Social Evaluation Study for the Milne Bay Community-Based Coastal and Marine Conservation Program png/99/G41 Jeff Kinch April 2001 unops contract for Services Ref
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The areas of Nabaina and Nagobi in particular have only been open to exploitation since the mid-1980s when the boom for beche-de-mer began. It is noticed by communities that reef areas closer to home are already showing signs of depletion. Recommendations: 22. Conduct a thorough stock assessment, biogeographical survey and community resource-mapping program. 23. Contract a fisheries modeller to quantitatively describe the potential biological performance of CBMMCSs and other alternative approaches to managing marine resources. Milne Bay Exports Since virtually all green snail, blacklip, trochus, beche-de-mer and giant clam adductor muscle are exported, production should equate closely with export data, though this is not necessarily the case. In liaisons with the National Fisheries Authority and the Planning Cell of the Milne Bay Provincial Government, the author has found significant discrepancies in the export figures, which gives cause for concern. The National Fisheries Authority’s data sets are incomplete for the years 1992-1996 and possibly 1997. Therefore export figures should only be regarded as approximates. It should also be noted that the point of export data can be misleading as an indicator of harvest point. Table 59: Milne Bay Marine Product Exports: 1998 (Source: National Fisheries Authority and the Milne Bay Provincial Government)
Summary and Conclusion Given the proportionately large area of reef present in Milne Bay, the marine resource in the Province represents a substantial proportion of the total resource potential in Papua New Guinea. Since the rapid increase in prices of several marine products in the past few years, more activity is now evident in the fisheries and this is of particular concern to the MBP. Villages within the CBMMCAs are landing significant quantities of marine resources. Sedentary species found on reefs or shallow lagoon areas are potentially at risk from over-exploitation. The extent of resources thus needs to be assessed and management measures introduced as appropriate. Illegal harvesting and poaching is of major concern to all. Longliners represent a threat to the marine biodiversity of the CBMMCAs. Concerns are being raised in the CBMMCAs that the fate of their marine resources seems to be decided as a result of deals made elsewhere, which they have no control over. They have no role in the issuance of fishing licenses to foreign and domestic companies. Greater local involvement and greater transparency is needed. Poor management of valuable marine resources will lead to decreased production affecting both food security and community wealth. Beche-de-mer will be the major target for sustainable resource management in the MBP. Resources need to be allocated for awareness and capacity building at the village level for management of these valuable resources in CBMMCSs and the wider CBMMCAs (see Kinch, 2001). Chapter 10 Tenure and Rights to Resources Rights to Resources Today customary rights are usually enforced only when outsiders fish for a cash return, not when they fish for subsistence. Customary rights are overlapping to a degree and at present lack clearly defined boundaries. Boundaries are naturally less permeable the more distant the ‘outsider’ group is socially or geographically. Disagreements over rights of access are unlikely to surface in a formal dispute unless a significant commercial opportunity is at stake. A number of works show that, in Melanesia at least, territoriality in coastal waters only came into existence in response to the commencement of trade in valuable resources such as trochus, beche-de-mer and pearl shell. This was sufficient to aggravate disputes over tenure (see Carrier, 1981; Johannes, 1982a,b; Akimichi, 1995; Polunin, 1984). Marine tenure in Milne Bay, is also defended with a vigour proportional to the perceived value of the resource within (also see Wright, 1985). Thus, as the commercial values for marine products have increased, so has the establishment of tenure and territoriality. This has been observed elsewhere, most notably in the Canadian Sub-Arctic with the advent of the fur trade in the 1800s. This had two immediate consequences. First, the value of furs as a resource to the Indians increased considerably. Second, and as a result, the scale of hunting activity rose sharply and added a new value to the possession of land, with Indians becoming more conscious of the exact boundaries of their territories. Private gain and ownership stimulated by the practices and intrusion of European traders, resulted in the rapid development of a mosaic of family owned hunting grounds within each tribal territory (Brasser, 1988). Leacock (1954) clearly established that a close relationship existed, both historically and geographically, between the development of private land rights and the development of commercial trade (Demetz, 1967; see also Averkieva, 1961; Speck and Eiseley, 1939; Cooper, 1939 for examples from Siberia). A similar pattern of tenure, this time related to resources such as beche-de-mer rather than fur bearing animals and reefs rather than trapping areas, could be suggested for Milne Bay. For example, at Sudest (ZONE 2) commercial use of reef waters has altered the previously open-use policy to one where the reef is now divided into family or clan boundaries of ownership (Ralphael Kiltus, Sudest Islander, pers. comm, 1998; also see Stevens, 1990). People within the CBMMCAs today strive to have enough money in order to satisfy their wishes, desires and obligations brought about by modernity and the cash economy. People need money for clothes, kerosene, certain foods, and consumer goods, church donations, community programs such as new churches or school buildings. Problems related to access to resource grounds have existed since the mid-1970s. These have not always been related to the harvesting of commercially valuable marine resources. Mailu people used to sail from Mailu to Sudest in ZONE 2 each year at the end of the northwest monsoon season until 1977 where they would dive for conus shells which they us for ceremonial exchange. During the 1970s and 1980s, there were several requests for Mailu fishers to enter CBMMCAs 2 and 3 waters. . . . the people of these areas [Deboyne and Engineer Groups] have expressed concerns that from time again, the Mailu people from Central Province are continually coming to the area and without consulting the people for this approval, have gone ahead and harvested marine products such as trochus shells, clam shells, beche-de-mer plus large cone shells (Heveve, 1977). . . . traditional island owners would not agree to allow your people to exploit the marine resources in their waters (Elimo, 1986). However, by 1992 the Mailu were apparently sailing to Milne Bay again. Swadling saw Mailu traders on five traditional outrigger canoes at Gaire beach in eastern Motu; they had brought conus shell from Tubetube (CBMMCA 2) for sale to the Motu (Swadling 1994). With the advent of reefs and their resources being seen as valuable commodities, the perceived value of natural resources has changed and requires protection from outsiders. Conflict over property rights in marine resources has arisen with increased demand and with new technology and techniques to harvest resources. In some cases, areas such as deep water, which were, only used for travel, may now come under claim. Willis (1993) writes For the open and deep sea water areas . . . up until now, only have been used for travel. With the new technologies proposed to be used by Coral Sea Fisheries, it is expected that fish will be caught in these areas. Once this is realised, claims of who has rights to what areas will be made. Disputes are bound to arise (see also Huber, 1993). During the operation of Coral Sea Fisheries, Brooker (CBMMCA 3) people closed off their areas to outsiders. The Brooker Ward unanimously agreed in community discussions not to allow anyone to fish within their boundaries for the purpose of selling fish to the Coral Sea Fisheries. Fishing for local consumption was not restricted and people could enter and fish for local consumption (see Louisiade Local Government Council, 1994). As can be seen when marine resources come to represent cash at the market, villages begin to guard their fishing rights jealously. Arguments develop over exactly where the traditional boundaries lie and who, by virtue of clan or village ties, has the right to fish within these boundaries. Traditionally, when everyone got all the fish they wanted, rights and boundaries were often hazily defined as there was no need for great precision. Growing harvesting pressure on marine resources is linked to the consequences of the process of monetization of these resources and in most areas has led to increased frequency of disputes over ownership rights (see also Pernetta and Hill, 1981). Access controls are applied to outsiders and people from other social groups within the CBMMCAs. There often is boundary permeability between groups due to a long history of friendship, kinship or other closer association. Boundaries are naturally less permeable the more distant the ‘outsider’ group is socially or geographically. But increased commercial resource use often leads to strong access controls, even for close neighbours (Ruddle, 1994a). There is increased concern within all CBMMCAs over other people poaching on their reefs and selling their catch for money. It puts the people and communities in an awkward financial position. In the Misima District a general consensus was reached that any outside person wanting to fish within community fishing grounds must consult the WDCs. Anybody found illegally fishing within their grounds would be fined 500 kina. A problem raised to the Council was how do we identify or determine boundaries of these fishing grounds or reefs if we are to say who owns what? The Councillor from East Panaeati (CBMMCA 2) suggested it would be best to refer this matter back to the wards for the people to have their professional input as they would be in a better position to deliberate on the resource ownership and other matters relating to common boundaries. Also called for was an investigation of the ownership of the small islands as well as the relationships of the islands and mainland people (Louisiade Local Government Council, 1998a). Even though these issues have been broached at the Local Level Governmnet nothing has actually happened. Recommendations: 24. Conduct research to determine the level of dependency on marine resources and community cash requirements. 25. Provide recognition and support to all levels of government for community developed regulations and CBMMCSs. 26. Conduct in-depth study of property relations for the CBMMCAs. Data on marine tenure needs updating with the implementation of a social mapping program. With each grouping of peoples having its own myths, legends and migration stories, it is important that an attempt is made by the MBP to gain at least some understanding of these and how they may (or may not) relate to claims to or ownership of marine resources. 27. Support Milne Bay Provincial Government programs in conflict resolution and mediation, either through informal/formal court systems and/or demarcation and registration of claims to traditional fishing rights. This would benefit villagers, particularly from Ware and Brooker, in CBMMCA 3. Property Rights and the Commons Debate Most conflicts over marine resources arise when the resource is (or is perceived to be) so scarce that sharing it becomes difficult. When rights, particularly those relating to participants' activities regarding their own portions of a stock, are well defined, understood and observed, allocation conflicts tend to be minimized. However, when rights to the use of a stock are not well defined, understood or upheld, divergent assumptions about what the rights may convey often result in conflicts over scarce fisheries resources (FAO, 2000). Fisheries resources are becoming increasingly scarce, so conflicts over the allocation and sharing of these resources are likely to become more frequent, unless there are mechanisms that allocate resources explicitly. Conflicts can be minimized by clarifying the property rights conferred by the management of a fishery, following risk-based decision strategies and using conflict mitigation processes (FAO, 2000). The 'tradegy of the commons' dilemma (Hardin, 1968, 1976) develops when there are too many users of a limited resource (Grima and Berkes, 1989). In traditional societies, the commons dilemma is often solved by the emergence of common-property institutions to define the rights and duties of the co-owners of the resource, or of the right to use the resource. Resources which are abundant relative to needs do not require any special arrangments such as territories. However, when the resource becomes scarce relative to needs, then special care has to be taken. Open access is an undesirable regime under which to exploit a natural resource, at least when extraction becomes intensive, as there is excess demand for the resource, and overexploitation results as each user rushes to harvest the resource before the next person does. Abuse of the resource occurs because each user, while striving for private gains, can spread some of the costs of his or her use to other users. This is what is occurring in the Milne Bay marine context. Generally, authors have accepted the assumption that sea tenure institutions are overwhelmed by wider global political and economic contests over natural resources (see Graham and Idechong 1998; Mantjoro and Akimichi 1996), or by situations where the difficulties of exclusion and the subtractability of benefits are intensified (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Exclusion refers to a group’s ability to control access to resources by its own members or outsiders. This ability depends on the social, economic, and political costs and benefits of defending a resource or territorial estate; on the group’s ability to legitimise territorial claims through their validation by neighbouring groups; and their ability to enforce these claims via either formal or informal means. If resources are located within a bounded common property regime where participants can prevent non-members resource access while enforcing limits on resource use among themselves, the regeneration rate of resources is more likely to be sustainable (Aswani 1999, 2000; Becker and Ostrom 1995). The problem of subtractibility may be approached by making and enforcing rules to limit short-term individual interest and to protect long-term, collective interest (Berkes, 1994). In every group there will be individuals who will ignore norms and act opportunistically. There are also situations in which the potential benefits will be so high that even strongly committed individuals will break norms, like when the price of beche-de-mer is so high or a commercial fishing company visits the area. The free-rider problem results when an individual shirks responsibiity to the community or group (Runge, 1992). As long as profit can be gained from a CPR, people will continue to enter the system and compete for diminishing goods until all true profit (rent) is dissipated. The presumed incentive any individual may have to shirk responsibility to the community is often construed as logical from the point of veiw of narrow self-interest and cited as a dominant human motive against which the group is defenseless (see Dasgupta, 1982). This opportunistic behaviour is a possibility that must be dealt with by the MBP. Ostrom (1990) has proposed a set of institutional characteristics that, when present, can mitigate free-riding, subtractability, and self-enforcement problems. These include: (i) the clear definition of boundaries; (ii) equitable costs and benefits for all inclusive members; (iii) participatory decision-making by all stakeholders; (iv) the capacity to monitor; (v) the enforceability of collective action decisions; (vi) the presence of conflict resolution mechanisms; and (vii) the availability of formal or informal means for users to secure tenure and organisational rights. Institutions displaying all or most of these traits are generally robust and enduring (Bromley 1992; Becker and Ostrom 1995). The MBP needs to determine whether or not people within the CBMMCAs can translate governance into effective management regimes. Rational actors will choose to either free-ride or not depending upon a group’s potential to develop monitoring and controlling mechanisms (see Aswani, 2000). Community-Based Co-Management The common property resource literature documents a range of past and current 'traditional' resource management systems in non-western societies, which have had the outcome of protecting particular areas or species for periods of time (Alcorn, 1995; Berkes and Farvar, 1989; Gibbs and Bromley, 1989; Lynch and Alcorn, 1994; McCay and Jentoft, 1996; Berkes, 1991; Ostrom, 1993; Pinkerton and Weinstein, 1995). Recent research on small-scale coastal fisheries has shown that a degree of regulated access, enforced at the local level through community institutions and social practices, as the best chance of success (see Hviding and Jul-Larsen, 1993; Korten, 1986; Berkes, 1989; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Poffenberger, 1990; Bromley et al, 1992). At the core of community-based management are the issues of property rights, resource management regimes and institutional arrangements. Community-management systems that will be devised by the CBMMCAs can perform a number of critical roles in the local community in maintaining livelihood security. In many cases the implementation of management and tenure systems has a potential capacity to avert or overcome problems of open-access fishing and to generate incentives on the part of holders of rights to harvest efficiently and conserve and manage resources (cf Ruddle, Hviding and Johannes, 1992). Enforcement Violations of the rules and conflicts over use of the commons suggest that any such rules must be designed to have an obvious and direct relationship to the goal of preservation. Co-owners of the commons will not obey regulations that they regard as frivolous or arbitary. They will obey regulations that are quite clearly based on principles of maximum sustainable yield. They will consent to being deprived of certain products of the commons only if they can be convinced that what they do not extract from the commons is truly needed for its long term maintenance, and that others will exercise similar self-restraint (McKean, 1992). If rights are to be meaningful, provision must be made within the system for monitoring compliance with rules and imposing sanctions on violators (Ruddle, 1994a). Sanctions are culturally constituted means for motivating the individuals of a given society in such a way that they will play their roles in the total scheme of property relations in the most efficient manner (Hallowell, 1943). Self-regulation works best in traditional societies in which economic activities are embedded in social relationships within the community, and are regulated by common values and rules (‘the culture’) of the people who live in that society (Berkes, 1985). Societies have the capacity to construct and enforce rules and norms that constrain the behaviour of individuals (Feeny, Berkes, McCay and Acheson, 1990). This will be developed by the MBP. Obligations associated with individual user rights usually involved a commitment beyond simple judicious resource use, including: (i) participation in decisions concerning resource allocation and management; (ii) agreement to abide by communally imposed measures designed to protect the resource; (iii) commitment to report infringement of agreed conservation and mangement measures; and (iv) participation in the performance of rituals designed to enhance resource productivity and longevity (Doulman, 1993). These will be helped by capacity building at the community level (see Kinch, 2001; Mitchell et al, 2001 for details). Current Tenure Disputes CBMMCA 1 Problems at Nuakata centre round the Balu Island dispute and poaching from Alotau, East Cape and Kurada, and by alleged intrusions by Nako and Kiwali. A total of 20 traditional fishing sites have been identified around Nuakata (Kelokelo, 2000). Ninety-nine percent of the catch was reef fish. At Nuakata ownership of the foreshore was awarded according to the principle of adjacency to owned land by matrilineages. There are boundary disputes at Iabam and Pahilele. Nuakata would like to see outsiders seek permission and respect management plans on selected species and size harvesting and fishing restrictions placed on the use of gill nets and on resources needed for food exchange. CBMMCA 2 In 1909 the government disallowed any further applications for the alienation of small uninhabited islands that might have been stopping places for Papuan canoes or visited by their fishermen. This suggests that the colonial government was already conscious in the first decade of the 20th Century of claims by local landowners to isolated (and unoccupied) reefs/islands/islets (United States of America Armed Forces. 1942). Both the Engineer Group and the Deboyne Islanders claim this area. On Tubetube when disputes did occur, myths were generally not drawn on to serve as charters for claims, nor were there appeals to the antiquity of a clan’s ownership. Instead, because of the high incidence of transferral of usufruct rights disputes resulted in careful examination of the history of land exchanges for previous generations, exchanges which in most cases involved immigrant affines or clanspeople (Macintyre 1983a). The basis of Panaeati land tenure, in particular the transfers of usufruct rights under the matrilineal system, is described in Berde (1974). Berde argues strongly that in the pre-colonial period inter-island sailing by Panaeati islanders was very restricted, with the closest contacts only with the Torlesse Islands and a small island known as Mabui, north of the reef fringing the Calvados. During World War II, it was recorded that only Bona Bona Kai (Bonnabonnawan on later maps) Island in the Torlesse group was under coconuts planted by Panaeati people (United States of America Armed Forces. 1942). Panaeati people claim the Torlesse Islands, whilst both Panaeati and Panapompom have rights to the Conflicts. In the past the Conflict Group has been under dispute between Panaeati and Kwaraiwa . . . even though the islands or reefs are owned by one group, it has been allowed for all groups to have access to them in the past years, as I understand both groups traditionally possess similar customs and perhaps conflict only arose as the result of economic development (Kotauga, 1983). A Louisiade Local Level Council Resolution No.: 40/1983 called for the Conflicts to be returned to Panaeati and Kwaraiwa. This free-hold land is now owned by a retired US Attorney General, L.J. Neveles. In recent Community Entry Patrols as part of the MBP concerns were raised about the return of these islands and there is very much the potential for conflict over resources to arise once again between Engineer and Deboyne peoples. Panaeati people are now diving extensively at Kanalilae and Kanali Tewtewa Reefs east of the Conflicts. The Conflicts are already considered fished out. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||