S. naval, usa. Terrorist Group Profiles: Index of Groups
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Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)From: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003. United States Department of State, June 2004. Comments on the content of the material should be sent to the U.S. Department of State 
Description Radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. Anti-Greek establishment, anti-United States, anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO group that seeks the ouster of US bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union (EU). First designated in October 1997. Activities Initially conducted assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. Added bombings in the 1980s. Since 1990 has expanded its targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. Supports itself largely through bank robberies. A failed 17 November bombing attempt in June 2002 at the Port of Piraeus in Athens coupled with robust detective work led to the first-ever arrests of this group. In December 2003, a Greek court convicted 15 members—five of whom were given multiple life terms—of hundreds of crimes. Four other alleged members were acquitted because of a lack of evidence. Strength Unknown, but presumed to be small. Police arrested 19 suspected members of the group in 2002. Location/Area of Operation Athens, Greece. External Aid Unknown. 36. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)From: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003. United States Department of State, June 2004. Comments on the content of the material should be sent to the U.S. Department of State
Description The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an outgrowth of the GIA, appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998 and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC has gained some popular support through its pledge to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria. Its adherents abroad appear to have largely co-opted the external networks of the GIA and are particularly active throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. First designated in March 2002. Activities The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. A faction within the GSPC held 31 European tourists hostage in 2003 to collect ransom for their release. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al-Qaida. In late 2003, the new GSPC leader issued a communique declaring the group’s allegiance to a number of jihadist causes and movements, including al-Qaida. Strength Unknown; probably several hundred fighters with an unknown number of support networks inside Algeria. Location/Area of Operation Algeria, Northern Mali, Northern Mauritania, and Northern Niger. External Aid Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in years past. 37. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)From: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003. United States Department of State, June 2004. Comments on the content of the material should be sent to the U.S. Department of State
Description Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, but reports of recent SL involvement in narcotrafficking and kidnapping for ransom indicate it may have a new source of funding with which to sustain a resurgence. Its stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any infl uence by foreign governments. In January 2003, Peruvian courts granted approximately 1,900 members the right to request retrials in a civilian court, including the imprisoned top leadership. Counterterrorist operations targeted pockets of terrorist activity in the Upper Huallaga River Valley and the Apurimac/Ene River Valley, where SL columns continued to conduct periodic attacks. Peruvian authorities captured several SL members in 2003. First designated in October 1997. Activities Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations. In June 2003, an SL column kidnapped 71 Peruvian and foreign employees working on the Camisea gas line in Ayacucho Department. Strength Membership is unknown but currently estimated to be 400 to 500 armed militants. Location/Area of Operation Peru, with most activity in rural areas. External Aid None. 38. United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)From: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003. United States Department of State, June 2004. Comments on the content of the material should be sent to the U.S. Department of State
Description The AUC—commonly referred to as the paramilitaries—is a loose umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to consolidate most local and regional self-defense groups each with the mission to protect economic interests and combat FARC and ELN insurgents locally. The AUC is supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective government security and claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insurgents. Some elements under the AUC umbrella, under its political leader Carlos Castano’s influence, have voluntarily agreed to a unilateral cease-fire though violations of the cease-fire do occur. Parts of the AUC loyal to Castano currently are in negotiations with the Government of Colombia to demobilize. To date, approximately 1,000 AUC fighters have demobilized. First designated in September 2001. Activities AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to engaging FARC and ELN combat units. Castano has publicly claimed that 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are financed with drug-related earnings, the rest from “donations” from its sponsors. The AUC generally avoids actions against US personnel or interests. Strength Estimated 8,000 to 11,000 and an unknown number of active supporters. Location/Area of Operation AUC forces are strongest in the northwest in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, and Bolivar Departments. Since 1999, the group demonstrated a growing presence in other northern and southwestern departments. Clashes between the AUC and the FARC insurgents in Putumayo in 2000 demonstrated the range of the AUC to contest insurgents throughout Colombia. External Aid None. 39. |