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Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa Policies, incentives and options


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3.3New integrated conservation-development markets are expanding and emerging but …

3.3.1The problem


There are new market opportunities emerging for products and services from the miombo, but there remains limited financial or technical support for forest enterprise development. Traditional products suffer low margins and transaction costs often make their commercial viability marginal. Ecotourism and NTFPs can motivate conservation and raise incomes but is difficult to maintain such IGAs in the long-term. Also creating alternative livelihoods outside of forests does not mean reducing pressure on forests (Chomitz 2007).
Domestic private sector participation is influenced strongly by political stability, macroeconomic policies, political attitudes to foreign direct investment/ involvement of the private sector, levels of savings, and domestic market factors. With decentralisation, tax raising powers developed by district/local governments to raise operational funds create potential disincentives to rural investment. Ellis et al (2002) quote the example of Uganda where not only does local tax revenue impose punitive burdens on monetised activity in rural areas, it is also almost wholly utilised on sitting allowances for councillors and other functionaries rather than providing locally specific services to rural citizens. Given that the miombo-based enterprises are primarily small, itinerant and seasonal (for rural households agricultural production remains, by and large, the mainstay of the rural economy) revenue collection may be difficult to do effectively.

3.3.2New investment opportunities for miombo


Overall, private sector investment into forestry is substantial and growing. In 2003 private sector forestry investment in developing countries and countries in transition accounted for circa US$15 billion – 9 times ODA flows whilst the forest and forest products industries generated an annual production of c. US$750 billion (World Bank 2007d).
Whilst much of this is commercial investment, NGOs and other bodies are also investing, the latter often involved in conservation related activities and small and medium enterprise development. In fact, conservation activities appear to have greatest potential access to innovative finance (Table 5), but many other SFM related activities can also benefit from such mechanisms (UNDP 1999).

The World Bank strategy (2004c) recognises the potential of partnerships with the private sector and engagement with responsible investors. It notes the importance at a national level of good governance whilst Chomitz et al (2007) adds the need for incentivisation at the local level: a good system with incentives is more effective than narrow a regulatory approach (WB 2003). Creating the right environment requires certain policy and market interventions: whilst this will inevitably vary between country and sub-sector, some common policy issues emerge (Chomitz et al 2007, World Bank 2003, 2004c, 2007d, UNDP 1999, Karsenty 2000):




  • Policy reform can help reduce and/or make equitable transaction costs, and create the legal space for certain types of investments to operate or markets to become viable.




  • Institutional or governance reform can improve transparency in decision-making processes, in law enforcement, in land and resource ownership and tenure; through establishment of credible standards and monitoring systems, can improve accountability.




  • As part of trade reform, fiscal and trade policies can be revised to improve forest revenue collection, increase rent capture and ensure benefits are effectively distributed; to establish systems and processes for the financing of or payment for environmental services.




  • Conservationist practices can be rewarded through market-oriented certification instruments, although the degree of penetration this offers is often market-limited.




Table 5: Innovative Financing Mechanisms for Sustainable Forest Management

Mechanism

Type

SFM Barrier Addressed

Main sources

Main recipients

Timing

Likely Scale

Portfolio Equity Instruments

Direct financial: equity

Operational (lack of local capital)

Private commercial

Private commercial

Late stage

Global

National


Public Private Instruments

Direct financial: equity, debt

Operational (lack of capital, risk)

Public

Private commercial



Public

Private commercial



Early stage

Mid stages



Global

National


Local

Private Sector Forestry Investment Funds

Direct financial: equity, debt

Operational (lack of capital flows into new investment areas)

Private commercial

(public)

Private commercial


Mid stage

Late stage



Global

National



National Environmental Funds

Direct financial: grants, concessional credit

Operational (potential for structural)

Public

Private commercial



Public

Private commercial and non-commercial



Early stage

Mid stage

Late stage


Sub-regional

National


Local

Debt-for-nature and development swaps

Direct financial: transfer payment

Operational (structural can be included in conditionalities)

Public (bilateral)

Private commercial



Debtor government

NGOs


Mid-stage

Late stage



National Local (site specific)

Conservation trust funds

Direct financial: transfer payments, concessional credit

Operational (potential for structural)

Public

Private


Government agencies, NGOs, CBOs

Early stage

Mid stage

Late stage


Local

Sub-regional



Biodiversity venture capital finds

Direct financial: equity, debt

Operational (risk reduction)

Public

Private commercial and on-commercial



SMEs in biodiversity-based businesses

Early stage

Mid stage



Global

National


Regional

Small and medium scale enterprise credit lines

Direct financing: concessional loans

Operational (access to capital)

Public

Private


SMEs

Structural

(early/mid/late stages)



National

Local


Micro-credit

Direct financial: grant concessional loan

Operational (Access to capital; risk) Structural(inadequate financial institutions in rural areas)

Public ODA & locally generated private savings

Private small scale farmers and other land owners

Early stage

Local

Small Targeted Grants

Operational




Public

Private (mostly non-commercial)



NGOs, CBOs, communities, research groups

Early stage

Mid stage



Local

Bioprospecting fees

Commoditisation: creating meaning for biodiversity use value

Structural (market creation)

Private commercial

Some public research bodies



Non-commercial private land-owners and forest users. Some public bodies

Structural (early/ mid/ late stage)

Global

Water Resource Use charges

Commoditisation

Structural (market creation)

Private and public water users

Upstream land owners

Structural (early/ mid/ late stages)

Sub-regional

Local


Tradeable development rights

Commoditisation

Structural (legal and policy)

Public

Private non-commercial



Private commercial

Private non-commercial



Structural (early/ mid/ late stages)

Global

National


Marketable forest protection and management obligations

Commoditisation

Structural

Public (possibly private)

Governments with large forests and small protection obligations

Structural (early/ mid/ late stages)

Global

National Forest Funds

Structural (though can be direct financial through targeted payments)

Structural

Operational (risk reduction, SFM costs)



Internally generated income ODA grants

Government forest departments

Private farmers and land owners



Early stage

Mid stage

Late stage


National

Local


Environmental Performance bonds

Direct financial: incentive for good environmental performance

Structural (high discount rates, high opportunity costs of SFM)

Large private commercial operators

Public sector

Early stage (payment)

Late stage (payback)



National

Local


Source: UNDP 1999 Annex 4

There is clearly a role for both the public and private sectors, in a range of sectors outside of, but related to, forestry as well as forestry itself. Fiscal, legal and market policy reforms will influence the role the private sector can play in strengthening miombo management and use by the poor.


There are opportunities for policy to facilitate new modes of partnership between public and private sectors (Table 5) and to support, underwrite or regulate the use of novel financing arrangements that support both national and local initiatives.

3.3.3Institutional options for forest-based enterprises


The multitude of institutional options available and the parameters regarding their appropriateness for various business development situations, can be roughly separated into four categories:
Those that operate at community/ village level as the primary business unit for collection and/ or income distribution. These primary business units are normally associations, cooperatives, local partnerships or companies. Often the main determinant of structure is that form of incorporation that requires the least effort to get a collective bank account opened. However structures that facilitate efficiency, democracy, identification at communal level and transparency in their operation are more important. Some countries have simplified procedures to facilitate a communal “business group” to become incorporated.
Those that operate as a post harvest, primary storage, processing, forwarding and selling organisation. Such an organisation can again be an associations, cooperative, partnership or company. They can either be wholly communally owned, or joint ventures with tertiary level organisations. The main distinguishing feature is that they are local intermediaries in the collection/ post harvest/ selling activities and frequently have little control over the added value processing and marketing activities.
Tertiary level organisations that operate with market orientation. This level of institution should understand the importance of meeting/supplying a market need and understands the mix of business ingredients to make this happen. Frequently this means a company structure. Ownership will normally be a mix of the above mentioned intermediaries and primary business units, the in-country private sector, overseas investors, NGOs, and possibly state owned business units.
Service level organisations. This is a more diverse grouping, including private sector business facilitators, government extension services, financing organisations, overseas development assistance agencies, NGOs, legal/ accounting/ technical/ training service providers etc.
The overriding objective when discussing institutions, is to create an enabling environment to encourage the private sector to invest in business development for the opportunities presented. Investment in institutional analysis and development is normally part of the business planning function for each individual opportunity. The wide range of differing institutional factors surrounding each opportunity is beyond the scope of this paper. There is however a generic investment need both at a country or regional level to:


  • Research, analyse and document a selection of past economic activities relating to miombo woodlands to identify the critical business success (or failure) features relating individual activities




  • Identify and document within each miombo country (and also regionally for those providers that operate regionally) where the most suitable mix of miombo related business extension assistance services are located.




  • Recommend capacity building investments to overcome “missing links” in the business development process for miombo related economic opportunities. This could include a wide range of activities, including possibly: selected product market studies, selected product resource availability surveys, subsidised business plan preparation services, capacity building of relevant government/ quasi-government and private extension services, capacity building for miombo related business plan preparation, a contestable fund for business planning/ business establishment, and management training.

The challenges facing the small investor or entrepreneur in the miombo are technical and specific on the one hand (related to the low inherent productivity of the system) but also cross-sectoral and generic to many small enterprises on the other. Sub-national planning and influence may be the tactic to use to draw issues of developing sustainable forest enterprises into national budget processes.


3.3.4Non-timber forest products


Although many miombo-related income generating activities are just that – a livelihood activity to generate income for livelihoods needs – there are some traditional uses that are more viable enterprises: the non timber forest products honey, mushrooms and wildlife being the main products that represent commercial potential. The challenges for commercialising NTFP demonstrate the institutional and management complexities involved in the miombo. Challenges for commercialising NTFP are typically (summarised from Belcher & Schreckenberg 2007):


  • Production is often dispersed and markets poorly developed

  • Markets are diverse and faddish, but product development is long

  • Volumes are typically small

  • There are frequent misunderstandings about the level of technology required to get NTFPs to market

  • Barriers to entry may be high, when the product development costs are taken into account. Barriers are particularly stringent for food and herbal or medicinal products. Very few low-income countries have the high degree of infrastructural and institutional development, to implement and maintain the strict quality control and sophisticated supply-chain management practices necessary to enter the international market with a new product.

  • Certification is a mixed blessing in that it requires a high level of organisation and technical sophistication from producers, especially with regard to management planning, monitoring, product tracing and marketing

  • There are often intellectual property rights issues.

Box 6 provides the case of Honey in Zambia and the constraints broadly echo the generic points above.


3.3.5Tourism


Tourism is rapidly growing in Africa (ODI 2006b) and is also a growing source of revenue for governments. Southern and Eastern Africa’s wildlife-related tourism has benefited from the greatest share of that growth. Often the departments of forestry and environment or tourism are in separate Ministries but have overlapping mandates (see Table 2) in terms of managing a country’s forest and woodland resource so although revenues may not always benefit public forestry departments, support for forest-dependent households can be significant, although often localised. It of course depends on the nature of the intervention (ibid.) but new modalities of tourism that strengthen linkage between operators and local economic development households can generate benefit through employment, institutional development, profit or related income share (ibid.).


Box 6: Constraints holding back Zambia’s beekeeping industry
Zambia’s miombo-based honey industry has tremendous potential. A number of constraints through are preventing its further development. These include:


  • Conflict over land access between honey producers and loggers, with the latter seeming to have more rights than the beekeepers

  • Limited resource base due to existing laws that define honey and beeswax as minor forest products and restrict beekeeping to forests outside national forests

  • Lack of monitoring and regulation of beekeepers by the Forestry Department due to financial and human resource constraints

  • Absence of accurate industry data in such areas as production levels, output and marketed volume

  • Inadequate support for organic certification, which is central to achieving premium export prices, a better and healthier product and better forest management

  • Uncoordinated industry regulation by different government agencies who oversee various aspects of honey production (e.g. beekeeping as a commercial activity, bees as live animals, honey as a food item etc.).


Source: www.cifor.cgiar.org/Publications/Corporate/NewsOnline/NewsOnline39/honey.htm

Tourism is no panacea (see Box 7 for a case from Malawi) and the potential for community benefits depend on the wider conditions for pro-poor growth (Ashley 2006).


  • Growth is more likely to be broad-based and involve the poor if they have decent education and training, health care, access to infrastructure and market information, and do not face too many barriers to entrepreneurship.

  • The literature on ‘pro poor growth’ identifies many factors that can make growth (in any sector) less broad-based and inclusive of the poor, including macro instability, low human resources, inadequate infrastructure, asset inequality, gender inequality, and insecurity.1

  • Interventions to increase the human capital of the poor can have a dramatic influence on their ability to participate in the mainstream economy.

3.3.6Payment for environmental services


The main (forest) environmental services with potential for financing are watershed protection, biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. There needs to be a demand, nationally, or internationally for that service and a land-holder that has the rights to modify or cut trees who may incentivised not to (Chomitz et al 2007). Logistically, it should be possible to cost effectively collect the funds, make payments and monitor compliance with conditions for payment and it must be clear, who is eligible for how much and under what conditions (ibid.). WWF lists three steps for proceeding with a PES scheme:


  • First, an assessment of the range of ecosystem services that flow from a particular area, and who they benefit

  • Second, an estimate of the economic value of these benefits to the different groups of people

  • And third, a policy, subsidy, or market to capture this value and reward landowners for conserving the source of the ecosystem services.

Sanders (2006) raises the following lessons from initial PES transactions that it has had involvement in:


  • One size does not fit all

  • Identify the services being provided clearly

  • Understand and document the links between forests and services

  • Begin from the demand side, not the supply side

  • Monitor effectiveness

  • Design flexible mechanisms

  • PES is not a universal solution

  • Ensure the poor can participate through the planned delivery mechanisms

There are already instances of PES from miombo forests in Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Hegde 2007). There are many schemes operating worldwide, with either internal government funding (e.g. Vietnam for forest protection) or external donor assistance (Indonesia, Central America, China, Venezuela).


Financing for many environmental services is likely to be international, so regional policy interventions are likely to focus on governance issues such as creating credible international standards (World Bank 2007d), monitoring and information management (Chomitz et al 2007). The importance of national pol icy should not be played down however. The State itself may be a buyer, or provider, of ecosystem services, but it also needs to ensure the appropriate regulatory conditions are in place (Ravnborg et al 2007:26) to enable:


  • The legal recognition of private PES arrangements

  • The regulation of the participation of interpmediaries; and

  • The legal arbitration in cases were external parties wish to criticise a PES arrangement.

There is reportedly limited evidence at this stage of the impact of PES on reducing household vulnerability. The focus has been on the scheme (Ravnborg et al 2007) and Hegde (2007) reports that in the case of Mozambique, payments have reduced the need for forest use as an income generating option.



3.3.7


Box 7: Lessons from nature-based tourism in Malawi
Tourism contributes widely towards the costs of managing protected areas. The Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD) approach builds on the protected area approach by linking conservation and tourism development and by involving the people living in or near protected areas.

However, experience in Malawi shows that while tourism can generate significant revenues, this does not always benefit local communities directly. Liwonde National Park (LNP) is one of Malawi’s smaller parks, high in biodiversity and popular among tourists. However, local communities forced to relocate outside the park still experience conflicts with park authorities regarding ‘problem animals’, such as elephants, which destroy their crops and pose a life threat to community members. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DPNW) aims to make Liwonde an example of ‘best practice’ for protecting the biodiversity of Malawi, whilst ensuring its sustainability through tourist revenues.
Research has found:

  • While tourism has brought in revenue, the park only retains enough to cover operating costs, with the rest going to the government.

  • Tourism employs 77 people in park lodges and a few small local enterprises. Besides this, there is little local economic impact from tourism.

  • Local people resent the lack of employment opportunities, which they consider necessary since they can no longer rely on natural resources from the park. While tourism has supported conservation, it has not brought much development locally. The DNPW is looking at ways to generate more benefits and reduce poaching.


Lessons drawn out are that:

  • Revenues must be shared fairly, encouraging entrepreneurial development and discouraging poaching. The DNPW has been granted permission to split total park revenues between the LNP and the local communities, but nothing has happened so far.

  • Village Natural Resource Management Committees have been formed, but the lack of empowerment and human resource development among park officials and local people undermines the involvement of key individuals.

  • Further research should assess community attitudes, particularly after the implementation of the scheme to share tourism revenues.


Source: IDS 2007

Carbon and avoided deforestation


Carbon has been pulled out as a specific PES case due to its particular relevance to the forest context and the reported high applicability (Chomitz et al 2007) of payments for avoided deforestation.
The role of forestry in the international market in green house gas emissions is still marginal (Karsenty 2000): the establishment costs, offset assessment complexities, risks of leakage and forest loss and current carbon values – particularly in the voluntary market – give it marginal value (ibid. ). Whilst low productivity presents an economic barrier to technical management (Table 1) the scale of miombo coverage (Table 2) and the impact of good management (such as fire management) mean that it has great potential. The voluntary offset market is already using carbon offsetting to co-fund improved miombo management and community utilisation (e.g. Envirotrade in Nhambita, www.envirotrade.co.uk) but at this stage it remains largely outside the compliance market defined by existing Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, although recent government discussions in Bali have resolved to include forest conservation in future discussions on a new global warming treaty.
Systems based on the ‘compensated reduction’ approach are apparently among the most favoured as they would allow avoided deforestation to be incorporated into the CDM market mechanisms (Peskett et al 2006). Should avoided deforestation fall under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms in due course; measurement, monitoring and management will still remain challenging: without defining deforestation and understanding the multiple causes, the distribution of payments and the likely impact of such incentives on deforestation will be complex to calculate.
What does still need to be considered is that enhancing woodland conservation through these new instruments has a trade off by reducing the access the poorest have to miombo for subsistence and commercial use, even if that access is currently leading to resource degradation in the short term. Such instruments would have to be accompanied by interventions that enable rural households to realise their subsistence needs.

3.3.8Concessional loan finance and livelihoods


Access to concessional lending is seen as virtually essential if communities are to be actively involved either as primary level collectors/ processors or as partners in miombo forestry related business opportunities. Typically concessional lending will be through either a domestic development financing institutions (DFIs) or a micro – finance scheme. For communal resource and communal borrowing situations, some kind of cooperative guarantee arrangement among borrowers is normally necessary to improve credit availability and assure repayments. The micro-finance schemes that have been most successful in Africa have not been those that focus on productive credit, but hose that begin with savings (Grant & Allen 2002). From the perspective of the poor, savings are usually more important than credit: Credit increases risk while savings reduces it (ibid.). Since the poor are risk averse, they have greater demand for savings services than for credit. Evidence from Tanzania supports this: in a study of six microfinance schemes Wild, Millinga & Robinson (2008 in prep) found that village savings and loan schemes have proved more successful than financial services associations or savings and credit cooperative societies. These schemes can be undertaken as part of an intervention to support improved forest management and household livelihoods.
Support for development financing/ micro-finance institutions is therefore an important part of the investment package to support miombo forestry related business opportunities. Such support for communal business opportunity lending is invariably more costly in terms of specialised staff time and risks for the institutions involved. The Tanzania example shows how savings schemes linked to forest conservation can improve financial, natural and social assets for the poor. The value added by micro-finance is strengthened when linked to other interventions aimed at improving people sustainable use of resources.

3.3.9Intervention options


When scaled up to reflect national contributions, the value of miombo to national economies can be impressive (e.g. Jumbe et al 2007). The value of miombo at a household level whilst significant (e.g. Hegde 2007, Bwalya 2007) in terms of actual monetary income generation potential, it is limited. One has to be realistic what monetary benefits can be derived from miombo by individual households: there are ecological limits to production in the natural (in situ) context. Most woodland derived enterprises are likely to be small and part of the miombo’s safety net function. In any commercialisation intervention, trade-off risks for the poorest should be considered: the poorest, whose low-risk low-return practices disincentivise entrepreneurial behaviour are the least likely to be involved in commercialisation interventions except as passive participants.
This is no reason not to invest in miombo enterprise: it may require thinking about enterprises differently – small forestry enterprises are numerous but require different support to traditional large scale enterprise, as the objectives are different (e.g. social and financial capital as opposed to economic growth). We should also recognise, argue Mayers & McQueen (2007), that small forestry enterprises work for local development – when rights and policy are favourable. If we serious about forestry for local development we need to turn much forestry governance on its head – and stop rigging the rules in favour of large scale. We should focus new financial instruments on small forestry enterprises and invest in small forestry enterprise information, connection and capacity. Small forestry enterprises can benefit the poor and the forest (ibid) as:


  • Wealth accrues locally

  • Conflicts due to external resource appropriation are reduced – decisions are made close to home

  • Entrepreneurship spreads – ideas move through face-to-face contact

  • Service networks develop – through local multiplier effects

  • Cultural identity / niche markets are catered for – with products of local relevance

  • Local environmental accountability is strengthened – e.g. in patchwork landscapes smallholder producers are more accountable to each other for their actions linked to forest resources

Nevertheless, not everyone is going to want to be a rural micro-entrepreneur – some people just want to have a job. It is the elite that are likely to be at the forefront and the trade offs for the poor (and their subsistence-related risk strategies that rely on woodland access and use) needs to be appraised and their basic needs secured.


More work is needed to identify the viability of potential products and markets for up-scaling [e.g. poles, wildlife, wood energy, carbon and PES]. Where a potential is identified, there will be need to support forestry to engage with the finance and trade ministries to identify and implement appropriate enabling conditions for the development of the forest produce market. Development policy dialogue, focused in the agencies of state finance, can facilitate engagement on such issues. Options for intervention include:


  • Supporting producer organisation (e.g. producer cooperatives) to improve economies of scale, marketing and price negotiation. Evidence suggests (e.g. Bukula & Memani 2006) that the key to making small forest enterprises work is the development of effective alliances, confederations, cooperatives and associations:

  • Promoting community-private sector linkages particularly for local processing or value addition. Using appropriate modalities donors could support technical advice on specialist processing technologies or niche markets, standards development processes, and support for building local certification and verification capacity.

  • Increasing private sector financing (both domestic and foreign) by “selling” forestry opportunities as investment options that are viable and competitive with other opportunities.

  • To support the identification of investment need related to financing miombo related business analysis of the existing development financing/ micro-financing institutions, and the “missing links” in the business finance process for miombo related economic opportunities will be needed. This is most likely to result in a recommendation for subsidised assistance packages (with designated “miombo related funding”) to selected DFIs/ NGOs and micro-finance institutions.

The lack of credit terms that meet the cash-flow requirements of forestry investments (particularly long term tree planting) is a problem worldwide and results in the lack of interest in forestry investment by private landowners in both developing and developed countries (Arnold 2001). Options to gain the confidence of the business community, and enhance its strategies for generating interest in forestry investment (Joshi 1998) include:




  • modifying traditional biases against forestry investment and credits;

  • increasing private returns through financial subsidies and public technical assistance;

  • reducing investment risk and uncertainty; and

  • eliminating or significantly reducing the cash flow problems associated with long planting and gestation periods. While the first strategy is critical for domestic, mostly local small landowners, the other three are common to both domestic and foreign private investors.

  • At the household level, other credit options need to be applied:

  • Using low risk forms of micro-financing (not credit, but saving schemes) to generate capital for enterprises. Savings schemes provide a low-risk entry point for the poor to access resources for alternative livelihoods. This may require facilitating engagement between governments and finance institutions.

  • At the micro level, there may be need to support the establishment of and over see the running of credit and saving schemes designed to grow financial resources at low risk levels.

  • Focus new financial instruments on small forestry enterprises and invest in small forestry enterprise information, connection and capacity.

Payments for environmental services (PES) provides another valuable route to monetising rural communities fortunate enough to own resources important for ecosystem functioning. PES does have possible negative trade-offs for the poorest:




  • Requires secure land tenure – poorest often have no access to land

  • PES funds when coming in to a ‘community’ risk capture just as with other benefit sharing

  • PES places traditional conservationist (often INGOs) and developmentalist (often donors) paradigms on either side of the forest fence.

The investment opportunity to expand the use of PES in relation to miombo forests will present similar issues to those facing more traditional enterprises. Obviously the size, variability and wide range of differing community situations involved in and around miombo forests, will mean careful identification and prioritisation of opportunities that have both the potential for the greatest environmental gains, plus the potential to interest beneficiaries with a willingness to finance environmental services. This could be facilitated by providing greater clarity on the potential financial benefits of environmental services and greater certainty regarding the associated markets.


One area little studied (judging by the information searched) is the relationship between remittances and reduced dependence on miombo. The role of remittances from urban (and mining) jobs in the Southern African rural economy is well documented (e.g. Crush Frayne & Grant 2006) and studies from Malawi (Abbot 1997, Kayambazinthu & Locke 2002) have found that such financial support reduced the vulnerability of the poorest and allowed them to adopt more risky coping strategies, such as investment in rural enterprises. The low monetisation of the rural economy, with little cash in circulation to promote enterprise development, getting cash into the rural economy is one way to kick-start rural enterprise development. The Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) and the public works schemes aim to do this and have had generally positive reviews (Booth et al 2006). That said, while urban to rural remittances has been the predominant direction of commodity and cash transfers, benefiting the rural household economy, this dynamic is changing, direct food transfers from rural households to urban households are on the rise as urban poverty increases in countries across the region (Crush Frayne & Grant 2006).
This study did not examine the potential new economic risks and opportunities to the poor brought about by the impact of the so-called BRIC countries on forestry trade. Such a study, in the context of miombo, is urgently required, although the impact is already documented for countries like Mozambique (e.g. Mackenzie 2006).
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