John stuart mill

argument can be founded on this, in favor, for instance, of the Maine Law;

because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse,

are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use. The interest,

however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and

justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees, which but

for that justification would be infringements of legitimate liberty.

A further question is, whether the State while it permits, should nevertheless

indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of

the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the means of

drunkenness more costly, or add to the difficulty of procuring them, by limiting

the number of the places of sale. On this as on most other practical questions,

many distinctions require to be made. To tax stimulants for the sole purpose of

making them more difficult to be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree

from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were

justifiable. Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do

not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on

them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their

mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral

obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must

rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to

condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes

of revenue. But it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is

absolutely inevitable; that in most countries it is necessary that a

considerable part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State,

therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which to some persons may be

prohibitory, on the use of some articles of consumption. It is hence the duty of

the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the

consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which

it deems the use, beyond a very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious.

Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest

amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it

yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of.

The question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive

privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the

restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require

the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences

against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to

confine the power of selling these commodities (at least for consumption on the

spot) to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct; to make such

regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for

public surveillance, and to withdraw the license if breaches of the peace

repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the

house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences

against the law. Any further restriction I do not conceive to be, in principle,

justifiable. The limitation in number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses,

for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and

diminishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an

inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused, but

is suited only to a state of society in which the laboring classes are avowedly

treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to

fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the

principle on which the laboring classes are professedly governed in any free

country; and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to

their being so governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate

them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved

that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the

alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in

any case which needs be considered here. It is only because the institutions of

this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our

practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal,

government, while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise

of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy

as a moral education.

It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that the liberty of the

individual, in things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a

corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual

agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but

themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as the will of all the

persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will may change, it is

often necessary, even in things in which they alone are concerned, that they

should enter into engagements with one another; and when they do, it is fit, as

a general rule, that those engagements should be kept. Yet in the laws probably,

of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are

not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties, but it is

sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement,

that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilized countries,

for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow

himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law

nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing

of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme

case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a

person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice

is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endurable, to

him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his

own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his

liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act. He therefore

defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of

allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in

a position which has no longer the presumption in its favor, that would be

afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot

require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed

to alienate his freedom. These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in

this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is

everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continually require,

not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this

and the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands

uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves,

requires that those who have become bound to one another, in things which

concern no third party, should be able to release one another from the

engagement: and even without such voluntary release, there are perhaps no

contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of

which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of

retractation. Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, in the excellent Essay from which I

have already quoted, states it as his conviction, that engagements which involve

personal relations or services, should never be legally binding beyond a limited

duration of time; and that the most important of these engagements, marriage,

having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of

both the parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the

declared will of either party to dissolve it. This subject is too important, and

too complicated, to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch on it only so far

as is necessary for purposes of illustration. If the conciseness and generality

of Baron Humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content

himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises, he

would doubtless have recognized that the question cannot be decided on grounds

so simple as those to which he confines himself. When a person, either by

express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon his

continuing to act in a certain way — to build expectations and calculations, and

stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition, a new series of moral

obligations arises on his part towards that person, which may possibly be

overruled, but can not be ignored. And again, if the relation between two

contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others; if it has

placed third parties in any peculiar position, or, as in the case of marriage,

has even called third parties into existence, obligations arise on the part of

both the contracting parties towards those third persons, the fulfilment of

which, or at all events, the mode of fulfilment, must be greatly affected by the

continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the

contract. It does not follow, nor can I admit, that these obligations extend to

requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the

reluctant party; but they are a necessary element in the question; and even if,

as Von Humboldt maintains, they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom

of the parties to release themselves from the engagement (and I also hold that

they ought not to make much difference), they necessarily make a great

difference in the moral freedom. A person is bound to take all these

circumstances into account, before resolving on a step which may affect such

important interests of others; and if he does not allow proper weight to those

interests, he is morally responsible for the wrong. I have made these obvious

remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty, and not

because they are at all needed on the particular question, which, on the

contrary, is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything,

and that of grown persons nothing.

I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general

principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as

withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the

modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case

where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as

he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in

acting for another under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own

affairs. The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially

regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of

any power which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost

entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations, a case, in its direct

influence on human happiness, more important than all the others taken together.

The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs not be enlarged upon

here, because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil, than

that wives should have the same rights, and should receive the protection of law

in the same manner, as all other persons; and because, on this subject, the

defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of

liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. It is in the case of

children, that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the

fulfilment by the State of its duties. One would almost think that a man's

children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a part of

himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his

absolute and exclusive control over them; more jealous than of almost any

interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of

mankind value liberty than power. Consider, for example, the case of education.

Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel

the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its

citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth?

Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the

parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the father), after summoning a human

being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform

his part well in life towards others and towards himself. But while this is

unanimously declared to be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country,

will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead of his being required

to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child, it is

left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis! It still

remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into existence without a fair

prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction

and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate

offspring and against society; and that if the parent does not fulfil this

obligation, the State ought to see it fulfilled, at the charge, as far as

possible, of the parent.

Were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted, there would be an

end to the difficulties about what the State should teach, and how it should

teach, which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and

parties, causing the time and labor which should have been spent in educating,

to be wasted in quarrelling about education. If the government would make up its

mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the

trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education

where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school

fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses

of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged

with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of

education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that

education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or any large part

of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one

in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of

character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the

same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education

is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as

the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in

the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the

majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and

successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural

tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the

State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing

experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the

others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in

general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for

itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the

task; then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take

upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of

joint-stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for

undertaking great works of industry does not exist in the country. But in

general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to

provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and

willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the

assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory,

combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense.

The instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations,

extending to all children, and beginning at an early age. An age might be fixed

at which every child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or she) is able to

read. If a child proves unable, the father, unless he has some sufficient ground

of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be worked out, if

necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his expense.

Once in every year the examination should be renewed, with a gradually extending

range of subjects, so as to make the universal acquisition, and what is more,

retention, of a certain minimum of general knowledge, virtually compulsory.

Beyond that minimum, there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects, at

which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a

certificate. To prevent the State from exercising through these arrangements, an

improper influence over opinion, the knowledge required for passing an

examination (beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge, such as

languages and their use) should, even in the higher class of examinations, be

confined to facts and positive science exclusively. The examinations on

religion, politics, or other disputed topics, shouLd not turn on the truth or

falsehood of opinions, but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion

is held, on such grounds, by such authors, or schools, or churches. Under this

system, the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed

truths, than they are at present; they would be brought up either churchmen or

dissenters as they now are, the State merely taking care that they should be

instructed churchmen, or instructed dissenters. There would be nothing to hinder

them from being taught religion, if their parents chose, at the same schools

where they were taught other things. All attempts by the State to bias the

conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are evil; but it may very

properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge

requisite to make his conclusions, on any given subject, worth attending to. A

student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination

both in Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he takes up with, or even if

with neither: and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in

the evidences of Christianity, provided he is not required to profess a belief

in them. The examinations, however, in the higher branches of knowledge should,

I conceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giving too dangerous a power to

governments, were they allowed to exclude any one from professions, even from

the profession of teacher, for alleged deficiency of qualifications: and I

think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that degrees, or other public certificates of

scientific or professional acquirements, should be given to all who present

themselves for examination, and stand the test; but that such certificates

should confer no advantage over competitors, other than the weight which may be

attached to their testimony by public opinion.

It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced notions of liberty

prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognized, and

legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for

the former always, and in many cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of

causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions

in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility — to bestow a life

which may be either a curse or a blessing — unless the being on whom it is to be

bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a

crime against that being. And in a country either over-peopled or threatened

with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect

of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence

against all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The laws which, in many

countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that

they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers

of the State: and whether such laws be expedient or not (a question mainly

dependent on local circumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as

violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of the State to prohibit a

mischievous act — an act injurious to others, which ought to be a subject of

reprobation, and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd

legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which bend so easily to real

infringements of the freedom of the individual, in things which concern only

himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when

the consequence of their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and

depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within

reach to be in any way affected by their actions. When we compare the strange

respect of mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect for it, we

might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and no