Review of Experience
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Establishment and Major Restructuring: The OGE was originally established under the Office of Personnel Management in the Ethics in Government Act 1978, a response to the Watergate scandal. The OGE became a separate agency within the executive branch in 1989. Major Functions:
Agency Structure: Director 
Office of General Counsel and Legal Policy Office of Administration and Information Management Office of Agency Programs 5 employees 18 employees 34 employees 1 employee
France Agency Details: Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption 129 rue de l' Université
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/minister/minscpc.htm Chairperson: Establishment and Major Restructuring: The SCPC was established in 1993 under the Justice Ministry. Its investigation powers were later struck down as unconstitutional, thus making the SCPC an interministerial coordination body. Major Functions:
Agency Structure: The SCPC is made up of judges and civil servants attached to central departments, including treasury and audit. It is headed by a judge. Annex 3: Agency Enabling Acts and Enforcement New South Wales Australia Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Enabling Act: - Independent Commission Against Corruption Act (1988) - http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/icaca1988442/
Botswana Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime Enabling Act: - The Corruption and Economic Crime Act (1994) - http://www.gov.bw/government/directorate_on_corruption_and_economic crime.html
- Corruption and Economic Crime Act (1994) Ecuador Comision de Control Civico de la Corrupcion; Commission for Civil Control of Corruption Enabling Act: - Decree 107A 4 March 1997; Decree 506 30 July 1997; Articles 220 and 221 of the Constitution 10 August 1998; Law of the CCCC 12 March 1999; Reglamento of the law 11 October 1999. Enforcement: - Constitution: Art 3, 97, 109, 111 - Penal Code: Art. 218, 219, 235, 253, 257a-d, 260, 264, 265, 277, 285, 286, 291, 296a, 338, 347, 348 - General Law for Financial Institutions: Art. 90 Hong Kong Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Enabling Act: - ICAC Ordinance (1974) Enforcement: - Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (1971) - Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Enabling Act: - Resolution in the Ministry of Home Affairs (February 11, 1964) Restructuring: - CVC Ordinance (August 25, 1998) - http://cvc.nic.in/vscvc/ragordi1.htm
- Prevention of Corruption Act (1988) Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) Enabling Act: - Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 241 (1960) - http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, Chapter 241 (1960) - The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits Act; Chapter 65A (1999) - http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ Thailand The National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) Enabling Act: - Organic Act on Counter Corruption (1999) - Constitution, sections 297-313
Inspectorate of Government Enabling Act: - Constitution of Uganda, chapter 13 (1995) Enforcement: - Leadership Code of Conduct (1992) Argentina Oficina Anti Corrupción; Anti Corruption Office (ACO) Enabling Act: - Law 25.233, B.O. 1999/12/14, or “Ley de Ministerios” - www.msal.gov.ar - Decree 102/99 - www.jus.gov.ar
- Criminal and administrative laws of the Argentine Republic having to do with fraud against the Federal Government, as well as white-collar crimes and asset declaration within the public administration. - Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. Malaysia Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia (BPR); Anti Corruption Agency, Malaysia (ACA) Enabling Act: - Anti-Corruption Act; Act 575, Section 3(1) (1997) Enforcement: - Anti-Corruption Act; Act 575, Section 3(1) 1997) - Penal Code, Sections 161-165 and sections 213-215 - Customs Act, Section 137 (1967) - Election Offenses Act, Sections 7-11 (1954) Tanzania Taasisi ya Kuzuia Rushwa; Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) Enabling Act: - Prevention of Corruption Act; Act No.16 (1971) Enforcement: - Prevention of Corruption Act; Act No.16 (1971) Philippines Office of the Ombudsman Enabling Act: - Constitution, Article XI (1987) - Ombudsman Act, Act 6770 (1989) Enforcement: - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Act, Act 6713 (1989) U.S. Office of Government Ethics Enabling Act: - Ethics in Government Act (1978) France Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption; Central Service for Prevention of Corruption Enabling Act: - Law no. 93-122 (January 29, 1993) Annex 4: Research Protocol Study: A Review of Anti-Corruption Agencies Research/Interview Protocol This protocol is to be used by the in-country researcher to gather information about the specified anti-corruption agency (or agencies). To address the questions in this protocol, the researcher will consult documents, studies, and data from official and non-official sources. The researcher will also interview at least two senior officials and two rank-and-file officials within the agency, and consult knowledgeable people outside the agency.
1.a. What is the formal name of the anti-corruption agency (ACA) in the official language and in English (if different)? 1.b. Contact details: address, phone, website, e-mail contact, name and coordinates of public relations/information officer or other contact point if any. 1.c. Current chairperson of the agency: name, age, synopsis of training and experience, regional/ethnic origin, party affiliation if any, reputation based on public record and/or press coverage.
2.a. What year was the agency established in its current form? If it had predecessor agencies with the same role, in what years were they created? 2.b. Was the agency (and its predecessors) designed explicitly on the basis of any particular ACA model? If so, which one? Were alternative actions (other kinds of agencies or reforms) considered? If so, what were they and why were they rejected? 2.c. What is the main governance problem that the agency was designed to address – e.g. certain types of corruption, certain weaknesses in a predecessor agency, lack of coordination or effectiveness by relevant institutions such as courts and prosecutors? 2.d. What is the agency’s mandate or policy regarding the forms of corruption, and the types of individuals or positions, that it must focus on as a priority (e.g. grand corruption or conflict of interest, senior officials or those with certain kinds of functions)? 2.e. Describe the political context of the ACA’s founding (and major restructuring, if there were predecessors) and continued operations: Why and how was it created/restructured? -- i. Major events, including scandals, that prompted its creation or restructuring. ii. Political, social, or economic groupings that have influenced the creation, restructuring, and/or continued operations and sustainability of the agency: i.e. the positions they have taken on the agency and why, the nature of their influence, their involvement in or attitude toward corruption. 2.f. Diagram the major changes in the agency using a timeline with key political events above the line and institutional developments (such as new functions, new resources, new leadership, etc.) below the line.
3.a. Provide the text and citation of the law(s) or decree(s) that establish and govern the agency, and summarize any parliamentary debate on the bill, and any subsequent court judgments and enactments of major importance in understanding the objectives and powers of the agency. 3.b. What is the legal form or status of the agency (e.g. constitutional body, autonomous agency, ministry, court, statutory body, special unit within a ministry), and how, specifically, does this delimit its powers and autonomy? 3.c. What are the agency’s functions, powers, responsibilities, and immunities? Discuss any synergies or incompatibilities among these, the reasons for them, and their impact. 3.d. What laws does the ACA enforce (e.g. official corruption act, serious frauds and white-collar crime laws, asset declaration law)? Discuss any synergies or incompatibilities among these, the reasons for them, and their impact. 3.e. Provide outline of the agency’s structure: i. Divisions, departments, branches, etc. and their functions ii. Responsibilities and powers of key managers, and reporting relationships iii. Organogram. 3.f. The position of the chairperson: What are the required qualifications, if any? How is the person recruited and appointed? To whom is the chair responsible? Who has authority to remove or sanction her/him and in what circumstances? 3.g. What protections are there, in law, administration, and/or politics, for the independence of the agency? Please describe and give any useful examples of their application. Which, if any, are effective, and why? 3.h. What arrangements in law, administration, and/or politics exist to ensure accountability and transparency on the part of the agency (e.g. legislative oversight, judicial review, ombudsman, citizen committees)? Please describe and give any useful examples of their application. Which, if any, are effective, and why? 3.i. What protections does the agency have – on paper and in fact – for the confidentiality of assessment, advice, investigations, suspects, and witnesses? 3.j. What person or entity has authority to initiate action by the agency – and under what conditions? Does the agency have authority to select cases, to pursue cases, and on what basis? Does it in fact do so, and what impact does this have? 3.k. Provide a brief overview of the historical development of the above arrangements in the agency since it was established or restructured in its current form.
4.a. Provide the number and type of staff (e.g. level of qualification and responsibility), by function and/or division – both the formal staff complement and the actual number of staff. Can you assess whether these numbers are adequate for the functions (or alternatively, either insufficient or excessive)? 4.b. Describe how the above categories of staff are recruited and appointed: from within government or also outside, on secondment, on short-term or permanent appointments, using political or merit criteria, based on examinations, within or independent of the civil service personnel structure? 4.c. Describe the compensation of the main categories of staff: the full package of salary and benefits, the range of increases within each category, incentives, comparison to other public sector organizations and the private sector, other important conditions and benefits of employment. 4.d. Describe the level and adequacy of staff training within the main categories above: Are the staff well-qualified and trained? What training is made available to them during their employment, which of it do they in fact receive, and is it obligatory? 4.e. Describe the personnel management system: What system and criteria are used in performance evaluation and promotion? What disciplinary measures are available, and in what cases have they actually been used? How effective is this system, and why? 4.f. Provide a brief overview of the historical development of the above arrangements in the agency since it was established or restructured in its current form.
5.a. Budget allocation: Provide the total allocated budget, and actual expenditures, for the agency in the two most recent fiscal years for which figures are available. Provide a breakdown of these figures by major category (by division and by expenditure category, e.g. major personnel categories, major support and procurement items). Are the budgetary resources adequate or not, and why? 5.b. Budget process: Describe the sources of the agency’s funds, along with any arrangements to ensure the agency’s budgetary autonomy, e.g. separate line in national budget, own fiscal sources, protections in the budget process. 5.c. Assets: Describe the agency’s physical infrastructure, including buildings (quality, location and access); computer and transport equipment and supplies; equipment and materials used in research and advisory assistance, outreach and education, investigation, prosecution (as applicable). 5.c. How have these factors developed during the life of the agency, since it was established or restructured in its current form?
6.a. Describe the relationships – on paper and in actuality – of the agency to other relevant public bodies, including: courts, prosecutors, police, the agency charged with administrative and civil service reform, parliament, ministries, audit body, other anti-corruption bodies, head of government and chief of state. In particular, what has the agency’s relationship been to government bodies that it has targeted for assessment, TA, or investigation, and what have been the results of these relationships? 6.b. Describe any major problems or obstacles that the agency faces in its operating environment, including: weakness or non-cooperation on the part of the agencies discussed in 5.a. above, shortage of budgetary support or problems in the budgetary process, political intrusion, inadequacies or conflicts in applicable laws and regulations. 6.c. What relationships – formal and actual – does the agency have with nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the private sector in carrying out its main functions? Does the agency report to the press on a regular basis; if so how often and on what issues? 6.d. How have these factors developed during the life of the agency, since it was established or restructured in its current form?
7.a. Describe the systems or procedures used to monitor and evaluate the agency’s performance – both internally and externally, including by other government bodies, non-governmental organizations, and independent researchers. In each case, what methods, data, and benchmarks are used? Summarize the key findings of these evaluations for the two most recent years in which they have been done (if available). 7.b. What information and feedback systems does the agency have in place (or make use of), including hotlines and corruption complaint intake, complaint boards concerning its own activities, surveys, etc.? 7.c. Is the agency subject to financial and performance audit? Does this include cost/benefit analysis? In the two most recent years in which this was done (if available), what were the major findings of these assessments? Provide copy of text if available. 7.d. Does the agency use information from any type of income and asset disclosure? If so, 1) does the agency or some other body process the forms?; 2) does the person under investigation have the burden of proof to identify the source of his/her income? 7.e. Patterns of investigation and prosecution (if applicable): Provide figures for the most recent year (if available) on the numbers of cases (by type if possible) initiated, the numbers taken through the investigation phase, the numbers taken to prosecution, and the prosecution success rate. Provide information on the types of persons investigated and prosecuted (if available), including their department, level or position, offense, party affiliation, regional or ethnic origin.
7.g. In which areas is the agency popularly viewed as a success, and in which areas a failure? Why? In your estimation, is this view correct? Why or why not? 1 The above points apply to emerging and established democracies, as well as to economically liberal but semi-authoritarian regimes. In a fully authoritarian regime (Stalinism, the Taliban), an ACA can be effective as long as the regime lasts, based on the proven ruthlessness of the individual or coterie holding power. 2 N.B. the categories also include Input indicators, and Efficiency and Productivity indicators are presented separately, in the source material. 3 This is reported as an outcome because one of ICAC’s outreach objectives was to increase this number). 4 Information on this agency comes from telephone and e-mail correspondence, the CCCC (2000) report, as well as the agency website: www.comisionanticorrupcion.com 6 New Vision, April 26, 2002, Kampala. 7 “Fight Against Corruption,” Korea Herald, April 4, 2002. 8 Much of the material for this section was provided by Aziz Ahmad. 9 Narasimhan, p. 258 10 Das, p. 163. 11 CVC 1999 Report, p.104 12 Raj, Ranjit Dev. “Budget fails to tackle huge black economy”. Asia Times. March 7, 2000 13 Vittal, p. 25 14 Das, p. 165. Quoted in Sudha Mahalingam and Praveen Swami, “Empowering Investigative Agencies”, Frontline, January 9, 1998, p. 28 15 Shah, Aqil. “South Asia” Global Corruption Report. http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/rr_south_asia.pdf 16 Vittal, p. 23 17 Das, p. 159 18 B.O. 1999/12/14, known as the Ley de Ministerios. 19 Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia, 1967-1992, Sejarah Penubuhan dan Perkembangannya (The Establishment and Development of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Agency, 1967 – 1992) i 20 The functions for the divisions are taken from the ACA Annual Report 1999. The Division structure was amended in 1996 to provide an early warning system for corruption in large government corporations. (Langseth 2001) 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Case study produced by ESRF (2002). 25 Sources: “Federal Trade Commission Site Visit Report 4/27/99” at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/ftc.htm; “EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program Highlights: FY 1998 Efforts” at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/98accomp.html; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse data on the FBI at http://trac/syr.edu/tracfbi/findings.html; Department of Justice, “Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan” at www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2000; State of Virginia, “2000 Performance Measure List” at www.dpb.state.va.us; U.S. Office of Government Ethics, “Annual Performance Report” (March 2000); Hong Kong ICAC, Annual Report” and “Performance Pledge” at ____. |