Monthly Forecast May 2013

In May, the Security Council expects a briefing by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), followed by consultations on the

latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUCA. The report, originally due 31 March, was postponed until 30 April to take

into account recent developments.

A resolution amending BINUCA’s mandate, which expires on 31 January 2014, is possible.

Key Recent Developments

Agreements between the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Séléka rebels (an alliance formed by factions of the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix, the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement and the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro) were reached on 11 January in Libreville. In mid-March, the Séléka renewed fighting claiming that the government had not fulfilled its promises under the agreements. Under the 11 Janu- ary agreements President François Bozizé would remain in power until the end of his term in 2016, and a government of national unity—in which opposition leaders were to be given key posts—would be formed to implement reforms and hold parliamentary elections within 12 months. The rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, forcing President Bozizé to flee to Cameroon and BINUCA to evacuate most of its staff.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held a summit on 3 April in N’Djamena, Chad, to discuss the CAR. The summit did not recognise Séléka leader and self-appointed interim President Michel Djotodia, but allowed Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye—appointed on 17 January in the aftermath of the Libreville agreements and subsequently designated by Djotodia to head an interim government—to attend on behalf of the CAR. The ECCAS summit called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC) tasked with drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections within 18 months, and electing an interim president who would be forbidden to run in the ensuing presidential elections. According to media reports, Djotodia accepted the ECCAS framework.

Vogt briefed the Council in consultations via video-teleconference on 9 April. She told the Council that the political and security situations remained highly volatile and the humanitarian situation was dire. Vogt emphasised that the Libreville agreements were key to restoring order in the country.

On 13 April, at its first session, the TNC elected Djotodia as interim president. (Djotodia was the only candidate in the

vote.)

On 25 April, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, issued a statement expressing alarm about the use of child soldiers by the Séléka, indicating that “boys, uniformed and armed, have been seen patrolling, manning checkpoints and participating in looting activities across the country”.

The Council was briefed in consultations on the security, political and humanitarian situation by Under-Secretary- General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on 29 April, after his recent visit to Cameroon and CAR, where he met with Tiangaye, representatives of political parties and civil society and Vogt. In his meeting with Tiangaye on 20 April, Feltman expressed the Secretary-General’s “deep concern over the alarming situation regarding security and human rights in the country, and the lack of public order and the rule of law”. After consultations, Council members adopted a press state- ment calling for the quick implementation of the ECCAS framework and expressing its concern of human rights violations in CAR (SC/10993).

HUMAN RIGHTS-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

On 12 April, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said more than 2,000 children have been recruited by armed forces in the CAR since December 2012. Also according to UNICEF, 1.2 million people have been cut off from essential services. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, 37,000 refugees have fled the country since December. In addition, some 173,000 people have been internally displaced over the last four months.

In a 16 April statement, the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, expressed alarm at continuing reports of widespread human rights violations in the CAR—including targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, child recruitment, rapes, disappearances and kidnappings—since the December Séléka offensive. Pillay called for the rule of law to

be restored and perpetrators of abuses to be held accountable.

The key issue for the Council is to play a more effective and assertive role, especially as the security and humanitarian

situations remain volatile.

Achieving synergy with subregional and regional actors in addressing the aftermath of the seizure of power by the

Another issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in the new political reality and in light of the ongoing transi- tional process.

The Council may consider the following regarding BINUCA:

• amending its mandate following receipt of the Secretary-General’s report;

• entrusting it with a more central role in mediating between the parties; and

• expanding its supporting role for the regional efforts of ECCAS.

Further options include adopting a strong position on security and humanitarian issues, expressing support for the deployment of additional MICOPAX troops and taking a more aggressive stance towards the Séléka leadership.

The Council has remained fairly passive in recent months regarding the CAR, giving preference to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. It has for the most part addressed the crisis in the CAR through press statements.

While no major discussions have taken place on the failure of the 11 January Libreville agreements to achieve stabil- ity, Council members are of the view that BINUCA will have to be re-evaluated for the UN presence—and the Council—to be relevant in efforts to solve the crisis in the CAR. Some members think that BINUCA’s mediation role should be fine tuned to reflect recent events and the transitional processes, but still within the framework of the Libreville agreements.

Several Council members are cautious about assigning blame for the crisis and prefer to deplore the situation in gen- eral. They feel that in light of the recent ECCAS statements and the apparent Séléka agreement to adhere to the ECCAS transitional framework, the Council should continue to take a back seat to ECCAS on the political front. They feel that the Council should focus on the security and humanitarian situation, rather than the legitimacy of the interim government, as there are signs of splits within the Séléka, which may lead to further instability. Council members will also be interested to hear more about the AU position, which, since suspending the CAR from the AU immediately after the Séléka takeover, has remained silent on the ECCAS initiative.

S/RES/2088 (24 January 2013) extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2014.

SC/10948 (20 March 2013) condemned recent attacks by the Séléka and called on all sides to abide by their respective commitments.

S/2013/215 (2 April 2013) and S/2013/216 (4 April 2013) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the

BINUCA Duration 1 January 2010 to present.

In May, the Security Council expects a briefing on the Secretary-General’s report on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) by Abou Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General and head of UNOCA.

A presidential or press statement are possible outcomes.

UNOCA’s mandate expires on 28 February 2014.

Moussa last briefed the Council on 18 December 2012, stressing the need to mobilise sufficient resources to implement the UN regional strategy to address the threat posed by the LRA (S/PV.6891). The next day, the Council adopted a presi- dential statement reiterating its support for the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (AU RCI-LRA) and urged further progress towards the implementation of its strategy (S/PRST/2012/28). The statement also requested the Secretary-General to present an implementation plan to support the UN LRA strategy (S/2012/481) by 28 February. It further requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the activities of UNOCA and on the LRA via a single report by 15 May 2013.

The implementation plan for the strategy was submitted to the Council on 19 April (S/2013/240). It highlights priori- ties in five strategic areas of focus and specifies the division of labour and coordination between the various UN entities in implementing the strategy. It also identifies the resources needed for specific projects and programmes.

Additionally, the implementation plan recalls that LRA-affected countries have been contributing troops to the AU RCI-LRA’s military component, the Regional Task Force (RTF), to fulfil its authorised strength of 5,000 troops. In Feb- ruary the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) contributed 500 troops to the RTF, adding to the 2,860 deployed troops from the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Uganda. South Sudan has committed to provide 500 additional troops to the RTF.

According to media reports, after the Séléka rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, Uganda suspended its participation in the RTF, claiming that the rebels have been hostile towards its troops in southeast CAR. In a meeting with Moussa and AU Special Envoy for the LRA Francisco Madeira in Kampala on 3 April, Uganda clarified that its role in the RTF has not been altered by the coup. In a press statement on CAR on 29 April, Council members expressed concern over the pause of operations in CAR and urged countries to resume their efforts as soon as possible (SC/10993).

On 3 April the US announced a $5 million reward for information leading to the capture of LRA leader Joseph Kony,

an International Criminal Court indictee.

LRA activities in South Sudan were taken off the list of parties to conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Secretary-General’s second report on sexual violence in conflict of 14 March (S/2013/149). LRA activities in the CAR and the DRC remain listed.

UNOCA, along with the UN Office for West Africa, has also been active in assisting the countries of Central and West Africa in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, in particular by assisting in the organisation of a regional summit for the development of an anti-piracy strategy, as requested by resolution 2039 of 29 February 2012. A ministerial conference was held on 19 March in Benin, where the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission adopted three memoranda of understanding concerning the repression

of piracy. The memoranda are to be adopted in a summit meeting to be held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on 17-18 May.

A key issue for the Council is to encourage progress in the implementation of the UN regional strategy and the role it can play in supporting UN and AU efforts to address the LRA threat and ensure a sustainable solution.

A related issue is obtaining updated information on the implementation of the AU RCI-LRA strategy and in particular the RTF.

Another issue is assessing how the 24 March seizure of power by the Séléka in the CAR may affect the regional strategy. A broader future issue for the Council relates to the recent decision to create an intervention brigade charged with neu- tralising rebel groups as part of the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. The brigade will not be deployed

in LRA-affected areas as of now, but it could be of future significance on this issue.

Options

Options for the Council include adopting a presidential statement or issuing a press statement that could:

• welcome progress in implementing the AU RCI-LRA strategy and the deployment of the RTF;

• welcome the efforts of affected governments and urge them to continue their contributions to the RTF despite regional instability;

• express support for the UN LRA strategy implementation plan or request its further elaboration;

• request further reporting from the Secretary-General; and

• welcome the engagement of UN field missions in the implementation of the UN LRA strategy and request their

continued support.

Council members generally support the UN LRA strategy and are keen to see how it will translate into reality during its implementation and what gaps exist. Areas of particular interest are the protection of civilians including regarding chil- dren; coordinated humanitarian assistance; the expansion of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programmes; and support in the fields of human rights, rule of law and development to establish state authority in the relevant areas.

Council members are in agreement on the importance of cooperation between countries in the region and of a coor- dinated approach in addressing the threat of the LRA. They will be keen to be updated by Moussa regarding the role of Uganda the RTF.

The UK is the penholder on the LRA.

S/RES/2039 (29 February 2012) was on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

S/2012/657 (21 August 2012) took note of the Secretary-General’s request to extend UNOCA for 18 months.

S/PV.6891 (18 December 2012) was a briefing on UNOCA and the LRA.

In May, the Security Council is expected to hold two meetings, likely in consultations, on Sudan-South Sudan issues in accordance with resolution 2046. It will also likely discuss in consultations the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) and renew its mandate, which expires on 31 May.

Council members held consultations on Sudan/South Sudan and UNISFA on 11 April. They were briefed by UNISFA force commander and head of mission, General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam and Assistant Secretary-General for Peace- keeping Operations Edmond Mulet. Tesfamariam advocated for an additional 1,126 troops to provide force protection for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), reiterating the Secretary-General’s request for these troops in his recent report on Abyei (S/2013/198). Tesfamariam said that the security situation in Abyei remained chal- lenging, in large part because of tensions between the Misseriya and the Ngok-Dinka communities. As such, he did not think that it would be possible to divert UNISFA troops currently in Abyei from their responsibilities to provide protection for the JBVMM monitors and support staff. Tesfamariam expressed concern that inadequate protection would hinder the impact of the JBVMM, cautioning that without an effective JBVMM, Sudan and South Sudan might be tempted to re-enter the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone from which they appear to have withdrawn.

Mulet said that South Sudan had resumed its production of oil and that it would be able to start exporting it through Sudan by May. He said that 23 April had been established as a date for direct talks between Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).

Mulet also touched on the situation in South Sudan. He noted that the ambush attack in Jonglei state that claimed the lives of five peacekeepers and seven civilians on 9 April had been well-organised and included more than 200 perpetra- tors. He said that while the attack occurred in the area in which David Yau Yau operates, he could not confirm whether Yau Yau’s rebels were responsible. (Yau Yau has denied any role in the attack.)

On 12 April, Presidents Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan and Salva Kiir of South Sudan held a summit meeting in Juba. They reiterated their commitment to fulfilling the cooperation agreements signed on 27 September (on oil sharing, cross-border trade, security arrangements, nationality issues and other matters). In a press release following the summit, the AU said that the meeting represented the commitment of both parties “to foster the normalization of relations between the two countries and promote the well-being of their peoples.”

On 4 April, the World Food Program (WFP) announced that it had initiated food distribution in the Geissan and Kurmuk areas of South Kordofan state in Sudan, which has been greatly affected by the fighting between Sudan and the SPLM-N. WFP is hoping to distribute food to 39,000 people in Kurmuk and 12,000 in Geissan.

While Adnan Khan, WFP Sudan Country Director, referred to gaining this access as “a major breakthrough”, the SPLM-N downplayed the initiative in a statement released by its Secretary-General, Yasir Arman, on 5 April. Arman said that Sudan “allowed the WFP to work in a limited area controlled by Khartoum and they made big news out of that”. He also said that Sudan had heightened its aerial and ground attacks in the Blue Nile state during the last month and noted that Sudan “is denying access for humanitarian assistance to… areas controlled by the SPLM-N in Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains”.

Armed conflict continued in South Kordofan in April. On 12 April, the SPLM-N shelled Kadugli, killing three people and wounding ten others, according to local officials. A spokesperson for the SPLM-N, Arnu Ngutulu Lodi, said that the attack was conducted in response to aerial bombardments by Sudan on 11-12 April of areas controlled by the SPLM-N where there are displaced persons. Lodi also claimed that the SPLM-N had seized the Dandor military base near Kadugli, on 15 April. It was reported in the media that four SPLM-N rebels and 15 soldiers from Sudan died in the fighting.

Sudan and the SPLM-N met for direct negotiations on 23 April in Addis Ababa. The talks ended on 26 April without progress on the humanitarian and political issues discussed, although media reports indicate that there are plans for the parties to reconvene in May.

On 27 April, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an umbrella group including several rebel movements, attacked Umm Rawaba, North Kordofan state, roughly 300 miles south of Khartoum. According to Sudan, the rebels destroyed a power plant, a communications tower, and some gas stations during the attack, which also reportedly claimed the lives of nine Sudanese policemen. The SRF withdrew from Umm Rawaba on the same day as the attack.

At press time, the Council was scheduled to hold consultations on Sudan/South Sudan on 29 April.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether the recent progress in relations between Sudan and South Sudan can be sustained

and how the Council can build on this progress.

Another issue is how the Council can foster constructive negotiations between Sudan and the SPLM-N.

An additional key issue is how effective the JBVMM will be in maintaining security along the Sudan-South Sudan bor-

der, given that the border is nearly 2,000 kilometres long and the SPLM-N controls a large portion of it.

The most likely option is for the Council to renew the mandate of UNISFA for an additional six months. In doing so, the

Council could consider:

• maintaining the current force level;

• authorising the additional 1,126 troops requested by the Secretariat; and

• assessing the force structure of UNISFA in three months, and assuming the Council decides to increase the size of the mission, ensuring that the additional troops are essential for UNISFA to support the JBVMM.

On Sudan-South Sudan issues generally, the Council could consider adopting a statement that:

• recognises progress made by the parties in implementing the cooperation agreements of 27 September;

• urges the parties to expedite the establishment of administrative structures in Abyei, including the Abyei Area Police and the Abyei Legislative Council; and

• reiterates its decision in resolution 2046 for Sudan and the SPLM-N to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the

28 June 2011 Framework Agreement, which calls for the parties “to work towards an inclusive national process in the Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform”.