|DRUG TRAFFICKING, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND U.S. POLICY IN
COLOMBIA IN THE 1990s
Dr. BRUCE MICHAEL BAGLEY
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
CORAL GABLES, FL.
February 7, 2001
This essay examines the impact of U.S. and Colombian government drug control policies on the evolution of drug cultivation, drug trafficking, and political violence in Colombia during the1990s. Its central thesis is that the Washington/Bogota-backed war on drugs in Colombia over the decade did not merely fail to curb the growth of the Colombian drug trade and attendant corruption, but actually proved counterproductive. Among the most important unintended consequences were the explosion of drug cultivation and production activities, the dispersion and proliferation of organized crime, and the expansion and intensification of political violence and guerrilla warfare in the country. As a result, Colombia at the outset of 2000 faced more serious threats to its national security and political stability than it had in 1990. The essay concludes that the massive escalation of the flawed anti-drug strategies of the past decade proposed by the Clinton administration in January 2000 is more likely to worsen Colombia’s ongoing problems of spiraling violence and insecurity than to resolve them.
Drug Cultivation and Production in Colombia
Despite the U.S. Government’s provision of almost one billion dollars in counternarcotics aid to Colombia over the decade of the 1990s, by 1999 Colombia had become the premier coca-cultivating country in the world, producing more coca leaf than both Peru and Bolivia combined.1 Between 1989 and 1998, Colombian coca leaf production increased by 140 percent, from 33, 900 to 81,400 metric tons. Even more remarkable, 1999 coca leaf production levels more than doubled the 1998 totals, reaching an estimated 220 tons. These dramatic increases in overall production reflected the fact that between1996 and 1999, the total number of hectares of coca leaf under cultivation in Colombia rose by almost 100 percent, from 68,280 to 120,000 hectares. This explosive expansion occurred in spite of a permanent Colombian National Police eradication program that sprayed a record 65,000 hectares of coca in 1998 alone (approximately 50 percent more than the total for 1997). This year – 2000-- the total area under cultivation is projected to rise to 200,000 hectares and could reach 500,000 hectares by 2002, if current rates of expansion continue over the next few years.2
Concomitantly, Colombia also maintained its status as the world’s principal cocaine-refining nation, supplying some 80 percent (220 metric tons) of the total cocaine imports (approximately 300 metric tons) smuggled into the United States in 1999. In 2000 Colombia is expected to produce between 330 and 440 metric tons of pure cocaine from both domestically grown coca and from coca base smuggled in from Peru and Bolivia.
During the 1990s Colombian production of opium poppy (the raw material for heroin) also skyrocketed from zero in 1989 to 61 metric tons in 1998. While these production totals meant that Colombia still ranked as only as a relatively minor player in the world heroin market (less than 2 percent of total global supply), they did enable it to become the major heroin supplier to the eastern part of the United States by the end of the decade, exporting an estimated six metric tons of pure heroin yearly.
With approximately 5,000 hectares under cultivation, Colombia also continued to be an important producer of marijuana over the decade. In both 1998 and 1999 Colombia supplied about 40 percent (4,000 metric tons) of total annual cannabis imports into the U.S. market.
A study by Colombia’s National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF) reported that worldwide street sales of Colombian cocaine, heroin and marijuana totaled US$ 46 billion in 1999. Based on the assumption that less than 10 percent of total sales are repatriated to Colombia each year, ANIF estimated that the country’s total earnings from the illicit drug trade amounted to approximately US$ 3.5 billion in 1999. This figure placed drug earnings close to the US$ 3.75 billion made from oil – the country’s top export – and more than two and one half times earnings from coffe exports in 1999.3
These dismaying statistics notwithstanding, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the U.S.-sponsored “War on Drugs” in the Andean region as a whole was a total failure during the 1990s. In contrast to the Colombian situation, in Peru coca cultivation decreased by 27 percent between 1996 and 1997 alone, dropping from 96,000 hectares to 70,000 hectares. In 1999, fewer than 50,000 hectares of coca were cultivated in Peru. As a direct result, total Peruvian cocaine production also declined precipitously over the 1990s, from a high point of 606 metric tons in 1992 to 264 tons in 1998. In 2000, Peru was projected to produce just 192 metric tons. Since March 1998, however, resurgence in the price of Peruvian coca leaf has threatened to rekindle the growth of cultivation in that country.4
Like Peru, Bolivia also registered substantial declines in coca cultivation during the decade, dropping from 48,800 hectares in 1996 to 46,000 in 1997, and down to 38,000 hectares in 1998, while total cocaine production declined from 248 metric tons in 1992 to 77 tons in 1999. In 2000, Bolivian production was expected to drop further to just 55 metric tons.5
Much of the success of the U.S.-backed coca eradication and alternative development programs in Peru and Bolivia in the late 1990s is attributable to the disruption of the “air bridge” that had permitted Colombian trafficking organizations earlier in the decade to transport coca paste or “base” from these two central Andean countries into Colombia, where it was subsequently refined into cocaine and then smuggled into the United States. The air bridge effectively collapsed in late 1995 after the Peruvian air force, under orders from President Alberto Fujimori, began to shoot down suspected trafficker airplanes flying between Peru and Colombia. Indeed, during 1995 the Peruvians shot down 25 planes and forced many other suspect aircraft to land for inspection. As a result, between April and August 1995 demand for coca leaf in Peru plummeted and leaf prices dropped by more than 60 percent. Combined with the more aggressive eradication efforts undertaken by both the Peruvian and Bolivian governments (with U.S. financial backing) in 1996 and subsequent years, alternative development programs began to enjoy considerable success among the coca cultivating peasants in both countries. With the air bridge down, however, the Colombian traffickers rapidly expanded coca cultivation in Colombia, thus leading to Colombia’s progressive displacement of Peru and Bolivia as the major coca cultivating country in the world during the late 1990s.6
In 1999 the continued success of Peru’s highly lauded coca eradication program was in serious jeopardy as the price of coca leaf in the country shot back up over the year to two thirds of its previous 1995 high, thereby stimulating renewed peasant cultivation. Several factors appear to account for this reactivation of coca growing in Peru. First, Peruvian traffickers gradually found ways to reopen some air routes to Colombia and to replace others with road, river and sea routes, thus raising international demand for Peru’s coca crop and making coca cultivation in the country more profitable. The decision by the U.S. government in May 1998 to suspend Awac and P-3 Orion surveillance flights over Peru in order to increase aerial spying over Colombia as trafficking activities increased there clearly reduced the Peruvians capacity to intercept drug flights over their national territory. The ability of the Peruvian police to carry out interdiction operations was further diminished when El Nino hit Peru in early 1998 and obliged the country’s security forces to transfer helicopters and planes normally used in antidrug operations to the flooded Pacific coast for emergency aid duty. Similarly, a renewed outbreak of tensions between Peru and Ecuador in 1998 led the Peruvian military to send some planes to the border area temporarily, thereby reducing the availability of aircraft for interdiction activities. In late August 1999 the Clinton administration once again agreed to resume surveillance flights over Peru to help the Peruvian air force intercept smuggling planes.7
Second, more Peruvian traffickers began processing coca paste into refined cocaine within their own country, thereby increasing domestic demand for coca leaf in Peru. Third, cocaine consumption in Peru’s major urban centers rose substantially in the late1990s (as it did in major urban centers throughout the region over the decade), thereby increasing the profitability of the local market and overall demand for coca leaf in Peru. Finally, the continued decline of coca leaf availability in Bolivia placed an additional premium on coca cultivation in Peru (and Colombia), especially in light of rising demand for cocaine in Europe, where street prices often ran twice as high as those current in the United States.8