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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, Azerbaijan)
In the hundred years between the first Russo-Japanese treaty of 1855 and the "Joint Declaration" of 1956 that marked the resumption of diplomatic relations after World War II, the history of relations between Russia and Japan were always characterized by periods of tension, recurrent crises, conflict of interests, and war. In this century they have fought five wars: the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese intervention in Siberia (1918-1920), the border war in Lake of Khasan (1938), the Nomonhan War (1939), and the Soviet-Japanese War (1945). Friendly relations existed only during the brief periods of 19061917, 1925-31, and 1941-45. Even during these times, suspicion characterized their relations1.

Diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan was cut off after the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. In 1925, Japan recognized the Soviet Union de jure and diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries. During the latter half of the 1920's, Japan and the Soviet Union experienced a period of relative stability.

For long years the two countries were major contestants for control and domination of Northeast Asia, particularly Korea and Manchuria2. In fact, the Russian-Japanese rivalry had its origins in the 1860's when Russia and Japan broke with their past and began to emulate the more advanced nations of the West and to contend over territorial issues and hegemony in Northeast Asia. In the last decade of the 19th century tsarist Russia appeared on the scene as a great power in Far Eastern politics. The building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, between 1891 and 1902, however, signaled the revival of Russia's interest in the Far East and set off several years of imperialist rivalry in Korea and Manchuria by both countries.



Relations grew increasingly hostile until they culminated in the first war between the two countries, in 1904-05. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, that ended war, Japan acquired complete and absolute right of control in Korea, obtained southern Sakhalin, and established special interests in Manchuria along side that of Russia.

The military victory of Japan over Russia changed the structure of power politics in the Far East and marked the start of new relations between the two countries. Instead of long-standing conflict and struggle, there appeared a prospect of mutual respect for each other's interests in Manchuria. During the period 1905-17 the both countries sought to demarcate their respective spheres of interest in Northeast Asia in order to remove a major source of trouble and to work together to prevent any third power, especially the United States, from penetrating the region .

The Russian Revolution injected another source of conflict into Soviet-Japanese relations: ideology. The Soviet government nullified all foreign debts, published secret treaties concluded under the tsarist government - including the secret treaty of the Russo-Japanese alliance of 1916 - and openly supported Communist movement abroad by creating the Comintern. Japan, like many other Western nations, broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

As Hasegawa states, however, dominating Japan's policy toward the Soviet Union was not necessarily ideology, but expansionist ambition4. Japanese saw in the upheaval conditions that might enable . Japan to achieve its aim of seeing Russia so weakened. Russia could no longer furnish a serious obstacle to the execution of Japan's continental policy, including the extension of its economic interests in this area. Taking advantage of the domestic confusion caused by the Russian civil war, Japan military intervened in Siberia and the Soviet Far East in 1918. Thus, the first period of Japanese-Soviet relations, 1918-22, may be characterized as Japan's attempt to pursue its goals -the elimination of the Russian menace, the extension of its own economic interests, and the forestalling of the spread of bolshevism -by means of armed force5.

The Japanese intervention met with serious resistance from Soviets. When more than three hundred Japanese residents were massacred in Nicolaevsk in 1920, the Japanese government sent troops to northern Sakhalin. In order to deal with the Japanese threat in the Far East, the Bolshevik government decided to create a Far Eastern Republic as a buffer zone. Diplomatically isolated and losing popular support for the protracted and costly foreign intervention, the Japanese government finally withdrew its troops in 1922 After the Japanese withdrawal from the Soviet Far East, Japan and the Soviet Union moved toward a normalization of relations. Although the Japanese government finally put an end to the expedition to Siberia, it neither immediately recognized the Soviet government not attempted to open official intercourse with it6


Among the Japanese who spoke out for a Russo-Japanese rapprochement was Viscount Goto Shimpei. He was formerly foreign minister and currently lord mayor of Tokyo. Even in the decade following the Russo-Japanese War Goto had advocated Russo-Japanese collaboration as a means of blocking American penetration into the Far East. He was connected with shipping and railway enterprises, which had far-reaching interests in the Russian Far East before the Revolution. In 1906-08 he had served as president of the South Manchurian Railway, in 1909-10 had participated in negotiations with Tsarist representatives concerning economic cooperation between the two countries and in 1915-16 had conferred with the Tsarist minister about the conclusion of an alliance.

Goto was the first leading political figure who was strongly advocated a policy of rapprochement with the USSR and worked for realization of talks between representatives of both countries. He realized that the difficult economic situation in which Russia found herself in the wake of the Revolution presented a great opportunity for Japan utilize the vast territory of the Soviet Far East to further her own development. He deemed economic collaboration between Japan and Russia not only desirable but necessary "The resources of the eastern part of the Russian territory seem to be waiting for our help in their exploitation". He also argued that conclusion of a treaty with Russia



would forestall the normalization of Russo-American and Russo-Chinese relations. In this case Japan might be isolated. In March 1923, he wrote a memorandum on his perception of conditions and objectives in the Far East. It reads as follows:

The settlement of the question will not only help advance Japan's economic interests but will also contribute to the solution of key problems in Japan's policy toward China and the United States... The urgent tasks for Japanese foreign policy are the following: 1) to solidify the foundations for undertaking economic development in Asiatic Russia; 2) to eliminate the source of future troubles by forestalling possible American moves toward Russia. 3) to prevent any machinations on the part of the Chinese before they can achieve a rapprochement with Russia9. Thus besides necessity of economic collaboration between Japan and Russia, the other main factor of necessity of these relations was Goto's fear of Russo-American and Russo-Chinese rapprochement and the consequent isolation of Japan in the Far East.

At the beginning of 1923, Goto learned that Ioffe, a leading figure of the Soviet Foreign Office, had fallen ill. Ioffe had been the chief Soviet delegate at Changhun. He decided to invite him to Japan for a cure and taking the opportunity in the process to open informal talks. Like Ioffe, Goto was a physician by training - he had received a M.D. in Germany - and had been director of the Public Health Bureau and chief inspector of army hygiene10. He was also president of Russo-Japanese Association.

Meanwhile the Japanese Ambassador to Poland, Kawakami Toshitsune, on his way through the Soviet Union told Foreign Commissar Chicherin that the cession of North Sakhalin to Japan would make possible the normalization of Russo-Japanese relations and the de jure recognition of soviet Russia by Japan. Chicherin refused to consider the cession of any part of Russian territory as subject to discussion, however, was agree with Ioffe to visit Tokyo and

to enter into negotiations about the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations but without any prior commitment.

On January 29, 1923, Ioffe reached Nagasaki and Tokyo on February 1. His private secretary Levin accompanied him during the visit to Japan. On the same day Goto and Ioffe met for the first time and talked about three hours. The following day Ioffie left Tokyo for the hot spring resort of Atami where he was to confer with Goto while recuperating.

In the Foreign Ministry there was a division of opinion in rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Uchuda Yasuya, and various old diplomats including Matsudaira, director of the Europe-America Bureau, Obata, the minister to China were against recognition of the Soviet Union, and attempts were even made by them to interrupt the Goto-Ioffe talks. On the other hands, Ambassador of Japan to Poland Kawakami and a number of young diplomats favored recognition of the USSR and evacuation of Sakhalin.

The Ministry of War opposed the recognition of the USSR, in the desire to retain possession of North Sakhalin. The Home Office also was against it for fear that it would contribute to the spread of revolutionary feeling inside Japan".

On the other hand, the Japanese navy was agreeable to an early establishment of normal relations between the two governments. The navy had been concerned with the preservation of tranquillity in Northeast Asia and now was concerned with the stabilization of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it was very much interested in obtaining access to oil concessions in northern Sakhalin. In this connection, as Hosoya notes that Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo, an admiral, gave his consent in advance to Goto's move to invite Ioffe .

At the beginning of March, Ioffe declared his government's three conditions to go on official talks: equal rights of the negotiating parties, consent of Japan to negotiate concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations as well as commercial relations, the fixing of an acceptable date for the evacuation of North Sakhalin". Goto declared Japan's willingness to negotiate on an equal basis. However, he also



stated that Japan would make recognition of the USSR, and also the evacuation of North Sakhalin conditional on the settlement of the Nikolaevsk incident.

Goto talked also about the exchange of commercial agents who could perform consular functions until such time as diplomatic relations had been reestablished. The Japanese envisaged that they would send commercial agents to Moscow, Vladivostok, Nikol'sk-Ussuriisk, Bladovechensk, Nikolaevsk-on-the-Amur, Chita and Petropavlovsk; Soviet official would proceed to Yokohama, Nagasaki, .Tsuruga, Hakodate and Gensan. Ioffle knew that more and more Japanese businessman were clamoring for the resumption of Russo-Japanese trade and sought to take advantage of the situation., He strongly advised that the Japanese proposal to be accepted and Russian representatives carefully selected.

Foreign Minister Uchida wanted Goto to ascertain first how Russia proposed to settle the Nikolaevsk and North Sakhalin questions, on the solution of which the success of failure of any negotiations hinged. In turn, Ioffe informed Goto that the Soviet Government was willing to assume moral responsibility for the Nikolaevsk incident if Japan in turn expressed regret about the action of Japanese forces in Siberia. In regard to the Soviet demand for the evacuation of North Sakhalin, Ioffe repeated the offer to grant to the Japanese economic concession in that region.

Despite Ioffe talks with Goto had been confined essentially to political issues, at the same time, fishery matters were discussed by Ioffe directly with Japanese fishery people from April. As a result, an agreement between Japanese fishery enterprises and Soviet officials was concluded in Vladivostok on May 21, İ923. Japanese agreed to pay back rental fees for the use of the fishing grounds in 1920-21 and in turn received the right to lease in 1923 255 out of 511 fishing grounds. For Soviet historians the fishery agreement was "a victory for Soviet diplomacy" since the fishery people thereby recognized the sovereignty of the Soviet state over these waters14.

On June 9, Primer Minister Kato proposed Ioffe through Goto that the unofficial preliminary talks be terminated and what might be called

"official unofficial preliminary negotiations be begun for the purpose of determining the prior conditions for a Russo-Japanese conference1 . On June 16, 1923, Commissar Chicherin informed Uchida that Ioffe had been appointed as the Soviet plenipotentiary. On June 21, the Japanese government replied that Minister Kawakami Toshitsune would represent Japan.

Kawakami Toshitsune had experience in dealing with Russians. A graduate of the Tokyo Foreign Language School in Russian (1884), he had served as interpreter in St. Petersburg in 1892-1900, as commercial representative in Vladivostoc in 1900-04 and 1907-07, and as consul general in Moscow in 1912-14. He also served as president of the North Sakhalin Mining Company (1926) and later as president of the Nichi-Ro Fisheries Corporation, a Japanese-Russian joint venture.

On June 28, 1923, during the first negotiation Ioffe demanded as prior conditions for the convening of such a conference: 1) formal recognition of the USSR by Japan, and 2) the fixing of a definite date for the evacuation of North Sakhalin. In turn, Kawakami presented Japanese demands: 1) settlement of the North Sakhalin question, 2) settlement of the Nikolaevsk incident, and 3) Soviet fulfillment of international obligations.

Kawakami argues that the best solution of the Sakhalin question would be for Russia to sell the northern half of the island to Japan. Ioffe was more receptive to the alternative proposal for settling the Sakhalin question by granting to Japan long-term concession for the development of natural resources, such as oil fields, coal mines and forest in North Sakhalin.

The Nikolaevsk issue evoked much controversy. Kawakami presented the Japanese side of the Nikolaevsk incident, in which the Japanese consul and members of the consulate and hundreds of Japanese military and civilians had been massacred.

About the Japanese intervention in Siberia, Ioffe at first replied that it was the Japanese commander who had provoked the incident and that the Soviet Union would express regret at the massacre of Japanese at Nikolaevsk if Japanese government would express its



regret at similar crimes perpetrated by its forces in Siberia16. It was finally resolved to leave the matter for later consideration and to proceed to other issues.

No agreement could be reached also on the question of Soviet assumption of the international obligations of the Tsarist and Provisional governments.

On July 19, Ioffe received instructions from Moscow that the Soviet Union was prepared to send special plenipotentiaries and to begin official negotiations. The Japanese were not yet ready to enter into official negotiations. Uchida still opposed recognition of the USSR and Kawakami, acting under his instructions, merely explored the Soviet position without committing Japan . The main issue for the Japanese - the evacuation of North Sakhalin depended of the Nikolaevsk incident.

When another week passed without concession from the Japanese, Ioffe was instructed by Chicherin to break off the unofficial negotiations and at the same time to propose that official negotiation be begun as soon as possible. He declared the ending of talks at the meeting on July 24. Thus, Kawakami and Ioffe talks, which lasted from June 28 to July 24, were terminated, and they were not successful in bringing any agreement between the two countries.

At the beginning of September 23, Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan succeeded Ioffe as plenipotentiary representative to China. He had been an assistant to foreign commissar from 1918 to 1922. He Was well versed in foreign affairs, therefore, and upon his arrival in Peking threw himself into the task of renewing Soviet-Japanese negotiations.

On September 22, Karakhan called to the Japanese niniisiei iu Peking, Yoshizawa Kenkichi. He expressed his sympathy on the disaster that had happened in Japan on September 1, in a result of the earthquake, and then asked him whether the Japanese government would be willing to begin official negotiations about the normalization of Russo-Japanese relations, as proposed by his government earlier. He also wrote a letter to Goto, who had become home minister in the new cabinet, about this matter.

On March 19, 1924, Yoshizawa informed Karakhan that the Japanese government had decided to recognize the Soviet government and had instructed him to enter into negotiations with him. He told Krakhan that he had a detailed draft of recognition of the Soviet Union, but before transmitting it to him needed Soviet consent to three prior conditions: 1) that the negotiations would be secret; 2) that the negotiations would simply be conducted only between the two representatives in Peking, neither informal talks nor a formal; 3) that the Soviet government would immediately, before recognition, settle the Vladivostoc incidents that it would free two Japanese officers still under arrest on a charge of espionage, would recognize the consul, and reestablish postal communication18.

Almost two months Yoshizawa and Karakhan exchanged a number of notes and letters on conditions of both sides before formal negotiations were begun at last on May 15. Meanwhile the Japanese cabinet had decided to provide Yoshizawa with full power, as well as the Soviet government empowered Karakhan to enter into negotiations with Japanese.

Both sides mainly stated their prior conditions. Yoshizawa presented to Karakhan the Japanese draft agreement. Article 3 stated that the Japanese would evacuate North Sakhalin within three months from the moment that the agreement between the two countries went into effect. Article 4 stipulated that the oil, coal, forest and fishery concession on North Sakhalin be granted for periods of 99 years from the moment the agreement went into effect at a lease fee of 5% of net income, with the Soviet government bearing all responsibility for compensating prior Russia interests that might exist in those places.

After Karakhan refused to accept the new concession, demands, at a cabinet meeting on July 24 the Japanese government agreed to a modification of Japanese demands in line with Shidehara's general policy of conciliation19. The Japanese

Government was willing to forego long-term concession on North Sakhalin as compensation for the Nikolaevsk incident; it was willing to reduce the length of oil concession that it wanted on North Sakhalin and to give Russia a share of the profits; a Soviet expression of regret



would be sufficient to settle the Nikolaevsk affairs. The Japanese government announced its willingness to recognize the Soviet Union under these conditions and to withdraw Japanese forces from North Sakhalin within two months after conclusion of an agreement.

On August 4, Yoshizawa resumed negotiations with Karakhan and presented the new Japanese draft treaty. For five session, beginning on Monday, August 4, and ending on Saturday, August 9, they argued about the new Japanese draft treaty. The entire week was devoted primarily to the discussion of the Japanese proposal and a whole without going into details. The crux of the problem Yoshizawa and Karakhan were not agreed was that the Soviet objected to extensive and specific concessions, lest they appear to be a condition of recognition or evacuation and thereby violate the principle of equality and reciprocity on which they insisted. For the Soviets, the negotiations were complicated by secondary commercial questions about the exploitation of the Sakhalin concession that the Japanese side wanted to discuss.

On December 27, after an interruption of more than four months, negotiations were resumed in Peking. On January 9, 1925, Karakhan presented counter-proposals in regard to Yoshizawa's draft treaty of December 27, according to which Japan agreed to have 50% of the oil fields being worked or to be discovered in the designated area of 1,000 square verst. Karakhan tried to limit oil fields to at most 45%, and at last agreement was reached20. Yoshizawa proposed and Karakhan agreed that the Japanese evacuation of Sakhalin would be completed by May 15.

Finally, on January 20, 1925, the convention laying dawn the basic rules of relations between the USSR and Japan was signed. This Basic Convention, concluded by Karakhan and Yoshizawa, bore the title of "The Convention Embodying Basic Rules of the Relations Between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Generally, scholars use the term "Japanese-Soviet Basic Treaty". The Basic Convention in its final form consisted of the convention proper, two protocols, one declaration, an exchange of two notes, an annexed note, the protocol of signature, and a memorandum. In February 1925, the

USSR and Japan ratified the convention. It was registered with the League of Nations on May 20, 1925.

Japan recognized the Soviet Union and the two countries restored full diplomatic relations in 1925 by concluding the Basic Convention. Japan agreed to withdraw its troops from North Sakhalin and canceled debts of Tsarist Russia in return for mineral, forest, and oil concessions in North Sakhalin that were to last for forty-five years.

During the latter half of the 1920's, Japan and the Soviet Union experienced a period of relative stability. However, the conclusion of the treaty did not bring in fact about any radical change in the basic Japanese attitude of distrust, suspicion, and hostility towards the Soviet Union and in the way the Japanese viewed to deal with the Soviet Union. Both countries had a fundamental conflict of interest over China. Two views on the expansion of Japanese influence in northern Manchuria emerged in Japan. The Gaimusho, represented by Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro (1926-27, 1929-31), considered it possible to expand Japan's influence through a modus vivendi with the Soviets, while the army and the South Manchurian Railway officials . harbored more aggressive intentions, seeking to expel Soviet influence from northern Manchuria21. In addition, Soviet aid to the illegal Japanese Communist Party through Comintern activities in Japan and to anti-Japanese forces in China was resented Japan. Japan thus rejected in August 1926 a Soviet proposal for a neutrality pact and in May 1927 a Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact.

1 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese

Relations. Volume 1: Between War and Peace, 1697-1985, (University of California, Berkeley, 1997), p. 13.

2 Rajendra Kumar Jain, The USSR and Japan, 1945-1980, (The Harvester Press,

Great Britain, 1981), pi. ' James E.Goodby, Vladimir I. Ivanov, Nobuo Shimotomai (eds.), "Northern Territories" and Beyond Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives, (Westport, Connecticut, 1994), p. 5

4 Hasegawa, p. 34

5 Hosoya Chihiro, "Japan's policies toward Russia", in Japan's Foreign Policy,

1868-1941: A Research Guide (Columbia U.P., 1974), p. 382



6 Hasegawa, p. 34

7 Hosoya, p. 391.

8 George Alexander Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR. Soviet)'apanese

Relations, 1921-1930, (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1970), p. 86.

9 Hosoya, p. 392.

10 Lensen, p. 86.
" Lensen, p. 105:
12 Hosoya, p. 393.
1 Lensen, p. 107.

14 Lensen, p. 113.

15 Ibid, p. 125.

16 Ibid, 130.

17 Ibid, p. 132.

18 Ibid, 148.
"ibid, p. 163.

20 Ibid, p. 174.

21 Hasegawa, p. 35.

1. Hosoya Chihiro, "Japan's policies toward Russia", in Japans Foreign Policy,

1868-1941: A Research Guide (Columbia U.P., 1974)

2. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese

Relations. Volume 1: Between War and Peace, 1697-1985, (University of California, Berkeley, 1997)

3. George Alexander Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR. Soviet-Japanese

Relations, 1921-1930, (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1970)

4. George Alexander Lensen, Russian Diplomatic and Consular Officials in East

Asia, (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1968) 5* George Alexander Lensen, Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Officials in Russia, (Sophia University, Tokyo, 1968)

  1. John J. Stephan, Sakhalin: A History (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971)

  2. Ian Nish, The Origin of Russo-Japanese War (London & New York: Longman

Group Limited, 1985)

8. James E. Goodby, Vladimir I. Ivanov, Nobuo Shimotomai (eds.), "Northern

Territories" and Beyond. Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives, (Westport, Connecticut, 1994)

9. Rajendra Kumar Jain, The USSR and Japan, 1945-1980, (The Harvester Press,

Great Britain, 1981)

10. H. A. JlaTbiuieB (pea.), CCCP u Hnomut, (MocKBa, "HayKa",1987)

11. С. И. Вербицкий, И. И. Коваленко (ред.), СССР и Япония. К 50-летию

установления советско-японских дипломатических отношений (1925-1975), (Москва, "Наука", 1978)



(Xarici İşhr Nazirliyi, Bakı, Azərbaycan)
1855-ci ildə ilk Rus -Yapon müqaviləsinin imzalanmasından 1956-cı ildə imzalanmış "Birgə Bəyanat"-a qədərki yüz il müxtəlif meyllərin olması, təkrarlanan krizislər, maraqlann toqquşması ve muharibələrin olması ilə seciyyələnir. Bu əsrdə onlar arasında beş müharibə olmuşdur: Rus-Yapon müharibesi (1904-1905), Yaponların Sibirə müdaxiləsi (1918-1920), Xasan gölündə sərhəd müharibəsi (1938), Nomonhan müharibəsi (1939) ve Sovet- Yapon müharibəsi (1945). Yalnız qısa dövrlərdə - 1906-1917, 1925-1931 1941-1945-ci illərdə iki ölkə arasında dostluq münasibətləri olmuşdur. Hətta bu vaxt ərzində də onların əlaqeləri şübhəli idi.

Uzun illər iki ölkə arasındakı əsas rəqadət Şimal -Şərqi Asiya, xüsusilə də Koreya və Mancuriya üzerində üstünlük və nəzarət üstün-də olmuşdur.

Mə'lumdur ki, Rusiya - Yaponiya ziddiyyeti 1860-cı ildə keçmiş münasibətlərini pozub, Qərbin avanqard ölkələrini təqlid edərek, Şimal -Şərqi Asiya üzərində erazi və hegemonluq rəqabətinə başlamaqla yarandı. XIX əsrin sonuncu on ilində Uzaq Şərqin siyasi səhnəsində Çar Rusiyası qüdrətli bir dövlət kimi peyda oldu.

Ziddiyyətli münasibətler 1904-1905-ci illərdə baş verən mühari-bəyə gətirib çıxartdı.

Yaponiyanın Rusiya üzərindəki qələbəsi Uzaq Şerqdəki siyasə-tin strukturunu dəyişdi və iki ölkə arasında yeni münasibətlərin yaran-dığı nəzərə çarpdı. Uzun sürən çəkişmə və mübarizənin yerini iki dövlətin hər birinin Mancuriya marağina olan qarşılıqlı hörməti tutdu. 1905-1917-ci illərdə hər iki dövlət Şimal -Şərqi Asiyadakı maraq dai-rələrinin gələcəyini dürüst müəyyən etməkdə maraqh idi. Burada



səd üçüncü dövlətin, xüsusilə də Birləşmiş Ştatların bu ərazini ələ ke-çirməsinin qarşısını almaq idi.

Rusiya ilə Yaponiya arasmdakı diplomatik əlaqələr 1917-ci il Oktyabr inqilabından sonra kəsildi. Rus inqilabı iki ölkə arasındakı əlaqələrə yeni münaqişə- ideoloji münaqişə gətirdi.

1918-ci ildə Rusiyada Vətəndaş müharibəsi ilə nəticələnən qarı-şıqlıqdan istifadə edən Yaponiya Sibirə və Sovet Uzaq Şərqinə müda-xile edir. 1918-22-ci illərdə Yapon-Sovet münasibətləri Yaponiyanın öz məqsədlərinə çatması üçün təşəbbüskarlıq dövrü kimi səciyyələn-dirilə bilər.

Yaponiya bolşeviklərin güclü müqavimətinə rast gəldi. 300-dən artıq yapon Nikolayevskdə qətlə yetirildi. Yapon hökuməti Şimali Sa-xalinə qoşun göndərdi. Yapon təhlükəsinin qarşısını almaq üçün bol-şeviklər bufer zona - Uzaq Şərq Respublikası yaratmaq qəranna gəldi-lər. Diplomatik cəhətdən teklənmiş və məşhur dayağını itirmiş Yapo-niya, nəhayet, 1922-ci ildə qoşunlarını geri çağırmağa məcbur oldu.

Bundan sonra Yaponiya ilə Sovet İttifaqı arasindakı münasibət-ler normallaşmağa başladı.

1923-cü ildən e'tibarən iki ölke arasındakı əlaqələrin yaradılması haqqında danışıqlar başlayır. Əvvəller xarici işlər naziri və hemin il-lərdə isə Tokionun lord- meri olan Viskaunt Qoto Şimpey SSRİ ilə münasibətlərin Ьэфа olunmasının qeti tərəfdarı kimi çıxış edən ilk siyasi xadim oldu və bu ölkələrin nümayəndələri arasındakı danışıq-lan gerçəkləşdinnək üçün çox işlədi. O, Rusiyadakı çətin iqtisadi və-ziyyətin Yaponiyaya Sovet Uzaq Şərqinin geniş ərazisindən özünün gələcək inkişafı üçün istifadə etmək imkanı verəcəyini dərk edirdi. Qoto deyirdi:"Belə görünür ki, Rusiya ərazisinin Qərb hissəsindəki sərvetlər istismar olunmaq üçün bizim kömeyimizi gözləyir."

Rusiya -Amerika və Rusiya -Çin əlaqələrinin genişlənməsi və bunun nəticəsində Yaponiyanın Uzaq Şərqdə təcrid olunması qorxusu əlaqələrin yaradılmasına Yaponiyanı sövq edirdi. .

İki il davam edən gərgin danışıqlardan sonra 20 yanvar 1925-ci ildə Yaponiya rəsmi şəkildə Sovet İttifaqını tanıdı və iki dövlət ara-sında diplomatik əlaqələrin yaradılmasını bildirən saziş imzalandı.

Buna baxmayaraq, Yaponiyanın Sovet İttifaqına münasibətindəki inamsızlıq, şübhə və düşmənçilik azalmadı. Hər iki ölkənin Çınə olan marağı onlar arasında ziddiyyət yaratmışdı.

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