The Great Chinese Revolution Stage 1: New Democratic Revolution 1911-1949

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Topic 1: Causes, practices and effects of war

‘The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them’ (Mao Zedong [Mao Tse-tung]). To what extent do you agree with this statement?
Why was there so much civil strife and civil war in China during the first half of the twentieth century?

Topic 3: The rise and rule of single-party states

What are the common factors in the rise of a single party states in developed and developing countries? Be specific in your answer.
In what ways and for what reasons did China develop its own brand of Marxism/Communism?

Log Requirements:

For each log entry you must complete all of the following that are applicable

Complete citation (author, title, publication information, & date of publication)
Type of writing / Audience for the writing
Major Thesis
Supporting information
Specific quotes that illuminate the author’s argument
Strengths and limitations of the source
Your response to the reading (how has the reading effected your understanding of the subject)

Rubric:

A – Logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner, No missing entries.

B+ – Most logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner, few logs do not deal with all issues, No missing entries.

B – Some logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner, many logs do not deal with all issues, No missing entries.

C+ – Missing entries, All logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner.

C – Missing entries, Most logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner, few logs do not deal with all issues.

D+ – Missing entries, Some logs deal with all applicable issues in a thoughtful manner, many logs do not deal with all issues.

D – Majority of entries are missing.

F – No Log

HISTORY

HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL

PAPER 1

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANIDATES

You may use your notes, logs, texts, handouts & you may discuss it with your classmates but the final product should be your own.
Refer to the Source Booklet which accompanies this examination paper.
Answer all four questions on ONE section only either:

Section A

Section B

Section C
SECTION B
Prescribed Subject 2 The Emergence and Development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946-1964

(a) According to Source A what is ‘the chief aim of our party’?

[3 marks]

(b) Explain the association between the two men in Source D

[2 marks]

How consistent are Sources A & B in explaining the goals of the Chinese Communist Party?

[6 marks]

With reference to their origins and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources C and E for historians studying the rise to power of Mao.

[6 marks]

Using the sources and your own knowledge, explain how Mao Zedong was able to rise to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

[8 marks]

H
ISTORY

HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL

PAPER 1

SOURCE BOOKLET

Texts in this source booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets […]; minor changes are not indicated.
Section B
Prescribed Subject 2 The Emergence and Development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946-1964
These sources relate the conflict within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regarding the nature of the CCP.
SOURCE A An extract from The First Decision as to the Objects of the CCP (July-August 1921)
1) Labor Organization

To form industrial unions is the chief aim of our party. In any locality where there is more than one kind of industry, an industrial union shall be organized; if there is no great industry in a certain locality but only one or two factories, a factory union can be organized suitable to conditions in that locality.

The party should imbue the unions with the spirit of the class struggle. If the political struggle fostered by various unions, does not agree with our program, the party should avoid becoming a puppet of other parties. …

SOURCE B An extract from the Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan. By Mao Zedong (28 March 1927)
…The further development of the peasant movement is a tremendous problem. Within a short time, hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in central, south, and north China with the fury of a hurricane; no force, no matter how strong, can restrain them. They will break all the shackles that bind them and rush toward the road of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants. All revolutionary parties and comrades will be judged by them. Are we to get in front of them and lead them or criticize them behind their backs or fight them from the opposite camp? Among these three alternatives every Chinese can choose freely, but the current situation demands a quick decision. …

SOURCE C An extract from Mao by Shaun Breslin, London 1998
We are in many ways entirely correct to talk in terms of ‘Mao’s China’ (he was the single most important figure in the country’s evolution after 1949) and to take a Mao-centric approach (he was the central figure to whom all other political actors referred in defining their own approaches and strategies). But China was never a totally totalitarian state, and Mao was never an all-powerful figure who could single-handedly shape the entire country and its destiny. There were considerable limits to Mao’s power, and the way that he tried to over come these limit was an important determinant of the evolution of Chinese politics while he was alive.

SOURCE D A photograph of a Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in north Shensi in 1937

SOURCE E An extract from the Outline for Communicating the Zunyi Enlarged Politburo Meeting. Chen Yun

(February-March 1935)
[…] While such errors in military command persisted, controversies occurred within the party and the Military Council. Mao [Zedong], Zhang [Westian], and Wang [Jianxiang] raised many objections, and even Comrade [Zhou] Enlai expressed his disagreement concerning some individual battles, but such mistakes could not be successfully overcome. […]

The enlarged meeting points out that while three comrades A [Braun], Bo [Gu], and Zhou [Enlai] constituted the erroneous military leadership, the two comrades A and Bo must bear the main responsibility.

The enlarged meeting points out that the correction of the erroneous military leadership in the party is not a split in the party. On the contrary, it makes the party more united, puts the military leadership on the right track, and further increases the prestige of the party and the Military Council. All vacillating, discouraged, and pessimistic elements have not the least bit in common with the advancing Bolsheviks. The enlarged meeting calls for opposing all right opportunist trends while refuting the pure defense line in military command.

D) Finally, the enlarged meeting made the following decisions:

i) Comrade Mao Zedong has been elected a member of the Standing Committee. […]

1 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. Columbia University Press, 1994, Page 14. Chen Jian is C. K. Yen Professor of Chinese-American Relations at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, Professor of History at the University of Virginia, and Zijiang Visiting Professor at East China Normal University, P.R.C. Professor Chen’s work tries to place the events of the Cold War in Asia within the context of China’s domestic framework. Professor Chen is a native of mainland China where he experienced the Cultural Revolution

2 Glenn R. Chafetz, “Did Ideology Plan an Important Role in the U.S.-Soviet Conflict?,” History in Dispute, Farmington Hills, Mi.: St. James Press, 2000 (Page 149).

3 Shuisheng Zhao, Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity. St. Martin's Press: New York, 1997, (Pages 16-18).

4 Sir Isaiah Berlin quoted in James G. Blight & Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with Superpowers after the Missile Crisis. Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (Page 115). Though Blight & Brenner were writing regarding Cuba, the ideas of Berlin certainly express the frustrations and aspirations of the Chinese people.

5 Shaun Breslin, Mao. Longman 1998. (Page 67)

6 Franz Schrumann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. University of California Press. 1968 (Pages 29 –30).

7 Shaun Breslin, Mao. (Page 66)

8 Shaun Breslin, Mao. (Page 66)

9 Shaun Breslin, Mao. (Page 68)

10 Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton University Press, 1994. (Page 13).

11 Chinese names are given in the Pinyin and parenthetically in the Wade-Giles. The British developed Wade-Giles in the 19^th Century and its use is considered by some to reflect imperialistic values. The Pinyin system developed in Mainland China in the 1950s and received general acceptance in the 1970s. Its use is considered my some to reflect greater sensitivity to China.

12 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918-20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery. St. Martin’s Press. 1991. (Pages 37-38).

13 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918-20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery. St. Martin’s Press. 1991. (Page 40).

14 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China. Norton, 1990. (Page 293).

15 Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918-20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery. St. Martin’s Press. 1991. (Page 74-76).

16 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China. Norton, 1990. (Page 320).

17 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China. Norton, 1990. (Page 409).

18 Shaun Breslin, Mao. Longman, 1998, Page 55.

19 Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War, University of North Carolina, 2001, Page 5

20 Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945. Stanford University Press, 1962 Page 7.

21 Suzanne Pepper’s book was originally published in 1978 when Wade-Giles was still the standard system of transliteration in the United States academic community. The cost of changing all the system would have been prohibitive for the publishing of the second edition.

22 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 433.

23 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 6^th Ed. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pages 582-583.

24 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 6^th Ed. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pages 589.

25 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 6^th Ed. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pages 589.

26 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. 6^th Ed. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pages 591.

27 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, & Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Page 2.

28 Chen Jian, Mao’s China & the Cold War, University of North Carolina, 2001, Page 31.

29 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. Yale University Press, 1994. Page 125.

30 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 425.

31 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 426.

32 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 426.

33 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 428.

34 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 428-29.

35 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 430.

36 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. 2^nd Ed. Rowman & Litttlefield. 1999. Page 431.

37 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. Columbia University Press. 1994. Pages 13-14.

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The Great Chinese Revolution Stage 1: New Democratic Revolution 1911-1949

Topic 1: Causes, practices and effects of war

‘The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them’ (Mao Zedong [Mao Tse-tung]). To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Topic 3: The rise and rule of single-party states