Yaroslav Hrytsak, Victor Susak
|
|  Yüklə 136.5 Kb.
|
| was erected in the central part of the city. His grave of the Lychakiv cemetery originally served as a place for the first Soviet meetings. Franko allegedly fitted perfectly [either allegedly or perfectly: “seemed to have fitted perfectly”?] to the Soviet paradigm: he was born in Galicia, he spent most of his life in the city, suffered political repression from Austrian and Polish authorities, and displayed pro-socialist and pro-Russian sympathies. The irony was that in a more intellectually mature period of his life he turned into a harsh critic of Marxism and became one of the first proponents of Ukrainian political independence.39 This part of his life, however, was strictly silenced by the Soviet regime.
Another part of Soviet manipulations were obliterations of memories of the pre-Soviet L’viv. It has affected first of all the streets with Polish names. Their number was reduced to a minimum. The few ones preserved ( Kopernik, Mickiewicz, Kosciuszko, Slowacki), and few ones introduced (Banach and Boy-Zelinski, professors of the L’viv university), hold some memories of the Polish population that lived here. But seen otherwise, those names could be regarded as a part of the Soviet historical pantheon, which included "progressive" figures from different national cultures and fitted into an image of the Soviet multiethnic nation. There was a total obliteration, however, of the old Jewish names, as if there were no Jews in L'viv before 1939. But while streets with Jewish names even before 1939 made a minor group, their dissapearence has not contributed to an erasure of pre-Soviet image of L'viv to a degree, comparable to the case of Polish names. [not clear] A combination of dominant Soviet and Ukrainian symbols was aimed to create a Soviet Ukrainian image of the city [was it successfu?]. This was a part of a larger project to create a political Soviet nation. Besides Russians, Ukrainians became the prime targets of molding a single Soviet people. These politics were willing to tolerate some distinctive features of each group (say, as reflected in folklore) as long as they did not imply national differences. While historical memory plays a crucial role in shaping national identities, those manipulations were most visible in the realm of history.40 NEW UKRAINIAN IMAGE OF L'VIV,1990-1997 This project [which?] had some success in different regions of Ukraine, as it was witnessed by the post-Soviet developments. But it proved to be a total failure in the case of L'viv.The erasure of the Soviet image of the city started here already by the last months of the Soviet regime. The first free elections in the Soviet Union (March 1990) has brought to power in L’viv the first (in terms of all Ukraine) non-Communist local government, both on city and regional levels. A statement of the first session of the L'viv regional council, which elected the leading Soviet Ukranian dissident Viacheslav Chornovil, described the L'viv region as an 'island of freedom' which intends to 'end the totalitarian system'. The issue of a replacement of Soviet with Ukrainian national symbols became a primary cocnern for newly elected power. Suffice it to say, that L'viv was the first city in the Sovitet Union that removed the momument fo Lenin (September 1990) and the first city in the Soviet Ukraine that introduced the Ukrainian national anthem and flag.41 [The below section seems too detailed, in comparison with your discussion on the previous renamings. Pls explain why this is the case] Within the Lviv city council there was founded a Committee for national and cultural revival. Among its first initiatives were renaming of the city streets. The committee head, Yaroslav Svatko, has addressed director of the Lviv Central Historical Archive Orest Maciuk to make an expert group for an elaboration of proposals. The group was made of six perons - Orest Maciuk, Ivan Svarnyk, Andrij Dorosh, Roman Krypiakevych, Volodymyr Vujcyk, Bohdan Yakymovych. Most of them were professionally trained historians. The only exception was Roman Krypiakevych, a specialist in technical sciences. But as a son of famous Lviv Ukrainin historian Ivan Krypiakevych, he owned an archival collection of his father that among other has files on history of L'viv streets. In a sense, the group reflected a dramatic history of the intellectual life in Lviv. Krypiakevych and Dorosh were two only members who were second generation of Lviv-born intellectuals. Families of the four others came from the outside, including (as in case with Svarnyk) Eastern Ukraine. Because of their engagement with Ukrainian history, they have been victimized in their academic careers by the Soviet regime. Orest Maciuk was prohibited to defend his dissertation, and Volodymyr Vujcyk's book has been expelled from a wide ciruclation because their findings ran against the Soviet scheme of the Ukrainian history. Both Svatko and Dolynska attended meetings of the group, serving as a liason between the experts and the city council. Each expert was preparing his own suggestions as to new names of streets. These suggestions were discussed on a regular monthly meetings of the group, and after a common consensus has been reached, they were transfered to the city council. With a few exceptions, there were no expicit tensions neither within the group, nor between the group and the council. The experts, however, felt a constant pressure "from below", both from civic organizations and individuals who were insisting on commemorating some names (most often, the names of their leaders or, respectively, relatives). None of the experts was ever paid for his work, and that fact was considered by them as expression of their both civic responsibility and an intellectual independence. The expert group has worked for seven years (1990-1997) and has submitted 550 proposals.42. At the very beginning the work proceeded somewhat chaotically. But soon enough the expert elaborated several general principles 43. Some of them were of a non-politiical nature: names could not be repeated (to avoid complications for post-office or taxi-service ), or refer to living persons44. The other principles were, however, dictated by ideological considerations. The main aim was to remove names that made a Soviet image of the city. The replacements were made according to some priorities. First of all, the experts sought to restore historical names of the city. In some cases the restoration required to disentengle large Soviet constructed streets into original pre-1939 smaller streets. Secondly, the new names had to reflect the Ukrainian character of the city. Non-Ukrainian names were accepted as far their bearers had a direct relation to the city history, and/or were widely known beyond L'viv -- but on a condition that a commemoration of these names did not harm a national pride of Ukrainians. A choice of a name had to reflect historical reality: a street had to memorate a person who lived there. While selecting names from suggested pools, the expert group took also into a consideration a prestigious or non-prestigious character of the street. The presumption was that a name of a major importance could not be given to a street that was removed far from the city center or was in a dire condition. And finally, there was a "clandestine" principle to leave some names of streets unchanged, for a commemoration of contemporary politicians, intellectuals etc. after their deaths.45 [interesting point] For a study of the ranaming those were not just the rules, but frequent exceptions that made a special interest. As to repeated names, they were preserved in cases of Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, the most famous Ukrainian national figures, and of Danylo Halyts'kyj, a Ruthenian-Ukrainian prince who has allegedly founded the city. The Franko street made an exception in another way: though it was a large Soviet street made from original smaller streets, the expert group has left it intact. All mentioned streets broke another principle: neither of them had historical (i.e., pre-Soviet) names, and as such they were subjects to changes. It was even more so with Lesia Ukrajinka street --in contrast to the previous streets, it is placed within the oldest historical part of the city. While Shevchenko, Franko and Lesia Ukrajinka are the main figures of Ukrainian national pantheon, 46 their names were preserved, even though it violated several basic principles elaborated by the expert group. Another interesting case was that one of the Soviet marshal Konev, who has captured the city from Nazis in Summer of 1944. He has rendered a tremendous service to the city while due to his tactical maneuvre he has saved L'viv from a war destruction. In the Soviet times, his name was given to one of the finest streets in the central part of the city. The expert group decided, however, to eliminate his name, while he was allegedly responsible for mass human losses amon Galician Ukrainians that were drafted to the Soviet Army at the final stage of the war47. The general idea was not just to create a Ukrainian image of the city, but to promote a national version of Ukrainian historical memory as well. Preferences were made to names of Ukrainian historical figures that were totally silenced during the Soviet period. These names were chosen for the central and most populated streets with an intensive transport communication (Ivan Mazepa, Petro Doroshenko, Myxajlo Hrushevs’kyj48, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, Stepan Bandera, and others). Another principle was to cover certain quarters with set of names represented a separate chapter of the Ukrainian national history. Two large neighboring streets were given names of the Kiyv Princes, "Baptizers of Rus'--Ukraine", Ol’ha and Volodymyr; another quarter that is covered by the names of the Ukrainian nationalist leaders in 1920-1940s, Jevhen Konovalets'– Andrij Mel’nyk – Stepan Bandera – Roman Shukhevych). The center of the city was turned in a symbol of unification of all Ukrainian lands in their striving for national liberation (so called sobornist, one of the central idea of Ukranian nationalism). The main quare (former Hitlerring and Lenin square) was named Liberty square (prospekt Svobody) and has a monumentum of Shevchenko in the center and a statue of Liberty, facing from a roof of large adjacing building (a subject of pride for many Lvivites, while L'viv was allegedly the only Soviet city that had its own statue of Liberty). This "liberty-Shevchenko" link is reinforced in another way, while the Liberty square is neighbouring with the Shevchenko square. Two ends of the Shevchenko square are connected respectively with streets of Mykhajlo Drahomanov and Mykhajlo Hrushevs'kyj, two Eastern Ukrainian intellectuals who had made a major contribution into Ukrainization of Galician Ruthenians under Austrian Empire. The link between the Shevchenko square and the Hrushevs'kyj street is marked by a huge monument to Hrushevs'kyj, as alleged "first president of independent Ukrainian state" (which he never really was, while the first Ukrainian independent state -- Ukrainian National Republic -- in 1918 was a parlamentary republic, and Hrushevs'kyj was a head of the parliament). Three other adjacent streets have names of "presidents" of regional Western Ukrainian Ukrainian states -- Avhustyn Voloshyn ( Transcarpathia), Yevhen Popovych (Bukovyna), and Kost Levyts'kyj (Galicia). And another square, neighboring to both Liberty and Shevchenko square, bears a name of a (national)Unity (Soborna Ploshcha). 49 Among all Ukrainian names, a majority refers to the modern Ukrainian history of the XIX and XX centuries. The pre-modern national history is featured by the old Rus' (14 names) and Cossack (32 names) history, i.e., by the periods, when Ukrainians, according to the national paradigm of their history, either have their own national state or fought for it. There is also a group of local historical figures (10 names), that were born or lived in Lviv -- they were chosen to symbolize the Ukrainian character of the city in mediaeval and early modern times. The selection of modern names is organized along the same lines. The XIX century was presented exclusively by activists of the Ukrainian national revival. This group is divided in two more or less equal parts of Galicianers and non-Galicianers [Galicians. “Galicianer” is a pejorative for Galician Jew!] (58 to 67) thus signifying a significant input of L'viv and Galicia in modern Ukrainian nation-building. The largest number (202) refers to the XX century and is dominated by leaders and activists of Ukrainian nationalism. And again, the history of the Ukrainian nationalism became a subject of a selection. Some important representatives of a liberal (Milena Rudnyts'ka), social democratic (Volodymyr Starosol'skyi) or non-Soviet communist (Roman Rozdol'skyj) trends were omitted, while the militant nationalistic trend was presented in much larger numbers and with much more minor figures. The focus on the latter trend evoked serious tensions between the local and central authorities, both in the Soviet Union and in the independent Ukraine. Suffice it to say, that in December 1990 and June 1991, in Western Ukraine three nationalist monuments to Yevhen Konovalets and Stepan Bandera, leaders of Organization of Ukriainian Nationalists, and to the SS Gaicia Division (a Ukrainian force that was trained by the Nazi Germans) were blown up, allegedly by the same KGB anti-terrorist unit that was used in the Vilnius in January 1991.50 While in Western Ukraine the nationist figures are considered as central historical symbols of Ukrainian movement for national independence, in Eastern Ukraine even after 1991 they are treated by many as Nazi collaborators. The expert group suggested to rename a large street -- the one that lead from the central railway station -- after Stepan Bandera. The idea was that every guest arriving from L'viv and taking a tram to the city center, at one of the first stop would hear an announcement of Bandera street. This suggestion was considered unpropriate. even by Viacheslav Chornovil, himself born in Eastern Ukraine, He has tried to persuade Orest Maciuk to postpone this renaming suggesting that " [all other] Ukraine will not understand us". The decision was postponed for several years, and this name was introduced during one of the last wave of renamings. Still, there were a lot of letters addressed from Eastern Ukraine to the Lviv city council protesting against this renaming. 51 Another controversial issue was erasing of such highly estimated names for the Russian speaking population as Aleksander Pushkin and Myxail Lermontov (as to exacerbate the situation, the latter was replaced by the name of the fallen Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev). Both renamings were made by the city council, without a consent of the experts; they claimed a neutral position in the former and negative position in the latter cases.52 The expert group should be given a credit for a restoration (though to the limited extent) of the former multicultural image of the city. The city council was pressing the expert group to reduce a percentage of Russian names, but to no avail.53 As a result, the largest non-Ukrainian group is still made by Russian names though their number has been significantly decreased (from 85 in 1986 to 33 in 1997). Among those preserved an absolute majority is presented by pre-Soviet names (Aleksaner Herzen, Ivan Turgeniev, Leva Tolstoy, Volodymyr Korolenko, Ivan Pavlov and others). There is only one new name that refers to the post-1917 Russian history -- the Andrej Saxarov street, that was renamed immidiately after his death. The Russian group is followed by a Polish pool. In a contrast to the Russian case, it has even been slightly increased (from 9 in 1986 to 17 in 1997) due to a limited restoration of some pre-1939 names. Another telling example of a reconstruction of the multicutlural historical heritage was a return of three old Jewish names (Starojevrejs'ka, Diamanda, Rapoporta), that were obliterated by Soviets, and adding two new ones (Meyer Balaban and Sholom-Alejkhem). As to the Starojevrejs'ka (Old Jewish), there was a lot of discussion which form of the name to choose. In the local Galician (Ukrainian, Polish, and German) tradition, the name of Jews was pronounced as "Zhydy" (Żydzi, Juden), while in the Russian [and contemporary Ukrainian, sadly] language (and in the Soviet practices) this form has a distinctive pejorative meaning in a contrast to a neutral "Jevrei". There was a long discussion among the experts which form to choose: some were for a restoration of the original historical name (Starozhydivs'ka), while Matsiuk insisted to modify it in Starojevrejs'ka, to avoid any possible offense of Jews. Finally, his suggestion has won.54 In a final result, among all the L'viv streets that have historical names (410 in 1997), mere? 20 per cent have non-Ukrainian names55. Conclusions The whole issue of renamings was regarded by the epxert group as setting of an exapmle to be followed later by all Ukraine. Therefore it was done "quickly, almost without any mistakes". [maybe a critical remark here?]57 An available material does not permit to establish to which extent the Lviv experience became expemlary for all the post-Soviet Ukraine. Our comparison is limited, however, to very important cases of Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, and Donets'k, the largest industrial ubran center in the Eastern Ukraine. In Kyiv, a committee for renaming has been formed by the last monthns of the Soviet Union, too. It has a broader representation, including municipal clerks, architectures and historians. Professional historians came forward with proposals to memorialise some of Ukrainian national figures that were silenced during the Soviet regime. By 1997 only few proposals of that kind have been accepted, and even fewer were related to central streets. To be sure, memory of the most notorious Soviet leaders has been oblitaterated in Kyiv, too. Their names were replaced, however, with the ones that refer to a local, rather than to a national history. 58 Even This was not It was not hard to find a source of intellectual inspiration for the L'viv renamings: as a member of the expert committee admitted, the city streets were thought to become as an illustration to the Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyj scheme of Ukrainian national history. This scheme perceives the Ukrainian past more in “ethnic”, than in “territorial” sense61, and represents a relatively coherent narrative of a national history than has a powerful appeal to Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians. In historical terms, the post-Soviet renaming of the L’viv streets finds clear parallels with some general patterns of the Polish renamings. The similarity between "Ukrainian" L'viv of 1997 and the Polish "Lwów"of 1938 (see schemes # 2 and 3) is striking: in both cases the central part of the city is covered by an intense network of "national" historical names. The principle "cuius regio ejus historia" is clearly displayed here. And in both cases, the ethnic conept of a nation prevails. Historical figures and symbols of other groups were permitted to an extent they fitted in this paradigm (as symbol of a political or cultural assimilation of city ethnic minorities in the dominant group), or, if they were not, they were relegated to a second-rank status. Surprising The Polish and Ukrainian "nationalizing" projects are very alike to each other in another way: they represent some similar mental structures while dealing with the past. In both cases the historical symbols and figures of modern period (XIX-XX centuries) clearly dominate over those from earlier times. The most famous national names are reiterated on the city map to reinforce an image of a "national" city. Such manipulations quite often were done on a price of sacrificing local history, especially that one of pre-XIX century. This is quite understandable given to the fact that the "pre-national" local history reflect an exltremely multicultural character of the city, and, by definition, could not be succesfully integrated into a paradigm of a national history. While none of experts ever refered to the Polish example, it is hard to judge whether in the Ukrianian case we are dealing here with borrowing and inheriting intellectual schemes of Polish nationalism,62 or the similarity between the two projects just reflects a common sense of any nationalizing scheme. One can not oversee, however, some internal weaknesses of the Ukrainian project. Nationalization of masses in urban space requires some |