National consumer disputes redressal commission

O R D E R

 PER JUSTICE K.S. CHAUDHARI, PRESIDING MEMBER

           Complainants have filed complaint against the opposite party for recovery of Rs.30.00 lakhs as compensation.

2.         Brief facts of the complaint are that complainant no. 1 is father of deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal, complainant no. 2 is wife of deceased Rajeev Aggarwal and complainant nos 3 to 5 are minor daughters and son of deceased Rajeev Aggarwal.  Father Rajeev Aggarwal aged 41 years met with an accident while he was proceeding towards Agra as his vehicle overturned and he sustained multiple serious injuries and became unconscious.  He was immediately taken to opposite party-hospital at Secundra, Agra where he was admitted and Rs.1200/- were charged for C.T. Scan of head, Rs.300/- for X-ray chest and wrist, Rs.600/- as OT charges, Rs.500/- as emergency charges and Rs.500/- as Doctors examination fee.  Rajeev Aggarwal was plastered in left hand and he was discharged and was informed that he is alright. He was not given documents of discharge.  Rajeev Aggarwal was complaining of serious headache and pain at back but no treatment regarding aforesaid pain was given to Mr. Rajeev Aggarwal while he was in opposite party-hospital.  Rajeev Aggarwal was taken to the house, though, his legs and hands were not moving properly besides suffering from severe pain in head and back.  Elderly persons of his family advised to shift Rajeev Aggarwal to good hospital in Delhi and for this purpose ambulance was hired on 15.10.2001 and proceeded for Delhi but Rajeev Aggarwal collapsed after he travelled about 20 kms on account of the injuries sustained by him in the accident.  Complainants contacted opposite party-hospital to supply entire medical record but opposite party-hospital refused.  From post mortem report it was revealed that the deceased had fracture of left partial bone and there was evidence of haematoma of left side of the brain and even the membranes were found congested.  100 ml. free clotted blood was also found in the brain.  Opposite party-hospital neither operated nor advised operation and on account of negligence of opposite party-doctors, Rajeev Aggarwal succumbed to death. The deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal was tee-totaller having good health and earning about 3 lakhs per annum and was also assessed to income tax.  The deceased last assessed income was Rs.3,35,332/-.  There is longevity of life in the family of the deceased as his father about 75 years old is alive, hence, complainant may be awarded Rs.30 lakhs as compensation along with 18% p.a interest.

3.         opposite party-hospital filed written statement and submitted that deceased was given first-aid treatment as outdoor patient at the hospital of opposite party.  It was admitted that C.T. scan of the head and X-ray of the chest was advised by the opposite party-hospital and Rs.300/- were charged, Rs. 600/- were charged for operation theatre and Rs.500/- were charged as fee of doctor.  It was further admitted that first-aid treatment by putting bandages on the wounds of the deceased was given.  Duty doctor of opposite party-hospital very vehemently advised the deceased to be admitted in the hospital but this advice was not followed and was not admitted in the hospital.  When Rajeev Aggarwal was brought to the opposite party-hospital, he was accompanied by his friends and after sometime his father and brother Dr. Rohit Aggarwal came there and they were of the firm view that they did not want to admit Rajeev Aggarwal in opposite party-hospital or take further treatment from the opposite party-hospital.  Dr. Rohit Aggarwal represented himself to be a doctor having his own nursing home at his house where he wanted to treat the deceased.  So, the deceased was not admitted in opposite party-hospital, hence, question of discharge does not arise.  The deceased was not in a condition to be taken to Delhi rather should have been admitted in opposite party-hospital for proper care and treatment.  The deceased was brought to the opposite party-hospital in the afternoon of 14.10.2001 and was taken away within an hour by his brother Dr. Rohit Aggarwal, his father and other relatives. As the deceased was not given proper care and treatment by his own relatives the deceased, Rajeev Aggarwalexpired.  It was denied that complainants contacted the opposite party-hospital to supply medical record and opposite party-hospital refused to supply the said medical record.  The deceased’s earning, longevity of life and his last assessed income was also denied. It was further submitted that no compensation is payable by opposite party-hospital as there was no negligence or deficiency of service on the part of the opposite party-hospital and prayed for dismissal of complaint.

4.         Complainants filed replica and alleged that Duty Doctor of the opposite party-hospital did not advise admission in the hospital and further alleged that Dr. Rohit Aggarwal did not say that they do not want to admit the deceased or take further treatment at the hospital.  Deceased was neither properly treated nor CT Scan was properly observed and deceased was negligently discharged, he was not taken voluntarily from opposite party-hospital and further submitted that deceased expired on account of negligence of opposite party-hospital.

5.         Complainants filed affidavit of Mahesh Prasad Aggarwal (father) and Dr. Rohit Aggarwal (Brother).  Opposite party filed affidavit of Dr. Munishwar Gupta (Managing Director of opposite party-hospital).  Parties also filed documents in support of their case.

6.         Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused record.

7.         Learned Counsel for the complainant submitted that opposite party-hospital discharged the deceased Rajeev Aggarwal negligently, though, deceased was not in a position to move, hence, complainants may be awarded compensation.  On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite party submitted that deceased was never admitted as indoor patient in opposite party-hospital, but was given first-aid and in spite of advice of opposite party Duty Doctor, relatives of deceased took away the deceased from opposite party-hospital in such circumstances, no deficiency on the part of opposite party-hospital, hence, complaint may be dismissed.

8.         It is an admitted case of the parties that deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal sustained injuries on 14.10.2001 in an accident and was brought to opposite party-hospital by some persons.  It is also admitted that deceased Rajeev Aggarwal’s C.T. Scan and X-ray of chest was done by opposite party-hospital after charging money and opposite party-hospital also charged Rs.600/- as O.T. Charges and Rs.500/- as Doctor’s examination fee.  It is also admitted case of the parties that after putting plaster and bandages on the left hand of the deceased, he was discharged/takenaway by his relatives from opposite party-hospital.

9.         Learned Counsel for the complainants vehemently argued that opposite party- Duty Doctor committed negligence in discharging patient from the hospital and placed reliance on Notification dated 11.3.2000 issued by Medical Council of India.  He has drawn our attention to para 1.3 of Chapter I (Code of Medical Ethics) according to which every physician is required to maintain medical record pertaining to his indoor patient for a period of 3 years.  The important question in this case is whether the deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal was indoor patient in the opposite party-hospital.  Opposite party-hospital has proved Annexure ‘E’ vide affidavit of Dr. Gupta which reveals that on 14.10.2001, 4 patients were admitted in opposite party-hospital and deceased was not admitted in the opposite party-hospital as indoor patient.  In these circumstances, Notification dated 11.3.2000 issued by the Medical Council of India is not applicable to the present case and opposite party-hospital was not required to maintain the medical record of deceased Rajeev Aggarwal, as deceased was treated as outdoor patient and after C.T. Scan, X-ray and giving first-aid, the deceased Rajeev Aggarwal was taken away from opposite party-hospital by his family members and relatives. 

10.       Complainant Mahesh Prasad Aggarwal has mentioned in para 1 of his affidavit that Rajeev Aggarwal died on 21.11.2001 which is not correct in the light of evidence of other witness and documents which shows that Rajeev Aggarwal died on 15.10.2001.  Complainant Mahesh Prasad Aggarwal and Dr. Rohit Aggarwal who is brother of deceased have stated in their affidavit that deceased was not fit and on reaching home he was very uncomfortable and his condition was deteriorating.  His sufferings were manifold and pain was unbearable and in such circumstances it was decided to shift him to a good hospital in Delhi and accordingly the ambulance was hired on 15.10.2001. This evidence reflects that after taking deceased Rajeev Aggarwal from opposite party-hospital he was brought to his residence which is not believable because when his legs and hands were not moving properly and was suffering from severe pain in back and head, no person will take his kith and kin to his home instead of shifting him to some hospital particularly when deceased’s brother Dr. Rohit Aggarwal was running Usha Memorial Health Centre in the same city having 24 hrs. facility for fracture and accident cases as reflected in photograph of Annexure ‘A’, ‘B’ & ‘C’ which have been proved by opposite party’s evidence.  In normal course either Rajeev Aggarwal would have been brought to Dr. Rohit Aggarwal’s hospital or admitted to some other hospital instead of bringing him home as condition of Rajeev Aggarwal was deteriorating. Complainant’s witness nowhere explained that after taking Rajeev Aggarwal to opposite party-hospital where was he kept for another 24 hours or more before proceeding for Delhi.   It was obligatory on their part to lead evidence and prove that in last 24 hrs. proper care of the deceased Rajeev Aggarwal was taken which they failed to do, rather they have suppressed material facts about his treatment in last 24 hours.  

11.       Complainant’s witness simply say that after plaster, opposite party informed that Rajeev Aggarwal is alright and fit and can be taken to home and he was discharged.  This statement has not been supported by any other independent witness, though, as per complaint and written statement, Rajeev Aggarwal was brought to opposite party-hospital just after accident by other persons and these two witnesses reached opposite party-hospital after sometime.  Both witnesses being interested in the complaint cannot be believed unless supported by other independent witness, particularly, when opposite party in the written statement specifically stated that Duty Doctor of opposite party-hospital advised the deceased to be admitted in the hospital but his advice was not followed and Rajeev Aggarwal was not admitted in the hospital. Same fact has been proved by affidavit of opposite party witness.  In such circumstances, it cannot be believed that in spite of insistence by the deceased’s father and brother, the deceased was not admitted in opposite party-hospital and was discharged but this inference can be drawn that advise of opposite party-hospital was discarded as deceased’s brother Dr. Rohit Aggarwal was having his own hospital in the same city.  He and his father insisted opposite party-hospital not to admit Rajeev Aggarwal in the hospital and took away him for treatment either in Dr. Rohit Aggarwal’s hospital or in some other hospital where Rajeev Aggarwal’s condition deteriorated and ultimately died on next day.  

12.       Learned Counsel for the complainant has not alleged any deficiency in taking C.T. Scan, X-ray and plaster of Rajeev Aggarwal’s left hand.  In such circumstances, neither any negligence nor any deficiency of service can be attributed on the part of opposite party-hospital towards treatment of Rajeev Aggarwal and no compensation can be awarded to the complainant on account of sad demise of the deceased Rajeev Aggarwal on next day.

13.       Learned Counsel for the complainant placed reliance on I (2006) CPJ 16 (NC) – Dr. Shyam Kumar Vs. Rameshbhai Harmanbhai Kachhiya in which it was held that if fees is paid towards receiving medical services by the complainant, the complainant falls within the purview of consumer. There is no dispute on this legal aspect and certainly in the present case complainants being legal heir of deceased, falls within the purview of consumer as opposite party has charged fees for C.T. Scan, X-ray, etc.  Learned Counsel for the complainant also placed reliance on (2005) 6 SCC I – Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. in which it was held that complainant has to prove 3 constituents, namely; (1) the existence of a duty to take care, which is owed by the defendant to the complainant; (2) the failure to attain that standard of care, prescribed by the law, thereby committing a breach of such duty; and (3) damage, which is both casually connected with such breach and recognised by the law, has been suffered by the complainant.  It was further observed that if the claimant satisfies the Court on the evidence that these three ingredients are made out, the defendant should be held liable in negligence.  We agree with the proposition of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court but this citation does not help to the complainants in the present case.  Pleadings and evidence clearly proves that when Rajeev Aggarwal was brought to Opposite party-hospital, C.T. Scan, X-ray, etc. were done immediately and his hand was plastered and in such circumstances, it can be presumed that Opposite party-hospital took care of the deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal. Complainant has failed to show any negligence or deficiency in taking C.T. Scan, X-ray or plastering his hand.  Leaned Counsel for the complainant submitted that Opposite party-hospital discharged Rajeev Aggarwal against the wishes of deceased, hence, Opposite party-hospital is guilty of negligence as Opposite party-hospital failed to take standard of care required under the law.  This argument is devoid of force in the light of discussion made earlier as we have come to the conclusion that Rajeev Aggarwal, the deceased was never admitted as indoor patient in the Opposite party-hospital, rather Rajeev Aggarwal was taken away by the complainant, Mahesh Prasad Aggarwal and deceased’s brother Dr. Rohit Aggarwal and other relatives  against the advice of Duty Doctor of Opposite party-hospital and further supressed material facts about Rajeev’s treatment in last 24 hours after he was taken away from Opposite party-hospital.

14.       Learned Counsel for the complainant also placed reliance on I (1997) CPJ 332 – Kanaiyalal Ramanlal Trivedi & Ors. Vs. Dr. Satyanarayan Vishwakarma & Anr. in which it was held that in case of death due to medical negligence compensation can be awarded as in fatal motor accidents.  This citation does not help the complainant in present case as complainant has failed to prove negligence or deficiency on the part of Opposite party-hospital.

15.       In the light of the above discussion, it becomes clear that Opposite party-hospital was neither negligent nor deficient in providing services to the deceased, Rajeev Aggarwal and complaint is liable to be dismissed.

16.       Consequently, complaint filed by the complainants against Opposite party-hospital is dismissed.  Parties are directed to bear their own costs.

 ..………………Sd/-……………

( K.S. CHAUDHARI, J)

PRESIDING MEMBER

MEMBER

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI

                   REVISION PETITION NO. 897 OF 2012.

 ( From  order dated  19.01.2012 in FAIA 98 of 2012  in FASR 217 of 2012

 of State  Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,  Andhra Pradesh )   

Shriram Transport Finance Co. Ltd. Represented by its Senior Recovery, Executive, D. No. 54-15-5, 2^nd Floor, Dhoom Complex, Near Srinivasa Nagar, Bank Colony, Vijaywada.

                                 Versus

 Syed Mahaboob Ali, S/o Syed Vali Basha, D. No. 19-13/3-20, Main Road, Near Habeed School, Old Rajharajeshwaripeta, Vijayawada, A. P.

     ….Respondent

(2)               REVISION PETITION NO. 898 OF 2012.

 ( From  order dated  19.01.2012 in FAIA 99 of 2012  In FASR 214 of 2012

 of  State  Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,  Andhra Pradesh )  

The Branch Manager Shriram Transport Finance Company Ltd.  D. No. 54-15-5, 2^nd Floor, Dhoom Complex, Near Srinivasa Nagar, Bank Colony, Vijaywada.

                        Versus

Syed  Ayesha D/o Syed Abdul Khader D. No. 19-13/3-20, Main Road, Near Habeed School, Old Rajharajeshwaripeta, Vijayawada, A. P.

For the Petitioners     :                   Mr. Lenin Singh Hijam,  Advocate

 Pronounced on: 4^th January,  2013

              Above noted petitions have been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by order dated 19.1.2012 of State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Andhra Pradesh (for short, ‘State Commission’). As common question of law and facts are involved, these petitions are being disposed of by this common order. .

2.       Facts in brief are that respondents/complainants purchased TATA Ace Autos which have been financed by the petitioners/OP, by hypothecating their vehicles. Petitioners seized the vehicle without any intimation. Accordingly, respondents filed complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II Vijayawada, (for short, ‘District Forum’).

3.       Notices of the complaints were issued to the petitioners. Inspite of receiving the notice, petitioners failed to contest the matter before the District Forum. Accordingly, District Forum, vide its order dated 08.06.2011, allowed the complaints.

4.    Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, petitioners filed appeals before the State Commission. Alongwith it, applications seeking condoning the delay of 168 days were also filed. The State Commission, vide impugned order, dismissed the same.

5.       Hence, the present revision.

6.       I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners who have also filed written arguments in support of its case.       .

7.      Petitioners, as per its written arguments have challenged the order passed by the fora below on merits. Regarding applications for condonation of delay, it has been simply mentioned that small period of delay can be condoned under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, ‘Act’) by imposing cost. In support, learned counsel has relied upon certain judgments also. 

8.     State Commission in its impugned order observed;

“2)                  The opposite party finance company preferred the appeal when it was directed to return the vehicles on payment or certain amounts or pay Rs.1,28,900/- + Rs.72,000/- + Rs.57,800/- together with compensation of Rs. 5,000/- and costs of Rs.2,000/- and along with it above application to condone delay of 168 days in filing the appeal on the ground that on receipt of copy of order on 9.11.2011 it had contacted its counsel and on verification it came to know that no notice was served nor an opportunity was given. On that it had taken copy of the record from the Dist. Forum, and in the process delay of 168 days was caused. It also alleged that the complainant sent the notice to its older address knowing full well that it has shifted its office.

 

6).         When the delay was whopping 168 days without any explanation and considering the fact the delay in preferring the appeal was not satisfactorily explained, it is a fit case where the petition is liable to dismissed, and consequently reject the appeal. 

“  It is also opposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer foras. With the above observations, the application for condonation of delay is rejected and the special leave petition is dismissed as barred by limitation”.  

 

8)                        The parties seeking relief has to satisfy the court that he/she has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the time prescribed and the explanation has to cover the entire period of delay. A litigant cannot be permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 15(a) of the Consumer Protection Act. The discretion conferred on this court is a judicial discretion and is exercised to advance justice and even if there is a strong cause for acceptance of the appeal that would not be a ground for condoning the delay. Consumer Protection Act provided for speedy redressal to consumer disputes. It follows that the delay cannot be allowed to occur in a routine way and sufficient cause should be made with specific reasons given supported by material; and that the discretion for entertaining the appeals filed beyond the period allowed will not be exercised in a light and routine manner.

9)                      We may also state herein that the respondent should not be denied the right accrued to him on expiry of limitation provided for to prefer an appeal. If he receives summons or notices after a lapse of time he may surprise and may not be able to comprehend as to when the litigation would come to an end. As was opined the explanation has to reasonable, plausible and believable. Mere explanation is not sufficient for condoning the delay in favour of applicant. It is does not satisfy the ingredients, and that it does not reflect ‘sufficient cause’ then the application should be dismissed. When consistently routine and rigmarole  facts are pleaded without any justification or proof condonation of delay cannot be made. We are of the opinion that the ground being routine and absolutely n o document whatsoever was filed to justify the delay, we are unable to entertain the application”.

9.       It is basic principle of law that question of limitation should be decided at the threshold. Without deciding the question of limitation, petition cannot be considered on merits.

10.    Admittedly, petitioners were ex parte before the District Forum and as such no written statement was filed. Under these circumstances, petitioners have no defence on merits. Moreover, valuable rights have accrued in the favour of the respondents.

11.   It is well settled that “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.

12.     In  Ram Lal and  Ors.  Vs.  Rewa  Coalfields  Ltd.,  AIR  1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

13.          Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that;

“There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.”

14.     In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed:

      “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

15.          Hon’ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under;

“We  have  considered   the  respective    submissions.  The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that   they    do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the  legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same   time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause   is   shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

         The   expression  "sufficient cause" employed  in   Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which  sub serves the   ends   of   justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has  justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration   and a   stricter   approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land   Acquisition,   Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy  (1998) 7 SCC 123 and 10 Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106”.

16.     Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has observed ;

   “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras”.

17.    Petitioners’ affidavit seeking condonation of delay, filed before the State Commission, interalia states;

 “ That the District Forum was pleased to dispatch the said orders on 23.06.2011 and the same was not served to our company and came to know about the pendency of the litigation only when the complainant has sent the notice to the new address on 09.11.2011. I crave leave of this Hon’ble Commission to read the memorandum of grounds as part and parcel of this affidavit.

18.   In entire affidavit, petitioner has nowhere stated as to how much days of delay was there in filing the appeal before the State Commission. Be that as it may, as per affidavit case of petitioner is that District Forum has dispatched the order on 23.06.2011 which was not served to their Company. Petitioner came to know about the pendency of the litigation only when respondent had sent the notice at the new address on 9.11.2011. Affidavit further states that, petitioner thereafter contacted its counsel. No details have been mentioned in the affidavit so as to show as to when, petitioner after getting the copy of order on 9.11.2011, had sent the papers to its counsel. What is the name and address of that counsel and on which date the appeal was made ready. The affidavit is absolutely silent on these material facts.

19.    Main plea taken by petitioner is that they had shifted to a new address and as such they could not get the copy of order passed by the District Forum within time. This plea is against the record

20.    In the complaint (Page 41 of the paper-book) address of petitioner has been mentioned as;

              “Shriram Transport Finance Company Ltd., Rep. by its

                Branch Manager, D. NO. 40-1-100, B.H.R. Plaza,

              Benz Circle, Kanna Nagar, Vijayawada ”.

21.     District Forum has also mentioned the same address in its order, dated 8.6.2011.  Even in appeal memo filed by the petitioners before the State Commission, same address has been mentioned. Appeal before the State Commission was filed in January, 2012. Thus, as per petitioners’ own case, above mentioned was the address of the petitioner in January, 2012 also. Thus, this plea that petitioner did not receive the copy of order of District Forum and they came to know about the litigation only when respondents had sent notice to their new address on 09.11.2011, is against the record.

23.      Since, no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner in its application seeking condonation of delay, the State Commission was justified in not condoning the delay. I do not find any ambiguity or legality in the impugned order passed by the State Commission. Thus, there is no jurisdictional or legal error in the impugned order. Hence, present revision petitions are accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand Only) each.

24.  Petitioners are directed to deposit the total cost of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) by way of demand draft in the name of “Consumer Legal Aid Account” of this Commission, within four weeks from today.

25.     In case, petitioners fail to deposit the aforesaid costs within the prescribed period, then they shall also be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a., till realization.

26.       List on 15^th  February, 2013 for compliance

                                                        ……………………………...J

(V.B. GUPTA)

                        PRESIDING MEMBER

SSB