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The “Big A” Trinity The defense acquisition structure is a trinity of three interdependent processes of requirements, budgeting, and acquisition; also known as the “Big A.” The requirements system is the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The budgeting system is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). The acquisition system, known as the “little a”, is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). This defense acquisition structure is represented in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Defense Acquisition Structure10 JCIDS. In June 2003, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approved the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to replace the 30 year old Requirements Generation System (RGS). The JCIDS addresses capability gaps and shortfalls defined by combatant commanders. 11 The RGS was a threat-based assessment while the JCIDS is a capabilities-based approach to requirements generation. Currently the DoD develops, produces, and fields capabilities (as opposed to fielding systems) based on strategic direction from the National Military Strategy (NMS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). The JCIDS process begins with developing joint integrating concepts and the capabilities they imply from the U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). From these joint integrating concepts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) refine requirements quarterly and develop an integrated priority list. Then the Vice-JCS and the service vice-commanders form the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to validate capability requirements and determine procurement strategies. A three-phased Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) is conducted to assess joint integrating concepts. First, a Functional Area Analysis (FAA) defines operational objectives and tasks. Second, a Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) assesses how current and programmed capabilities accomplish FAA tasks. Then the FAA and FNA results are combined into a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) which highlights capability gaps. The JCD is the baseline for the third CBA phase, the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). The FSA evaluates alternative solutions to address capability gaps and its results are published in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for material solutions and in a Joint Doctrine Change Request (Joint DCR) for non-material solutions. Further analysis or acquisition decisions are conducted under the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), but the JCIDS’s Capability Development Document (CDD) and the Capability Production Document (CPD) are used to support major design Milestone approval decisions that usually lead to new contracts and defense expenditures to continue acquisition programs. The previously mentioned capability gap defining ICD supports Milestone A decisions for concept demonstrations. When technology matures, the CDD provides a more detailed solution to support Milestone B decisions to start the System Development and Demonstration (SDD). Finally, the CPD supports Milestone C decisions for low rate initial production (LRIP) and operational tests. Milestones will be discussed later on in this chapter and the JCIDS CAB process is represented in Figure 1.2.
The POM starts each service’s programming phase. The POM projects time-phased allocation of forces, resources, and manpower six years in advance. POMs identify funding shortfalls that the Joint Staff mitigates with alternative solutions that are sent off to the SECDEF for decision. The results are documented in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The budgeting phase occurs simultaneously with the programming phase. Each service submits its budget concurrently with its POM. Budget submittals project resources for two years into the future with considerable financial detail that are analyzed by the DoD Comptroller and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The analysis results in a Program Budget Decision (PBD) that proposes financial adjustments for the SECDEF to approve. After final adjustments, an overall DoD budget is submitted as part of the President’s request to Congress. The execution phase occurs along with the programming and budgeting phases. The execution phase provides feedback for defense acquisition programs through metrics that measure output versus planned performance. If program goals are not being met; observation, reallocation, restructuring, or cancellation of programs might be recommended.15 Although the DoD must request funding from Congress annually, the new PPBES exercises the planning and programming phases in even-numbered years (called “on-years”) and the budgeting and execution phases in both even-numbered years and odd-numbered years (called “off-years”).16 The PPBES on/off-years processes are represented in Figure 1.3.
(POS), Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) hierarchy. PMs are responsible for accomplishing program cost, schedule, and technical performance objectives with a staff of engineers, logisticians, contracting officers, and quality assurance, evaluation, and business management personnel. PMs are military officers or federal civil servants who report to PEOs for program execution purposes (and may also report to another leader for organizational reporting purposes). A PEO might be responsible for one large program (like F-22A or the Joint Strike Fighter) or for a portfolio of similar programs like Major General David Eidsaune, Air Force PEO for Weapons does. PEOs are military officers or federal civil servants who report to CAEs who are usually called Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs). Most SAEs report to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), who also serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).18 The DoD uses decision milestones to guide materiel development and direct capabilities production of acquisition programs. Milestone A, B, and C have a specific set of warfighter, statutory, and regulatory requirements. Milestone A is the result of the concept refinement (CR) phase that enhances the concept decision (CD) with the development of a technology development strategy (TDS). Following a Milestone A decision approving the TDS, the technology development (TD) phase reduces technology risk by determining appropriate technologies to be integrated into the full system. All technologies intended for the full system, however, are not required for Milestone B decisions. Spiral development allows the DoD to add less mature technologies into the full system after Milestone B which starts the Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.19 However, Milestone B establishes the baseline that Nunn-McCurdy breaches are based against.20 Within SDD, the systems integration (SI) phase combines various subsystems into a single prototype. Still within SDD, but after SI; the system demonstration phase tests prototypes for military utility and to identify deficiencies. The Design Readiness Review during SDD provides an opportunity for mid-phase assessment of design maturity and spiral development insertion opportunity. Milestone C represents the beginning of low rate initial production (LRIP) which is meant to prepare manufacturing and quality control processes for full-rate production (FRP), provide factory-produced products for operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and to declare initial operational capability (IOC). Defense acquisition milestones are depicted in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4 Milestones Framework21 Each milestone must be approved by a Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), usually the DAE, CAE (SAE), or PEO. MDA oversight of acquisition categories (ACATs) increases as the value of the program increases. If money is not the issue, complexity and risk usually fall under as special interest designations. Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) receive the most DoD and Congressional scrutiny and are categorized as ACAT I programs. ACAT designation and decision authorities are represented in Table 1.5. What to Remember about Acquisition The DoD acquisition process is a trinity of the “Big A”; JCIDS, PPBES, and the DAS. The JCIDS is a capabilities-based approach using strategic guidance to identify capability gaps and alternative solutions. Although planning and parts of programming occur every other year, the PPBES requires budgeting and execution every year. The “little a” DAS establishes the authority and organizational structure with the PM, PEO, CAE (or SAE), and the DAE; each
Table 1.5 Acquisition Categories22 capable of acting as a milestone decision authority for different levels of acquisition categories. Finally, acquisition officers must abide by U.S. Code and the FARs, with particular attention to the Berry Amendment which promotes domestic and small business opportunities. Despite these rules, some acquisition programs still over-spend, over-run, and under-achieve. Clearly any product, service, and process can be improved upon to create even more value. Chapter 2 will examine acquisition transformation and how the government tries to curb these disappointments. Chapter 2 Transformation is in the Eye of the Beholder Simply put, the Department of Defense acquisition process is broken. —House Armed Services Committee Report, May 5, 200623 The U.S. Government authorized the U.S. War Department to procure six large frigates in 1794 which became the first major weapons system acquisition. Seventeen months later, six keels were laid but only three of the frigates were built due to schedule and cost overruns. That very first purchase laid the foundation for an interesting pattern that has been repeated for over two centuries under countless administrations.24 Aside from the amazing military industrialization that geared up to help win World War II, a transformation of the modern defense acquisition didn’t begin until the 1960s under Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert McNamara. As a former President of Ford Motor Company, McNamara brought his system analysis discipline to the Department of Defense (DoD) and instituted the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Although SECDEF McNamara tried to cut costs by consolidating service programs (like making the Air Force buy the Navy’s F-4s and A-7s), he still experienced an average development program cost increase of 20 percent. In fact, following SECDEF McNamara’s reign, numerous commissions with infamous names such as Fitzhugh (1971), Carlucci (1981), Packard (1969, 1985), Perry (1994), and Rumsfeld (2001) failed to turn that 20 percent cost increase around.25 While each time these leaders implemented new oversight, directives, and instructions or reemphasized old initiatives; cost overruns, schedule delays, and missed expectations continued within DoD acquisiton. This chapter summarizes historical commissions, reviews recent analyses, describes controversial reports, and includes some of the most enduring legislation amendments affecting acquisition transformation. In addition, numerous government customers’ expectations of the corporate defense industry are described. This background could be used to examine whether DoD is clear about what it actually has and what it really wants. Being clear about how DoD got where it is today is one of the first steps to leading transformation.
Over the past 35 years, many acquisition transformation commissions and directives have focused on slow, almost evolutionary improvements to the much prescribed acquisition process explained in Chapter 1. “Fly Before You Buy” was recommended in the 1970s. However, today, programs are begging for more investment dollars to have companies build working prototypes during competitive risk reduction competitions. Multi-year funding was argued for in the 1980s, but it was a struggle for the F-22 program to get a three year deal in 2007, which will save the government millions of dollars. The 1990s emphasized commercial off the shelf equipment (COTS) and commercial business practices, but Congress and the public cringes when a sub-supplier is from a foreign nation. In 2001, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld complained about bureaucratic inertia within the DoD acquisition community, but today more oversight and less insight are demanded because of Nunn-McCurdy breaches which will be explained later in this chapter. Table 2.1 summarizes past acquisition commissions’ recommendations and directives. The next section will analyze what the latest initiatives have in store for acquisition system of systems. Since 2005 several analyses have been conducted focusing on defense acquisition. Common recommendations include strengthening the roles of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), investing in the general defense acquisition workforce, and emphasizing “time certain Recent Initiatives
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