Air university

— John Wilcox, Director of JCTDs¹⁵⁶

The Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition (LJDAM) program, the Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), and the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB-II) Risk Reduction Competition are derivatives of JDAM and SDB Increment-I (SDB-I) programs. Major General David Eidsaune, Program Executive Officer for Weapons and Commander of the Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) called JDAM and SDB-I as model-acquisition programs at the 2007 Air Armament Symposium in October 2007. Both programs are currently in production.¹⁵⁷ The original JDAM program began as an Operational Concept Demonstration to answer the need for an all weather precision weapon after Operation Desert Storm. Then Congress mandated JDAM as a Defense Acquisition Pilot Program (DAPP) to streamline acquisition flexibility. In contrast, LJDAM began as a Boeing Company (Boeing) investment to fulfill the need to hit a moving target in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). As a Congressional mandated Pathfinder program to cut acquisition length and after initial testing, the SDB-I was advertised as a low collateral damage weapon due to its smaller blast and fragmentation radius as compared to a conventional 500 pound Mark(Mk)-82 JDAM equipped series bomb (Guided Bomb Unit, GBU-38). Due to the enemy engaging coalition troops from positions near schools, hospitals, and religious buildings in OIF and OEF, the FLM evolved from the military labs into a JCTD as an ultra low collateral damage weapon because of its confined blast radius. While the JDAM program prioritized cost and SDB-I program emphasized schedule, the SDB-II competition is prioritizing performance against stationary and specifically categorized moving targets. Several questions about the programs come to mind. Are LJDAM, FLM, and SDB-II following in the successful footsteps of JDAM and SDB-I? Are these derivative programs applying any of the lessons offered by JDAM and SDB-I? This chapter will attempt to answer these questions, as well as, what is the same and different in relation to leadership, teaming, strategy, and execution.

Laser JDAM

The LJDAM (GBU-54) expands the capability of the JDAM. It provides a modular laser sensor kit that is easily installed to the front of existing JDAMs in the field. The laser-guided JDAM adds mission flexibility to attack targets of opportunity, including mobile wheeled, tracked, and boat targets, to the already outstanding Global Positioning System / Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS), all-weather capability, that the current JDAMs offer.¹⁵⁸ The Air Force and Navy already have Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs), but its current capability is limited against fast moving targets. The next section describes how one retired Air Force warrior, now Boeing contractor, provided the customer an option to meet an unfilled need.

Feedback from Air Force F-16 and Navy F/A-18 aircrew in OEF in late 2001 and early 2002 was that they were getting re-fragged off their scheduled Air Tasking Order missions to Targets of Opportunity (TOO) 60 to 80 percent of the time. Eventually, aircraft TOO weapon loadout consisted of a LGB on one wing (for weather good) and JDAM on the other wing (for bad weather). No matter what happened on the missions, half the loadout would be invariably wrong. Furthermore at the beginning of OEF, aircrew confidence of JDAM’s GPS commensurate coordinates for attacking targets was low. After Enduring Look studied tactical results for OEF and the initial results of OIF in 2003, JDAM achieved a circular error probable much better than expected.¹⁵⁹

Steve Wingfield, a former F-4E and F-15E Weapons System Operator and Air Combat Command (ACC) requirements staff officer, now manager of Boeing JDAM business development, built a business case suggesting that Boeing Weapons was missing out on business opportunities stemming from an unsatisfied mission. In 2002, it took him just nine months to convince Mike Marks, Vice-President of Weapons, and Rick Heerdt, JDAM Program Manager (PM) to approve $20 million for independent research and development and flight tests to expand the target set for the JDAM by giving it a laser to engage moving targets. Mr. Wingfield’s process was slowed, however, because it took him four years, 2002 to 2006, to convince the Air Force that LJDAM could fulfill a well documented requirements gap to engage moving targets as a formal requirement. ¹⁶⁰

The grassroots process began when Mr. Wingfield was invited to the annual Combat Air Forces Weapons and Tactics Conference (CAF WEPTAC) at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) in January 2003 (and every January thereafter). Each year at WEPTAC, the Air Force warfighters consolidate their Top-5 Requests for the Commander of Air Combat Command. The attending warfighters report their consensus perspective to their respective Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) who in turn consolidate their requirements into the Integrated Priority List to compete for funding. In 2005, Mr. Wingfield briefed Air Force Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Walter Buchanan, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Air Forces and showed him a video of a LJDAM hitting a 15 miles per hour (mph) bread van.¹⁶¹ Lt Gen Buchanan was an instant supporter of this “field installed” capability and asked to be informed of Boeing’s progress. He wanted to see the capability against faster moving targets. In lieu of formal requirements, Mr. Wingfield helped develop the Air Force’s system requirements for a mission flexible JDAM/LGB type weapon to hit fixed targets with a 3 meter circular error probable (CEP) and a 40 mph moving target with a 5 meter CEP.¹⁶² Mr. Wingfield continued visiting WEPTAC and CENTCOM Air Forces (CENTAF) once a year. Finally in 2006, Boeing hit an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) at 25 mph. To keep Boeing’s cost as low as possible, they shared range time with other testing and provided contractual consideration to the JDAM Joint Project Office to get the moving target LJDAM testing accomplished¹⁶³ This motivated Lt Gen Gary North, Lt Gen Buchanan’s successor to begin crafting a CENTCOM Urgent Operational Need (UON) statement for a moving target capability. In September 2006, the LJDAM scored a 2 meter “hit” on a 40 mph target, motivating CENTAF to encourage ACC to include LJDAM in a planned evaluation of inventory weapons against fast moving targets. Finally, the Air Force’s 422^nd Test and Evaluation Squadron supported a fast moving target test which included LJDAM. Although the threshold criterion is 40 mph, the objective criterion is 50-70 mph.¹⁶⁴

In the past, requirements were directed from the top-down or were based upon the experiences from the last war. For the Air Force, ACC owned that requirements process. There used to be enough warfighters/operators doing staff jobs working requirements and they were always willing to take risks and make decisions. But today, most of the warfighters/operators are on the front line fighting or planning for the next operation and contractors are doing more of the requirements paperwork. By law, these contractors cannot sign up to any requirements and they do not sit on source selection boards. As more and more staff jobs concerning acquisition are sourced out, fewer active duty decision makers are available. And to slow down the process even more, JROC and Materials Command all have a vote in the process.¹⁶⁵ After four years of Mr. Wingfield courting the Air Force, Boeing was awarded a $28 million quick reaction capability contract for delivery of 600 laser seekers for existing inventories of Mk-82 500 pound bombs, 200 of which will go to the Navy by June 2009.¹⁶⁶ The first 15 laser kits were delivered to the Air Force in April 2008 and are expected to be employed in support of OEF/OIF.

In a separate effort, the Navy is running a $214.6 million competition for the Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC) program. DAMTC seeks over 17,000 JDAM and/or LGB weapons as the foundation for a dual mode weapon that is capable of prosecuting moving targets up to 70 mph.¹⁶⁷ This is the second quick reaction capability (QRC) effort to answer the UON for a fixed wing aircraft moving target weapon. DAMTC’s goal is to field a solution by fiscal year 2009, but Laser JDAM is already fielded. What normally takes 10-12 years to develop took industry 3-4 years to develop. This time frame included the Air Force’s requirements.

FLM

The FLM (GBU-39B) is an ultra low collateral damage version of the SDB-I weapon. The GBU-39B is designed to be carried on the smart SDB Bomb Rack Unit (BRU)-61 four-place carriage. FLM uses an advanced, multiphase blast explosive (MBX) fill. The MBX fill was developed by the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Munitions Directorate at Eglin AFB and the fill was produced in limited fashion as government furnished equipment from the High Explosive Research and Development (HERD) facility, also at Eglin AFB. The composite carbon fiber case was developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and is currently subcontracted out to Aerojet. The FLM warhead was designed to create a more intense and lethal near-field blast with significantly less warhead fragmentation.¹⁶⁸ The FLM was not intended to replace SDB-I, but to compliment it. "FLM is a ultra low-collateral-damage variant of our SDB I system that provides a large blast effect with very few metal fragments," said Boeing SDB Program Manager Dan Jaspering, "it will allow the warfighter to prosecute targets in confined areas while minimizing the risk of damaging adjacent structures.”¹⁶⁹

According to John Wilcox, Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Precision Engagement and Director of JCTD Programs, “The primary goal of the JCTD Program is to demonstrate, operationally assess, rapidly deploy, and transition capability solutions and innovative concepts to address the joint, coalition and interagency operational gaps and shortfalls.”¹⁷⁰ JTCDs began as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) in 1995. Since then, of the 168 JCTDs/ACTDs that were initiated, 100 completed a demonstration. Of that 100, 45 transitioned to a program of record, 33 produced residuals that are meeting warfighters needs, and 22 were returned to the technology base.¹⁷¹

COMCOMs sponsor JCTDs through their codified operational priorities and needs. Due to the increasing successes of JCTDs with residuals out in the field, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has developed a set of best practices in the JCTD Practical Operating Guidelines (POG), Version 1.0, to support the JCTD life cycle from candidacy and development through operational demonstrations and assessment, to effective transition planning and fielding. Some of the best practices include using mature technology; providing tactics, techniques, and procedures; results within three years; being joint; demonstrating prototypes; leaving behind residuals; and backing it with a robust military utility assessment (MUA).¹⁷²

Michael Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), and Sue Payton, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, approved FLM as a candidate JCTD in February 2006 at a “Breakfast Club” meeting where service JCTDs are vetted.¹⁷³ In fact it has become well known that FLM was the SECAF’s pet project to support the warfighters in OIF/OEF in the timeliest manner. In April 2006, CENTCOM sponsored FLM as an out of cycle JCTD to determine the military utility of the FLM system based on CENTAF’s identification of an UON for a low collateral damage weapon. In August 2006, the 918^th Armament Systems Group and Boeing entered into a $27 million contract arrangement for the integration and test of the FLM warhead into the SDB weapon system and delivery of 50 FLM weapons residuals in 2008 with the Air Force potentially procuring as many as 450 SDB I FLM units through 2012.¹⁷⁴

The FLM program underwent a robust three-phased MUA. The first phase involved weaponeering workshops to understand collateral damage estimation better and to incorporate FLM mission planning into SDB-I. The second phase detonated static warheads to verify FLM’s blast characteristics versus personnel, personnel in light vehicles, and personnel in various masonry structures. The third phase conducted flight tests with both Guided Test Vehicles (GTVs) and live tactical rounds. The GTVs were flown for accuracy because the new warhead had different mass properties than SDB-I. The live rounds were flown against simulated environments consisting of personnel in or near light trucks, adobe and masonry houses, and oil pipelines. The FLM program is represented in Figure 5.1. Note that the 50 FLM residuals were delivered to the Air Force on February 28, 2008, three months early.¹⁷⁵

Mike Wasylczyk, Boeing’s first and current FLM PM, attributes the success of the FLM program to an experienced and small team made up of Boeing and Eglin AFB Systems Program Office (SPO) professionals who took on an aggressive and simple test schedule with some leveraging off the SDB-I program. Mr. Wasylczyk felt the Boeing/SPO team became a mini-integrator of AFRL, Lawrence Livermore, HERD, and Aerojet.¹⁷⁶ Mr. Wasylczyk’s testing methodology evolved under USAF Colonel (Retired) James McClendon, the original SPO SDB-I PM. Colonel McClendon dubbed Mr. Wasylczyk’s simple, but realistic testing results as “Trunk Monkey Certified.”¹⁷⁷ Mr. Wasylczyk and the Boeing/SPO team said they look forward to FLM’s operational use by Lakenheath AFB’s F-15E’s in OEF/OIF during the summer of 2008.



Figure 5.1 FLM Program¹⁷⁸

As alluded to by John Wilson, the Director of JCTD Programs, transitioning a successfully demonstrated JCTD to a program of record or to low rate initial production (LRIP) can be challenging.¹⁷⁹ In FLM’s case, there will be a significant gap, several months to a year, between the delivery of residuals to Milestone C approval (for LRIP) to actually producing the first production lot of FLMs. Mr. Wasylczyk believes there are three challenges. First, FLM suffers from the same reputation that SDB-I suffers from, not being originally designed as a close air support weapon. Second, there are competing low collateral damage programs in every service. Third, FLM’s funding scheme is making the FLM hard to afford, “It comes down to the timeliness of the money,” according to Mr. Wasylczyk, “it is tough on the supplier base when you only plan to make a hundred weapons a year for just a few years.”¹⁸⁰ If FLM weapons are not used by the warfighters now, JCTD success can still be declared if the MBX fill is put inside a Mk-82 carbon fiber case with a laser JDAM kit or if a miniaturized laser JDAM-like package can be put on front of the current FLM—all to satisfy the warfighter.

The second SDB weapon, (SDB-Increment II, SDB-II) provides a robust network capable weapon against stationary and specifically categorized moving targets and, if necessary, from stand-off ranges. In April 2006, the Air Force awarded Boeing and Raytheon $144 million each to compete in a 42-month risk reduction program competition, which has a potential value worth of $1.3 billion.¹⁸¹ This is not the same as the rolling down-selects for JDAM and SDB-I. The SPO will carry both contractors to the end of the risk reduction competition hoping that the competition will yield two very viable prototypes. Only one “helper”, not a team of helpers, is assigned to each contractor. Although interim feedbacks for each contractor will not count towards the final selection, past performance is part of the four source selection factors. The two most heavily weighted source selection factors are past performance (based on recent and relevant Contractor Performance Annual Reports) and proposal risk (technology readiness levels, manufacturability), followed by mission capability (performance specifications and robustness), and cost (estimated within independent government estimate).

For SDB-II, Boeing has teamed with Lockheed-Martin. In this relationship, Boeing performs as the prime contractor and system integrator. Boeing is responsible for the overall weapons system and will supply the air vehicle and data link system. Lockheed Martin is responsible for the tri-mode seeker that enables the all-weather attack and categorization of moving targets, a critical requirement for SDB-II.¹⁸²

Why the Re-compete?

As originally reported, funding constraints and immature technology forced the SECAF, the Chief of Staff for the Air Force, and the Commander of ACC to defer SDB-II requirements in May 2002. In August 2003, the Air Force discovered additional funding that could be applied to SDB-II requirements. Since Boeing won the SDB-I Component Advanced Design competition, the Air Force submitted a sole source justification and approval letter in November 2003 to award Boeing the SDB-II moving target requirements to in a spiral development effort during Boeing’s System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. In October 2004, Darleen Druyun, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, pleaded guilty to arranging prospective employment for herself, her daughter, and her son-in-law at a company she was negotiating with. That company was Boeing and most of the negotiation was thought to be associated with the now defunct Boeing 767 Tanker Lease deal. When Ms. Druyun’s testimony became public in October 2004, it showed that most of the family job negotiation was during the time the original SDB-II requirements were deferred in 2002. In light of this information, Lockheed-Martin submitted a protest to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in November 2004. In February 2005, the GAO recommended that the Air Force conduct a competitive procurement for the previously deferred SDB-II requirements, especially since Boeing’s contract was not yet amended to perform such duties.¹⁸³ In an interesting turn of events, Boeing and Lockheed-Martin decide to team together and compete against Raytheon.

The Air Force is not expected to award a sole source contract for the SDB II SDD phase until late 2009, a full three and a half years for the competitive risk reduction phase. The SDB-I Component Advanced Design competition only took two years. Just as SDB-I was named as a Pathfinder program, ACC nominated SDB-II as a Time Certain Capability (TCC) pilot program. According to Lieutenant Colonel Jason Denney, the SDB-II PM out of the 682^nd Armament Systems Squadron, “TCC gives the PM the power to make trades below the KPP requirements level to get a capability out to the field on-time.”¹⁸⁴

Without divulging any competition sensitive issues, the SDB-II technological challenge is getting squeezed, even with 18 months left in the risk reduction competition between Boeing/Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon. In the near term, the laser homing capability in the SDB-II tri-mode seeker is already emerging now with Laser JDAM and DAMTC. In the far term, SDB-II could be supplanted by the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile’s (JAGM’s) advanced electro-optical seeker that the Army and Navy are supporting.¹⁸⁵

What’s the Future?

So the pendulum is definitely swinging for the next generation of Boeing weapons. JDAM combined a couple of service programs to become a DAPP. LJDAM and DAMTC are potentially diverging away from jointness to get what their respective services want to engage fast moving targets with a laser designator. Although Boeing was able to develop LJDAM in two years, it took four years to convince the Air Force to procure this capability. This lag time cost the warrior and perhaps even the OEF/OIF efforts in numerous immeasurable ways.

Although FLM makes the case for agile acquisition, it had the luxury of leveraging off the existing SDB-I program. Nevertheless, FLM took only 18 months from concept to delivery of residuals. Even with the SDB-I handicap, it took the leadership of one person and the effort of a small team to drive the testing schedule home.

JDAM’s champion was General McPeak and JDAM’s motto was cost. SDB-I’s champion was General Jumper and SDB-I’s motto was schedule. SDB-II’s motto, by default, is about technical performance. SDB-II currently has several good PM’s, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Jason Denny from the SPO, Dick Bernard from Boeing, and Rich Roellig from Raytheon. However, the Air Force is sending Lt Col Denney to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, a very good opportunity, but the PM position will be unfilled for a few critical months during the risk reduction competition. Although SDB-II was dubbed a TCC, its customers want incredible performance that other programs might partially realize first.

Not without challenges, Table 5.2 summarizes some Laser JDAM, FLM and SDB-II lessons on leadership, teaming, strategy, and execution that might be useful in the future.

— Terry Little, Testimony to House Armed Services Committee, 2006¹⁸⁶