Europe at Present [Spring 2003]

Background of the conflict

Territorial conflict in Belgium has linguistic roots. Dutch (or Flemish) has always been the mother tongue of a majority of the population, even while in the nineteenth century French was the dominant official language. The origins are fairly recent. French, the court language of the Habsburg monarchy, became the language of the administrative and cultural elite of Flanders and Wallonia during Austrian rule in the eighteenth century. This process was reinforced by the French revolutionary occupants and their Napoleonic heirs. Meanwhile the peasants of Flanders continued to speak (though less frequently read or write) a range of local Flemish dialects. Despite a shared language base, Flemings and Dutch were divided by religion; the Flemish Catholics’ suspicion of the Protestant ambitions of the Dutch monarchy contributed to their initial welcome for an independent Belgian state. Domination by French speakers was reinforced by early-nineteenth-century industrialization; impoverished Flemish peasants flocked to Wallonia, the heartland of Belgium’s wealth in coal, steel, and textiles.¹⁷⁸

So until 50s, political, economic and social power rested primarily with francophones, even in the northern area now contained in the Flemish Region. Economic development enhanced the power of the southern region known today as Wallonia. Parts of the southern region were early beneficiaries of the industrial revolution, and developed heavy industries. The social and political status of the French language promoted a strong Francophone presence in Brussels.¹⁷⁹

Language has always been a socio-economic marker. In the 19^th century, those with power, money or aspirations spoke French. The roles are reversed in contemporary Belgium. After the Second World War, the reversal of Walloon economic fortunes and the rapid economic growth in the Flemish region reinforced linguistic conflict between the two regions, and this consolidated the territorialization of Flemish-Francophone conflict. The tide began to turn in the 1950s. Economic success in the Walloon region had depended to a large extent on heavy steel and coal industries, which were rapidly losing importance. Flanders, meanwhile, has boomed. Unencumbered by old industry or an unemployable workforce, towns like Antwerp and Ghent have flourished with the growth of service technology and commerce.

Table 1: The Regional Structure of the Belgian Economy

In 1947 over 20 percent of the Flemish workforce was still in agriculture; today fewer than 3 percent of Dutch-speaking Belgians derive their income from the land. There are more Dutch speakers than French speakers in the country (by a proportion of three to two), and they produce and earn more per capita.¹⁸⁰ This process, whereby the Belgian north has overtaken the south as the privileged, dominant region, has been gathering speed since the late Fifties-accompanied by a crescendo of demands from the Flemish for political gains to match their newfound economic dominance.¹⁸¹ Wage rates are significantly higher in Flanders. Unemployment is 10.5 per cent in Wallonia but only 6 per cent in Flanders. Long-term unemployment is more serious in Wallonia too. Flanders has created far more jobs and lost far fewer. Health costs, often an indirect indicator of social problems, are higher and rising faster in Wallonia and Walloon life expectancy is lower.

Taken together, there has been a complete reversal. Wallonia has lost its sense of direction and dynamism. Wallonia has an image of being a ‘loser’, with a self-image of low esteem, paralysis, outmoded and inflexible attitudes and institutions, poor adaptability and dependency on the state and a particracie seen as more endemic there than in Flanders. By 1970 the conflict had been transformed from one between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers into one between the Flemish region on the one hand and the Walloon region and primarily French-speaking Brussels on the other hand.¹⁸² However, territorial conflict has only occasionally given rise to disruptive protest. The conflict as such was most disruptive and most mobilizing in conjunction with religious or socio-economic non-territorial issues.

Next we want to focus on influence of other factors on the level of territorial conflict.

Models of uneven economic development link territorial conflict to economic backwardness and exploitation of a region by the rest of a country. What is important is to specify the conditions under which economically backward groups are likely to become separatist as opposed to economically affluent groups. A more straightforward economic explanation links ups and downs in territorial conflict to the business cycle. A grievances-based explanation would suggest greater conflict in times of economic downturn because competition for scarce resources is sharper. A resource-based explanation would expect intensification of conflict during economic prosperity because there are more resources available for the mobilization of territorial protest. Neither model provides a sufficient explanation for the dynamics of territorial conflict in Belgium. However, a cursory comparison of table 2 with economic indicators does not provide support for either hypothesis. Territorial conflict was highest in the 1960s—a period of unparalleled prosperity—and in the late 1970s-early 1980s—a period of negative or stagnant growth, high unemployment and government deficit spending. ¹⁸³

Territorial conflict is usually seen primarily as a domestic matter. But the rise in regionalism and separatism is also often connected with the erosion of national sovereignty by economic globalisation and international institutions. The most tangible expression of these twin transnational developments for Belgium has been European integration. EU membership has intensified the Flemish-Walloon conflict because it has exacerbated divergent economic developments between the regions. But we have seen that Flemish-Walloon conflict is only partly fueled by divergent economic interests. Though it is correct that European integration as a market-making process has made the preferences of Flemish and Walloon actors more divergent, it has also lowered the stakes of territorial conflict. It has eased the terrain for federal reform, and as a polity-building exercise it has increased incentives for cooperation among these territorial units. An independent Flemish or Walloon region will incur smaller efficiency losses from separation within a European Union where free trade can be enforced across countries. That is why some have predicted that a country like Belgium is more likely to break up when it is an integral part of a single European market.¹⁸⁴ But the potential benefits of separatism for political actors in terms of policy autonomy are also considerably smaller than in a world of sovereign nation states. European regulations limit the range of policy choices at domestic level, whether that is the federal, regional or community level. At the extreme, incentives for separation may evaporate. The rules of EU decision making induce Flemish and Walloon actors to search common ground in the European arena. The most important formal institutional constraint is that the European Union recognizes only member states, which makes it difficult for the regions or communities to act officially.¹⁸⁵ Membership of the European Union is a double-edged sword for territorial conflict in Belgium. On the one hand, EU membership provides the most powerful external discipline on territorial conflict in Belgium. It reduces the expected benefits of separatism; it constrains policy divergences among Belgian actors; and it induces moderate and co-operative behavior among subnational and federal actors. At the same time, it reduces the cost of separatism as the benefits of free trade vary no longer with country size. Small countries such as Ireland or Luxembourg benefit as much from European integration as Germany or Spain.

Some sociologists argue that generations’ turnover may weaken the support base for territorial conflict. Survey data of the mid-1990s demonstrate that the generation younger than 40 years is distinctly less interested in Flemish-Walloon conflict. However, the implications for regional nationalism are different for Flemish and Walloons.

For Flemish citizens, there appears a still relatively weak, but growing interaction effect between age and education. Young and educated people tend to feel more Belgian (or European) than the average Flemish citizen. This seems to point to the emergence of a pro-Belgian movement among Flemish intellectuals, and that while Flemish nationalism has been historically strongest among intellectuals.

The effect of age is more pronounced in Wallonia, and it works in the other direction. Walloon regional identity is significantly stronger among the younger than the older generation. That effect is present across all educational or occupational categories, but Walloon nationalism is much less concentrated in intellectual circles than it is in Flanders. Anti-unitarist sentiment is strongest among uneducated workers and radical regionalism is powerful among self-employed. Moreover, there is a shift from moderate to radical regionalism among younger Walloons, though few regionalists are yet willing to embrace separatism.

The fact that, in Flanders, defenders of Belgian unity are primarily found among progressive political actors but, in the Walloon region, mainly associated with traditionalist, ethnocentric values impedes the mobilisation of a national pro-Belgian counter movement. Some Flemish and Walloons feel strongly about maintaining Belgian unity, but they promote very different models of Belgian society.

Finally, there are strong institutional incentives in the Belgian system of dual federalism that continue to induce politicians to emphasise territorial conflict and de-emphasise co-operation.¹⁸⁶

The roots of conflict stick also partly in experience of colonization of Congo. It aroused very specific, even strange effects and interactions in Belgian society. The shadow of blame gathered with economic diversities and claims bred surprising reactions and expectations in groups of conflict. ¹⁸⁷

So we may say that to some extent the Belgian identity has been the effect of the contact with the Congolese, a product of the colonial adventure. As this adventure came to an end, the Belgian had to get rid of his story on someone else, and he told it to himself, that is, to an other Belgian. For the Flemish this other came to be the Walloon and vice versa. Self-evidently they had told this story always already also to each other, but only at the decolonization of Congo they were really thrown onto each other’s company. There were no escape routes left now. No less self-evidently one of both had to be the colonizer, the other decolonised. Curiously enough the former colonizers, whether Flemish or Walloon, only wanted to pass for the colonized. There was no one who in the motherland wished to assume for themselves the position of the colonizer. The awareness that something had been wrong with colonization all this time grew strong. Actually the awareness had always been there, and for the time being they wanted to take advantage of this new-recovered sense. In post-colonial Belgium there is a symbolic struggle for the cherished position of the colonized, the exploited, the oppressed, the black person. At all price one wanted to be black.¹⁸⁸

Phenomenons that support stabilization and the ones supporting separatism.

In Belgium there are several factors that fuel both tendency to stabilization and separatism. We can mention economic, political, psychological, religious, social background.

What factors will tend to hold the system in a stable balance and what factors will tend to undermine the system and perhaps push it towards separatism? First, stabilising factors:

Political investment

The political parties have invested considerable political capital in the process for a long time. They will not wish to forfeit that lightly. With the exception of the far right, all parties have at least some investment in the process, whether or not they are in government. Indeed the Green parties have never been in government, but they supported the St Michael’s Day Agreement of 1993 which was the latest stone in the procces.

Flemish self-confidence

Increasing Flemish self-confidence can lead to longer-term stabilization, as it could mean that the Flemish numerical majority would lose its dangerous psychological sense of minority status: in Belgium you have a majority with a minority complex and a minority with a majority complex. Were that to become over time established accommodation between the communities-based on some concessions to the Walloons going beyond their numerical rights - might become possible, creating a climate of greater mutual confidence.



Regionalisation

This will permit asymmetrical coalitions and greater flexibility in policies to take account of regional differences, reducing tensions within the system - as each community can go its own way - and potentially simplifying coalition-building. ¹⁸⁹



Brussels

Both communities are attached to Brussels - an 80 per cent French-speaking enclave in Flemish territory, though a Flemish city until the 19^th century when it became a government city. It can not be geographically divided like Berlin or Beirut, as there is no distinct Flemish part. In the event of separation, it would be an almost insoluble problem to decide what should happen to Brussels. Hence, it has become a separate bilingual region, with strong guarantees for the Flemish minority. The problem of Brussels requires, as it were, the parents to stay together for the child. Otherwise a ‘velvet divorce’ would be quite likely.

There are, however, also destabilising factors:

External factors

Before the end of the cold war, the structure of European states seemed set in stone. It seemed unlikely any new European states would be created. Membership of the EU was also an important argument against secessionist pressures within Belgium and elsewhere. Since 1989, numerous new states have been created in central and eastern Europe. The velvet divorce in Czechoslovakia saw both successor states easily assume the membership of international organizations that had been held by Czechoslovakia, including association with the EU. There is now no longer any international taboo on splitting states, provided it happens-as it would in Belgium-in a peaceful, democratic and consensual manner. The international dimension is no longer a significant stabilizing pressure, and indeed the example of Czechoslovakia could offer a model.



Lack of national political parties

Traditionally, there were only three significant parties in Belgium, representing the three traditional ‘political families’: Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal. These unitary, national political parties were an important cement, holding the country together. By the mid-70s all three had split into pairs of Flemish-and French-speaking parties, making six in all. There were of course also the community parties and, later, the Greens and the far-right Vlaams Blok. The pairs drifted wider apart and tended to be more concerned about forming alliances or ‘fronts’ within their own communities, rather than ideological alliances across the community divide. Each pair of ‘sister’ parties first diverged on community issues, but then increasingly on other issues too.

Lack of a national civil society

In the reform phase, the disaggregation and decentralisation of the then national civil-society networks was necessary and desirable. It was then supportive of the reform process. Such networks naturally gravitate towards the most relevant and effective power centres, in terms of their areas of concern, as well as adopting an instinctive subsidiarity or proximity approach. As power centres devolved, they devolved. Now, this process may have gone too far. It contributes to the growing separation of the two polities. Like political parties, civil-society networks could be part of a residual national cement, counter-balancing centrifugal tendencies, if they were able and willing to do so.



Finance issues

There have always been implicit inter-regional transfers, as within any state. These have become more visible, and therefore the target of criticism, as federalisation has proceeded. They have seemed to be a one-way street, with Flanders as the net contributor to Wallonia. This has become particularly clear in relation to the most important remaining and increasingly expensive mechanism of financial solidarity, the social security system. Federalisation of social security, and with it financial responsibility, has become a key demand of the most radical Flemish nationalists. For Wallonia, this is regarded as non-negotiable. Failure to reach an acceptable compromise on this issue would be regarded by some in Flanders as a signal that no more could be achieved through inter-community dialogue. At that point some would seek to put separatism on the agenda.



Political alienation

Increasingly , these political structures, mentalities, processes and arrangements, put in place between 1970 and 1993, have come under critical attack as undemocratic, elite-driven, closed, inflexible, outmoded and unresponsive to new challenges. In the past, public support and indeed trust was perhaps more passive than active, but it was available, provided the political system delivered. Now, the system is subject to two different, though related, criticisms: one is essentially substantive while the second is more a matter of style and approach. Worse, the extreme concentration of political energy in one direction has pitted political antennae against new issues, whose emergence has been ignored with the result that they have been addressed far too late, if at all. This has only served to increase alienation, with a sense that the traditional structures are out of date, out of touch and irrelevant. ¹⁹¹

The conflict was also significantly fueled by Flemish-nationalist movements.

Although Flemish nationalism has enjoyed a history of just over eighty years (with a short break just after World War II) it has proved to be sustainable. It led the struggle toward federalism in the 1970s and 1980s, and leads the struggle today towards Flemish independence. The Flemish movement, backed by religious leaders and civil servants, began a cultural campaign to strengthen Flemish culture and language almost immediately after independence. ¹⁹²

Flemish Movement set forth several demands. In 1898, Flemish became an official language. This recognition transformed interethnic relations, as it strengthened the tendency to see Belgium as a bicultural society. Francophones reacted defensively against the pressure of the Flemish. In 1912, the Congrès Wallon advocated an administrative separation of Flanders and Wallonia. In 1912, future Minister of State Jules Destrée, in an often-quoted “open letter to the King” stated, “Sire, there are no Belgians. There are only Flemish and Walloons,” arguing that eighty years of nation building had failed to produce a dominant basis of identification, while ethnoterritorial groups had gained salience. Universal suffrage for men was granted in 1893, but multiple votes allowed Francophones to retain a majority of votes. This situation proved untenable, as it signified the domination of the majority by a demographic minority. Each reform changed the political and cultural climate to encourage further changes, but also mitigated the levels of hostility that could have erupted into violent conflict.

After the war, Belgians established the Research Center for the National Solution of Social, Political and Juridical Problems in the Walloon and Flemish Regions. The Center reported that the Flemish, although the demographic majority, had minority status in military, political, diplomatic, business and cultural circles. The Center noted a gradual spread of French in Flemish areas around Brussels and along the linguistic border. These reports provided additional incentives for mobilization along ethnoterritorial lines.

The Flemish demanded that the government redress the discrepancies but Walloons countermobilized against the threat to their position posed by the Flemish majority.¹⁹³

By 1969, the Flemish raised another problem. Although the territory of Brussels had been set, the “oil-stain” of Francophones in Flanders was growing towards the University of Louvain/Leuven, which is east of Brussels in Flemish Brabant. Flemish speakers in the university agitated for the removal of the Francophones from the University. The division of the university, with the creation of Louvain-la-Neuve, symbolized the larger divisions within the country. These changes reduced support for the unitary state as the notion of a common Belgian identity lost credibility. ¹⁹⁴

Economic power has shifted over the years from Wallonia to Flanders. In addition, political institutions have shifted, giving more power to Flemings and decentralizing decision-making. These considerations are further influenced by psychocultural factors such as group identification and perceptions of outgroups and motivations. These factors are compounded by the fact that the Francophone minority long held political, economic, and social advantages, leading the Flemings to become a “majority with a minority complex”. As we analyze conflicts, it is important to remember that a single approach is unlikely to address the problem completely.

However, various efforts to reduce a conflict, including symbolic, institutional, and economic measures may promote de-escalation. These approaches will then create additional structural change that will influence the choice of the parties’ tactics. An increased understanding of structural change is promoted by sensitivity to the interconnections of the various sides of the social cube. ¹⁹⁵

In 1994-95 a Flemish-Walloon conflict developed with the Flemish people arguing that the French community had violated autonomy of Flanders by supporting cultural organizations on its territory without prior consultation with Flemish authorities. Although the nationalists supported the conflict, Flemish media denied all accusations of nationalism itself as the root of the conflict.¹⁹⁶

The language border that was established in 1963 has also become a strong cultural dividing line according to Derk Jan Eppink in an article in Internationale Spectator in 1998:

"One does not only speak two different languages, one lives in two completely different worlds. The public opinion in the two parts is completely at odds with each other and only shows a common interest during a soccer game of the Red Devils [the national soccer team] … The knowledge of Walloons about Flanders is very limited, and the same way vice versa. Slowly, one starts to see each other as foreigners"¹⁹⁷

A farsighted professor of Liege university, G. Nijples, stated in the 1830s that: “This is the beginning of a struggle and God knows where this will lead”. And the struggle goes on.

“The Flemish movement that grew out of concern about and protection of Flemish rights, culture and language, has become increasingly concerned with nationalistic issues such as the place and legitimacy of Flanders within a Belgian federal state. Nobody is interested in maintaining Belgium as such, especially with the acceleration of European integration. What do we have in common? It used to be the Belgian franc, and now it doesn’t exist"¹⁹⁸

Tastenhoye takes this argument further:

"For Flanders it doesn’t matter whether it remains inside Belgium or operates directly within Europe. Moreover, in order to achieve new social and economical relations, it is better to perform as an independent federal state in the European frame than in the jammed, chaotic social-economical context of Belgium.”¹⁹⁹

Thus the Belgian society is both horizontally and vertically divided. Each language community is almost self-sufficient entities in the modern welfare state. The Belgian party system is even more fragmented (in addition to six unilingual parties representing the main pillars there are some regional and some post-materialist or anti-system parties), yet on the federal level it shows remarkable stability or at least ability to cope with the crises (though, as some would argue, mostly delaying the inevitable decisions).²⁰⁰

The main parties have in general successfully adopted the strategies that induced the decline of the regional parties.

To form a government is difficult: it requires multi-party deals within and across regions, „symmetry” between national, regional, community, provincial, and local party coalitions, a working majority in both major language groups, and linguistic parity at every political and administrative level. And when a government is formed, it has little initiative: even foreign policy-in theory the responsibility of the national government-is effectively in the hands of the regions, since for Belgium it mostly means foreign trade agreements and these are a regional prerogative.²⁰¹

Belgium has sometimes been described as a unique example of federation in terms of two features. On the level of popular perception, the country has already been “split” into two ethnic parts and the bulk of political activity is directed toward regional governments — not to the distant center with few competencies left. However, contrary to the always present fears of the final split-up, the national, or federal, dimension of politics has not entirely vanished and the central institutions still reinforce themselves and the notion of Belgium as the single entity on the European arena.

Conclusive remarks:

Belgium today is held together by little more than the King, the public debt-and a gnawing collective sense that things cannot continue as they have. Of course the desire for a political housecleaning, Italian-style, is quite compatible with demands for even more federalization-as radical Flemish politicians have not failed to point out. The generation of the Sixties, now in power, continues to play the federalist and communalist cards; but recent polls suggest that most people, even in Flanders, no longer put regional or language issues at the head of their concerns.

This is especially true of new Belgians: the children of immigrants from Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco, or Algeria have more pressing concerns. Even those who identify strongly with Flanders (or Wallonia) don’t see a need to abolish Belgium, much less conjoin their fate to another country, or to „Europe.” Language politics, then, may have blown themselves out in Belgium.

For similar reasons, the old „pillars” are in decline. Younger Belgians see the world rather differently. They are not much moved by appeals to sectoral interest-the same prosperity that has underwritten the „Flemish miracle” has defanged the politics of linguistic resentment. What is more, Belgians no longer align themselves with a single party or community in every facet of their lives. Declining religious practice, the accessibility of higher education, and the move from countryside to town have weakened Catholic and socialist parties. This is a desirable development. Without the „pillars” Belgian politics and public life may well become more transparent and less corruption-prone. In short, they will cease to be distinctively Belgian. But what, then, will keep the country together?²⁰²

One answer is prosperity. The obvious difference between Belgium and other, less fortunate parts of Europe where politicians exploit communal sensibilities and corruption flourishes, is that Belgium is rich. Brussels may be an unappealing, seamy city and unemployment may be high in Wallonia, but life for most people in Belgium is materially sufficient. The country is at peace-if not with itself then at least with everyone else. If Belgium disappeared, many Belgians might not even notice. Some observers even hold the country acts as a postnational model for the twenty-first century: a virtually stateless society, with a self-governing, bilingual capital city whose multinational workforce services a lot of transnational agencies and companies. ²⁰³

As we enter the twenty-first century, and an uncertain era in which employment, security, and the civil and cultural core of nations will all be exposed to unprecedented and unregulated pressures beyond local control, the advantage will surely lie with countries whose governments can offer some guarantees of protection and a sense of cohesion and common purpose compatible with the preservation of civil and political liberties. So Belgium does matter, and not just to Belgians. Far from being a model, it may be a warning: we all know, at the end of the twentieth century, that you can have too much state. But Belgium may be a useful reminder that you can also have too little.²⁰⁴

Belgium is known around the world for its chocolates, its French fries, its mussels but also for … its linguistic problems.

Peaceful “conflicts” between Flemish and Walloon politicians were and will be present in Belgium’s everyday life. They break out because of various reasons. Flemish and Walloon people dislike each other, this is why it would be very difficult to end this conflict. However, a significant fact is that no one has ever been injured in clashes connected with it, blood has never been shed.

All the problems involved with this conflict have always been solved through political negotiations and compromises. Belgian political and linguistic background has been very complex. That is why Belgian government has to be flexible to work out efficient mechanisms of solving these linguistic conflicts.

The main characteristic of the Belgian solutions to language and community problems is the concern for the protection of linguistic minorities. This dimension of the “Belgian model” and the basic components of the reform of the institutional architecture can certainly be a source of inspiration to solve peacefully local conflicts between linguistic communities in other parts of the world²⁰⁵.

For many decades, a cultural dispute had been simmering between the Flemish and Walloon (French speaking) factions. By 1994, the Flemish and Walloon communities formalized their district regions (plus a third German-speaking region) in a constitutional revision.²⁰⁶

It was never a love match. But through 161 years of ups and downs, Flanders and Wallonia had created a marriage of convenience in the name of Belgium. Now, just as Brussels is blossoming into the capital of Europe, rivalries between French- and Dutch-speaking Belgians have erupted with untimely fervor²⁰⁷. While Belgium has achieved great international status, its domestic politics remain turbulent.

Conflict between these two factions is a hot topic. There is even a discussion forum about it on the website: belgium.com. I think that the opinions found there are a good illustration of the situation.

„The conflict is still alive and kicking, and for the following reasons:

Until the second world war, Belgium's official language was French, and this while 60% of the population was Flemish !, it was the war that finally made an end to this.

Many do not know this, but Brussels used to be 99% Flemish, it was like Antwerp, one of the big and prosperous cities of Flanders. With the creation of Belgium, the French-speaking liked the beautiful and well-settled city near the language border, and moved in on a massive scale, without learning its native language. And ok, Brussels is now the European capital, so it should be multilingual, shore, but it doesn't stop in Brussels ! They come and live in nearby Flemish cities, and refuse to learn the language !, they open their own stores and voila, another Flemish city is lost.

The Walloons are lazy, it is actually Flanders that carry the Belgian economy, without Flanders, Wallonia wouldn't even meet the criteria to join the European Union!

So? Well, they enjoy the same social benefits the Flemish do, which results in cash transfer of Flanders to Wallonia of 10 billion Euro! That's over 1666 Euro per every Fleming, I don't know the number, but I assume the working population of Flanders will be around 2.5 million, so it means we working Fleming pay 4000 Euro every year for Walloons social security!

And after all that, Walloon politicians still object to everything they can, and demand more and more and more. Just know one thing, The Republic of Flanders would be the most prosperous country on the face of this planet (for real). So that’s why this country should be separated !! Belgium is killing Flanders !”²⁰⁸.

This is one of the longest and mildest opinions from this forum. One can find there also statements like: “Stupid Walloon!” or “La Flandre rules!”.

This conflict is also present in everyday newspapers. The next passage is an actual letter to the editor:

“May I remind you that those “rights for the French-speaking community” were set up in the 1970s to allow the French time to learn Dutch, which they never did. They now owe themselves the right never to learn Dutch.

Also, tell your readers about the parity in parliament with 60% Dutch-speaking and 40% French-speaking, how come the parliament is represented 50-50?!”²⁰⁹.

In everyday life conflict between Flemish and Walloon is also present. One side accuses the other of discrimination, bullying etc. Few years ago a problem of NMBS (Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen, National Company of the Belgian Railways) was widely discussed. Flemish said, that their priorities were being constantly neglected.

In May 1996 it came to an open conflict between the NMBS on the one side and the Flemish Parliament joined by the Flemish Minister-President Luc van der Brande on the other. Luc van der Brande even threatened to invoke a “conflict of interests “ at the federal government²¹⁰.

The NMBS uses the following mechanism to avoid investments in Flanders: each time a new plan for ten years is launched, the investments in Flanders are planned in the second halve of those ten years, while the Walloon investments get the first five years. But usually, after five years, the plan is superseded by another, new plan, after most of the Walloon investments but before Flemish investments. The result is that Flanders don’t get much. An example of this was STAR21, that was supposed to run from 1991 until 2000, but was called of in 1995. The new plan is supposed to run from 1996 until 2005, and most of the investments in Flanders are planned after the year 2000, while most of the Walloon investments are planned before the turn of the century. If this plan too would be cancelled around 2000, Flanders won't have even seen much of the promised investments²¹¹.

There was definitely something wrong with the recognition of main axes by NMBS. Some of the important railroad axes that bring thousands of passengers to their work offices each day weren't recognized as main axes, while other railroads in Wallonia that hardly have any passengers at all were. In this logic, some necessary investments in Flanders were put aside, and moreover, to its own disadvantage, a lot of potential passengers were lost. Of course, as a national holding, the NMBS should indeed guarantee transport services in scarcely populated areas too, but it cannot justify the recognition of some of those Walloon main axes.

Fortunately, this problem was solved somehow and till now no new conflicts between Flanders and NMBS have occurred.

There has always been a conflict between "La Flandre" and "La Wallonie". Like in the UK where you have Scotland and England, however, the differences are much bigger there. In Belgium the difference between these two parties is the language. Apart from that they have the same traditions and habits. They all have the same passport, like the same food and beer.

This conflict has a long history and it is a common knowledge that both factions dislike each other. However, no one has ever been harmed because of it.

There have never been any real conflicts between Belgian (Walloon and Flemish) people, as opposed to conflicts between Belgian politicians. The best illustration for this is that even during the most heated episodes, no one has ever been killed or seriously injured in clashes connected with the linguistic conflict²¹². It suffices to consider similar situations in other countries (e.g. Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland) to conclude that such peacefulness is not a common rule.

Another important issue is that because of this mix of cultures and languages Belgium became what it is today. Belgians are tolerant and flexible. They are open to external influences and unwilling to engage in offensive actions because they have many contacts with various cultures. This mix, in my opinion, resulted in the fact that Belgium has, since the Middle Ages, always been one of the richest and most developed regions in the world and Brussels has blossomed into the capital of Europe.

Marta Majda, Katarzyna Gajda, Roman Łaboda