John stuart mill

the product of palpable imposture, not even supported by the prestige of

extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands,

and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers,

railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this

religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that its prophet and

founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its

adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly

expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now

that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many

in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not

convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to

conform to the opinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine

which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the

ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy; which,

though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite

unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English, and profess

to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of

this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in

any way countenanced by the principle of liberty, it is a direct infraction of

that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the

community, and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation

towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much

voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the

sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution;

and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the

common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage

the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer

being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not

asked to recognize such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from

their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients

have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be

demanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were

unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which

they have been the first to render habitable to human beings; it is difficult to

see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living

there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other

nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied

with their ways. A recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit,

proposes (to use his own words,) not a crusade, but a civilizade, against this

polygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in

civilization. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community

has a right to force another to be civilized. So long as the sufferers by the

bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities, I cannot admit that

persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a

condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be

satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some

thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send

missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair

means, (of which silencing the teachers is not one,) oppose the progress of

similar doctrines among their own people. If civilization has got the better of

barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to

be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and

conquer civilization. A civilization that can thus succumb to its vanquished

enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests

and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to

stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilization receives notice

to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and

regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.

[1] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When this

industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian

fire-worshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs, arrived

in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on

condition of not eating beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the

dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a continuance

of indulgence, on condition of refraining from pork. What was at first obedience

to authority became a second nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both

from beef and pork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence

has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East, is a

religion.

CHAPTER V

APPLICATIONS

THE principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the

basis for discussion of details, before a consistent application of them to all

the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any

prospect of advantage. The few observations I propose to make on questions of

detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them

out to their consequences. I offer, not so much applications, as specimens of

application; which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and

limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay

and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, in the cases

where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.

The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his

actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself.

Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if thought

necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can

justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that

for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual

is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments,

if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its

protection.

In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or

probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the

interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such

interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object,

necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or

intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such

oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social

institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would

be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded

profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in

any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of

others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by

common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons

should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other

words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed

competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to

interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to

the general interest to permit — namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of

goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of

society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the

jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of

governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix prices,

and regulate the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, though not

till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of

commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and

sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for

supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade,

which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle

of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on

production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua

restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of

conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because

they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them.

As the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of Free

Trade so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the

limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of public control is

admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration; how far sanitary

precautions, or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous

occupations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions involve

considerations of liberty, only in so far as leaving people to themselves is

always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling them: but that they may be

legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On the other

hand, there are questions relating to interference with trade which are

essentially questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already touched upon;

the prohibition of the importation of opium into China; the restriction of the

sale of poisons; all cases, in short, where the object of the interference is to

make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These

interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the

producer or seller, but on that of the buyer.

One of these examples, that of the sale of poisons, opens a new question; the

proper limits of what may be called the functions of police; how far liberty may

legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident. It is one

of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime

before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it afterwards. The

preventive function of government, however, is far more liable to be abused, to

the prejudice of liberty, than the punitory function; for there is hardly any

part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit

of being represented, and fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form

or other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or even a private

person, sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime, they are not bound

to look on inactive until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent

it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission

of murder, it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may,

however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, and

restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other.

Again, it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If

either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a

bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn

him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back without any real

infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and

he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a

certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can

judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk:

in this case, therefore, (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state

of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting

faculty,) he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger; not forcibly

prevented from exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied to such a

question as the sale of poisons, may enable us to decide which among the

possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle. Such a

precaution, for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive

of its dangerous character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the

buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous

qualities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a medical

practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, always expensive, to obtain

the article for legitimate uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which

difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means,

without any infringement, worth taking into account, Upon the liberty of those

who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes, consists in providing

what, in the apt language of Bentham, is called "preappointed evidence." This

provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts. It is usual and

right that the law, when a contract is entered into, should require as the

condition of its enforcing performance, that certain formalities should be

observed, such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order

that in case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove that the

contract was really entered into, and that there was nothing in the

circumstances to render it legally invalid: the effect being, to throw great

obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circumstances

which, if known, would destroy their validity. Precautions of a similar nature

might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime.

The seller, for example, might be required to enter in a register the exact time

of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and

quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer

he received. When there was no medical prescription, the presence of some third

person might be required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in case there

should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to

criminal purposes. Such regulations would in general be no material impediment

to obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to making an improper use

of it without detection.

The right inherent in society, to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent

precautions, suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely

self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of

prevention or punishment. Drunkennesses, for example, in ordinary cases, is not

a fit subject for legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly

legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of any act of violence to

others under the influence of drink, should be placed under a special legal

restriction, personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found drunk, he

should be liable to a penalty, and that if when in that state he committed

another offence, the punishment to which he would be liable for that other

offence should be increased in severity. The making himself drunk, in a person

whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime against others. So,

again, idleness, except in a person receiving support from the public, or except

when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot without tyranny be made a

subject of legal punishment; but if either from idleness or from any other

avoidable cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, as for

instance to support his children, it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that

obligation, by compulsory labor, if no other means are available.

Again, there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the agents

themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly,

are a violation of good manners, and coming thus within the category of offences

against others, may rightfully be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against

decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only

connected indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally

strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed

to be so.

There is another question to which an answer must be found, consistent with the

principles which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to

be blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or

punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what

the agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or

instigate? This question is not free from difficulty. The case of a person who

solicits another to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct.

To give advice or offer inducements to any one, is a social act, and may

therefore, like actions in general which affect others, be supposed amenable to

social control. But a little reflection corrects the first impression, by

showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual

liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is

grounded, are applicable to it. If people must be allowed, in whatever concerns

only themselves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril, they

must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so

done; to exchange opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is

permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. The question is doubtful,

only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice; when he

makes it his occupation, for subsistence, or pecuniary gain, to promote what

society and the State consider to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element of

complication is introduced; namely, the existence of classes of persons with an

interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal, and whose mode of

living is grounded on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be interfered with,

or not? Fornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling; but

should a person be free to be a pimp, or to keep a gambling-house? The case is

one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, and it

is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are

arguments on both sides. On the side of toleration it may be said, that the fact

of following anything as an occupation, and living or profiting by the practice

of it, cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible; that the

act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that if

the principles which we have hitherto defended are true, society has no

business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the

individual; that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should be

as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In opposition to this it may be

contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in

authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or

such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they

are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or

not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be

acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which

are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial — who

have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the

State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects

only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good,

by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or

foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons

who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it

may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly

indefensible — though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each

other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own

subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors — yet public

gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is

never effectual, and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the

police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences; but they

may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy

and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them;

and more than this society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in

these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to

justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary, when the principal is (and

must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the

fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the

common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous

grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess,

and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no