Unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan002751.pdf>.
Daufmann, Daniel, “Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt towards Incentive-Driven
Approaches”, Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing
Countries, UNDP.
Debord, M. Henri-Pierre (1998), “The French Experience of a Specialised Agency”,
National and International Approaches to Improving Integrity and Transparency in Government, Paris, July 15-16.
Desierto, Aniano A, “Annual Report 2000”, Republic of the Philippines, Office of the
Ombudsman.
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, “Annual Report 2000”, Gaborone,
Botswana.
“Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime: Government of Botswana”, < http://
www.gov.bw/government/directorate_on_corruption_and_economic_crime.html>
Doig, Alan (1995), “Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies: A
Role for Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies?”, Public Administration and Development, May.
Doig, Alan, and Robin Theobald, eds. (2000), Corruption and Democratisation. London:
Frank Cass and Company Limited.
Doig, Alan and Stephen Riley (1998), “Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues
and Case Studies from Developing Countries”, Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries, UNDP.
Fombad, Charles Manga (1999), “Curbing corruption in Africa: some lessons from
Botswana’s experience”, UNESCO. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Guhan, S. and Samuel Paul, eds. (1997), Corruption in India: Agenda for Action. New
Delhi: Vision Books.
Harriger, Katy J. (2000), The Special Prosecutor in American Politics. Kansas:
University Press of Kansas.
Heilbrunn, John R. (1999), “Corruption, Democracy, and Reform in Benin”, in Schedler,
Diamond, and Plattner (1999).
Heidenheimer, Arnold J, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, eds. (1989), Political
Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Hodess, Robin, Jessie Banfield and Toby Wolfe, eds. (2001), Global Corruption Report 2001. Berlin: Transparency International.
Holloway, Richard (1999), “Regional Integrity 2000 and Beyond: Anti-Corruption for a
Changing World - Fighting Corruption in Africa: lessons learned from the region”, Presented at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale
U. Press.
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), “Annual Report 2000/01”,
Sydnedy, New South Wales, Australia.
“Inspector General of Government,” .
Johnston, Michael (1999), “A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies”, in Schedler,
Diamond, and Plattner (1999).
Katlholo, Tymon M, “Public Complaint Mechanism”, Paper, Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity.
Kaufmann, Daniel (1998), “Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies: Tilt Towards
Incentive-Driven Approaches”, Corruption & Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries, UNDP.
Klitgaard, Robert (1988), Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Kpundeh, Sahr J, (1999) “The Fight Against Corruption in Uganda”, in Rick Stapenhurst
and Sahr Kpundeh (eds.) Curbing Corruption: Towards a Model for Building
National Integrity. Washington: The World Bank, EDI Seminar Series.
Lai, Alan N. (2000), “Annual Report by the Commissioner of the ICAC, HKSAR.”
Lanseth, Dr. Petter (2001), “Anti-corruption Agencies,” Experts Meeting, National
Integrity Steering Committee (NISC), Jan. 22.
Leak, Tan Ah (1999), “The Experience of Singapore in Combating Corruption”, in
Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999).
Mauritius National Assembly (2001), sessional/standing.htm>, < http://ncb.intnet.mu/assembly/sessional/part3.htm>.
Viewed June 28, 2002.
Michele, Robert De (2001), “The Role of the Anti-Corruption Office in Argentina”, The
Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter.
Moran, Jonathan (2000), “The Changing Context of Corruption Control: The Honk Kong
Special Administrative Region, 1997-99,” in Doig and Theobald (2000).
NACSAP (1999), “The National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan for
Tanzania”, Dar Es Salaam.
Narasimhan, C.V. (1997), “Prevention of Corruption: Towards Effective Enforcement”,
in Guhan and Paul (1997).
National Center for Public Productivity (1997), “A Brief Guide for Performance
Measurement in Local Government”, Citizen-Driven Government Performance,
New Jersey: Rutgers University.
Noorani, A.G. (1997), “Commissions of Inquiry”, in Guhan and Paul (1997).
Noorani, A.G. (1997), “Lok Pal and Lok Ayukt”, in Guhan and Paul (1997).
OECD (1999), “Survey of Anti-Corruption Measures in the Public Sector in OECD
Countries: France”, OECD.
“OECD survey of public sector corruption: status of actions on twelve prevention
measures tabulated”,
sum.htm>. Viewed May 31, 2002.
“The Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission (ONCC)”,
Nccc.thaigov.net/ProjectNCCC/eng.htm>.
Olowu, Bamidele (1999), “Combating Corruption and Economic Crime in Africa: An
Evaluation of the Botswana Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime”,
Paper Presented at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference.
Phongpaichit, Pasuk (2001), “Good Governance: Thailand’s Experience”, Research
Paper, Asia Pacific Finance Association annual conference, Bankok.
Pope, Jeremy (1999), “The Need for, and Role of, an Independent Anti-Corruption
Agency”, prepared for Transparency International (TI), Aug. 13.
Quah, Jon S. T. (1999a), “Comparing Anti-corruption Measures in Asian Countries:
Lessons to be Learnt”, Asian Review of Public Administration, Vol. XI, no. 2.
Quah, Jon S. T. (1999b), “Combating Corruption in South Korea and Thailand”, in
Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner (1999).
Quah, Jon S.T. (1995), “Controlling corruption in city-states: A comparative study of
Hong Kong and Singapore”, in Crime, Law & Change (1995). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Republic of the Philippines, Office of the Ombudsman (2001) Annual Report 2000.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1978), Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York:
Academic Press
Ruzindana, Augustine (1998), “Combating Corruption in Uganda”, in Ruzindana,
Langseth, and Gakwandi (1998).
Ruzindana, Augustine, P. Langseth, and A. Gakwandi, eds. (1998), Fighting Corruption
in Uganda: The Process of Building a National Integrity System. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
Ruzindana, Augustine (1997), “The Importance of Leadership in Fighting Corruption in
Uganda”, in Kimberly Ann Elliott (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Ruzindana, Hon. A. (1997)., “The Part Played by Structural, Reforms of the State in
Fighting Corruption: The Case in Uganda”, Paper, 8th International Corruption
Conference.
Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. (1999), The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Sedigh, Shahrzad and Alex Muganda (1999), “The Fight against Corruption in
Tanzania”, in Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999).
Sedigh, Shahrzad and Augustine Ruzindana (1999), “The Fight against Corruption in
Uganda”, in Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999).
Speville, Bertrand de (1997), Hong Kong: Policy Initiatives against Corruption.
Development Centre of OECD.
Speville, Bertrand de (1999), “The Experience of Hong Kong, China, in Combating
Corruption”, in Stapenhurst and Kpundeh (1999).
Stapenhurst, Rick, and Sahr J. Kpundeh (1999), Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model
for Building National Integrity. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Theobald, Robin and Robert Williams (2000), “Combating Corruption in Botswana:
Regional Role Model or Deviant Case?”, in Doig and Theobald (2000).
Transparency International, “Chapter 11: Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies”, in TI
Source Book 2000, .Viewed April 19, 2002.
Tumwesigye, Matthias B. (1998), “The Role of the Inspector General in Government”, in
Ruzindana, Langseth, and Gakwandi (1998).
United Nations Development Programme (1997), “Corruption and Good Governance:
Discussion paper 3”, New York, NY: UNDP.
US Office of Government Ethics (2000), “Annual Performance Report FY 1999.”
Watt, David, Rachel Flanary and Robin Theobald (2000), “Democratisation or the
Democratisation of Corruption? The Case of Uganda”, in Doig and Theobald (2000).
Williams, Robert (2000), “Democracy, Development and Anti-Corruption Strategies:
Learning from the Australian Experience”, in Doig and Theobald (2000).
World Bank (1999), “Fostering institutions to contain corruption”, PREMnotes: Public
Sector, No. 24, June.
World Bank (2001), “Writing an effective anticorruption law”, PREMnotes: Public
Sector, No. 58, Oct.
Annex 1: Tables
Table 1: Illustrative Agency Performance Measures25
Agency/Indicator
|
Output
|
Outcome
|
Efficiency/Productivity
|
U.S. FTC
|
Number of redress orders; money seized by shutting down scams
|
Consumer savings due to FTC action -- includes estimates of price rises averted, or if data are not available, it is assumed a merger would have raised prices in the relevant market by one percent for a two-year period.
|
Average time needed to review merger applications
|
U.S. EPA
|
Number of civil and criminal case referrals, amount of fines and penalties assessed
|
Reductions in emissions measures after enforcement, dollars spent by polluters to correct violations and take other cleanup steps
|
|
U.S. FBI
|
Number of referrals for prosecution
|
Percentage of referrals prosecuted vs.percentage declined as legally insufficient; percentage of referrals resulting in conviction; percentage of convictions resulting in prison sentences; average prison sentence
|
|
U.S. FBI: Fraud, White Collar Crime
|
|
Fraud/corruption: Amount of recoveries/restitutions, fines; number of white collar convictions
Antitrust: Enforcement success rate; savings to U.S. consumers
Health care fraud: medicare expenditures for lab tests, ambulances, home health agencies
|
|
Agency/Indicator
|
Output
|
Outcome
|
Efficiency/Productivity
|
U.S. OGE
|
Number of formal/informal talks on ethics with govt officials – per month; Conduct ethics programs in all federal agencies over 4-year cycle
|
Percentage of policy issues with substantial impact on exec branch ethics program where executive (OMB) seeks and uses OGE advice; Percentage of OGE comments taken into account in legislation; Ensure all ethics agreements with Pres. Appointees completed within agreed time
|
Percentage policy proposals drafted by OGE within 6 months of identifying the need; Percentage of change proposals pursued to enactment within 18 months; Percentage agency financial disclosure issues resolved within 15 working days
|
State of Virginia
|
Dept Internal Audit: Number of investigations completed; number of management improvements identified
|
Dept Internal Audit: Amount of dollar savings/waste identified
Dept Profess/Occupational Reg: Percentage complaint investigations resulting in “no violation;” percentage unlicensed activity investigations leading to warrants
Commonwealth Attorney: Number of reversals on appeal due to prosecutor error
|
Dept Internal Audit: Percentage of cases recorded and assigned within 48 hours
Dept Profess/Occupational Reg: number of days to process enforcement complaints
Commiss on Local Govt: Percentage tech asst responses given within 24 hours
|
Hong Kong ICAC
|
Number of cases identified via own initiative; number of prosecutions; number of detailed studies of govt practices & procedures
|
Number of graft reports received (aim: increase this via district-based outreach); number and rate of convictions; number of requests from private firms for free corruption prevention advice
|
Percentage of those making graft complaints interviewed immediately/within 48 hours; percentage incoming calls handled immediately; percentage pursuable complaints completed within 12 months; percentage requesters of advice/training on corruption prevention contacted within 2 days
|
Table 2: ACA Performance Indicators, by Function
Function/Indicator Type
|
Output
|
Outcome
|
Efficiency/Productivity
|
Receive and respond to complaints
|
Number complaints addressed;
Number of referrals/redress orders
|
Number of complaints resolved
|
Average time needed to review complaints;
Percentage of those making graft complaints interviewed immediately/within 48 hours;
Percentage incoming calls handled immediately;
Percentage pursuable complaints completed within 12 months
|
Intelligence, monitoring, investigations
|
Number of investigations begun, number completed;
Number of cases identified via own initiative;
Number of civil and criminal case referrals
|
Percentage investigations leading to warrants;
Percentage of referrals prosecuted vs.percentage declined as legally insufficient
|
Percentage of cases recorded and assigned within 48 hours;
Completed investigations per staff hour
|
Prosecutions, administrative orders
|
Number of prosecutions begun, number completed;
Number of administrative orders issued;
Amount of fines and penalties assessed
|
Amount of recoveries/restitutions, fines imposed and collected;
Number of white collar/grand corruption/high official convictions;
Number and percentage cases resulting in conviction;
Number of reversals on appeal due to prosecutor error;
Percentage of convictions resulting in prison sentences;
Average prison sentence
|
Convictions per staff hour;
Amount of recoveries/restitutions, fines, penalties per staff hour
|
Preventive research, analysis, technical assistance
|
Number of detailed studies of govt practices & procedures;
Number of management improvements identified
|
Number of requests from private firms for free corruption prevention advice
Amount of dollar savings/waste identified
Savings to treasury, taxpayers, consumers resulting from reforms and reduced fraud/ corruption
Amount of attention and resources devoted by govt depts. to addressing problems identified
|
Percentage tech asst responses given within 24 hours;
Percentage requesters of advice/training on corruption prevention contacted within 2 days;
Percentage policy proposals drafted by ACA within 6 months of identifying the need;
Percentage of change proposals pursued to enactment within 18 months;
Outputs per staff hour
|
Ethics policy guidance, review of compliance and asset declarations
|
Number of formal/informal talks on ethics with govt officials;
Conduct ethics programs in all national agencies over __ year cycle;
Scores on satisfaction surveys
|
Percentage of policy issues with substantial impact on where executive seeks and uses ACA advice;
Percentage of ACA comments taken into account in legislation; Ensure all ethics agreements with political appointees completed within agreed time
|
Percentage agency financial disclosure issues resolved within 15 working days
|
Public information, education, outreach
|
Number of public forums;
Scores on satisfaction surveys
|
Number of graft reports received;
Survey data on public awareness/knowledge
|
Number of public forums per year
|
Table 3: Overview of ACAs in Industrial Countries
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
U.S.
|
a. Office of Government Ethics
b. Special Prosecutor
c. NYC Dept of Investigation
|
a. and b. Ethics in Government Act 1978, response to Watergate scandal
c. Founded 1873, response to Tweed ring abuses, latest reform 1988
|
a. Guidance and rule-making on ethical standards, review financial disclosures of high executive officials, compliance monitoring, outreach to public sector
b. Investigate, prosecute high officials
c. Anti-corruption law enforcement, prevention function now handled by separate Corruption Prevention Bureau
|
a. 74 staff, $11 million budget
|
a. Executive agency
b. Appointment by judicial panel with some AG oversight
|
a. No investigation powers, no authority over legislative or judicial branch
b. Legislation lapsed
|
UK
|
a. Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
b. Serious Frauds Office
|
|
|
|
|
|
France
|
Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption
Advisory -- scope includes public and private sector activities
|
Loi no. 93-122 du 29 Janvier 1993 relative a la prevention de la corruption et la transparence de la vie publique et des procedures publiques
|
Centralization of information and intelligence on corruption
Studies of corruption vulnerabilities
Advisory opinions at request of selected central authorities, courts, and regional/local councils
|
Made up of judges and civil servants attached to central depts., including treasury and audit
|
Independent interministerial authority attached to MOJ
Headed by a judge
|
|
Australia
|
NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption
(Hong Kong ICAC model)
|
NSW ICAC Act 1988
Response to scandals leading to imprisonment of senior judge and minister, disgrace and discharge of deputy police commissioner
|
Investigations and public hearings; Prevention and advice to govt departments;
Educating public
1994 legal amendment extended scope to parliament
Scope includes private sector
|
Net costs FY 2001: U.S. $8.6 million
Staff: 121 in 4 divisions
|
Commissioners appointed to non-renewable 5 year term
Oversight by 2 parliamentary committees
|
‘Products’ include Corruption Resistance Reviews, Ethical Culture Survey Kit
|
Table 4: Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asia
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
Brunei
|
Anti-Corruption Bureau
|
Prevention of Corruption Acts of 1982 and 1984
|
Prevention activities
Investigations, compel evidence, search, arrest
|
|
Director appointed by and solely responsible to Sultan
|
|
Hong Kong
|
Independent Commission Against Corruption
|
ICAC Ordinance 1974
Response to rampant police corruption, Godber scandal and Commission of Inquiry
|
Investigations, Prevention, Education & Public support
Crimes investigated include excess wealth
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance gives ICAC power to search bank accounts, seize travel and other documents, require suspects to provide details of assets
|
Staff of 369 in 1974 up to 1,314 recently
Annual recurrent costs: U.S. $91 million in FY 1999/2000, U.S. $7.2 million in 1997/7 (0.42% of overall annual govt recurrent expenditure)
|
Reports directly to executive
Subject to judicial review, legislative oversight
Independent complaints committee
4 citizen advisory (oversight) committees: general, and one for each of the 3 departments
Explicit performance standards
Policy of pursuing all corruption allegations with no selection
|
Uncertainty, hints of increased political intrusion since 1997 handover
By far the most-cited case, very well covered in the literature
|
India
|
a. Central Vigilance Commission
b. Central Bureau of Investigation, Scope: corruption, economic and special crimes
c. State-level CVCs/ombuds
|
a. Founded 1964, response to Santhanam Committee findings, made a statutory body in CVC Ordinance 1998
b. Founded 1941, reformed 1987
|
a. Monitor/guidance to ministries’ ethics practice, refer matters for investigation/ prosecution, oversight of police/CBI corruption cases (central govt only)
b. Investigation, prosecution of central and (in some cases) state officials (executive only)
|
a. Chair, 4 commissioners, 17 specialized staff and support staff
b. 800 investigators, 200 prosecutors, total staff complement of 5,000
|
a. Independent body reporting to parliament
b. Prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 requires prior approval relevant (central/state) govt department – high officials interfere
|
India did not prosecute a minister 1947-97, but new cases and tough action since 1998
|
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
Indonesia
|
ICAC model ACA being set up
|
1999 anti-corruption laws call for ACA, enabling law for ACA still in parliament
|
|
|
|
|
Korea
|
Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission (Jan. 2002)
Scope: corruption by high officials
|
Anticorruption Law 2001, superceding earlier bureaus going back to 1963
Scandals: senior officials, Kim family
|
Receive reports
Forward cases for investigation
Recommend preventive steps
Public outreach
|
139 staff
|
Commissioners appointed by president
|
No investigative powers
|
Malaysia
|
Anti-Corruption Agency (ICAC model)
Scope includes private sector corruption
|
Founded in original form in 1959, reformed in Anti-Corruption Act 1997
|
Investigate, arrest, prevention, public outreach, intelligence, random public sector checks.
|
8 divisions, offices in all 14 states
|
Dir. Gen. appointed by King, on PM’s recommendation, reports to parliament
Public Complaints Bureau
|
Public perception that “big fish” are immune
Case study candidate
|
Pakistan
|
National Accountability Bureau
|
NAB Ordinance (Presidential decree) of 1999
|
Investigation, prosecution, arrest, freeze assets
Scope includes financial sector crimes
Burden of proof re source of assets is on the accused
|
Staff: 800
|
Independent statutory body
Chair appointed to fixed term by President in consultation with Chief Justice,
Appeal rights
|
Cases under NAB Ordinance handled exclusively by Accountability Court
|
Philippines
|
a. Office of the Ombudsman
b. Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
|
a. Created by 1987 Constitution, response to Marcos-era abuses
b. Established 1994
|
a. Investigation, prosecution, administrative adjudication, public assistance, graft prevention
b. Look into administrative cases of corruption by high officials, make recommendations to President
|
FY 2001-2 budget U.S. $8.9 million
(0.0058% of total government recurrent costs FY 2001)
|
a. Constitutional body
b. Reports to President
|
a. Cases against high officials handled by Sandiganbayan (15 judge corruption court)
|
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
Singapore
|
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
Scope now includes private sector corruption
|
Founded 1952
|
Receive & investigate corruption allegations, Investigate other wrongs discovered in corruption cases, Prevent corruption through studies of public sector
Officials must declare wealth, annually declare non-indebtedness
|
FY 1991-2 budget U.S. $3.23 million
71 staff positions
Originally took staff on short secondments
|
Part of Prime Minister’s office
|
Public complaints of overzealousness, torture
Well covered in the literature
|
Sri Lanka
|
Permanent Commission for Prevention of Bribery and Corruption
|
Founded 1994, succeeded earlier AC bodies
|
|
Originally had 84 police officers, but this was reduced over time
|
|
Investigated 6,000 cases in 1st 2 years, then caught up in legal/political disputes with government
|
Thailand
|
National Counter Corruption Commission
|
1997 constitution, organic law of 1999 strengthened commission dating from 1975
|
Inspect asset declarations; Prevention through studies and public education; Investigation of complaints from govt or citizen groups, admin and criminal charges, unusual wealth
|
|
Constitutional body
Members appointed by Senate
Reports to Senate
Members subject to removal for enumerated causes
|
Receives 4,000 complaints per year
Public concern about ineffectiveness, selectivity
|
Table 5: Anti-Corruption Agencies in Africa
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
Benin
|
Cellule pour la Moralisation de la Vie Publique
|
Set up by 1996 National Conference following change of govt
|
Investigation, initiating prosecutions, public education
|
|
Separate budget
Reports to President
|
Public concerns about ethno-regional bias
|
Botswana
|
Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime
ICAC model; Scope includes private sector, but investigations only with consent
|
Corruption and Economic Crime Act, 1994
Response to early 1990s scandals and commissions of inquiry
|
Receive complaints; Investigation: very broad powers, including arrest, broad search powers very wide scope; Prevention through public sector studies, Public education
Unexplained wealth as grounds for suspicion
|
109 staff
Recruitment cumbersome due to need to go through dept of Public Service Management
|
Director appointed at sole discretion of President for unstated term
DCEC has formal autonomy, though part of civil service
Penalties for frivolous complaints
|
Received 1,380 complaints 1996
Public criticism for selective investigation
Staff helping AG in prosecutions due to backlog, courts also backlogged
Ombudsman handles petty corruption
Well covered in the literature
|
Ghana
|
Serious Frauds Office
Scope: offenses involving serious financial or economic loss to the state
|
Act 466 of 1993, superceding agencies dating to 1982
|
Investigation (freeze assets, compel information), Prosecution (with AG permission), Monitor economic activities, Prevention, Collect information
|
Limited staff, funds, and ability to reach outside capital
Staff said to be of high quality
|
Executive agency
|
Public concerns re lack of SFO constraint in charging complex fraud, using rewards to ‘buy’ information
Case study candidate
|
Malawi
|
Anti-Corruption Bureau
|
Corrupt Practices Act
|
Investigation, prosecution, prevention, civic education
|
|
|
|
Tanzania
|
Prevention of Corruption Bureau
|
Founded 1975
|
Investigation, Prosecution, Advice and prevention in public sector
|
FY 2001-2 budget U.S. $4 million
412 staff
|
Part of President’s office, Director appointed by President
|
Case study candidate
|
Uganda
|
Inspector General of Government
Type: Ombudsman plus
|
Founded 1987
1995 Constitution enhanced powers
|
Investigate abuse of office, corruption complaints; Review and advise on public sector practices; Inform and educate public
|
Scarce resources prevent outreach to countryside
|
Appointed by and reports to President
Also sends performance reports to parliament
|
Referrals for prosecution have had little result
Well covered in the literature
|
Zambia
|
Anti-Corruption Commission
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table 6: Anti-corruption agencies in Latin America
Country
|
ACA/type
|
Establishment
|
Powers
|
Budget & personnel
|
Independence & accountability
|
Other comments
|
Argentina
|
Anti-Corruption Office
|
Law 25.233 of 1999, superceding previous agency
|
Investigations, Initiate/refer for prosecution, Prevent corruption and enhance public sector transparency
Review official financial disclosures
|
21 investigators
16 public sector transparency experts
|
Part of MOJ
Headed by Public Administration Prosecutor
|
First 18 mo.: received 1400 allegations
ACO selects cases by economic, institutional, social impact
Suggested case study
|
Chile
|
a. National Commission of Public Ethics
b. Comptroller General
|
a. Est. 1994
|
|
|
|
|
Ecuador
|
Comision de Control Civico de la Corrupcion
|
Est. March 1997, defined in 1998 constitution and Law of CCCC of March 1999
|
Prevention programs, monitoring public sector, civic mobilization, investigate cases involving state funds
|
2002 budget: $3.6 million, some funds from donors for special projects
Staff: 54
|
Commissioners chosen by civic assns, chair elected by commissioners
Agency has its own budget line\
Reports to public via Congress
|
Branches in Quito and Guayaquil
Attorney General’s office obstructing referrals of investigations for prosecution
|
Guatemala
|
a. Comptroller General
b. Administrative Oversight Commission
|
b. Est. Jan. 2000
|
a. Ethics code preparation, complaints hotline
|
|
|
Financial disclosure law enacted 1997
|
Mexico
|
a. Supreme Audit Agency
b. Executive Branch Auditor
|
a. Est. 1999
b. Accountability Law for Public Servants 1999
|
a. Anti-corruption activities across all govt
b. Admin oversight of exec branch, refer cases to AG
|
|
|
|
Panama
|
a. Comptroller General
b. National Directorate against Corruption/MOF
|
a. Powers expanded 1998
b. Est. 1999
|
a. Hotline for corruption complaints, AC public education program, special investigation unit
|
|
b. Part of Ministry of Finance
|
Financial disclosure law for officials handling public funds, 1999
|
Table 7: ACA Powers
|
Select Cases
|
Investigate Abuses in Public Sector
|
Investigate Abuses in Private Sector
|
Make Arrests
|
Search and Seizure
|
Conduct Surveillance Operations
|
Prosecute
|
NSW Australia
(ICAC)
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
Yes
|
|
no
|
Botswana (DCEC)
|
no
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
Yes
|
|
no
|
Ecuador (CCCC)
|
|
yes
|
no
|
|
|
|
|
Hong Kong (ICAC)
|
no
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
no
|
India (CVC)
|
|
yes
|
|
|
|
|
no
|
Singapore (CPIB)
|
no
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
no
|
Thailand (NCCC)
|
|
yes
|
|
yes
|
yes
|
|
|
Uganda (Inspectorate)
|
|
yes
|
|
yes
|
|
|
no
|
Argentina (ACO)
|
yes
|
yes
|
|
|
|
|
no
|
Malaysia (ACA)
|
no
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
no
|
Tanzania (PCB)
|
yes
|
yes
|
|
|
|
|
no
|
Philippines (Ombudsman)
|
|
yes
|
|
|
|
|
yes
|
US (OGE)
|
|
|
|
no
|
no
|
no
|
No
|
France (SCPC)
|
|
yes
|
yes
|
|
|
|
no
|
Table 8: ACA Resources
|
Budget
(U.S.D.)
|
Staff Total
|
Number of Investigators (authorized or actual)
|
NSW Australia
(ICAC)
|
$15.7 million
|
122
|
53 (actual)
|
Botswana (DCEC)
|
$1.8 million
|
130
|
|
Ecuador (CCCC)
|
$3.6 million
|
54
|
|
Hong Kong (ICAC)
|
$90.66 million
|
1,314
|
216 (actual)
|
India (CVC)
|
|
252
|
800 (actual)
|
Singapore (CPIB)
|
$3.23 million
|
66
|
49 (authorized)
|
Thailand (NCCC)
|
|
425
|
|
Uganda (Inspectorate)
|
$3.36 million
|
145
|
|
Argentina (ACO)
|
$5.89 million
|
37
|
21 (actual)
|
Malaysia (ACA)
|
$10.1 million
|
1,067
|
|
Tanzania (PCB)
|
$4 billion
|
412
|
177 (actual)
|
Philippines (Ombudsman)
|
$7.3 million
|
|
|
US (OGE)
|
$11 million
|
74
|
|
France (SCPC)
|
|
|
|
Table 9: ACA Independence
|
Who Appointments Chair?
|
Term of
Chair
|
To Whom Agency Reports?
|
Are Reports Public?
|
Own Line in Budget?
|
NSW Australia
(ICAC)
|
Governor
|
Up to 5 years
|
NSW Parliament
|
yes
|
yes
|
Botswana (DCEC)
|
President
|
President’s discretion
|
President
|
yes
|
|
Ecuador (CCCC)
|
Elected by Commission
|
|
|
yes
|
yes
|
Hong Kong (ICAC)
|
Governor
|
|
Governor
|
yes
|
yes
|
India (CVC)
|
President
|
3 years
|
Parliament
|
yes
|
|
Singapore (CPIB)
|
President
|
President’s discretion
|
Prime Minister
|
no
|
no
|
Thailand (NCCC)
|
Elected by Commission
|
|
Senate
|
|
yes
|
Uganda (Inspectorate)
|
President
|
4 years, renewable once
|
Parliament
|
|
yes
|
Argentina (ACO)
|
President
|
|
President
|
yes
|
no
|
Malaysia (ACA)
|
King, on PM’s recommendation
|
Usually 2 years, renewable
|
Prime Minister
|
yes
|
no
|
Tanzania (PCB)
|
President
|
President’s discretion
|
President/
Chief Sec. of House
|
yes
|
no
|
Philippines (Ombudsman)
|
President
|
7 years; renewable
|
President/
Congress
|
Yes
|
yes
|
US (OGE)
|
President
|
5 years
|
|
yes
|
yes
|
France (SCPC)
|
|
|
MOJ/PM
|
|
no
|
Table 10: ACA Performance Data
Agency/Indicator
|
Cases/Complaints Received
|
Monitoring, Investigations, Prosecutions
|
Prevention, Ethics Guidance, Asset Declarations
|
Public Information, Outreach
|
Argentina
ACO
|
1,784 investigations started.
81% of investigations since Dec. 1999 concluded.
9% decrease in unsolved cases.
|
489 cases referred to the judicial system since Dec. 1999. 317 referred in 2001.
14% increase of cases under judicial investigation between 2000 and 2001.
44 prosecutions. 20 cases were dismissed
|
99.9% compliance rate by the civil servants required to file a financial disclosure statement.
|
|
Australia NSW
ICAC
|
265 recommendations for reform arising out of investigations.
6 investigative reports.
1509 complaints with 2058 allegations
|
10 prosecutions, 10 disciplinary action proceedings 2000-2001
|
4 prevention reports, 7 research reports published.
148 recommendations for reform fully implemented, 74 partly implemented.
|
3 major conference, and 5 government training events held.
|
Botswana
DCEC
|
Number of investigations commenced: 390
Number of
complaints received: 1475
Number made in which complainants identified themselves: 1096, 74.31%
Number made anonymously:
379
|
Number of cases either referred to other bodies or in which no action was taken: 1085
|
|
145 presentations to public on corruption
|
Ecuador
CCCC
|
Number of completed investigations: 322
Number of complaints received: 512
|
Number of cases referred for legal or administrative action: 79
|
|
|
Hong Kong ICAC
|
Percentage of those making graft complaints interviewed immediately/within 48 hours: 99%
Percentage incoming calls handled immediately: 100%
Percentage pursuable complaints completed within 12 months: 89%
Number of graft reports received: 3,561
Number of cases identified and investigated via own initiative: 216
|
Number of persons prosecuted (corruption and related offenses): 504 (32% increase over 1998, up from 300+ on avg. 1974-1984).
convictions: 302 (up 15% from 1998), for a success rate of 60%
|
Number of detailed studies of govt practices & procedures: 106
Number of requests from private firms for free corruption prevention advice: 260
Percentage requesters of advice/training on corruption prevention contacted within 2 days: 100%
|
|
India
CVC
|
Number of complaints pending: 484
Number of cases pending: 1594
Number of investigation reports pending: 977
Number of investigation reports received: 3568
Number of complaints received: 5609
Number of cases received: 5762
|
Number of Prosecutions: 59
|
|
|
Malaysia
ACA
|
413 investigations in 1999.
147 of prosecuted in 1999 comprised new cases or cases charged in 1999, 213 were cases outstanding from 1998.
|
360 prosecutions begun in 1999. 152 prosecutions completed which led to 89 convicted, 56 acquitted and discharged, 7 discharged.
|
|
|
Tanzania
PCB
|
Number of complaints under investigation(2000): 1128
Number of cases: 1461
Number of complaints under investigation closed (2000): 328
Number of public complaints received (2000): 1311
Number of private complaints received (2000): 88
|
Number of Prosecutions (1995-2000): 94
|
|
12 public meetings
225 seminars
157 radio programs
48,000 brochures and leaflets
|
Uganda
IGG
|
Number of cases investigated and completed: 98 (7%)
Number of complaints received: 1,428
|
Number of cases referred to other government department:
420
|
|
|
Philippines
Ombudsman
|
Number of new cases: 9,739
|
Number of cases filed for prosecution with the courts: 2,209
Cases in which penalties were imposed on government officials or employees: 514
|
Requests for preventive assistance tended to: 10,583
|
|
Annex 2: Agencies and Their Structures
|
Yüklə 0.69 Mb.