SUMMARY OF MARSHALL’S REPORTS ON CONFERENCE MEETINGS 1-11
March 10–21, 1947 Moscow, USSR
(page numbers indicate the location of Marshall’s meeting
summary message in Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. 2)
10 March—#1 Molotov presiding; pp. 239-40
Organization and agenda items. Molotov asks information reports on each nation’s fulfillment of promises re China; end of Prussia as a German state approved.
11 March—#2 Marshall presiding; pp. 242–44
Discussion of China reports and occupation troop limits suspended; demilitarization of Germany.
12 March—/#3 Bidault presiding; pp. 244–45
Meeting “relatively ineffective...propaganda for home consumption.” Bevin responds to Molotov on German demilitarization and criticizes Soviet actions.
13 March—#4 Bevin presiding; pp. 249–51
Denazification and disarmament. “The exchange between Molotov and Bevin [on demilitarization and political procedures], again, as yesterday, was well interspersed with propaganda for home consumption.”
14 March—#5 Molotov presiding; pp. 251–53
Marshall: “My initial attempt to expedite action of CFM by presenting my views in writing prior to the meeting and thus avoid tiresome reading and two time-consuming translations resulted in a confused discussion among the other three delegates.” Marshall reads a statement on democracy and Germany (see above, pp. 000–00). Charges and counter-charges re denazification, demilitarization, and democratization.
15 March—#6 Marshall presiding; pp. 253–55
Displaced persons. Bidault expresses concern with increasing German population because of DP influx. Bevin notes cost of Poles in UK. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky asks investigation of DP camp conditions in western zone; accuses western zone commanders of attempting unilaterally to federalize Germany.
17 March—#7 Bidault presiding; pp. 255–57
Bevin urges German economic unity, raises level of industry plan. Molotov objects to economic unity of US-UK zones, attacks western occupiers re reparations and deplores monopoly capitalists in US-UK zones. Marshall: “charges and countercharges get us nowhere except to develop greater differences”; indicates American sympathy for Soviet war losses; asserts that economic unity of Germany is the key to success of occupation and future peace.
18 March—#8 Bevin presiding; pp. 262–63
Bidault’s views on German economy, occupation costs, and reparations resumption; need to integrate Saar into French economic system; need for international agency to control use of German coal. Molotov-Bevin “rather heated exchange on reparations.” Marshall reaffirms US position that Potsdam Conference reparations agreements supersede preliminary agreement at Yalta.
19 March—#9 Molotov presiding; pp. 263–65
Bidault discusses German economic unity, reparations, level of industry. Molotov: economic unity and reparations are inseparable; failure of western zones to pay reparations is the reason for unilateral action taken by eastern zone military authorities. Marshall: rapidly changing Soviet views on increasing German steel production highlights the danger of paying reparations from current production. “We must avoid at all costs establishing conditions in Germany similar to those after the first World War, when in an incredibly short period of time, Germany, through increased production for reparations and foreign loans, was able to build up her internal economy geared for war. At the same time, under no conditions should we set her economy so low that a democratic way of life could not hope to survive in Germany.” (p. 265)
20 March—#10 Marshall presiding; pp. 265–66
Bidault: Ruhr should be under international control, France should get the coal she needs before any discussion of economic unity; German steel production should be limited more than US-UK desire. Bevin rejects French views on coal, economic unity. Report on progress made by deputy foreign ministers re German peace treaty preparations.
21 March—#11 Bidault presiding; pp. 270–71
Progress report of the Deputies for Austria. Discussion of the provisional German government. Marshall: time has come to authorize the Germans to establish a provisional government to deal with matters of nationwide concern that the states cannot adequately handle; proposes three-stage approach. *