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Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa Policies, incentives and options


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2.3


Box 2: Resistance to Decentralisation and Devolution in Malawi
Malawi is characterised by a neo-patrimonial state, namely a clientelist political system operating within the guise of a legal rational bureaucratic framework. The roots of the system are deep and as such a genuine internal commitment to decentralisation, including an informed and involved citizenry, effective representation and financially empowered local government, is absent. Decentralised forest management threatens the control of valuable resources by political elites and threatens to interrupt the flow of patrimony from local sources via chiefs to the centre. Participatory or community forestry imply both a movement of power from the central to more local levels and participation in decision-making, including transparency in transactions, downwards accountability and environmental subsidiarity.
Source: Cross & Kutengele 2001, Blaikie 2003
Revisiting the analytical framework

2.3.1The complex institutional landscape


To support the coping strategies used by rural households in overcoming risks to their forest-based livelihoods, policy responses may be required at the international, national and local level (Peskett et al 2006, Devereux 2006). At each level there are a range of institutional actors that can impact on those policy responses (Table 3). At the same time, households themselves adapt their livelihood responses as they manage their risks. Their responses exhibit characteristics of complexity: they are dynamic, multi-dimensional, openly interact with the surrounding environment, and the poorest often have weak relations to social and capital assets, and the natural resource assets too, which mean small changes in conditions can have big impacts on their vulnerability.

Table 3: Some variables of the institutional landscape that affect policy options in the Miombo

Geographical Arenas

National Socio-Political Actors

International Actors

International – Global

The State (central/decentral)

INGOs

International – Region

The Legislature

International treaties,

National

Judiciary

Multinational commerce (particularly the growing influence of BRIC countries).

Sub-national

Civil Society




Local

Traditional Leadership

Business


The People

Donor conditionalities

In this situation, interventions premised on simple cause and effect policy responses will result in trade-offs that need to be considered and managed (Chomitz et al 2007). A range of responses may be needed simultaneously in a number of related sectors at a number of levels. Barriers and opportunities for the poor are often linked; in many cases an opportunity for some may present a threat or barrier to others: a basic paradox of the complex relationships.


There are many different policies at different levels that apply to poor miombo woodland users; when they combine they can generate new outcomes that may not have been expected. They are often overlapping and incongruent (e.g. land and forest policy in Mozambique.) It means that solution it is not just a case of implementing better forest policies – forest policies may not be the problem it may be other policy/institutional constraints (Box 3 explores one case by way of illustration).

2.3.2The analytical approach


Unsurprisingly, approaches to analysing the effectiveness or appropriateness of the policy response have been varied. Chomitz et al (2007) and Sunderlin, Dewi & Puntodewo (2007) argue for a spatial and scale based approach (international, national, local), although this may be less relevant in the miombo woodland biome where there lies a closer relationship between the woodland (which is generally course grained, naturally subject to regular disturbance and incredibly resilient) and the prevalent farming system. Others have used the aid modality (e.g. Foster and Leavy 2001) GBS process issues (alignment, harmonisation, ownership – te Velde et al 2006) conditions for change (e.g. laws, incentives, people, policies (Seymour 2000)) or focus of change (e.g. capacity, decentralisation, monitoring, civil society – DFID 2003). In all approaches, it is as much about the location and scale of intervention as it is about the modality, the process and the conditions: they are all relevant and meaningful.
The poor do not exist in a vacuum but in a particular institutional landscape and they have a particular set of assets as a basis for the livelihoods. Because of their vulnerability, for the poor, this initial mix is particularly important in determining policy impact and the principle is relevant at different scales, whether at the local level (what Blaikie (2003) termed the small scale dependants) or at the macro-scale (national and international). We need to consider the mix of policy instruments and their relationship to the variety of groups known collectively as the rural poor, and: under what mix of conditions does the mix of instruments work. Empirical evidence shows that when the conditions are right, the miombo can generate substantial benefits for the poor (e.g. Bwalya 2007, Jumbe et al 2007, Monela & Abdallah 2007). However, conditions are not static, but co-evolve: whether these benefits can be sustained (or indeed are currently sustainable) remains dependent on that co-evolution.
The importance of setting the right mix and their sequence or phasing therefore becomes key and suggests that a contingency approach is required: “no one size will fit all”. This also implies that, as conditions change new options may then be applied, in an iterative way.


Box 3: The multi-dimensional landscape: example of charcoal
Charcoal production is a very important use of miombo, particularly as a livelihood activity for the very poor and energy source for urban populations. It is often seen as a “forestry problem”. But is it? Forest is the resource being exploited, but it may be as much about energy and energy pricing, infrastructure, an inefficient value chain or tax regime, lack of technical knowledge, ineffective market representation or group organisation, or, effective regulation and problems of corruption and/or elite capture, or, all of these things. The charcoal problem is identified because it is blamed for massive deforestation in countries like Malawi and Zambia. What elements of the value chain are responsible? Who is dealing with the “charcoal problem” in Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi? Is it the Forestry Departments? Who is benefiting most from the Charcoal trade both through the formal value chain and informally through rent seeking and the flow of patrimonial benefits? What is civil society doing about the issue, what evidence do they have to pressure higher authorities for change?
Source: Chidumayo 2001, Mwampamba 2007 and Kambewa 2007.

The opportunities and barriers identified by Campbell et al (2007) delimit the analysis and the scope is restricted to those key policies, institutions and processes identified by the literature reviewed.
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