Monthly Forecast May 2013
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Council Dynamics Council members are encouraged by signs of progress in relations between Sudan and South Sudan. However, the Coun- cil remains divided on how to approach Sudan-South Sudan issues. Some members hold Sudan largely accountable for its negative relations with South Sudan and are highly critical of Sudan for the humanitarian and political crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Others take what they perceive as a more balanced approach. Among this latter group, there are concerns that a Council outcome that is too critical of Sudan could undermine rather than facilitate progress in Sudan-South Sudan relations. Since February, several attempts by the Council to negotiate a statement on Sudan-South Sudan relations have failed to achieve consensus. The US is the penholder on UNISFA and other Sudan-South Sudan issues.
S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Secretary General’s Report S/2013/198 (28 March 2013) was the most recent report on Abyei. Security Council Letters S/2013/233 (16 April 2013) was a letter from Sudan containing a statement made by Bashir during the meeting with Kiir on 12 April.
on 12 April.
SC/10968 (9 April 2013) was a press statement condemning the attacks on UNMISS peacekeepers.   Sudan/Darfur
Expected Council Action In May, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, will provide the quarterly briefing on the work of the Committee’s work to Council members in consultations. No Council outcome is anticipated in May on Darfur. Key Recent Developments On 7-8 April, the International Donor Conference for Reconstruction and Development in Darfur was held in Doha, Qatar. In keeping with article 32 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, a Darfur Joint Assessment Mission—including vari- ous UN entities, the government of Sudan, the Darfur Regional Authority and other international development actors—had been established and produced a Darfur Development Strategy in preparation for the conference. This plan indicated that $7.2 billion would be needed for reconstruction and development of Darfur over the next six years. It also underscored three priority areas in need of support: governance, justice and reconciliation; reconstruction; and economic recovery. Approximately $3.7 billion was pledged during the conference, a figure that includes “renewed commitment and pledges” by Sudan of $2.65 billion, as described in the Doha Document. Qatar, which hosted the conference, pledged $500 million. The Panel of Experts (PoE) of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, appointed in late March, briefed the Committee on 18 April, requesting an extension of deadline for the submission of their interim report to the Committee. (Subsequently, the Committee agreed and extended the deadline set for 14 May, until 31 July.) The experts noted that they had not received visas and thus had been unable to visit Sudan to conduct their investigation. The experts received single-entry visas from Sudan on 19 April except for the finance expert, Ghassan Schbley (US), who had yet to receive a visa at press time. (Sudan has objected to Schbley, expressing concerns about his activities when he was a member of the PoE for the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Schbley was prevented from entering Sudan when he arrived in Khartoum in December 2012 even though he had a visa at the time.) The security situation has remained volatile in several parts of Darfur. On 6 April, heavy fighting between Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) broke out in and around the towns of Labado and Muhajeriya in eastern Darfur. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that approximately 40,000 people had been displaced as of 14 April. The SLA-MM seized Labado and Muhajeriya in the initial fighting, but they were forced to retreat in mid-April as Sudan reclaimed the towns. Witnesses alleged that pro-Sudan militia killed 18 civilians after the towns were retaken, while also accusing the militia of kidnapping, raping and torturing civilians. On 19 April, an AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeper was killed and two additional peacekeepers were injured when they were shot by unidentified assailants near Muhajeriya. (Since its inception in 2007, UNAMID has lost 44 peacekeepers.) The Council issued a press statement that condemned the attack. On 12 April, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that 50,000 people, mostly women and children, had fled across the border into Chad as a result of inter-communal violence in Um Dukhun, a town in western Darfur. UNHCR said that this was the highest number of refugees from Sudan to enter Chad since 2005. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Bashar faction, which formally made peace with Sudan by acceding to the Doha Document in Qatar on 6 April, and the JEM clashed on 19 April in the Furawiyya area of North Darfur. The JEM- Bashar announced that Saleh Mohamed Jarbo, its deputy general commander, had been killed during an ambush by JEM forces while en route to Furawiyya. The SLA-MM released 21 Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers—including 14 on 13 April and seven on 21 April—to Sudan. The ICRC served as an intermediary. On 29 April, the Council held a briefing and consultations on Darfur. During the briefing, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said that he was troubled by the situation in Darfur, referring to inter-communal violence, fighting between government forces and rebel movements, and large numbers of civilians recently displaced by the conflict.
According to the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNAMID, covering January to March, the human rights situation in Darfur deteriorated in a manner commensurate with the intensification of conflict (S/2013/225). The overall number of documented human rights violations increased to 117 cases involving 347 victims (compared with 94 cases involving 204 victims in October- December 2012). Of the 347 victims, 176 were victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 125 of violations of the right to life, 38 of sexual and gender-based violence and eight of arbitrary arrests and detention. The Secretary-General underlined that accountability remained a challenge. Of the 117 human rights cases documented by UNAMID during the reporting period, 42 had been reported to government authorities, but just eight of these cases are under investigation.
A key issue for the Council is the deteriorating security situation in Darfur, as evidenced by numerous reports of inter- communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels, as well as by the large numbers of recently inter- nally displaced persons. Another key issue is the restriction on humanitarian access in areas affected by the conflict. (On April 16, Ali Al-Za’tari, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, released a statement in which he expressed his concern that humanitarian organisations were not being permitted access to Labado and Muhajeriya to help thousands of civilians impacted by fighting there). An additional key issue is the fact that Sudan has issued only single-entry visas to four of the five PoE members, even though resolution 2091 calls on Sudan to issue “timely multi-entry visas to all members of the Panel of Experts for the duration of its mandate.” Another important issue for the Council is what can be done to enhance the safety of UNAMID peacekeepers.
One option is for members of the Sudan Sanctions Committee to visit Darfur to gain a better understanding of the cur- rent situation on the ground. (It appears that the Committee is planning such a trip in October. It had originally planned to travel to Darfur in the second half of 2012, when Colombia was chair, but the trip did not materialise, apparently due to scheduling challenges.) The Council may also consider requesting a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the impact of the conflict in Darfur on civilians. An additional option, although unlikely, is for the Sanctions Committee to update its consolidated list, which dates back to 25 April 2006, by targeting indictees of the International Criminal Court for their participation in perpetrating crimes in Darfur as permitted by paragraph 3(c) of resolution 1591. Council Dynamics Several Council members remain concerned about the difficult security environment in Darfur. In particular, they continue to be alarmed by the toll of the conflict on civilians, the limited humanitarian access and the dangers faced by UNAMID peacekeepers. While supportive of the Doha process, several members have criticised the slow pace of implementation of the Doha Document. However, some members are less critical of Sudan than others, arguing that financial difficulties have con- strained its ability to implement the provisions of the Doha Document. (To date, the Liberation and Justice Movement and the JEM-Bashar faction have signed the Doha Document, while the JEM, the SLA-MM, and the SLA-Abdul Wahid have not.) The UK is the penholder on Darfur. UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2091 (14 February 2013) extended the mandate of the PoE assisting the 1591 Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2014.
In May, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution creating a UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). Key Recent Developments On 6 March the Council adopted resolution 2093 re-authorising the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and asking the Secretary-General to deploy a technical assistance mission (TAM), whose findings should be submitted to the Council by 19 April, after which the Council would formally mandate the new mission to be deployed by 3 June (S/PV.6929). Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council on the TAM report on 25 April. From 17 to 29 March, the TAM travelled to Somalia, Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The mission met with the UN Country Team (UNCT) and international partners in Nairobi and consulted with the AU in Addis Ababa. In Mogadishu, it held meetings with senior government officials, civil society and some regional and international actors. The TAM also visited areas that had been recovered from Al Shabaab in south and central Somalia. Additionally, part of the team conducted meetings in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, and Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. According to the TAM report, UNSOM will be guided by four broad principles: national ownership, flexibility, collabo- ration and partnerships and risk management. UNSOM will have substantive expertise in the areas of political affairs and mediation/facilitation; rule of law and security institutions; and human rights and protection. In addition to these three core areas, multi-disciplinary task teams are also envisioned. At the outset of UNSOM, the task teams would cover: stabil- ity and recovery in former Al Shabaab areas, maritime issues, capacity development and economic drivers of conflict. As for its structure, UNSOM will be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with a deputy Special Rep- resentative (and a second deputy as of January 2014), and will also be backed by a Director of Mission Support/Director UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). There will be a strong emphasis placed on integration and coordination both within UNSOM and with the UNCT. On 29 April, Nicholas Kay (UK) was announced as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. The TAM report also highlights security as a critical challenge for UNSOM. As the report notes, “insecurity has many implications, both operational and political”, particularly in south and central Somalia where recovered towns were described by local UN staff as “islands, beyond which movement is nearly impossible”. Partly in recognition of the difficult security environment, UNSOM’s initial footprint will be light and then scaled up as conditions permit. The TAM report also offers a few other options: use of local UN-contracted and trained security guards, the impending deployment of an AMISOM guard force in Mogadishu and reliance on Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed insufficient, UN Guard Units or international private security companies could be utilised. The security situation in south and central Somalia continues to be in a state of flux, particularly regarding the status of about 2,500 Ethiopian troops allied to AMISOM and the government. On 17 March, Ethiopia withdrew from the town of Hudur in the Bakool region, which ultimately allowed Al Shabaab to regain control. This prompted concerns about a complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian contingent from Somalia. The prime ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia held bilateral talks on 8 April, but they were apparently inconclusive. Widely reported comments by the Ethiopian prime minister on 23 April seemed to suggest the country would withdraw its troops, while the following day the foreign ministry was careful to clarify that this was not the case. In the interim, on 3 April a battalion of 850 troops began to arrive from Sierra Leone in Kismayo allowing a Kenyan battalion to withdraw from AMISOM. Meanwhile, the US has officially signalled its intent to militarily back the government in Mogadishu. On 8 April, Presi- dent Barack Obama determined that Somalia is eligible for US military assistance. The US was the strongest proponent within the Council of a partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, which was approved in resolution 2093. In the worst incident in Mogadishu since 2011, Al Shabaab attacked the courthouse on 14 April, leading to more than 50 civilian deaths, according to an estimate by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The attack was condemned by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, and the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights. On 15 April, the Security Council issued a press statement condemning the attack, reiterating a willingness to take action against those threatening stability in Somalia and reaffirming Council resolve to support peace through the upcoming deployment of UNSOM (SC/10972). At a meeting of G8 foreign ministers in London on 10-11 April, there was agreement to offer high-level political support for Somalia’s re-engagement with the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nearly half of Somalia’s $2.2 billion external debt is owed to the World Bank, ADB and IMF. On 12 April, the IMF recognised the Federal Government of Somalia, allowing a resumption of relations after a 22-year interval. The UK has organised an international donor conference for Somalia in London on 7 May. Key Issues The central issue facing the Council is establishing a mandate for UNSOM. Subsidiary questions concern the mission’s structure, strength and timeframe. Somalia poses an extremely difficult security environment. Despite the very real operational constraints—which the UN will need to address—there is a risk of negative public perceptions developing against the UN for a “bunker mentality”. Determining and managing the division of labour among the government, the UN and AU will be an evolving, complex challenge for the Council and other actors. Managing the apparently high expectations of the government with regard to capacity-building and service delivery could also be an issue for the Council. Options The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a resolution authorising UNSOM to be deployed by 3 June as outlined by the Secretary-General in his 19 April letter transmitting the TAM report (S/2013/239). Council members may also wish to take note of the Secretary-General’s observation that AMISOM’s military and civil- ian components require “enablers and force multipliers” and resources for “stabilization activities in south and central Somalia”.
Relations between the AU and the UN have reportedly been strained since the adoption of resolution 2093 due to differing conceptions regarding the role of AMISOM (multidimensional peace support vs. counter-insurgency) and the scale and source of its financing (enhanced support package from UNSOA vs. internal AU funds). Mutually agreeing on a division of labour between the AU and UN will be critical. The future of approximately 2,500 Ethiopian troops in Somalia remains ambiguous, with significant implications for the changing military equation in Somalia. The prime minister of Ethiopia has expressed frustration with the lack of progress by AMISOM and SNSF in assuming control over territory captured by Ethiopia from Al Shabaab. He has also objected to the mounting cost of the deployment in Somalia. Theoretically, Ethiopia could maintain the status quo, re-hat as AMISOM, obtain external financing, or withdraw from Somalia. The UK is the penholder on Somalia, while the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanc- tions Committee. UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia.
S/2013/239 (19 April 2013) was from the Secretary-General regarding the findings and observations of the TAM. Security Council Press Statement SC/10972 (15 April 2013) condemned the terrorist attack in Mogadishu. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania).
*Does not reflect Kenya’s withdrawal of a battalion offsetting Sierra Leone’s deployment. Special Representative of the AU and Head of AMISOM Mahamat Saleh Annadif (Chad). Kosovo
Expected Council Action In May, Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mis- sion in Kosovo (UNMIK), is scheduled to brief the Council during a quarterly debate. Zarif will update the Council on the Secretary-General’s report due 29 April and on other recent developments, particularly the outcome of EU-mediated talks in Brussels between Serbia and Kosovo. Key Recent Developments When he last briefed the Council on 22 March, Zarif characterised ongoing EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo as an “historic” opportunity and urged the Council to support the negotiations. He also cautioned that obstacles remained, particularly in northern Kosovo where insecurity and ethnic tensions have been a problem. On 2 April, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton hosted the eighth round of “Belgrade-Pristina” talks between Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo. In exchange for recognition of Pristina’s authority over northern Kosovo, Belgrade sought institutional autonomy for Serbs in the north, which Pristina resisted. When the parties failed to reach agreement, Ashton then established 9 April as a deadline for Serbia and Kosovo to accept the EU-mediated proposal. On 8 April, Serbia rejected the EU plan, which was not made publicly available. Dačić stated the principles proposed by the EU “do not guarantee the full security, survival and protection of human rights to Serbs in Kosovo”. Critical points of disagreement concerned control over the police and the courts in the north. Although Ashton had previously declared that the EU would no longer mediate, Serbia and Kosovo called for further talks, which Ashton eventually agreed to broker. After renewed bilateral and trilateral negotiations on 17 April, the parties once again failed to reach agreement. Progress had apparently been made on the interrelated issues of autonomy for Serbs in northern Kosovo and Serbia’s recognition of Pristina’s authority in the region. However, the talks ultimately broke down over point 14 of the EU proposal, which required Serbia not to obstruct Kosovo’s accession to “international organisations”, implicitly meaning the UN. Negotiations resumed on 19 April, when Dačić and Thaçi initialled a “First agreement on principles governing the nor- malisation of relations”, in what may become an historic act of reconciliation. Ashton congratulated the parties for their “determination” and “courage” and suggested this represents a “step away from the past and, for both of them, a step closer to Europe”. On 21 and 22 April, the parliament of Kosovo and cabinet of Serbia respectively approved the agreement. The key elements of the 15-point agreement include: • the establishment of an association of Serb municipalities with representation at the central government; • a national police and judiciary but with provisions for a regional police commander in northern Kosovo and an appellate court for Serb-majority municipalities; • municipal elections to be held in northern Kosovo in 2013 with the assistance of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and • a commitment that neither Serbia nor Kosovo will block each other’s respective “EU paths” (this represents a com- promise with respect to earlier language that had referenced “international organisations”). On 22 April, the European Commission recommended that the European Council approve negotiations on membership for Serbia and talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement for Kosovo (a preliminary step toward EU membership candidacy). A joint report submitted by Ashton and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, concluded that since October 2012 Kosovo had made progress in the four critical areas of public administration, rule of law, trade and protection of minorities. |