Sociology, Disasters and Emergency Management: History, Contributions, and Future Agenda

səhifə	2/3
tarix	18.07.2016
ölçüsü	143.5 Kb.

1 2 3

Theory. Evolving from years of analysis of interviews conducted by DRC staff, Kreps and his associates have moved toward a generalized theory of disaster response (e.g., Kreps 1987; 1989; Kreps et al. 1994). When disaster strikes, emergent networks are born to handle the unique demands generated. Early on in the life of the DRC, a typology of organized disaster responses was formulated (Dynes 1970). Many (e.g., Stallings 1978) discovered that this typology helped make sense of the complex responses they observed in the field. The typology reflected two criteria: structure and tasks. Thus, established organized response units (Type I) reflected old structures being used to accomplish regular tasks. Conversely, emergent organized response units (Type II) reflected new structures being used to accomplish non-regular tasks. Expanding and extending units reflected non-regular tasks with old structures (Type II) or regular tasks with new structures (Type III). Kreps and his associates coded hundreds of DRC interviews so as to document the patterns of social structure that emerged during responses to disasters resulting from such agents as tornadoes, hurricanes, and the like. Their structural code reflected four key analytic qualities, i.e., domains, tasks, human and material resources, and activities. Their preliminary theoretical framework specified that various exogenous factors, e.g., event qualities were followed by social processes that defined the post-event organizing behavior which in turn produced various outcomes that could be assessed at both the individual and structural level. Their meticulous work lead them to conclude that the DRC typology was both an efficient and effective tool for understanding disaster behavior. Furthermore, if “. . . specifies nicely a micro-macro link between the individual and social structure.” (Kreps et al. 1994, p. 191).

Building on the collective stress perspective noted above, Drabek (2003) formulated a model for predicting the relative effectiveness of disaster responses. This work paralleled the logic of the Kreps team, but introduced different concepts. Local emergency managers were viewed as being nested within state and federal systems that changed over time reflecting perceptions of threats, government policies, demographic trends, and other such factors (pp. 147-152). By implementing a series of managerial strategies, various forms of interagency networks are nurtured which spring into action when disaster threatens. Use or misuse of 26 specific coordination strategies predict the shape of the emergent response and its effectiveness. While far from complete, future comparative research along these lines will provide the foundation required for scientifically based theories of emergency management.

Finally, as Dynes (2002, 2003) has documented, social capital theory offers many important insights. This analysis was extended by Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) in their case study of reconstruction following the 1995 devastating earthquake in Kobe, Japan. Their results clearly documented that the high level of trust in local leaders by the community was the major factor that facilitated acceptance of the collective decisions made throughout the recovery process. They concluded that “. . . social capital and leadership in the community are the basic attributes, which are universal in nature, irrespective of the development stages of the country.” (p. 29).

Social Criticism. A final area of contribution has taken the form of social criticism. Reflecting its historical roots, sociologists have offered “observations” about disaster responses that have highlighted fundamental flaws in both response and policy. This practice has reflected DRC publications since its origin. In its first publication, for example, Drabek, pinpointed “operational problems” stemming from inadequate inter-organizational coordination and communication (e.g., 1968, pp. 155-169). Years later (Drabek 1996a) reemphasized that business executives need to “resist threat denial” (1996a, p. 244), “do not overreact” (1996a, p. 245), and “debunk the panic myth” (1996a, p. 245). Dynes (1994, 1983) repeatedly has critiqued the planning and preparedness actions practiced by many who continue to fail because their top-down approach is fundamentally flawed, rooted in assumptions reflecting myth rather than research results.

Most recently, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has been found lacking. For example, Major and Atwood (2004) documented that only 49 percent of U.S.A. citizens surveyed in April, 2003 (p. 82) responded that the system was “useful.” Ambiguity in the announcements was the major complaint and it had real consequences. “The ambiguity of such announcements leaves the public with but one choice: not to prepare.” (p. 97). Studies like these led Aguirre (2004) to a highly critical view.

“The current Homeland Security Advisory System does not draw from years of social science study and does not benefit the nation. It is not a warning system. At best, HSAS is a mitigation and anticipatory public relations tool.” (p. 112).
Disciplinary Overlaps

Sociologists studying disasters frequently have integrated both theory and methodological tools reflective of other disciplines into their work. Indeed, the first major textbook on emergency management (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991), reflected a blending of concepts, conclusions, and analyses from sociology, public administration, and a wide variety of other disciplines. Such points of overlap within the literature at large are varied and numerous. The following illustrations document the point.

Response. A core theme in the analysis of disaster response is the concept of emergence, e.g., Drabek and McEntire 2002, 2003. Quarantelli (1996) summarized many of the key insights that had been accumulating over the years as scholars like Stallings (1978), Weller (1972), and Neal (1984) examined such dynamics. Most recently, Mendoça and Wallace (2004) have combined these insights with those from social psychologists like Weick (1993), and offered important new observations based on detailed examination of DRC interviews after Hurricane Camille (1969). In so doing they have developed a new methodology to specify the types of data required to document the “where, when and how” that improvisation occurs during disaster responses.

Recovery. Assessments of long-term impacts of disaster on individuals and communities illustrate, the close links between sociology, psychology, economics, and other disciplines. Drabek (2004) summarized numerous studies wherein various theoretical frameworks were used to document the lasting psychic pains following the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Arata et al. 2000), Hurricane Floyd (Willigen 2001), the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (Siegel et al. 1999), the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (Benight et al. 2000) and other disasters. While controversy remains regarding the relative efficacy of alternative treatment modalities (NIMH 2002, p. 9), the evidence is clear that most individuals cope well with even the worst of events. For some, however, the lingering pain of loss and fear continue although some interventions such as the “critical incident stress debrief” may offer promise (e.g., Mitchell and Everly 2000). Economic and demographic shifts following such events as Hurricane Andrew (e.g., Peacock et al. 1987), have recast earlier “no-effect” conclusions reached by others (e.g., Rossi et al. 1978; Wright and Rossi 1981). Short-term effects on such social phenomena as marriage rates (e.g., Cohan and Cole 2002) regarding Hurricane Hugo), transportation patterns (e.g., Edwards et al. 2000 regarding Hurricane Floyd) and other social phenomena continue to be documented as does increased ethnic inequality such as that which occurred after Hurricane Andrew (Morrow and Peacock 1997). Future multidisciplinary collaboration will be required if the processes and outcomes disaster recovery are to be better understood.

Preparedness. Following extensive study of tourism evacuation behavior (e.g., Drabek 1996a), FEMA supported Drabek’s effort to team with faculty of the School of Travel Industry Management, University of Hawaii at Manoa (Drabek and Gee, 2000). An emergency management instructor guide was created for faculty within departments of tourism, hospitality, restaurant and travel management. This facilitated the diffusion of knowledge from the social sciences, especially sociology, into this professional area whose businesses reflect a catastrophic level of vulnerability (Drabek 1994).

Diffusion of innovations has long been a focal point of sociologists and communications researchers (e.g., Rogers 1962). Drabek (1991) documented the social history of the adoption and implementation of microcomputers into several local and state emergency management agencies during the late 1980s. Problematical aspects of such adoptions were specified by Quarantelli (1997). His observations contrast sharply with the advantages of such technology that are proposed by those coming from other disciplinary perspectives, e.g., Stephenson and Anderson 1997; Gruntfest and Weber, 1998.

Mitigation. Learning from the wisdom of such social geographers as Gilbert White, Mileti (1980) formulated a general paradigm for assessing human adjustments to the risks associated with environmental extremes. Over the years, his work matured so that by 1999 he was able to present a well developed framework of a “sustainable hazards mitigation approach” (Mileti 1999, pp. 31-35). His approach has not been without criticism, however, and scholars like Aguirre (2002) have questioned both the content and direction. Others, like McEntire recognize both the strengths and weaknesses of applying sustainability to the study of disasters (McEntire and Floyd, 2003), but he is concerned that the perspective is not holistic as implied by those who espouse it (McEntire et. al., 2002, pp. 270-272).
Emergency Manager Recommendations

As is evident from the above analysis, sociologists have offered recommendations to emergency managers for decades. Many of these were codified in the text edited by Drabek and Hoetmer (1991). These ideas built on the continuing stream of publications produced by DRC staff, graduates, and sociologists located at other universities. Most important among the recommendations are such principles as the following.

An all-hazards approach is essential (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991).
Planning and preparedness activities are continuous processes, not goals to be accomplished and put aside (Dynes et al. 1972).
Social science knowledge, not myths, should guide program activities, priorities, and implementation strategies (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972).
If disaster plans are to be relevant guides for the behavioral response, they must be developed by those who will implement them (Dynes and Drabek 1994).
Managing emergency responses requires the implementation of theoretical models that are resource based rather than authority based (Dynes 1994; Neal and Phillips 1995; Drabek 2003).

This last principle reflects another point of disciplinary overlap and points the way for a future research agenda. Writing from the perspective of a political scientist, Sylves (2004) stated the point with succinctness. “When it comes to the field of emergency management, the aim should be to develop new theory or adapt old theory to produce manageable policy. . . . the field must advance through the production of codified knowledge widely diffused to anyone who chooses to learn it.” (p. 32).

These basic recommendations, and others like them, are being implemented in local emergency management agencies and related units of government more frequently than at any other time in the history of the nation. A recent write-up by a utility security manager in Bradenton, Florida is but one of dozens of illustrations that could be cited. In response to the federal mandates which amended the Safe Drinking Water Act, i.e., Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, Brian Sharkey (2004) pressed for changes. Among the steps taken, all of which reflect the principles listed above, were these.

“At the outset, the plan was developed with input from the department’s senior staff. These are the people who are responsible for carrying out the plan, so they must have input and ownership.” (p. 7)
“Local emergency response agencies were involved in plan development. This “. . . allowed the emergency response agencies to integrate their plan with ours.” (p. 7)
“The plan is always considered an unfinished product. It has been made an active and evolving part of our working environment, and is not just another dust collector.” (p. 7)

Unfortunately, vulnerabilities and risks are accelerating at rates that far exceed such increased capacities due to a whole host of social, demographic, technological, and political factors. So while much has been accomplished through applications of sociological research findings, the net result has been a society at increased risk. And globally, the situation is far worse.
Future Research Agenda

To celebrate the 40^th anniversary of the founding of the Disaster Research Center (DRC), numerous scholars gathered to reflect on the past and propose directions for the future (Rodríguez et al. 2004). At the end of their two day conference, they identified a list of research priorities. Among these was a vision of increased “globalization,” more focus on vulnerability and development, increased multi and interdisciplinary research, emerging technologies, special population impacts especially children (and race, ethnic, gender, class and age inequalities), and new complex threats as represented by terrorist attacks (pp. 130-131). This listing and the elaborations provided are invaluable to any who might formulate their own research agenda. From this and other such efforts (e.g., Anderson and Mattingly 1991; Simpson and Howard 2001), two key themes merit priority.

1. Alternative theoretical perspectives should be elaborated, encouraged, and compared. Starting with the social problem orientation proposed by Kreps and Drabek (1996), disasters must be placed within the broader context of public policy, perception, and history. Similarly, analyses must be continued of the unique and continuing social injustices reflective in the inequalities of race, gender, age, etc. that are highlighted by those advocating social vulnerability perspectives (e.g., Enarson et al. 2003). So too must the insights from Mileti (1999) and others whose focus on mitigation led them to see the wisdom of the breadth of perspective inherent in sustainability theory. Different research questions may best be pursued through one of those perspectives or some other. The field will develop best through expansion, not premature closure.

2. A global, rather than a national, focus must be developed. There are many reasons why a global perspective must be nurtured. First, it is through cross-societal comparison that the issues of external validity can best be addressed (Drabek 2000; Peacock 1997). Second, as Dynes (2004) pointed out so effectively, the majority of disaster victims reside in underdeveloped countries where few research teams have ventured. Third, links between disaster consequences and other events, like resettlements caused by World Bank mitigation projects, should be assessed. “Without understanding the impoverishing consequences of displacement, the inequalities between gainers and losers from such projects will be amplified and perpetuated: more than a few displaced people will end up worse off, poorer than before the project came into their midst.” (Cernea 2003, p. 37). Fourth, new threats, like terrorism, and the vulnerabilities they reflect must be viewed within an international context if preparedness, response, and mitigation policies are to be informed effectively. Dynes put it succinctly:

“One of the other consequences of 9/11 was the effort to remove the burkas, which distorted the vision of those in Afghanistan. U.S. policy has insisted that we keep our burkas on, ignoring the lessons of Hamburg, Hiroshima, and New York.” (Dynes 2003, p. 21).

References
Aguirre, Benigno E. 2004. “Homeland Security Warnings: Lessons Learned and Unlearned.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 22 (No. 2):103-115.
Anderson, William A. and Shirley Mattingly. 1991. “Future Directions.” Pp. 311-335 in Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government, edited by Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.
Arata, Catalina M., J. Steven Picou, G. David Johnson and T. Scott McNally. 2000. “Coping with Technological Disaster: An Application of the Conservation of Resources Model to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 13:23-39.
Bankoff, Greg. 2003. “Vulnerability as a Measure of Change in Society.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 21 (No. 2):5-30.
Barton, Allen H. 1969. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.
Bates, Frederick L. and Walter G. Peacock. 1987. “Disaster and Social Change.” Pp. 291-330 in Sociology of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research, edited by Russell R. Dynes, Bruna DeMarchi, and Carlo Pelanda. Milano, Italy: Franco Angeli.
Bates, Frederick L. and Carlo Pelanda. 1994. “An Ecological Approach to Disasters.” Pp. 145-159 in Disasters, Collective Behavior, and Social Organization, edited by Russell R. Dynes and Kathleen J. Tierney. Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press.
Benight, Charles C., Robert W. Freyaldenhoven, Joel Hughes, John M. Ruiz, Tiffany A. Zoschke and William R. Lovallo. 2000. “Coping Self-Efficacy and Psychological Distress Following the Oklahoma City Bombing.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 30:1331-1344.
Bolin, Robert. 1994. “Postdisaster Sheltering and Housing: Social Processes in Response and Recovery.” Pp. 115-127 in Disasters, Collective Behavior, and Social Organization, edited by Russell R. Dynes and Kathleen J. Tierney. Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press.
Briceño, Sālvano. 2004. “Global Challenges in Disaster Reduction.” Australian Journal of Emergency Management 19 (No. 1):3-5.
Britton, Neil. R. 1987. “Toward a Reconceptualization of Disaster for the Enhancement of Social Preparation.” Pp. 31-55 in Sociology of Disasters: Contributions of Sociology to Disaster Research, edited by Russell R. Dynes, Bruna DeMarchi, and Carlo Pelanda. Milano, Italy: Franco Angeli.

Britton, Neil R. and Kathleen Clapham. 1991. Annotated Bibliography of Australian Hazards and Disaster Literature, 1969 1989.(Volume 1: Author Indexed; Volume 2: System Level Indexed). Armidale, New South Wales, Australia: Centre for Disaster Management, University of New England.

Burton, Ian, Robert W. Kates and Gilbert F. White. 1993. The Environment as Hazard. 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Publishers, Inc.
Cernea, Michael M. 2003. “For a New Economics of Resettlement: A Sociological Critique of the Compensation Principle.” International Social Science Journal 55:37-45.
Cisin, Ira and Walter B. Clark. 1962. “The Methodological Challenge of Disaster Research.” Pp. 23-47 in Man and Society in Disaster, edited by George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman. New York: Basic Books.
Cohan, Catherine L. and Steve W. Cole. 2002. “Life Course Transitions and Natural Disaster: Marriage, Birth, and Divorce Following Hurricane Hugo.” Journal of Family Psychology 16:14-25.
Dombrowsky, Wolf R. 2002. “Methodological Changes and Challenges in Disaster Research: Electronic Media and the Globalization of Data Collection.” Pp. 305-319 in Methods of Disaster Research, edited by Robert A. Stallings. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Xlibris Corporation.
Dombrowsky, Wolf R. and John K. Schorr. 1986. “Angst and the Masses: Collective Behavior Research in Germany.” 1986. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 4:61 89.
Drabek, Thomas E. 1968. Disaster in Aisle 13. College of Administrative Science. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University.
_______. 1970. “Methodology of Studying Disasters: Past Patterns and Future Possibilities.” American Behavioral Scientist 13:331 343.
_______. 1986. Human System Responses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings. New York: Springer Verlag.
_______. 1987. “Emergent Structures.” Pp. 190-259 in Sociology of Disasters: Contribution of Sociology in Disaster Research, edited by Russell R. Dynes, Brune DeMarchi and Carlo Pelanda. Milano, Italy: Franco Angeli.
______. 1990. Emergency Management: Strategies for Maintaining Organizational Integrity. New York: Springer Verlag.
_______. 1991. Microcomputers in Emergency Management: Implementation of Computer Technology. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
_______. 1996a. Disaster Evacuation and the Tourist Industry. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
_______. 1996b. Sociology of Disaster: Instructor Guide. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
_______. 1999. “Disaster Evacuation Response by Tourists and Other Types of Transients.” International Journal of Public Administration 22:655-677.
_______. 2000. “The Social Factors that Constrain Human Responses to Flood Warnings.” Pp. 361-376 in Floods, (Vol. 1), edited by Dennis J. Parker. London and New York: Routledge.
_______. 2002. “Following Some Dreams: Recognizing Opportunities, Posing Interesting Questions, and Implementing Alternative Methods.” Pp. 127-153 in Methods of Disaster Research, edited by Robert A. Stallings. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Xlibris Corporation.
_______. 2003. Strategies For Coordinating Disaster Responses. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
_______. 2004. Social Dimensions of Disaster 2^nd ed.: Instructor Guide. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Drabek, Thomas E. and Chuck Y. Gee. 2000. Emergency Management Principles and Application for Tourism, Hospitality, and Travel Management Industries: Instructor Guide. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Drabek, Thomas E. and Gerard J. Hoetmer (eds.). 1991. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.
Drabek, Thomas E. and David A. McEntire. 2002. “Emergent Phenomena and Multiorganizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 20:197-224.
_______. 2003. “Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and Opportunities from the Research Literature.” Disaster Prevention and Management 12:97-112.
Drabek, Thomas E., Alvin H. Mushkatel, and Thomas S. Kilijanek. 1983. Earthquake Mitigation Policy: The Experience of Two States. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science, The University of Colorado.
Dynes, Russell R. 1983. “Problems in Emergency Planning.” Energy 8:653 660.
_______. 1994. “Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies.” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 12:141 158.
_______. 2002. “The Importance of Social Capital in Disaster Response.” Preliminary Paper #322. Newark, Delaware: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.

1 2 3