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The Alternative: Multiple-Agency Approaches
The single-agency strategy exemplified by Hong Kong and Singapore came about through a combination of circumstances, including entrenched corruption and an outbreak of scandal; failures in the traditional institutions – especially the police force – leading to a loss of confidence; and dramatic action by semi-authoritarian leadership backed by a consensus (even if belated and somewhat reluctant) of key elite groups – in a culturally cohesive city-state context. This constellation of factors does not frequently recur.
Not surprisingly, most countries continue to follow the alternative approach of combining traditional state institutions with one or more specialized anti-corruption units or agencies. In these situations, there may be a major scandal or at least a wide perception that existing structures have proven inadequate to prevent or repress costly ethical lapses. However, the depth of the crisis and the strength of leadership are insufficient to support a more robust centralization of anti-corruption functions. In other words, traditional judicial and administrative agencies retain their core capabilities and legitimacy while additional structures are put in place to address gaps, weaknesses, and newly-emerged opportunities for corruption. Further, the government in power is unlikely to command sufficient support for more dramatic steps – especially the draconian measures adopted in Hong Kong and Singapore. This may be due to elite opposition, civic concerns about the erosion of liberties, or a combination.
In this section, we review a prominent sample of these multi-agency approaches. Our cases come mainly from the United States, India, and the European Union.

The U.S
A watershed date for the development of anti-corruption agencies in the U.S. was 1978, when the Ethics in Government Act established both the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of the Independent Counsel – in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the revelation of other lapses in the U.S. Government. However, this did not represent as radical a break with the past as was seen in Hong Kong, Singapore, and most of the other cases just reviewed.
Special prosecutors had been appointed ad hoc to deal with scandals from Teapot Dome in the 1920s to Watergate in the early 1970s. The new legislation attempted to codify the procedures and powers of this office, and did so through legislative provisions that would “sunset” after a period of years, then need to be renewed (and which have now lapsed). The main concern was to address the potential conflict of interest involved when the Attorney General, an executive appointee, is required to address criminal allegations against other high executive officers. When there are credible allegations of illegalities by certain high officials of the federal government, the law required the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the charges warranted further investigation or prosecution. The AG then had to make a report justifying a finding one way or the other. If the charges were worth pursuing, then a Special Counsel would need to be appointed. Regarding both the preliminary investigation report and the appointment of a Special Counsel, the Attorney General was answerable to a panel of appeals-level judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court – and it was this panel that defined the Counsel’s jurisdiction. In the last decade, it has become clear that this arrangement guarantees the Special Counsel’s independence, but does not impose sufficient accountability – a problem that early critics anticipated. Nor does it add value to existing systems, according to many critics. (Harriger 2000)
The Special Counsel was the best-known of the post-Watergate innovations in the U.S., but was in fact only one of several institutions with anti-corruption responsibilities. At the federal level, these include the Public Corruption unit of the FBI (investigations), the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice (prosecutions), the General Accounting Office (technical studies and reform proposals), the Inspectors General, the Office of Government Ethics, Congressional committees, and others. There is no centralized anti-corruption agency or strategy. At the state and local levels, there have been some agencies that fit the single-agency mold more closely, notably New York City’s Department of Investigations, which had both investigative and preventive functions. The DOI has been criticized for taking too strict an approach to public integrity, especially since the preventive functions were handed to another agency, with the result that it instills fear and passivity in city officials – thus reducing the quality of governance. (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996) Also, many states have Ombudsman offices, which are not ACAs, but do handle complaints and conduct outreach to citizens on good government issues.
Probably the closest approximation to an ACA at the U.S. federal level is the Office of Government Ethics. However, OGE has a very specific and limited mission of serving as an executive branch ethics watchdog. This, for example, is one of several functions performed by such agencies as Uganda’s IGG and the Philippines Ombudsman. OGE is relatively small for a U.S. government agency, with some 74 employees and an FY 2003 budget of U.S. $11 million distributed among five departments. It has a separate line in the federal budget and a Director appointed by the President to a five-year term – i.e. the term overlaps Presidential and legislative terms, which enhances the Director’s autonomy. In other structural respects, OGE is like other federal agencies. Its performance criteria are summarized in Table 1 in the Annex. (USOGE 2000)
Given its limited mandate, OGE functions as a central coordinating body similar to an ACA – it aims to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest, foster high ethical standards, and strengthen public confidence in the integrity of government. OGE does this by developing ethics rules and regulations, providing guidance and interpretation, evaluating the effectiveness of rules and agency-based ethics programs, and conducting outreach and education for executive officials and staff. Its most prominent public role is that of receiving and reviewing the financial disclosure statements of White House employees and Presidential appointees who are confirmed by the U.S. Senate. In this role, it enters agreements with these appointees to use blind trusts and other instruments to ensure that direct conflicts of interest are avoided – and monitors these arrangements. (www.usoge.gov) The OGE’s functions are carried out by other structures within the legislative and judicial branches. One notable example of such a legislative institution is the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards in the UK.
India8
As mentioned above, the function of ethics watchdog is often performed by agencies that also have a number of other powers and responsibilities. Here, a notable example would be India’s Central Vigilance Commission. This was set up as an advisory body in 1964, in the aftermath of the Santhanam Committee’s report on public sector corruption. Originally reporting to the Ministry of Home Affairs, it was later made an independent statutory body reporting to Parliament. In the ethics area, CVC works with all elements of government on their programs of “vigilance” against corruption, providing guidance and monitoring implementation. Like the U.S. OGE, the CVC has corresponding units within each ministry and public body that are responsible for vigilance programs. In addition, CVC scrutinizes transactions by public officials that may be improper, receives and addresses complaints of corruption and abuse of power in the administration, refers inquiries to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and monitors CBI’s investigations and prosecutions of offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act. As for external scrutiny of the CVC, its Annual Report to the President and Parliament offers one avenue for oversight, and it issues frequent press releases.
The CVC’s sister agency, the CBI, is the central government’s investigating arm, focusing on corruption and economic crimes, in addition to ordinary criminal offenses under its jurisdiction. It came into being in 1963, about the same time as CVC, taking over from a special bureau that had until then been part of the police force. The CBI continues to be manned by policemen employed by the government (who may freely be transfer in and out). It also lacks credibility with the public. Not a single CBI case involving a minister had lead to a conviction from 1957-1997 (but see below).9 The lack of credibility is exemplified in the low number of corruption reports CBI receives.
India, being a federation, also has bodies at the state level with functions similar to the CVC – many go by the name of Lok Ayukta – and it is the state level that approves any CBI investigation into state matters. India also has the usual array of audit, prosecuting, and inspection agencies. From this mixture, experience seems to show that CVC is gaining credibility as it gains power, a few of the state-level bodies have proven quite adept at addressing corruption, and the remainder – notably including CBI – may have reputations for professionalism but are hampered by political intrusion. (Mauritius National Assembly 2001, Quah 1999a, Narasimhan 1997, http://cvc.nic.in).
Major changes have been made in the respective roles of CVC and CBI since the mid 1990s. During a raid in 1995, the CBI found records of massive amounts of black market money paid to 115 high level politicians over a decade (the Jain Hawala scandal). Though it ended many political careers, not a single conviction was made. Jain Hawala did lead to a second trial, Vineet Narain v. Union of India. A public interest petition was filed against the government for its mishandling of the CBI investigation. The court took this opportunity to make major changes in the anti-corruption agencies of India. In 1997, in an attempt to save the investigating agency from unjustified political interference, the Supreme Court ruled that the central government must grant the CVC statutory status. All investigations under the Prevention of Corruption Act would be under the direct supervision of the CVC and not the executive. The Court also struck down the “single directive” clause of the CBI. In the past, this had meant that the CBI needed express permission from the central government to investigate any official above the position of Joint Secretary. The executive branch conferred all of these rights in the President’s CVC Ordinances of August and October 1998.10
Despite the above changes, the CVC continues to be hampered by the environment in which it operates. For example, vigilance offices in central agencies are often unable to furnish required reports on time. In particular, the Quarterly Statistical Returns required from all organizations/departments are significantly delayed, missing quarters, or are not submitted at all.11 In addition, jurisdiction is a major hurdle for the CVC. It cannot investigate IAS (All India Service) officers, local police, or forest officers. Furthermore, the CBI must ask permission of the state to begin any investigation at the state level. Political intrusion continues to limit the power and impact of the CVC. Delays in implementing the 1997 Supreme Court ruling suggest that parliament is hesistant to grant the powers necessary to curb corruption. In March of 2000, the CVC advocated investigations of politicians for income tax violations. In response, the spokesman for the ruling party suggested that such actions could jeopardize legislation to confirm the Supreme Court order turning the CVC into a statutory body.12
More recently, in the Bofors case (involving a Swedish arms company and the Indian Defense Ministry), the defendants filed a motion for the case to be dropped because the CBI began investigation and issued a charge sheet without formally consulting the CVC. The defendants argue that in reality, corruption cases in the CBI aren't closely monitored by the CVC. The CVC takes more of a advisory role (not a case by case role). The defendants claim this is unconstitutional because of the Vineet v. India ruling in 1997 in which the court mandated changes in the functioning of the CVC and CBI. This is interesting because the law fulfilling that mandate doesn't exist (as a resolution at least). While the Court ruling didn't convince parliament, it is being used as precedent (rule of law) and the court plans to further clarify CBI roles when ruling in Bofors.
The general public views the internal control systems for corruption in India (the CVC, CBI and CVOs) with a sense of futility. Most obviously, the CBI is not politically free to produce the results that are needed. The Supreme Court ruling in Vineet Narain v. Union of India called for a panel of expert lawyers to assign blame in each acquittal in court. The criminal conviction rate in India is a mere 6%.13 This oversight may act as a disincentive for prosecuting cases. As a CBI officer puts it,
Most criminal cases in India anyway end in acquittal. . . . because of legal lacunae, lack of witnesses. . . The CBI already filters out a high percentage of cases to keep a high success rate. The court order will simply work as a disincentive against pursuing difficult cases with a low chance of conviction.14
Yet, a string of high-level convictions in 2000 might have made an impact on the average Indian. In October, P.V. Narsimha Rao became the first Indian prime minister to be convicted on charges of corruption. Jayaram Jayalalitha, a national party head, was sentenced to five years for illegally purchasing state owned land.15 Earlier that year, the CVC made headlines by publishing the names of over 100 public servants who were under investigation for corruption. Though it received some bad press for being sensational, in a Hindustan Times poll, 93% of the people surveyed approved of the site.16
In terms of performance against their anti-corruption mandate, many argue that the CVC and partner agencies have not done enough to raise the stakes for corruption. The CBI examined 6520 complaints in 1992. They only investigated 229 of those complaints. Compared to the ICAC of Hong Kong, these numbers are distressing. The ICAC examined 3312 cases in 1994. India is a much larger country with a civil service population of around 20 million. Furthermore, it is ranked the 68th most corrupt in a sample of 85 countries.17 There should be much more complaints received and investigated. As mentioned earlier, 75% of complaints come from agency-specific vigilance organizations, and less than 25% from the CBI. The public does not see the agency as their response to corruption. When the new website Tehelka.com videotaped ministers accepting bribes for defense contracts in 2000, it created a flurry of public interest. The Tehelka tapes are infinitely more influential than the CVC report on irregularities in defense deals.
The EU and Others
The European countries have taken quite disparate approaches to the institutionalization of the anti-corruption effort. One interesting example is France, which in 1993 established the Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption. This is an advisory body whose priority function is to centralize all information needed to detect and prevent a wide range of corrupt acts – including misappropriation, influence peddling, and self-dealing. The SCPC also provides assistance to the judiciary on corruption cases and advises central and local government bodies on prevention and reform. The SCPC commissioners are led by a senior judicial official of the rank of Principal State Prosecutor, and include representatives of relevant agencies such as audit, taxation and customs, police, competition, and consumer affairs. The SCPC reports annually to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice. (Debord 1998, www.justice.gouv.fr)
The innovation here is in creating a body to deal with information and analysis relating to corruption. SCPC was originally given investigative powers under its 1993 statute, but these were struck down as unconstitutional because the agency’s actions are not subject to judicial review. While it has its own professional ethic, SCPC is not structurally independent. Placing representatives of the main relevant agencies of government on the Commission appears designed to foster coordination and information exchange in this area, and also to make it more of an interministerial body than a component of the Justice Ministry. The approach here is to improve information and foster cooperation, rather than to remove to a central agency powers exercised by the police, Justice Ministry, Conseil d’Etat, Ombudsman (Mediateur), and others. The rationale for this is to make it possible for agencies with disparate missions to create a unified picture of complex corruption schemes and networks, which are made up of what would otherwise appear to be unconnected elements. (Debord 1998) In a similar vein, Ireland’s Standards in Public Office Commission brings together the relevant agencies – but in this case, the agency does have investigative powers, and it reports to parliament rather than government. (OECD 1999)
Most other countries also avoid the single-agency approach. An OECD survey found that 13 of the 15 surveyed countries had “”bodies with power to investigate corruption,” but only five had “specialized bodies to prosecute corruption.” (OECD 1997) As noted above, the investigative powers of the French SCPC were struck down due to constitutional concerns about lack of judicial oversight. Similarly, Britain’s Law Commission found that it could not confer special anti-corruption investigatory powers on the police, lest it violate the European Convention on Human Rights. Where the UK has placed extraordinary powers is in the Serious Fraud Office, which focuses on complex fraud which in some cases entails public sector corruption. The SFO is operationally independent, although it is responsible to the Attorney General. It has the kinds of authority that ACAs have, but in the context of complex frauds – and it can receive referrals from the police. (Mauritius National Assembly 2000, www.sfo.gov.uk)
By comparison, the SFO’s counterpart in Ghana has a wider remit that makes it more akin to an ACA – it deals with cases involving serious financial or economic harm to the state, which clearly includes many forms of public sector corruption. (Asibuo 2001) The Ghanaian SFO thus follows the Hong Kong, Singapore, and Botswana approaches of addressing public and private sector frauds through the same agency. This clearly has a certain logic, given the public-private nexus that gives rise to corruption. However, most countries, like the U.K., do not empower a special agency to handle both areas, but rely on cooperation and information exchange across agencies.
The Latin American countries also fit the OECD pattern. A few, such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Chile, have followed the single-agency approach discussed above. Most others appear simply to supplement their traditional institutions with special anti-corruption units placed in the Public Prosecutor and Supreme Audit agencies (e.g. El Salvador, Guatemala), or with policy-level coordinating bodies (e.g. Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama). (www.respondanet.com/english/anti_corruption/reports/compendio_...)
Conclusion
One should avoid exaggerating the distinction between single- and multiple-agency approaches in the anti-corruption field. Where to put the dividing line is not always obvious – at least one observer (Quah 1999a) has approached this differently from ourselves. Clearly, more than one part of government has some concern and responsibility for dealing with corruption in all the countries we have encountered. The difference lies in the extent to which powers are taken from other law enforcement agencies – or new and extraordinary powers are created – and housed in a single powerful agency designed to lead the anti-corruption effort. As suggested previously, most countries, especially OECD members, appear to have a political or legal bar to the establishment of such a powerful agency. It is also likely (but not necessarily the case) that those countries do not have an urgent need for an ACA, since they have the means to create special units within other agencies, to strengthen their laws, and to achieve the necessary coordination and centralization of information.
In the search for a useful “counterfactual,” these multi-agency examples point to the most easily accessible comparison. What if Hong Kong or Singapore had taken this approach? Conversely, what if the U.S., Britain, or France had used the single-agency strategy? Can we compare the two basic types of systems (and the variants of each) with respect to their success in carrying out the core functions (listed in part 2 above) for which ACAs have been designed? Further, does success in this area translate into effective restraint of corruption – whether in terms of cross-country corruption data, or in terms of predictive models? We will return to these issues later in the paper. For now, this discussion should provide a useful conceptual framework for the three in-depth case studies presented in the next part.

4. Original Case Studies


The existing record suggests that the single-agency approach inspired by Hong Kong and Singapore has produced some successes, but also a host of disappointments, when adopted in varied contexts across the globe. We understand some of the reasons for this, since a few cases such as Hong Kong and New South Wales are exceptionally well-documented. For the rest, information tends to be spotty. As we’ve suggested, understanding how ACAs perform requires some in-depth investigation. We need to know more about their inner workings, the allocation of resources, their location and relationships within the overall system, the quantity and quality of their output – and the politics surrounding them. To address these needs, we have commissioned a series of detailed case studies. To these we now turn.
In this part, we present a set of cases in more depth than those in the previous section. This presentation includes original material developed by researchers focused on three countries: Argentina, Malaysia, and Tanzania. Our review of the cases is largely drawn from original studies commissioned by IRIS and written by Professor Luigi Manzetti of Southern Methodist University (Argentina), Teresa Benedict of Transparency International Malaysia (Malaysia), and Haji Semboja and James Kajuna of the Economic and Social Research Foundation (Tanzania). More detailed data from these cases appear in the Annexes. The choice of countries was guided by a number of factors including the relative scarcity of published studies on these cases, the desire to have a mixture of geographic and political contexts represented, a practical decision to focus scarce resources on studies of agencies having fairly broad powers, and the availability of researchers and data in these countries. We begin with an overview of the agencies, then provide a summary discussion of these agencies’ salient aspects, including, as above, their mandate, authority, resources, structural protections, and agency performance monitoring.
Establishment
As in the cases covered previously, the anti-corruption agencies in these three countries have been shaped by political responses to crises of governance. As expected, the strength of the challenge posed by these crises, hence the firmness of the ruling party’s grip on power, plays a major role in determining how powerful is the agency that emerges. Economic conditions, and therefore resources available, are also crucial. In these conditions, policymakers take strategic decisions about the type of agency, the laws it enforces, and in general the location of various anti-corruption functions across government.
Argentina
The Oficina Anti Corrupcion or Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) of Argentina was created through Law 25.233 of 199918 and Decree 102/99. Its predecessor was the Oficina de Etica Publica (OEP). The OEP had come into existence in early 1997, but became functional only the following November. President Carlos Menem issued a new decree (41/99) on January 27, 1999 further specifying its functions. In other words, the OEP came into effect only during the last two years of the Menem administration (1989-1999). The OEP was patterned after the U.S. Office of Government Ethics and limited itself to gathering public officials’ sworn statements regarding their own assets. Even in this regard, the OEP was widely considered to be an ineffective institution created mainly for public relations. Its second head, Dr. Luis Ferreira, was a medical doctor. It was directly dependent on the executive and, according to most observers, was meant to appease foreign concerns regarding the tarnished reputation of the Menem administration, which had been plagued by many corruption scandals since its inception.
During the Menem administration the public perception of corruption, according to public opinion polls by Gallup and other polling agencies, escalated to record levels. This was due to a stream of scandals involving government officials at the highest levels, which Congress and the judiciary systematically failed to investigate. As the Menem administration drew to a close, the public demand to curb corruption became one of the most important issues contributing to the electoral victories of opposition parties in the congressional elections of 1997 and the presidential elections of 1999. Therefore, there is no single scandal, like the “Mani Pulite” investigation in Italy in 1992, triggering public outrage and demand for a major change. Rather, the situation has evolved slowly over time. People were willing to tolerate corruption while Menem could make the economy grow. However, as Argentina went into a steep recession in 1998, the public was no longer willing to tolerate crooked politicians.
Between 1989 and 1992, President Menem either eliminated institutions in charge of government accountability within the public administration or appointed at their helm loyalists who would neutralize any concrete action against his administration. The Supreme Court was “packed” with pro-Menem justices by 1990, and so were the federal courts, particularly those dealing with criminal law. In Congress, between 1989 and 1997, Menem’s party (the Justicialist Party, better known as the Peronists) held a working majority in both houses, which made it an ineffectual oversight institution. As noted above, the OEP was established very late and was considered a governmental fig leaf.
During the second half of Menem’s second mandate (1995-99), the two major opposition parties (Radical Civic Union and Frente Pais Solidario-FREPASO) created an electoral alliance whose short-term goal was to win the elections for mayor of Buenos Aires and the mid-term congressional elections taking place in 1997. If successful, the long-term goal was to challenge the Peronists for the presidential elections of 1999. This new electoral alliance took the name of Alianza. Capitalizing on popular dissatisfaction with corruption and an ailing economy, the Alianza made these two issues the center of its campaign.
Fernando de la Rúa, the Alianza leader, made transparency the cornerstone for his successful bids first as mayor of Buenos Aires and then as Argentina’s presidency. Before assuming office (Fall 1999), president elect de la Rúa decided to deliver on his promise to fight government corruption by giving this task to his future Minister of Justice, Ricardo Gil Lavedra. Gil Lavedra was instrumental in the creation of the ACO. He recruited well-respected experts in the field of corruption and criminal justice and gave them an ample mandate to create a new institution that could effectively tackle the problem. So, what seems to have occurred is that different groups within the Alianza coalition coming from different parties and civil society organizations put pressure on the government to deliver on its promises. The fact that the top management of the ACO is not party-affiliated would suggest that there was no single political sponsor behind it.
Thus, the ACO was established with the intent of creating an independent institution within the public administration that could fill the vacuum created in the 1990s in terms of government accountability. In creating the ACO, its directors looked at the U.S. Office of the Inspector General and the Spanish Fiscalia Anti-Corrupción (Anti-Corruption Prosecutor). However, the ACO’s top management tried to organize their institution based upon the realities that they faced in Argentina. The ACO has ample powers to design preventive policies against administrative corruption and to intervene as a plaintiff in anti-corruption cases. In addition, the ACO is quickly filling the role of a specialized consulting institution that provides assistance to Congress and the different departments of the public administration in transparency and corruption-related issues. It also provides state prosecutors valuable information to put together cases that are outside its own jurisdiction.
Malaysia
In its current form, the Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia or Malaysian Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) was established in 1997 pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (Act 575), which replaced a 1982 Act of the same name. It operates as a unit of the Prime Minister’s Department. The ACA arose as the most recent step in a complex progression.

In 1950, the colonial government had established the Taylor Commission to enquire into the integrity of the public service. The Commission concluded in 1955 that


bribery and other forms of corruption are practiced in all the vulnerable departments but no evidence can be estimated. There is no evidence from which either the actual or the comparative incidence can be estimated. There is no evidence of their existence, except in isolated instances, but there is clear evidence of abundant opportunities and we infer that these opportunities must be taken.19
The Taylor Report included a recommendation that an agency be established to curb the practice of corruption, but the colonial government took no action, except to enact a code of conduct and discipline for public servants.
After Independence in 1957, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman appointed Shah Nazir Alam, a Senior Pakistani Police Officer, to conduct a detailed study and advise on methods of preventing corruption in the government services, and in particular the establishment of an anti-corruption agency in the government. The Shah Nazir Alam report suggested a program of moral education; amendments to the existing anti-corruption legislation, and to the General Orders to facilitate action against corrupt officers; the establishment of Federal, State and District interdepartmental committees to study corruption; and the establishment of a Special Investigating Agency, with the Federal Headquarters and representatives at State and District levels.
Acting on this Report, the government in 1959 established the first Anti-Corruption Unit, in the Prime Minister’s Department (moved in 1960 to the Ministry of Home Affairs), along with a Criminal Investigation Department (Special Crime) under the Commissioner of Police. The AC Unit was administered by an officer of the Malayan Civil Service along with the Special Crime branch. The division of duties was as follows: the ACA would receive complaints, obtain information from the public and initiate cases; then, the case would be sent to the Special Crime Branch for investigation and arrests; finally, the Attorney General’s chambers would prosecute the offenders. This arrangement created administrative problems and impeded consistency and coordination in the action plan against corruption. The division of labour also turned out to be inefficient, as each of the agencies had only limited jurisdiction.
To ensure uniformity and effectiveness in carrying out their functions, the government recognized the need for a new amalgamated body with an identity of its own. In 1967, a Cabinet Committee examined the weaknesses of the above arrangements and recommended the merger of the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Special Crime department, and the Attorney-General’s Office into one Anti-Corruption Agency under the authority of the Inspector-General of the Police, directly responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs. The newly formed agency had four functions: investigation, prevention, research, and prosecution. The ACA’s staff was recruited from the ranks of the police. The establishment of this Agency included a provision for government review after two years, with a view to possibly detaching the Agency from the police force.
Another expansion of the ACA’s powers occurred during the emergency period following the May 1969 race riots. The ACA could freeze and seize any property of a government servant suspected of corruption. The Anti-Corruption Agency’s Director General would act as the Public Prosecutor during the emergency period and need not obtain either prior approval or orders from the Minister of Home Affairs. As the powers of the ACA widened, its limitations became more apparent. First, its human resources became more and more strained. Most of the staff and officers were seconded from other government departments and thus could be recalled to previous duties at any time. Additionally, these seconded personnel had a problem of “dual loyalty”: loyalty to their own department as well as loyalty to the ACA. This eroded the professionalism of the ACA force, since a considerable amount of time went to acclimatise the officers to their jobs and provide them with skills, which could not be used when they returned eventually to their home departments.
Second, political leaders recognized the need for a more independent ACA. The discovered problems along the way which hindered its investigations. It would make recommendations for reforms giving it additional powers, amending its structure, augmenting its personnel, etc. For example, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1970 arose in the aftermath of the controversial 1969 elections, where there were serious allegations of corruption among politicians. The elections had caused the ruling party to lose a number of seats. Though the agency had information on these corruption allegations, it was unable to prosecute the offenders, as the witnesses did not want to come forward.
The National Bureau of Investigation was established in 1973 to replace the previous anti-corruption agency. The wide-ranging powers of the NBI included investigation of corruption cases not only in the government but in public bodies, the private sector, and government contractors. The new Act provided additional powers to investigate criminal breach of trust violations and other kinds of commercial offences. Under the Prime Minister’s confidential Circular #1 of 1974 (renewed in 1994), the NBI also obtained the power to investigate and seize files and documents of any government department. All this led to a shift in the type of people arrested by the Bureau: while most of the arrests by the NBI’s predecessors were members of the public, NBI increased the proportion of civil servant arrests. From 1973 to 1982, there was an increase in the number of prosecutions for corruption related cases, including the prosecution of the Selangor Chief Minister. The Chief Minister, a member of the ruling coalition, was charged with several offenses, including misappropriation of approximately U.S. $300,000, in connection with the 1969 elections. He was ordered to return some of the monies that belonged to the ruling Muslim party (UMNO-party affiliation).
Despite such successes, however, the NBI’s broad jurisdiction combined with continuing human resource limitations to undermine the Bureau’s efforts to prevent corruption. In 1980, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad requested a review of the role and powers of the NBI. The review suggested that, that to achieve its primary objectives, the NBI should deal with only corruption cases. The NBI had too wide a scope, including criminal breach of trust, fraud, and other violations. If this situation continued, the Bureau would not be able to focus its efforts on combating corruption. The Anti-Corruption Act of 1982 changed the name and jurisdiction of the agency. Further, steps were taken to improve the skills and performance of the agency through internal restructuring of the ACA.

The current ACA derives its mandate from the Anti-Corruption Act of 1997, and it covers all instances of corrupt activities, whether they arise from the public or the private sector, the civil service or the public at large. Prevention of corruption receives more emphasis now than in the past with a three-pronged strategy of Information, Education, and Communication. In July 1997, the then Deputy Prime Minister explained in Parliament that among the objectives of the new anti-corruption laws was the strengthening and harmonization of existing anti-corruption laws. The legislation aimed to incorporate new and better provisions on preventive efforts and investigative powers, as well as higher penalties against offenders.ii



The ACA is charged with implementing a Policy Paper called “Vision and Mission of BPR towards Achieving Vision 2020 – Challenges and Strategies (1996-2000).” Phase I of the program (1996-2000), now completed, focused on the public sector. Some of the successes of this phase include the passing of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997, the establishment of the Special Cabinet Committee on Integrity headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, and the reinforcement of the existing Management Integrity Committees in all government departments. The ACA has also played an active role in the re-education of directors of public listed and private limited companies, working closely with the Securities Commission, and Registrar of Companies. The ongoing Phase II (2001-2005) will focus on the private sector. The experience so far is that existing laws are sufficient to cover offences committed by the private sector.
Tanzania
In Tanzania, the Taasisi ya Kuzuia Rushwa or Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was established in its current form in 1991, and then strengthened in 1995. Its predecessor, the Anti-Corruption Squad, came into being in 1975, under Act No. 16 of 1971.
Two factors necessitated the formation of the original agency in the 1970s. One was the change of economic policy under the rubric of “Ujamaa” (African Socialism) beginning in 1967, in which the state became the main actor in the economy and the few privately owned production and service firms were nationalized. Parastatals took over management of the nationalized concerns as well as formation of others as needs arose. However, abuse of power and corrupt practices soon emerged in the parastatal sector. Secondly, the provision of social services such as education, health, and water supply required administrative decentralization – and this was put in place in 1972. This meant a larger bureaucracy controlling authority and resources, which lead to an increase in abuses.
The 1971 Act (as amended) governs the operations of the PCB. The core functions of the Bureau under this Act are essentially the same as the Hong Kong ICAC’s: (1) corruption prevention (this was added to the agency’s mandate in 1991); (2) identification and investigation of corruption cases; and (3) raising public awareness. By law, the Bureau is free to investigate all forms of corruption, whether grand or petty, involving either senior or junior officials.
In 1995, newly-elected President Benjamin Mkapa restructured and strengthened the PCB. The Bureau had been suffering from a number of weaknesses. First, it essentially played the role of another police department, with a weak institutional network that limited its independent functions. Second, its role was not publicly known. Third, applicable civil service conditions made it difficult to recruit professional and committed staff. Increasing outrage about corruption leading into the election period, combined with the inadequacies of the PCB as then constituted, led to the appointment of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry Against Corruption (known as the Warioba Commission) to examine the problems and form strategies to address them. The Commission’s report created a sensation, and its momentum helped carry President Mkapa into office, where he took some early dramatic steps such as declaring his own assets and dismissing over 1,000 government employees on suspicion of corruption. (Sedigh and Muganda 1999) Among many recommendations given by the Commission was strengthening the PCB. The 1995 reforms purported to make the agency independent in its performance – including autonomy in recruitment, a separate budget, and power to investigate and prosecute without political interference by the government.
President Mkapa had several motives in pursuing these reforms. He had made this part of his political campaign platform, and therefore needed to implement what he had promised. He also wanted to address the issues of transparency and misallocation of resources, as it these were perceived to be major political issues in the “Second Phase” Government (1985-1995) of Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Last, by this time, the fight against corruption was clearly emerging on the international aid agenda – both generally and specifically in Tanzania. The World Bank and IMF showed signs of not being satisfied, and signaled the likelihood of reduced aid flows to highly corrupt countries.
Responsibilities and Powers
In this section, we review the main functions, structures, powers, and immunities of these agencies. They share a similar basic blueprint with the ACAs described previously under the “single agency” rubric, but practical details differ in important ways.
Argentina
In Argentina, the mission of the Anti-Corruption Office is to pursue cases of corruption that affect the public administration, its deconcentrated agencies, and organizations receiving public funds. The ACO enforces criminal and administrative laws having to do with fraud against the Federal Government, as well as white-collar crimes and asset declaration requirements within the public administration. It also monitors the enforcement of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The jurisdiction of the ACO is therefore within the executive branch at the national level – and excludes the legislative and judicial branches, as well as provincial and municipal governments. Civil servants, both past and present of any rank, are in principle subject to the jurisdiction of the ACO.
The specific functions of the ACO, and its powers in these areas, are as follows:


  1. Receive complaints and charges from individuals or public officials.

  2. Start preliminary investigations against those who are suspected of corruption (as defined by the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption). In all cases, investigations will be carried out by the ACO without any prior green light from other government institution.

  3. Start preliminary investigations regarding all institutions or associations that either directly and indirectly receive, as their principal financial resource, government funds. This is done when there is enough circumstantial evidence that irregularities may have been committed in the administration of such funds.

  4. Refer to the judiciary those allegations that, according to the preliminary investigations, may constitute a crime.

  5. Litigate, within the limits of its jurisdiction, cases where the Federal Treasury has been negatively affected (i.e. as a civil plaintiff, a party in interest in a criminal case, or an applicant in an administrative case).

  6. Administer and collect the sworn financial disclosures of government officials, and assess conflict of interest cases.

  7. Develop programs to prevent corruption, and promote transparency in the public administration.

  8. Provide technical assistance to government institutions aimed at preventing corrupt behavior.

The ACO can select and pursue cases within its jurisdiction. Three main criteria guide the selection of cases: a) economic, b) social, and c) institutional. The economic criterion is based upon a quantitative analysis. All cases are examined but only those cases whose amount is regarded as large and serious enough to have substantially affected the functioning of a given government institution are investigated. Cases involving over one million pesos (currently U.S. $281,000) are always investigated. The institutional criterion is qualitative in nature. Cases are investigated when their magnitude and gravity prevent a given government institution from accomplishing its institutional mandate and functions. The social criterion is used to determine if a corrupt act may affect a significant number of people who are supposed to receive services from an institution under investigation. ACO Chief Massoni signs off all actions by the agency based upon the suggestions of the two Directors (Garrido and de Michele). There seems to be a high level of cooperation among these three individuals. In addition, lower staff can make suggestions to be submitted to the top management, which eventually decides whether or not to accept them.


The major weakness of the ACO rests in the immunity area. Its members are not shielded from legal actions against them while performing their duties. To date, however, no suits have been filed, but this remains an area of concern to be addressed in the future.
The ACO is comprised of two units whose duties are as follows.


Direccion de Investigaciones (Investigation Unit)

Direción de Planificación de Políticas de Transparancia (Transparency Policies Planning Unit)

-- Receives charges from individuals or government institutions regarding illicit acts. It then analyzes whether, according to the criteria of the plan of action, such acts are of institutional, social, or economic significance. It inquires, in preliminary fashion, into those cases that falls into these categories.

-- Advocates administrative actions and civil and criminal judicial proceedings and whichever other measure that it deems adequate according to the case at hand. It also follows up on such cases once they are in federal court.

-- Evaluates the information provided by the mass media related to the existence of irregular acts within its realm and, as appropriate, starts the corresponding procedures.

-- Analyzes the information related to its jurisdiction produced by SIGEN and the Auditoría General de la Nación (AGN-the legislative branch oversight institution).



-- Develops and proposes to the AOC’s head an action plan and the criteria to determine those cases of institutional, social, and economic importance.

-- Develops studies on administrative corruption cases and their nature. It also plans policies and programs aimed at corruption prevention and repression.

-- Recommends and assists government institutions in implementing preventive policies and programs.

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