I" (MIS) Tin Oo’s factions, the popular defense minister, Tin U, was purged. In 1983, "Em-I" Tin Oo himself,247 as a rising star and likely successor, was expelled, this time with the help of Sein Lwin and Ne Win’s daughter, Sanda Win, a major in the medical corps.248

These purges at the top meant that hundreds in the patrimonial chain, at times a thousand or more, were also sacked and/or imprisoned. In keeping with Ne Win’s reputed paranoid tendencies,249 moreover, officers with "the right stuff" – those who foolishly showed signs of ambition or independence – were weeded out, sent to the various fronts as cannon-fodder.250 Those whom Ne Win trusted and liked were, just as arbitrarily, rewarded with high and lucrative posts in the BSPP state-party hierarchy.

Ne Win’s style was replicated in the military chain of command: there, too, merit and performance mattered little. The key to getting ahead, to avoiding frontline duty, to preserve oneself from being sidelined or dismissed, was to curry favour with patrons and superiors. This meant providing them with regular cash payoffs or "tributes," obtained through the misappropriation of public funds, plunder, extortion, bribes, and blackmarket dealing in contraband goods or narcotics. For example, those posted to Mogok and Hpa-kan, noted for rubies and jade respectively, were expected to provide gems and cash "tributes."251 Wives of officers were and are required to run errands for the wives of superiors, thereby promoting their husbands’ careers. The tribute-based, patronage-oriented system regarded offices and ranks as opportunities to be fully exploited. The notion that rank and position were not personally owned was an irrational one in the patrimonial environment of the BSPP and post-BSPP military.252

Within this patrimonialized and de-institutionalized hierarchy of domination, Ne Win stood supreme.253 Like the kings of old, his every whim was law. Ministers and generals trembled before him like children or personal retinues, and he treated them as such: insulting, assaulting, and dismissing them at will. Cabinet meetings were rare. Instead, ministers and high officials were summoned to join a circle of his tea-sipping, rustic cronies. Direct instructions were seldom issued. Rather, the acolytes had to guess Ne Win’s wishes from the meandering talks he delivered on every topic under the sun.254 Many decisions were, to say the least, idiosyncratic-ally arrived at – based on numerology or astrology, or personal whims. These included the decisions to discontinue the teaching of English in schools, and then the abrupt reversal of the policy (in 1962 and 1980 respectively); the change of the traffic system from left-hand to right-hand drive, in 1972; and the demonetization of certain kyat notes and their replacement by odd-numbered denominates (kyat 15, 25, 35, 45, 75 notes -- and, the 90 kyat note, the number nine being a lucky number). With such power at his command, Ne Win could have emulated Sarit and Suharto, and made a degree of positive contribution to his country’s well-being. It is Burma’s misfortune that he did little with the near-absolute power he held so firmly and for so long, except ruin a potentially rich country.

An important key to Ne Win’s control over both the military and the population at large was the MIS, accountable to him alone. The agency was empowered to censor mail, tap phones, spy, conduct searches, make arrests on mere supicion, detain without warrant or charges laid, imprison without trial or formal sentencing, torture, maim, and kill with impunity.

No one was safe, not even the agency’s own personnel -- they were spied upon and frequently purged.255 The MIS kept tabs on prominent figures inside and outside the military, providing the strongman-ruler with a handy weapon against foes and challengers, real or imagined. MIS spies were attached to military units, with the information obtained filed away for future use. Thus, the MIS effectively paralyzed not just the military brass but the entire officer corps, prevent-ing the emergence of autonomous power centres.256 Owing to the untrammelled use of its arbitrary powers, the MIS gained the image of being all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-seeing. That was enough to depoliticize the general population, causing them to fear and shun politics.257

At least for the armed elites, however, servile loyalty generally had its compen-sations. Prime among them was Ne Win’s "cradle to grave" welfare system. He was generous with the state resources at his disposal, and his "generosity" earned him the status of Abha (Revered Father) among soldiers. A small example of this generosity was the fact that the houses of current and former senior officers are his personal "gifts" to them.258 Loyal officers were made ministers, ambassadors, heads of party and state bodies, legislators, judges. They received the usual perks – freehouses, cars, the best medical services, foreign travel, and imported luxuries. Their power was constrained only by Ne Win. Access to "special privileges and sanctioned corr-uption" put the armed elites at the mercy of the "Revered Father" and his MIS.259

For ordinary soldiers, standing above the law represented a huge upward leap for poor rural youths or unemployed urbanites. They could swagger and throw their weight around without fear of disciplinary action. Even for serious crimes like rape, looting, and assaults they were seldom disciplined.260 Victims, of course, had no avenues of redress: lodging complaints against a soldier was tantamount to suicide. Moreover, in addition to these "in-house" benefits, common soldiers had access to scarce fuel (gasoline, kerosene), medicine, ammunition, and army-issue goods: uniforms, boots, blankets, rice, cooking oil, tinned milk, sugar. These could then be sold on the blackmarket to middlemen, who would sometimes resell the same goods to the rebel opposition.261

Given Ne Win’s almost sole reliance on the military to consolidate authorit-arian rule and his personal dominance, and given too the use of state resources to preserve personal control, there occurred changes in the nature of the state and its institutions, as suggested in the theoretical framework. The above analysis shows -- in line with the theoretical observation made concerning the state, its autonomy, and its insulation from society -- the emergence in Burma of a state-society order where (a) both strongman-ruler and the military became so closely identified with the state that their interests (personal and corporate) could not easily be distinguished from the those of the state or its institutions; (b) the military became a highly cohesive, but thoroughly patrimonialized stratum of armed officials, thereby effectively insulating the state from society; (c) as a result, the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the private preferences of the military and Ne Win was greatly eroded; and (d) although the state’s coercive-repressive capacity was considerably strengthened, its ability to implement its goals and resolve economic and social problems, or capacity to gain legitimacy through performance, was drastically weakened, thanks to its patrimonial and non-institutional mode of functioning.

The BSPP’s main goal, a socialist society, remained unattainable. Instead, as will be shown, the socialist economy was penetrated by outside capital, and pervaded by the private interests and agendas of the officials (mainly military) who were responsible for making socialism work. Furthermore, due to the state’s weak problem-solving capacity, only one ready instrument existed to meet challenges and opposition from societal forces below: brutal repression.


The BSPP State, Socialism, and State-Society Problems
Ne Win’s establishment of a closed and narrowly-based state-society order reduced politics to a single leader, a single ideology, a single party, a single path, and a single vanguard body – the military. As noted, though, this posed problems of its own. The state's insulation, coupled with the decay of its institutional capacity, made it less able to achieve its proclaimed goals. The BSPP could only fail in its stated goal of uplifting the luptha-prithu ("working people"), the supposed foundation of its regime. After promising the masses a greater political say in a series of highly-publicized peasant-worker rallied in the mid-1960s, the regime turned against them. Workers in state enterprises were taught bloody lessons when they staged strikes in the Insein work-shops (1967), the Chauk Oilfields (1974), and the Sinmalaik dock-yards (1975). In all cases, strikers were met with massed firepower.262 The peasant-ry was scarcely better off, as David Steinberg has argued. "Socialist" agriculture turned out to mean the forced sale of prooduce at fixed prices. In 1981, almost nine out of ten rural families were living below the poverty level (US $40 a month), and one in four had become landless. Far from being liberated from landlords, peasants were delivered into the hands of a more powerful one – the BSPP state.263

The regime also failed to end rebellions, despite thousands of annual skirmish-es and regular offers of amnesty. Sporadic peace talks took place, but the demand for unconditional surrender proved futile.264 Moreover, a problem of truly global import -- the production and export of opium and heroin -- linked to the armed rebellion in Shan State, and remained unresolved.265

Most significantly, Ne Win’s state failed to keep its promise to create "a new world" of prosperity. The coup-makers, alluding to a Bama-Buddhist spiritiual aspir-ation, promised a world without the social suffering that stems from human wants or the inability to meditate because of an empty stomach.266 The regime contented itself, instead, with passing laws: the Law to Protect the Construction of the Socialist Economy and the People’s Corporation Law, both in 1963; the 1964 Law to Protect the Construction of the Socialist Economy; and numerous others. It also chose to decree all private economic actvity illegal. All enterprises, shops, hospitals, schools, newspapers, printing presses, cinemas – even corner kiosks – were nationalized.

But because the state maintained only a low degree of autonomy from the priv-ate interests of the military-socialist personnel who staffed it, the agencies created to facilitate "socialism" – the people’s store and corporations and banks – scarcely functioned as they were intended to. Everything produced, procured, or distributed by the state found its way into the "illegal" economy, where it was resold at a profit by military-socialists, their families and cronies. Military socialism meant misman-agement, corruption, and severe shortages, together with the growth of an informal economy that overshadowed the formal (and formally socialist) one.

Ordinary people constituted the base of this economy, engaging in all manner of buying and selling of scarce goods and services. Next up the ladder came the financiers, money lenders, currency dealers, providers of security at depots and on trade routes, transporters within and across the state’s boundaries. Further up were the major financiers, often overseas Chinese with links to the local Chinese commun-ity; warlords of the Chinese KMT; and the commanders of rebel or homeguard "arm-ies" (the KKY/Ka-Kwe-Ye), who controlled trade routes and taxed passage along them.267 Then, there were the protectors to ensure that formally "illegal" transact-ions took place unmolested -- MIS and BSPP-military personnel who oversaw the "socialist" economy and at the same time profited from the "non-socialist" one; and, finally, the officials and entrepreneurs of adjacent countries involved in the cross-border trade in contraband and narcotics.

This dual economy – "socialist" and moribund on the one hand, and on the other, the informal and thriving "non-socialist", "illegal" economy -- greatly benefitt-ed external financial interests and those domestically who controlled the varied means of accumulation. For the majority of the population the blackmarket was a blessing mixed with costly risks. It offered some relief from chronic shortages of goods, but at inflated prices. It provided many with jobs as hawkers of contraband wares and providers of illegal services, but also put them at risk as "economic insurgents." Some earned income as poppy cultivators, but were at the mercy of the state and local loan sharks. Many were forced into dangerous employ as soldiers in rebel or KKY armies, coolies on trade routes (which would take them through mine-fields and thick jungle), petty smugglers, drug pushers, or prostitutes in Thai brothels. For the majority, then, the dual economy brought with it the worst excesses of socialism and capitalism.

Adding to the hardships and restrictions that pervaded the BSPP state,268 was the exclusion of the ruled from the political sphere and all access to the state. Armed struggle, together with the "unlawful" protests that occurred on an almost annual basis,269 became the only ways of making demands and articulating interests. Once again, violence was the only response on the state’s part to these societal demands and dissent.

The strength of Ne Win's BSPP state lay in the cohesion of its narrow, highly-militarized base; its high degree of insulation and non-malleability by society; and its control over the apparatus of coercion and repression. Its very strength, however, resulted in an atrophying of its capacity to resolve problems in positive and constructive ways, and it became the kind of state which, as indicated in the theoret-ical framework, was not able to gain minimal legitimacy, or build a broader elite consensus -- one that extended beyond Ne Win's military power base. Thus, as will be seen, when mass firepower failed to drive peaceful protesters from the streets of Rangoon and other cities in 1988, the regime collapsed -- in a large part because non-military elements deserted their posts.




The Fall and Reconstruction of Authoritarianism in Burma
Prior to 1988, institutional decay and state-society dysfunction were obscured by a patina of austere strength and autocratic control. Many were misled into think-ing that, despite, the familiar litany of woes, the BSPP order harmonized somehow with the cultural and political values of the Bama majority.270 In fact, though, popular resentment had been building under the seemingly stagnant, placid surface.

The event that tipped the scales was a demonetization in 1987 (following one in 1985) which wiped out nearly all savings. Protests erupted in Rangoon and some other towns in late 1987, continuing sporadically until early 1988. A renewed round of protests then met with a harsh state response; but this time the protesters were not cowed.271 In the face of sustained popular opposition, Ne Win resigned as BSPP chairman in July and recommended a transition to a multi-party system. Sein Lwin, nicknamed "The Butcher" for his role in suppressing demonstrators, was named President, only to be forced out in mid-August.272 Dr. Maung Maung, a crony and civilian advisor of Ne Win’s, stepped into the breach. By then the BSPP state was in complete disarray. Civil servants, including the police, were defecting or going into hiding en masse.

Students initiated the uprising, but by mid-1988 the protesters included people from all walks of life, former leaders (including ex-military brass),273 police and soldiers, and the surviving "Thirty Comrades," contemporaries of Aung San and Ne Win. The military, it seemed, was beaten. The spotlight now shone on Aung San Suukyi, daughter of Aung San, whose name the regime had long exploited as "father" of the Tatmadaw and the "socialist revolution."

Amidst the euphoria, Saw Maung and Khin Nyunt (head of the feared MIS) staged a bloody "coup." Thousands were killed. One scene, showing cowering teen-agers being picked off systematically by military snipers, was captured on video-tape and shown world-wide.274 To wash away the stain of violence that had shocked the world, the new junta, SLORC, promised multi-party elections and a transfer of power to civilians. Elections were held in May 1990, under restrictive conditions. Despite the constraints, despite the ample resources of the recycled BSPP (the National Unity Party, or NUP), and despite Aung San Suukyi’s detention under house arrest, her NLD (National League for Democracy) won 392 out of 485 seats. Its ally, the SNLD (Shan National League for Democracy), claimed 23; the NUP won only 10 seats. Most damning of all was that the NUP lost even in pre-dominantly military areas such as Dagon and Hmawbi townships and the Coco-Gyun naval base.

But SLORC refused to step down. It declared it would rule until a new constit-ution was promulgated.275 In early 1993, it called a "National Convention." Elected MPs were coerced into participating, along with other handpicked delegates. Judging from its frequent, unexplained postponements, however, things have not been going well for the regime. Stiff opposition appears to exist to the junta’s overriding objective: the legitimation of the military’s role in politics along the lines of Indonesia’s "dual function" principle of military rule.

Burma is undergoing a grave crisis of political and economic transition. The collapse of Ne Win’s brand of ''socialism'' has not been accompanied by a democratic transition along the lines of the Eastern European countries. Burma is still ruled by soldiers. Nearly all ministries are headed by active or retired military men, as are executive-administrative bodies such as divisional and state-level "Law and Order Restoration Committees" (LORCs). Politics and relates processes are intra-military affairs, and hidden from view (and of course, from the public).

Still, there are differences from the previous era of military rule. Because neither Than Swe nor Khin Nyunt really dominates, changes in the modus operandi have been evident within the military-cum-ruling stratum. In the context of an "open" economy, the absence of the much-feared strongman has meant more freedom of action for bogyoke-wungyis (general ministers) and the top brass.276 Now they can enrich themselves without fear (of the "Old Man").277 The result has been an "open season for corruption" and the rise of what Burmese call "capital-less capitalists": children and kin of former BSPP and current military bosses.278 The patrimonialization of the state, or the relative non-autonomy of the state and its institutions from the private agendas of power-holders and high officials, seems even greater.


The Military Junta and the Politics of Transition
The situation in Burma today is more complex than is conventionally perceiv-ed. Actually, both the socialist one-party state and the socialist economy had long been political fictions. The former was a façade that hid personal dictatorship; soc-ialism was stillborn. The reality was a state where power was concentrated in the hands of one man alone. The real economy, meanwhile, had long been penetrated informally by outside capital. The 1988 uprising was a catalyst that compelled the military to abandon the political fictions it had clung to for a quarter of a century. The uprising not only exposed the true nature of Ne Win’s "uniquely Burmese" political-economic order, but also forced the military to acknowledge the existence of a non-socialist economy that was already penetrated by the regional capitalist economy, and to exploit it in order to survive.

Despite the 1988 uprising and many changes, the Burmese state remains "of soldiers, for soldiers, by soldiers." The SLORC generals who are now in control have three alternatives to choose from. One is to restore the old authoritarian status-quo: a state order similar to the one Ne Win presided over, with political power monopolized by the military, with the state insulated from non-military elites and societal forces, but highly malleable with regard to the private agendas and personal interests of power-holders and their allies.

Another option is to widen the support base of the still-authoritarian state, by co-opting and selectively empowering civilian elites. For example, bureaucrats, technocrats, and the more important economic and commercial figures could be brought into the ruling circle and made a part of decision-making processes. This would entail counter-balancing, even subordinating, the military to some extent to a new ruling bloc that consists of a mixture of military and civilian power factions, all held in check by an astute and skilful strongman-ruler along the lines of Sarit or Suharto. Yet a further option is for the military reach a compromise with what one diplomat called "an unmovable obstacle" -- Aung San Suukyi, whose nationalist pedigree is impeccable and whose personal safety seems quite assured, given that she is linked by blood to Aung San, mythic founder-hero of both modern Burma and "father" of the Tatmadaw.

The first alternative is one the junta has not yet abandoned. The most central problem remains the absence of a clear strongman who can unify the military and prevent coups and counter-coups as armed factions compete for dominance. As mentioned at a couple of points, the absence of such a unifier can lead to intense intra-military conflict, and possibly to the military’s withdrawal from politics, in orderly fashion or otherwise. (Ne Win engineered an orderly withdrawal in 1960 when he believed his grip on the military was uncertain.).

At present, the military and SLORC generals are unified by the residual author-ity of Ne Win, and by the necessity of hanging together lest they hang separately. Recently, with Ne Win (who is nearing ninety) declining physically, General Maung Aye is reported to be manoeuvring to become the next strongman. He is currently third in the SLORC hierarchy after Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe. Though it is uncon-firmed, he is also reported to have been behind the "mob attack" on Aung San Suu-kyi’s motorcade in November 1996. He is also said to be in control of the most hard-line segment of the USDA (the Union Solidarity Development Association), a milit-ary-sponsored "mass organization" that is slated to become the military’s political party, as Golkar once was in Indonesia.279 Maung Aye has also recently taken over direct command of military operations along the Burmese-Thai border, which means he now controls the teak forests, border trade routes, along with what opium fields and heroin refineries there are in the area. Most important, he has gained the power to grant or revoke teak concessions, hitherto held by Khin Nyunt.280

If Maung Aye is successful, change is unlikely. Like Ne Win, he can be expected to depend in large part on the military to maintain his power and personal control. It is uncertain, though, whether his power-play will be successful. Much depends on whether he is able to win over MIS cliques, factions close to SLORC chairman General Than Shwe, and the cliques of fence-sitting ''business generals,'' the bogyoke-wungyis (general-ministers).

The second alternative – widening the support base of authoritarian rule via selective inclusion – is apparently Khin Nyunt’s strategy.281 He has been primarily responsible for some of the SLORC’s successes in this area, and is well-regarded by SLORC’s newly-vigorous foreign patrons and defenders: the leaders of China, Sing-apore, Thailand, Malaysia, and other governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Among Khin Nyunt’s succcesses, two stand out as being of special strategic significance. The first is that he has won for SLORC the acceptance of some moneyed elements of society by initiating the transformation of Burma's disasterous "socialism" to a capitalist economic system intent on economic development. He is largely responsible for de-criminalizing those whom the BSPP regime had labelled "economic insurgents": namely, the trans-border ethnic-Chinese patron-client networks of black marketeers and drug traffickers who control the informal economic sector. These moves have encouraged some previously deported Indian and Sino-Burmese entrepreneurs -- many of whom have prospered elsewhere -- to return as investors.282 Their return has triggered a scramble by investors anxious not to miss out on the opportunity to exploit Burma’s rich natural resources and "repressed consumer demand".283

Second, credit is due to Khin Nyunt for a move that enabled SLORC politically to outflank the DAB (Democratic Alliance of Burma) -- the opposition front led by the Karen and Dr. Sein Win (who is Aung San Suukyi’s cousin). Khin Nyunt neutralized the non -Bama resistance "armies" in the alliance by co-opting their military leaders. The move has weakened the DAB and simultaneously boosted SLORC’s image as a "peacemaker." It has also allowed SLORC to concentrate on keeping the deeply-alienated Bama majority in line.284 Khin Nyunt’s success in this area, though, is largely due to a number of fortuitous circumstances. After the BSPP’s sudden demise in 1988, its most formidable foe, the White Flag CPB, also collapsed in the wake of mutinies by non-Bama units. The dissolution occurred just as SLORC was desperately seeking allies. Fortunately for the junta, Chinese authorities stepped in and persuaded the junta and the CPB mutineers to agree to a cease-fire. In exchange, the non-Bama, ex-CPB warlords were given a free hand to exploit border trade and "development."285 A similar deal was struck in 1993 with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), again with Chinese help.286

It seems that with Khin Nyunt's partial recognition of important economic-commercial elements and non-Bama military leaders, the groundwork is being laid for a "softer" and relatively more inclusive military-authoritarian order, so long as Khin Nyunt's views prevail. The "National Convention", the body established to formulate a new constitution, could bring this order about by opening the political arena in a limited way, such as in Suharto's Indonesia. To this end, SLORC has established a Golkar-like body, the USDA, which (like its predecessors, the NSA and the BSPP) is controlled and overseen by the military.

It is not clear, however, that the "Indonesian model" – a quasi-multiparty arrangement dominated by the government party, Golkar – is exportable, and it may not be possible for SLORC to establish a system that works in a similar fashion to that of Indonesia, or to emulate Suharto’s successes. Moreover, there has not yet emerged in post-1988 Burma a military politician with skills equal to Suharto’s, or with Ne Win’s authority. (Ne Win himself might have been able to establish such an order in the 1960s, had he chosen).

There are other obstacles. For one thing, the domestic commercial class that benefits from SLORC’s "open economy" is at best a "fair weather" ally. Many comprising this class are of dubious political value, being either former "economic insurgents", ex-communists, alleged drug kingpins, overseas Burmese investors with roots and interests elsewhere, or what local people call the "new Burmese" – Chinese from Yunnan. It is doubtful whether the non-Bama military leaders and warlords who made cease-fire deals with SLORC would stand by the junta in a crisis. The problems of center-state relations remain unsolved, and in non-Bama areas, local people are abused and exploited as before.287 Likewise, the majority of "investors" would likely view Burma simply as a business venture, and, other than desiring stability, do not have any stake in Burma's political future. The regime's only staunch supporters are the SLORC ministers, top military brass, some former BSPP ministers and ex-generals, and the "enterprising" children and relatives of Ne Win and the military.

The third obstacle is the emergence of a highly credible, popular, and internationally-respected challenger, Aung San Suukyi.288 She is the daughter of the fabled Bogyoke (General) Aung San, the father of independence and the Tatmadaw, whose name has been exploited by Ne Win and the military to bolster their own legitimacy. She remains a formidable obstacle to the attainment of SLORC’s goal of prolonging the military’s monopoly of power, and, by extension, wealth.


Burma’s Struggle for Democracy:
Burma is currently experiencing a protracted crisis of succession and transition to which, as suggested in the theoretical analysis, military-authoritarian regimes are vulnerable. Foremostly, there is the problem of who will succeed Ne Win as the ruling strongman. Such a figure must emerge to balance military factions and arbitrate between them and maintain military unity, or the current military-authorit-arian state will disintegrate. From appearance, there will likely be a power struggle, perhaps a protracted and violent one.

In its attempt to resolve the problem of succession and transition, the military has set in motion a process to legalize and institutionalize the role of the military in politics through a new constitution being slowly formulated by the "National Convention", which first convened in 1993. From this exercise, SLORC has to accomplish two major interrelated tasks: first, to organize power in such a way that the state will not only be strong in purely a coercive-repressive capacity, but also in terms of legitimacy based on the ability to solve problems and to remedy the country’s many ailments; and second, to deal effectively, using a minimum of force, with challenges arising from society, particularly the aspirations for a democratic alternative being articulated by Aung San Suukyi. Because of who she is, and what she represents, the challenge she poses to the military is the most difficult one for junta to overcome. As such, the best possible option for the military would be to come to terms with the democratic opposition.

One important development is Aung San Suukyi’s "unconditional" release, granted in July 1995. It is said this was ordered by SLORC chairman Than Swe and his trusted aid, Kyaw Sein, deputy head of the DDSI (Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence).289 This has led to hope that there will eventually be a dialogue between the junta and the democratic opposition in order to start addressing Burma's grave problems. However, if the release has just been a ploy to bolster SLORC’s external legitimacy, as seems quite possible, it is unlikely that SLORC will engage in any real dialogue.

It is difficult to predict Burma's future. Burma may become and remain, perhaps for quite some time, a lucrative back-water for extra-national entrepren-eurs.290 Tempting though it is, to think that despised, illegitimate rulers cannot last for long, soldiers who "own" the state and its resources -- and enjoy the support of neighboring governments (especially powerful ones like China)-- may be able to hold onto power for quite a while. This will make the struggle for democracy long and difficult. Life for the great mass of the population will remain sad and trying, as it has been in one form or another since 1962.

As I have shown in this chapter, the military in Burma is a formidable political force which has stayed on in politics to dominate the state-society order as the power base and political instrument of the military strongman-ruler Ne Win and his successors, the SLORC generals. The military still rules -- at gunpoint, without even a fiction of constitutional legitimacy.

The Tatmadaw has always closely identified itself with the state and viewed itself as the creator, guardian, and savior of the state and national unity. Mainly because the new state was challenged by armed rebellions (communist, and ethnic) at independence, the role of the military, in both combat and non-military spheres, expanded rapidly. This in turn reinforced the military's view of itself as indispensible to the existence of the state and nation.

The pattern of military intervention in Burma, indirectly in 1958, directly in 1962 and again in 1988, has been shown to be closely linked to concerns about the unity of the state, and as well to preserving the military's privileged place in, and identification with, the state. It is also clear that the Tatmadaw's decision to "stay on" and reorganize political power, and its ability to stay on for a long period, has been contingent on the presence of a military strongman who has maintained military unity. Ne Win is still in control, although his "Burmese socialist" BSPP state collapsed in 1988, and he does not now exercise power on a day-to-day basis.

In the military-authoritarian state set up by Ne Win, state-society relations have been characterized by a state that is highly autonomous from society. The state in Burma appears highly authoritarian, as can be seen, with the military occupying a very dominant place in both the political and economic spheres. At the same time, as predicted in the theoretical discussion, the state has had little autonomy from the strongman-ruler and the Tatmadaw. There has been an erosion of the integrity of state institutions and apparatuses as the result of the state's low insulation from the personal agendas and preferences of the military power-holders and the personal rule of Ne Win.


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