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Table 2.1 Past Acquisition Transformation26 development” and “risk-based source selection.” The Defense Science Board (DSB), the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BGN), and the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) are all influential in the SECDEF’s bi-annual Defense Acquisition Transformation (DAT) report. Likewise, the DoD’s Business Transformation Agency (BTA) began publishing an annual Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) in 2005 that lays out a roadmap for achieving DoD’s business transformation by implementing changes to technology, process, and governance. DSB. The Summer 2005 Defense Science Board (DSB) Study, “Transformation: A Progress Assessment Volume II,” made several key business assessments of the DoD. It said the DoD does not have an effective multi-year business plan that aligns people and financial resources to its missions (a sharp contrast to the Fitzhugh Commission recommendations in 1971). The DSB also said that Combatant Commanders are under-represented in the JCIDS process and that accountability of performance to objectives is weak (the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment has only resulted in a handful of cancelled programs since 1982).27 QDR. The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) “Reshaping the Defense Enterprise” section addresses acquisition transformation; “There are several ongoing reviews of defense acquisition improvements being conducted both within and outside the Department in an effort to address these issues. Their results will inform the Department’s efforts to reshape defense acquisition into a truly 21st century process that is responsive to the joint warfighter.”28 The QDR purposefully offers optimistic generalities because there are too many studies being done with too many political constituencies to satisfy. BGN. The April 2006 Center for Strategic and International Studies’ “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era” (BGN) devotes a chapter in Volume II to acquisition transformation. It gives consideration to the “Big ‘A’” and “little ‘a’” and makes recommendations to improve the JCIDS and PPBES processes; again, recommending more COCOM say-so in the acquisition process and for more stable funding through multi-year contracts.29 DAPA. The January 2006 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) project report attempted to answer Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England’s request for “an integrated acquisition assessment to consider every aspect of acquisition.”30 The DAPA report made recommendations in six major elements summarized in Table 2.2. DAPA repeats many of the old great ideas that government has been trying to implement since the Packard Initiatives. This suggests an implementation problem. Experts may have a solution and players could be refusing to take recommended actions.
Table 2.2 DAPA Recommendations31 DAT. The January 2008 Defense Acquisition Transformation (DAT) report is the third edition in response to the biannual congressional reporting requirement in Section 804 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 based on the recommendations from DAPA, DSB, BGN, and the QDR. Most noted improvements in the six major elements of the DAPA include promoting networked collaboration for best business practices (Workforce), continuous process improvement to streamline processes (Acquisition), time-defined acquisition to provide relevant products to the warfighter (Requirements), capital accounts for stable funding (Budget), industry days for companies to respond to military needs (Industry), and an Enterprise Transition Plan (ERP) to allow senior leaders to make strategic choices (Organization).32 BTA. The September 2007 DoD Business Transformation Agency (BTA) Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) implemented the Enterprise Risk Assessment Methodology (ERAM). ERAM requires programs to identify and mitigate risks that would keep programs from achieving their objectives. This ETP details ERAM implementation progress on 100 systems and initiatives.33 At least the BTA is more predictive than the Nunn-McCurdy process. Government Accounting Organization (GAO) The GAO issues both legal decisions and reports in relation to defense acquisition. Although the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (“FASA II”) eliminated the General Services Board of Contract Appeals which exercised contractor bid protests, the GAO may hear both pre-award and post-award protests under its general authority to audit and settle financial matters on behalf of the federal government. The GAO, however, still cannot order injunctive or declarative relief, as can the courts. In 2007, losing contractors protested the granting of the CSAR-X development and production contract and the KC-135 maintenance contract. In turn, the GAO found incorrect usage of acquisition procedures and upheld the contract protests. As a result, the Air Force was compelled, although not legally required, to rebid the contracts.34 While the Defense Acquisition System of Systems delays procurement or maintenance, time and money are wasted and the warfighters are put at risk until resolved. Since the DoD doubled its investment in new weapons systems from $750 billion to $1.5 trillion between 2000 and 2007, measuring efficiency of programs is of great importance. For 30 years, the GAO’s reviews of weapons programs in general have found consistent cost increases, schedule delays, and technical performance shortfalls. The GAO has provided annual assessments of selected weapons programs since 2003. GAO’s annual Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs provide congressional and DoD decision makers with an unbiased, fact-based approach to identify risks and create strategies for improving troubled programs.35 Troubled programs commonly violate one or more of what has become known as the “Seven Deadly Sins of Acquisition” shown in Table 2.3.
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