Table of contents criminal Law Outline

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Held, a criminal penalty may not be imposed for the failure to do an act required by statute if the actor made all attempts to comply with the statute.

The engineer did not have the requisite mens rea when he failed to stop. The object of the statute was to prevent accidents resulting from trains intentionally crossing another train line. The engineer intended to stop and tried to do so. The legislative intent is not fulfilled by imposing a fine in this case.

State v. Peery

Several women claimed they saw D stand unclothed in front of his dormitory window. D admitted that he often changed clothes about this time and may have forgotten to close the shades, but he did not notice any passersby. There was no evidence that he called attention to himself or that he intended to embarass anyone in any way. D was convicted of indecent exposure.
Held, one may not be convicted of indecent exposure when the exposure resulted from inattention rather than an intent to provoke or embarrass
1. There was no evidence that D had a guilty intention; without such he cannot be convicted of a crime.

Actus Reas

General
1. All crimes require a D to commit a voluntary criminal act.
2. The Actus Reus may be a positive act, such as hitting another or an omission, which is a failure to act when there is a legal duty to do so
3. Purpose:
  1. This is required so that people are not punished for their bad thoughts. It also limits law enforcement by focusing its efforts on identifiable occurrences and separates those seriously intend to commit harm from those with mere fantasies.
4. Verbal Contact alone
  1. Verbal conduct may be sufficient to constitute the Actus Reus of a crime such as solicitation, conspiracy, or aiding and abetting.
5. State v. Quick
  1. The evidence indicated that D intended to commit the crime charged, but never did anything.
  2. Held, intention to commit a crime is not an offense by itself.
    1. There must be an overt act coupled with an intent to be a crime. The law is not concerned with mere guilty intention.
Positive Acts
1. Voluntariness
  1. All physical acts must be voluntary to constitute the actus reus.
    1. Any act that is the result of conscious and volitional movement.
2. Exceptions
  1. Automaton – reflexive action
  2. Sleepwalking
  3. Movement by another
3. MPC involuntary acts - §2.01
  1. Voluntary – any act which is not involuntary.
  2. Involuntary:
    1. Reflex or convulsion
    2. Bodily Movement during unconscious or sleep
    3. Hypnosis or under hypnotic suggestion
    4. Bodily movement not otherwise the product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.
4. Extending the Period of the Actus Reus
  1. Epileptic Reflexes
    1. People v. Decina
      1. Epileptic was driving, had a seizure, and killed four people.
      2. Held, knowingly placing oneself in a position which can threaten the lives of others, one is criminally liable when such injury results.
        
        D consciously and knowingly committed an act in disregard of the possible consequences to others. This is criminal negligence and D is criminally liable.
Omissions
1. Generally, there is no legal duty. [Woman raped in public; Woman stabbed in public, etc.]
2. Rationale:
  1. American Law does not compel active benevolence among people. Rather, it only requires that one not cause others harm. Reasons:
    1. The American tradition of individual freedom
    2. The difficulty of knowing how much help one must provide others in life
    3. The fear of diverting attention from the perpetrator of the crime to the bystander
    4. The possibility that Good Samaritans may face undue risk of harm
Criticisms:
1. There is not moral difference between failing to help when one can do so with no peril to oneself and actively causing the harm
2. The general rule ingrains a callousness and indifference into how members of society interact with each other
3. The general rule may embolden violators to commit more crimes because they know people are not required to assist the prospective victims.
Exceptions:
1. Statute
2. Status relationships: Parent-child, employer-employee, spouse-spouse, owner-customer
3. Contractual Agreements
  1. Jones v. United States
    1. Mother of two children, unmarried and living w/her parents, hired D to care for her children. One of the children was improperly cared for and died. Evidence was in conflict about whether mother’s arrangement with D was terminated when the improper care was given. Jury was not instructed to decide whether D had a “legal duty” to care for the children. D was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and mother was acquitted. D claims that the element of a “legal duty” was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Held, a person must have a legal duty to act in order to be convicted for failure to act.
      1. One of the ways a legal duty can be established is through contract. In this case, while it is clear that there was initially a contract between D and mother, the evidence was conflicting as to whether the contract still existed.
4. Voluntary assuming care of another

Concurrence of Mens Rea and Actus Reus

General
1. Te actus reus and mens rea must be concurrent does not mean that they must happen at exactly the same time, in exactly the same location. Often, the courts employ the argument that a mens rea element “continues” until the actus reus is complete.
Intent Formed After the Actus reus was committed
1. Commonwealth v. Cali
  1. D set fire to a building belonging to a relative, and was tried for setting the fire with the intent to defraud an insurer. D offered evidence indicating that he had set the fire accidentally, and had later refrained from any attempt to put out the fire, although it appeared likely that putting out the fire would have been an easy matter and not one subject to a great degree of risk. Upon conviction, D argued that he didn’t set a fire with the intent to defraud an insurer.
  2. Held, an apparent innocent act which results in injury due to the actor’s subsequent “negative acts” may permit criminal liability for the original act.
    1. If D simply neglected to act, he would not be guilty of arson because negligence is not proof of intent. The intent to injure could be formed after the fire started, however.
    2. The jury found that D had criminal intent. This finding is supported by evidence.
2. Note: Generally, no crime is committed when the actus reus occurs prior to any mens rea element. In this case, however, D’s breach of his legal duty to stop the fire that he started, coupled with his then-formed intent to defraud, provides the necessary concurrence of mens rea and actus reus. The rule set forth in this case is conceptually similar to that of “continuing trespass” in larceny cases.
No intent when the Actus reus was committed
1. Jackson v. Commonwealth
  1. D and another attempted to kill Bryan by giving her a drug. They then moved her across the state line to Kentucky and decapitated her. The evidence was unclear as to the time of death, and therefore whether she died in Ohio or Kentucky. (At this time, death was required to be tried at the place of death). D argued that if the jury found that he decapitated the girl in Kentucky merely to hinder identification, thinking that she was already dead, they could not convict him of murder because he had no intent to kill in Kentucky.
  2. Held, a person may not exculpate himself by claiming that he had no intent to commit an act because he thought he had already committed it.
    1. D’s acts were a continuing trespass. He can’t avoid criminal liability by asserting that he only attempted murder in Ohio, then merely mutilated a corpse in Kentucky. D clearly killed the girl.

Accomplice Liability

General
1. Based on the premise that all people who assist in the commission of the crime should be held accountable, to some degree, for that offense. Whereas the law normally regards a person’s acts as the products of his or her own choice, accomplice liability is based on the doctrine of complicity. Complicity recognizes that one individual’s actions may influence whether or how another person acts. The involvement of more than one person in the criminal activity means there is more anger and more likelihood of the parties achieving their objectives
Common Law Distinctions
1. Principal in the 1^st degree
  1. This was the actual perpetrator of the crime.
    1. E.g. in a bank robbery, it is the D who enters the bank and demands the money
2. Principal in the 2^nd degree
  1. This was the person who aided and abetted the principal by beinig present, or nearby.
    1. E.g. in a bank robbery, the driver of the getaway car
3. Accessory before the fact
  1. This was the person who helped prepare for the crime.
    1. E.g. in a bank robbery, the person who cased the bank or purchased the disguises, but did not participate in the actual robbery
4. Accessory after the fact
  1. This was the person who, knowing that a felony had been committed, received relieved, comforted, or assisted the felon.
    1. E.g. in a bank robbery, a person who learned that her friend had just committed a robbery but offered to hide the D and her loot until the police called off their search.
  2. State v. Williams
    1. D and a number of others helped Hicks, who had shot a man, escape from the police. Among the acts committed were helping Hicks leave the scene of the crime and lying to police officers in an attempt to cover up the crime. The evidence indicated that the deceased did not die until after D and the others had helped Hicks escape. D was convicted as an accessory after the fact of murder. He appeals, claiming that there was not a murder at the time he helped Hicks.
    2. Held, a conviction for accessory after the fact of felony can not stand if the felony was not complete at the time of D’s act.
      1. In order to be convicted as an accessory after the fact of a felony, the prosecution must prove that
        
        The principal felon committed the crime
        
        The accused knew that a felony was committed by the felon
        
        That the accused offered relief, comfort or assistance to that felon.
      2. Here, there was no proof that the crime of murder had been committed when D helped Hicks attempt to escape.
Modern Approach
1. General
  1. Most modern statutes have eliminated the first three common law categories and hold that all participants in a crime, apart from the accessory after the fact, are subject to the same punishment.
2. Same Punishment for all except accessory after the fact
  1. All will be charged for the substantive crime except the accessory after the fact
  2. Rationale:
    1. The person who plans a crime may be as culpable or more culpable than the less sophisticated individual who puts the plan into action. That person should not be rewarded b/c he or she hid behind the scenes and convinced another to commit the crime. Moreover, when the crime is the collaborative effort of individuals, each contributed to the substantive offense.
  3. Note:
    1. While all are convicted of the same crime, the court may impose difference sentencing for different degrees of participation in the crime.
3. Principal need not be convicted
  1. Under modern statutes, the prosecution need only prove that a crime was actually committed and the accomplice participated before or during its commission.
  2. E.g. Three people participate in a bank robbery: the robber, the lookout and the planner. Only the lookout is apprehended. As long as the prosecution proves that the robbery occurred, and that the lookout played a role in the robbery, the lookout can be convicted even if her co-participants are never apprehended.
4. Sample Statutes
  1. California Law
    1. “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed.”
  2. MPC – 2.06 (509)
    1. “A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.”
    2. 2.06 (509) - Sets forth the conditions under which a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another
5. Accessory after the fact
  1. General
    1. Under both common law and modern standards, accessories after the fact are treated as less culpable than principals or accessories before the fact
Using another as an instrument to commit a crime
1. General
  1. If a person unknowingly or unwittingly participates in a crime, that person is not an accomplice but is considered a mere instrument by which the actual perpetrator committed the offense.
    1. Animals and Objects may also be used as instruments
Requirements for accomplice liability
1. Mens rea
  1. General
    1. The mens rea for accomplice liability is the “purpose to have the crime succeed.”
      1. Purpose to help, and
      2. Purpose to have the crime succeed
  2. Mere Presence
    1. As established in Hicks, mere presence at the commission of a crime is ordinarily insufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. However, if a D agrees in advance to be present in order to provide moral support or assistance to the principal, accomplice liability is established
    2. Examples
      1. If someone goes along to enjoy the spectacle of someone dying, they aren’t an accomplice b/c they don’t aid or abet
      2. If someone shouts “go get him!” then they have aided and abetted because they provided moral support
      3. A person cannot be guilty if they go along simply resolved to help if needed, b/c although they have the mens rea they have not made an affirmative act of assistance. However, if they told the other person they would be there to help, then they are guilty
  3. Purpose v. Knowledge
    1. General
      1. To be guilty as an accomplice, a D must not only know that his acts may assist the commission of a crime, but must also have the specific purpose of having the crime succeed.
    2. Establishing purpose to aid and abet
      1. The purpose of these tests is to draw a line between those who are incidental to the crime and those who assist
      2. Nexus:
        
        Courts look for a connection or relation between the accomplice and principal that shows that the accomplice had the purpose of aiding the principal’s commission of the crime
      3. Stake in the venture
        
        Somewhat more helpful is this test. To draw the line between whether the accomplice just knowingly aided, or did so purposefully, courts look to how much of a stake the accomplice has in the principal’s commission of the crime.
    3. MPC Approach – 2.06(3)(a)
      1. The final draft of the MPC now requires that the actor now have “the purpose of promoting or facilitating” the commission of the crime
    4. In a minority of jurisdictions, although purpose is required to convict lesser offenses, knowledge suffices to establish accomplice liability for major crimes.
  4. Liability for all reasonably foreseeable offenses
    1. Ordinarily, an accomplice is only responsible for thoses crimes he or she purposefully helps to succeed. However, a majority of jurisdictions now extend accomplice liability to both intended crimes and those criminal harms that are “reasonably foreseeable” or “the natural and probable consequence” of the D’s acts.
    2. Criticisms:
      1. The “natural and probable consequences” consequences allows for a conviction even when the D does not have the required mens rea for the crime.
    3. If someone engages in a “separate frolic” during the crime, the other should argue this wasn’t foreseeable.
  5. Accomplice mens rea for reckless or negligent crimes
    1. It is impossible, b y definition, to inten a negligent result. If the D intended the harm, the result would have been purposeful, not negligent. Therefore, accomplice liability for negligent crimes requires that the D (1) had the purpose to assist the principal; and (2) was negligent regarding the results.
    2. MPC
      1. The D need only act with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for commission of the offense.
      2. i.e. negligence, not purposefulness.
    3. When dealing with Negligent crimes, address two things:
      1. Causation
      2. Mens rea for complicity in a negligent crime
2. Actus Reus
  1. General
    1. T be an accomplice, the D must provide an act of assistance. The actus reus for accomplice liability may be either a positive act or an omission when there is a duty to act.
    2. Positive Acts:
      1. There are an infinite number of ways an accomplice may help the principal in the commission of a crime. Bank Robbery: plan the robbery, survey the bank, serve as a lookout, drive the getaway car, or provide encouragement to the principal robber.
    3. Omissions
      1. If a police officer turns the other way in the commission of the crime.
    4. Mere Presence and acts of encouragements
      1. Mere presence is usually not enough to constitute an actus reus for accomplice liability unless the D’s presence is offered as a form of encouragement.
  2. Help need not contribute to criminal result
    1. A person is guilty of aiding and abetting even if the criminal result would have occurred anyway and D’s actions had no actual impact on the outcome.
  3. Principal need not be aware of accomplice’s acts
    1. A person can aid and abet a crime even though the principal is unaware of the accomplice’s help.
  4. Attempted Complicity
    1. An accomplice’s acts must constitute some type of aid to qualify as aiding and abetting. If the would-be accomplice’s acts cannot actually help, given the circumstances of the case, then under traditional common law there is no accomplice liability.
    2. Compare MPC approach – 2.06(3)
      1. Under the MPC, there is accomplice liability if a person aids, or attempts to aid, another’s commission of a crime. The MPC focuses on the D’s actual blameworthiness, not the fortuity of success.
3. Relationship between the liability of the parties
  1. General
    1. The general rule is that an accomplice is liable if the principal committed the crime, even if the principal is not convicted
  2. Situations in which the liability of the accomplice and principal do not depend upon eachother
    1. General
      1. The general rule is that an accomplice is guilty when he or she helps another commit a crime. The status of an accomplice, however, may excuse that person from liability.
    2. Feigned Accomplice
      1. A person who acts as an accomplice in an effort to apprehend the principal during the commission of a crime is not guilty of aiding and abetting the offense. The person does not act with the purpose of having the crime succeed, but with the purpose of stopping the criminal activity.
  3. Excused Principal
    1. General
      1. Accomplice liability depends on proof that a crime was committed and the D assisted in the commission of the crime. Liability does not depend on the prosecution and conviction of the principal. Principals may be excused from crimes for many reasons:
    2. Public Authority justification
      1. There can be accomplice liability even though the principal cannot be prosecuted b/c he was working for law enforcement
  4. Protected class of persons
    1. If a statute to protect a certain class of persons, those persons may not be charged with aiding and abetting the offense.
      1. Children who contract their services in violation of those laws are not accomplices.
    2. Law v. Commonwealth
      1. Law, almost 12, was convicted as the principle in the 2^nd degree for aiding and abetting John Law in committing the crime of rape. At trial, the court refused jury instructions that stated if the jury believed that Nathanial Law was under 14, and did not have the capacity to commit the crime, he must be acquitted, and that if the jury found John Law only guilty of attempted rape, than Nathaniel Law must be acquitted.
      2. Held, one who aids or assists another, even if a minor, in the commission of a felony may be guilty of the crime or the attempt at the crime (if the attempt is a felony) as if he was the principal actor.
        
        The instructions suggest that, b/c Nathaniel Law is under 14, he can’t commit rape, and thus cannot be guilty of either the principal crime in the first degree or as principal in the second degree (aiding and assisting another in the perpetration of the crime).
        
        It has long been held in England that a child under 14 can’t be guilty of rape or of attempting it b/c he’s a bitch. This hasn’t been recognized wholeheartedly in America.
        
        All scholars agree that a boy under 14, who aids and assists another in the commission of rape is not the less a principle in the 2^nd degree if it appears under all circumstances that he had a mischievous purpose.
        
        It is the rule in this jurisdiction that the attempt at rape is a felony, and any person who aids or assists another in the commission of the felony is guilty as if he was the principal actor himself. Although John Law was only convicted of attempted rape, Nathaniel Law will be guilty of the attempt also.
  5. Using another as an instrument
    1. When the principal is not in control of his or her actions or has no culpability for his or her acts, it is more appropriate to charge the D with causing a crime by using another as an instrument rather than to charge him or her with aiding and abetting an offense
4. Abandonment / Withdrawl Defense
  1. Common Law
    1. At common law, a majority of jurisdictions did not recognize an abandonment defense to accomplice liability. Some jurisdictions, however, have added a statutory defense when a D voluntarily and completely renounces involvement in a crime and makes substantial efforts to prevent it.
    2. The King v. Richardson
      1. D and S accosted a man as he was walking along the street. After asking the man how much money he possessed, and learning that it was a small amount, one of the accused said to the other to let the man be. However, the other went ahead and took the man’s small amount of money. The man accosted cannot remember which accused desisted and which one took his money.

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