Managing the Miombo Woodlands of Southern Africa Policies, incentives and options

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3.2Resource rights are shifting to local people, but ….

3.2.1The problem

The ongoing trend in public sector reform is towards decentralisation of service delivery, with national agencies focusing on their policy and oversight functions and the strengthening of civil society capacity to support and monitor (Ribot 2004, World Bank 2007d). Rural resource rights are shifting to local people, often not as individuals but in terms of communities or user groups (ibid). In many cases, laws regarding land or resource ownership or the rights to benefit from them, have not kept pace with this change, resulting in people being handed responsibilities without rights or resources to carry them out (Arnold 2001). Without sufficient institutional support to strengthen local institutions to cope with their increased role, they lack organisation to manage their legal jurisdiction and promote development, and risk becoming dominated by elite who capture what value there is in the resource they are responsible for (Campbell et al 2007).
It is suggested here that this does not demand a forestry response per se: the use of community institutions for supporting policy implementation is an issue for most rural sectors (e.g. agriculture, wildlife, health, water resources) and as such should be organised through the local government institutions responsible for integrated implementation and for coordinating sector interventions in any given area. In Tanzania this is the village, and Wily (2001) notes that this legal recognition has empowered the village to successfully establish its accountability over its jurisdiction in many cases. This reform of forest tenure is the other main success factor that is brought out through the literature as key to effective decentralisation, particularly in the assigning of rights and responsibilities from the state to communities.

3.2.2Decentralisation: part of the problem or part of the solution?

Opinion is divided as to whether decentralisation of control and management of natural resources will lead to a more efficient, equitable and sustainable resource use (Box 4 presents some observations about the issue). The right national and locally specific conditions are required for it to stick successfully. Ribot (2002, 2004) outlines a set of conditions that need to exist or be established to enable decentralisation to occur in a way that is beneficial to the management of natural resources (Box 5).
As can be seen even from the brief observations in Box 5, many of these conditions are often just not in place. However, the process, sequencing or phasing of decentralisation also seems to be important (cf Ellis et al 2002, Cross & Kutengule 2002 for Malawi). A step wise approach may then be taken to iteratively pass along the continuum of decentralisation. Cross & Kutengule 2002 state that the first step has to be enfranchisement and empowerment at the grassroots, arguing that it is this which has to drive the administrative reforms of state machinery, not the reverse process.
Fiscal decentralisation (not mentioned by Ribot – Table 4) is identified by a range of commentators (Hobley 2996, Ellis et al 2002, Cross & Kutengule 2002, James et al 2002, Smoke 2000) as a final step, but remains contentious in terms of its impact, as giving additional resources to sub-national governments that are not politically, managerially and technically prepared to use them responsibly can create enormous problems (Smoke ibid.). Generally, rural Africa has very low levels of local revenue raising and the provision of tax raising powers to local government threatens to impose severe burdens on the relatively small monetized economy in rural areas (Ellis et al 2002, James et al 2002).

Box 4: Potential Risks from Decentralisation: Opinions from the literature
“… Superimposed on the precarious status of rural livelihoods comes the advent of decentralised local government with its idealised projection of participatory processes in communities enforcing good governance on the part of district assemblies, and effective service delivery by public agents at local levels. In the Malawi context, it is difficult to see how this can do anything other than make things more difficult for rural poverty reduction.” (Ellis et al 2002).
“…Whilst in principle decentralisation [in Malawi] is desirable, the prerequisites for making this work are absent. Decentralization, as currently undertaken, is unlikely to succeed because it is misconceived - or, at best, that it has been misphased. Current policies seek to ‘reform’ public sector institutions and behavioural norms based on a notion that the state is failing because of a reversion to a lingering ‘traditionalism’, and that the political class has been insufficiently diligent in pursuing their often proclaimed goals of the effective construction of a Western type of multi-party democracy” (Chabal, 1998)
“…Arguments advanced in favour of decentralization [in Malawi] are that it promotes better service delivery and more efficient government; promotes political stability; and assists in interjurisdictional and other forms of equity. In theory, yes. But the prerequisites are that local government is both more capable and more constrained in its patrimonial instincts than central government; that the promotion of local political party bases is not viewed as a threat by the centre; and that imbalances at both the meso- (rich districts subsidising poorer ones) and microlevels (affirmative action for women) are genuinely addressed. These pose major difficulties.” (Cross & Kutengule 2002)
“…A sense of realism about the limitations of decentralised local government [in Tanzania] and its place in the wider policy space is needed. Significant capacity, accountability and resource constraints are identified, which may limit the degree to which the decentralisation process will achieve the goal of meaningful participation. In addition to the challenge of ensuring quality local staff and politicians in remote districts, much will depend on the degree to which officials and politicians are downwardly accountable to their constituents. In many cases a culture of disinformation exists which is not conducive to successful local government. A shift in the values of rural citizens away from the expectation of ‘development from above’ toward a greater sense of ownership and active citizenship is required.” (James et al 2002)

Domination of decentralised institutions by the ‘Elite’, often considered a barrier to local involvement, may not always be a bad thing noted Ribot (2004). In neo-patrimonial societies such as Zambia, Zimbabwe or Malawi, the power and role of traditional authorities remains strong in social organisation and cohesion, and the traditional authority system managed to negotiate sufficient space to retain their legitimacy with the people through the political changes (Maliro 2001). It can be argued that this is less so in Tanzania where strong social engineering re-ordered the rural economy in the 1970s. Olowu (2001, 57 in: Ribot 2004) reminds us that the local elite are required for the success of local government systems - they bring resources, knowledge [and] networks that make these systems become fully operational and effective. Ribot (2004) also argues that elite capture does not necessarily mean that all of the benefits of a reform go to the elite. Evidence from Mansuri and Rao (2003) suggests that the poor are also likely to benefit.
However, the more unequal the society, particularly when members of the elite concentrate their powers, the less effective are efforts to target the poor. Improving governance at the local level can deter elite capture, by making local leaders down and up accountable. A thicker web of reporting and accountability relationships backed up by simple regulations, checks and balances will help. The role of NGOs in holding actors to account has been debated (e.g. Carothers 1999) and in a decentralised context, it is vital that there is a three way relationship, between the NGOs and both local, and, central governments.

3.2.3Strengthening civil society organisations

Box 5: Conditions for successful decentralization
For successful decentralisation of natural resource management, the following conditions are a prerequisite:

Elected and accountable local governments
A set of environmental subsidiarity principles to guide the transfer of appropriate and sufficient powers to local authorities.
An effective separation and balance of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers in the local arena.
The transfer of powers as secure rights not as privileges
Support for equity and justice, through central government intervention if necessary.
The establishment of the enabling legal environment for organizing, representation, rights, and recourse so that local people can demand government responsibility, equity, and justice for themselves.
Minimum environmental standards established that can facilitate ecologically sound independent local decision making.
Fair and accessible adjudication and local dispute resolution mechanisms.
Local civic education of peoples rights, including educating local authorities of their rights and responsibilities to foster responsible local governance.
To develop indicators for monitoring and evaluating decentralization and its outcomes and provide feedback

Source: Ribot 2002

Hobley (2006) makes a case for enhancing the participation of the poor in existing political and associational institutions rather than setting up new, sectoral ones. She argues that civil society can play a key role in supporting the poor to do this. Hussein (1999) similarly notes that farmer participation in research and development delivers policies and technologies more relevant to their needs, and in this way farmer institutions can emerge as service providers for their members. Bukula & Memani (2006) argue that these groups can be particularly helpful when developing small forest-based enterprises (discussed further under 3.3) where there is often a need for processing, marketing and technical inputs that are scale dependent.
Organisation through such civil society groups can, in part, address the limited opportunity or resources the poor have to sustain participation in processes that may otherwise be captured by elites. “It is difficult for poorer people to maintain a high level of mobilisation even for issues that may profoundly affect their livelihoods. Starting with those interventions that focus on securing people’s livelihoods and allow them to move beyond sometimes coercive relationships based on patronage but which provide immediate security to those where they have a degree of independence from patronage systems will help to develop a more effective capability to participate in decision-making processes” (Hobley 2006: 33).

3.2.4Forest tenure reform

Ribot (2002) refers to the transfer of powers as secure rights not as privileges. Certainly whilst responsibilities are often transferred, the [central] State often retains allocatory powers and revenues over more valuable forest areas (Hobley 2006, Chomitz et al 2007) and in the miombo region, regulatory provisions for use and access of centrally-controlled state reserves are considerably higher than for customary land forests. Local governments are rarely involved in these arrangements. Hobley (2006) makes the point that current customary land tenures that grant usufruct rights over land can be exploited by new elites if the value of certain forest products rises, or in some cases is monetised. Blaikie (2003) argues that increasing community rights over miombo threatens control of resources hitherto controlled by political elites, especially when land tenure reform is on the CBNRM agenda but also that the flow of patrimony from local sources, via chiefs and other local leaders to the centre, is potentially interrupted, allowing new political [rent-seeking] entrepreneurs to enter at the local level. This has particularly serious implications for women’s land and resource rights and those of the poor (Tsikata 2003 in: Hobley 2006). Tsikata (ibid) argues here that the central government has a role even in decentralized forest situations, to protect the rights of the chronically poor through legal and policy provisions (the “support for equity and justice…” condition from Box 5).

3.2.5Implementation options

Effective local institution can only be built from the bottom up, albeit within an effective supportive environment (such as legislative reform or support to law enforcement). The balance of responsibilities, powers and resources at each level of government needs to be sufficient to allow it to implement its mandate. This goes for devolution to community institutions: the group most unlikely to have the techncial management and marketing skills (and possible financial resources) required to manage the forest resource and the group most susceptible to outside influences. Even when resource rights and responsibilities are clear, decentralisation risks the externalising of risks or liabilities to local people.
Issues of local institutional development in the context of decentralisation are cross-sectoral: to ensure they are not marginalised they could be brought in at indicator level in the PRS and CAS processes so that they are monitored. Evidence of tangible results related to decentralisation, capacity (e.g. evidenced by local integrated development plan implementation), legal reform, may be cross referenced to those on forest cover or forest law enforcement. The options for intervention include to:

Ensure decentralisation of forest management is undertaken sequentially and with consideration of the local conditions. Consider implications of fiscal decentralisation for income generation from miombo and the rent-seeking ‘value chain’.
Ensure local government has greater downwards accountability (to the citizens) and local legitimacy
Decentralisation/Devolution needs to be the whole ‘package’: rights, responsibilities, capacity (and resources) and recognise that support will be needed to facilitate delivery of the responsibilities.
Strengthen the voice of the poor
- This does not necessarily mean through local ‘forestry’ institutions, which may be the structural problem
- Examine local (new/indigenous) institutions: are they reinforcing structural poverty; ensuring local institutions are legitimate, but, enabling.
- Enable access for the poor to the right information,
- Constituency representation through stronger parliament and CSOs,
- Government and/or civil society providing effective watchdog of local elites
Effective legal and regulatory back-up from support agencies (state/CSO) for local institutions to manage their responsibility
- Land and complementary resource rights secured
- Legal capacity to establish locally relevant rules
Establish simple regulatory frameworks or requirements retention in scale with the resource capacity and its value. [Miombo has little high value timber – it is a low value woodland (financially) with important subsistence value, which has low intensities of management applied (fire/fuel management, coppice management]
- Management planning, licensing requirements
- Manage benefit sharing, revenue generation and retention and be aware that benefit sharing mechanisms in the miombo states will attract ‘rent-seeking entrepreneurs’.

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