Please Note: This publication was made possible through support provided by the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U. S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Award No. Edg-a-00-02-00007-00

The post -1989 Romanian transition, regardless of the interpretation of its nature – remains relevant to the case of Cuba. Indeed, whether or not what happened in 1989 was a “revolution” (or, as many, including this author prefer, “events”), the post-Ceausescu regime(s) had to deal with very specific results. If the 1989 events in Romania were mostly a plot by regime survivors, associated with elements in the army and Securitate, as is the most plausible scenario, that would best explain the nature of the transition regimes. Since most archives on the 1989 events remain sealed (when not destroyed), protected by successive regimes in Bucharest, we may never know exactly, but considering the nature of Ceausescu’s collapse, one has to examine the post-Ceausescu regimes, especially the Iliescu governments of 1990–96, as the direct, logical extensions of the Ceausescu regime and its aftermath. That assumption is demonstrably true in the case of Romania, and seems the most likely to be repeated in Havana. A brief examination of the institutions, political culture, and electoral behavior since 1989 is relevant.

Regardless of its still unclear motivation for playing the key role in the collapse of the Ceausescu regime, the military was essential in the anti-communist liberation, and the slogan “The Army Is With Us!” was truly popular. Similarly, it is obvious that in Cuba, any transition, and especially the nature of a transition, will be dependent on the FAR’s behavior, which makes a double-edged sword. FAR’s performance in Angola made many Cubans proud of it, but disappointed others with its lack of positive results for themselves at home. During the heyday of Cuban adventures abroad the FAR enjoyed a high social status; since then, its dramatic reduction in size, decaying equipment and poor pay for all but the top leaders has brought it closer to the position of Romania’s military in 1989 - low social status in the society, and resentment for the privileges of a handful of apparently immovable old generals in the ranks.

And then is the issue of military indoctrination, relevant in both cases. In Romania, pre – 1989, political education in military academies was centered on anti – Russian and, to a lesser extent, anti – Western sentiments and nationalism – in Cuba is anti – Americanism and nationalism. The key issue is how fast could these patterns be changed at the time of and during the early transition.

While anti – Russian sentiments remained, and remain as strong as ever, more than a few post-1989 Romanian military leaders, especially in Transylvania, were reluctant to accept a radical turn to the West. Some openly criticized the very idea of joining NATO and even let themselves be dragged into sympathy with xenophobic ideologies (anti-Hungarian, anti-gypsy, and always anti-Russian). It took Iliescu’s regime many months to remove such officers, sometimes against his own instincts. Once the prospect of Romania’s actually becoming a NATO member became plausible around 1994, military officers who could not “become” pro-Western could have no career. That became even more evident during the centrist governments of the 1996 – 2000 period. Ambitious officers now have to learn English and undergo training abroad. On the other hand, defense spending barely increased and the armed forces, now much reduced in numbers, remain badly equipped. On the positive side, however, the armed forces now have the complete monopoly of organized force, with the entire former Securitate armed element dismantled or brought under military control.

What is to be expected in the case of Cuba? Anti-Americanism will probably be more difficult to contain and eventually eliminate than it was in Romania, but a post - Castro regime will have a different kind of leverage over FAR. Its leaders are too closely associated with the CP leadership and Castro’s government to survive a change, but their removal could become the younger officers’ opportunity (as was the case in Romania), if appropriate incentives are provided by the successor regime. Institutionally, for a while, the long-standing arrangements with Gaviota, could and should continue in some form, albeit temporarily. Victor Stanculescu, the key general in removing Ceausescu, became a very successful businessman – a fact that helped reduce his influence with other officers. Nor should former FAR and MININT officials should not be prevented from pursuing wealth—which, considering their talents and connections, they will achieve.

While the Romanian army retained its coherence, as Cuba’s is expected to, between December 1989 and March 1990, there were nonetheless three Defense Ministers in Bucharest. More significantly, Iliescu brought with him people like the retired (and ideologically discredited by his work for the Soviets) General Nicolae Militaru, hated by all members of the officer corps and ultimately forced out by them, in favor of Stanculescu, who himself was later replaced. The very idea that people like Del Pino could be reinstated in post-Castro Havana should be discarded lest it risks a dangerous backlash.

Whether one’s opinion over its role in 1989, the fact remains that ever since 1989 the former members, not just leaders, of the Securitate have been the main economic and financial beneficiaries of the transition because they were well - connected, well-educated and well-organized. Of course, conspiracy theories abound in the post-Ceausescu media, so that any attempt to quantify that phenomenon is doomed to failure.

As an institution, however, the Securitate has disappeared – it has lost its military (and thus the most intimidating) arm, as well as the capacity – and right – to oversee the officer corps. Its post -1989 successors, the Romanian Information Service (SRI) and the External Intelligence Service (SIE) were separated and largely controlled by the Presidency. Their first leaders, naturally, were former Securitate types. Both agencies, with presidential encouragement, resisted parliamentary control and only came under limited public scrutiny during the 1996 – 2000 government.

Considering the institutional weakness of MININT, however, its role in a post - Castro Cuba is unlikely to be comparable to that of the Securitate veterans – although will have to be used or, if need be, reinstated.

Police

The government of 2002—indeed all Romania’s governments since 1990—complains about the behavior and level of corruption of the police and the “gendarmerie” established after 1989. It took until 2002 for the Romanian Parliament to both recognize and decide to do something about the abuses of police—the former communist “militia”, which were sporadically seen as “with the people” during the early 1990s. Still poorly trained and equipped, plagued by corruption and with low levels of education, the police is still unable to cope with increased levels of crime and, especially, with problems it never faced before – international traffic in drugs and persons, a terrorist presence, etc.

There is little reason to believe that a post-Castro police, under whatever name, is going to need less time to become, let alone behave as a “normal” and professional force – especially as the same social pathologies experienced by post – 1989 Romania are more than likely to appear in Cuba as well.

Political Parties

Whether the post-communist Front of National Salvation (FSN) was “democratic” or just opportunistic in rapidly organizing the first free elections in over a half century in May 1990, the fact remains that the successors of the Romanian communists had it both ways. They enjoyed a natural advantage in the elections and looked good by being “democratic” in the eyes of the West. The same can clearly be expected for the Partido Comunista Cubano (PCC) or its successor. The faster “free elections” take place in Cuba, the more likely they will win, considering the ingrained advantages of the Communists.

As the implicit, albeit officially opposed, successor of the Communist Party, the FSN in Romania won, naturally and more or less fairly, the May 1990 elections. The PCR was “banned” after the regime’s collapse in December 1989; when the FSN first purged its anti – communist members and then decided to become a political party by Spring 1990, it ultimately inherited the PC’s assets as well as many of its personalities. It had the organization and tradition of half a century, while the opposition had at best five months to organize, no financial base, and no credible leadership. This is to be expected in a post-Castro Cuba as well, and indeed may well be the trap the advocates of early elections there are most likely to fall into. There is no logical, democratic, or legal reason a post-Castro PCC would be denied access to such assets and organization, nor could it be prevented from organizing early elections – taking advantage of a likely behavior of the electorate which could well be similar to that in Romania.

Electoral Behavior

In May 1990 this author was an observer to the first post - Ceausescu elections in Romania. The ruling FSN was ahead in most minds because it was “there”—that is, it was the reformed but familiar face of the legally defunct Communist Party. The result was that the Iliescu won easily against two returned émigré politicians, and the FSN obtained a huge majority against the remnants of the pre – 1945 Liberal and National Peasant parties.

Whatever the abstract considerations of the post-communist Romanian (and East European) elections, the sociological facts remain the same, as demonstrated in the Romanian elections of May 1990, 1992, 1996 and 2002:

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  The more backward regions (Moldova, Danube) are totally dependent on the huge industrial establishments, creating an “industrial proletariat” for the neo-communist pseudo industries.
  
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  A relatively backward rural population was reluctant to accept—indeed rejected— promises by the anti – communist opposition of to privatize land, especially in the poorer regions;
  
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  Retirees, hoping to retain their pensions and state health insurance, have consistently voted for Iliescu ever since 1990.
  
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  To this one may add that the Romanian, and indeed, with few exceptions, general East European, experience is that youth participation in post-communist elections is low; that of the older and rural inhabitants and the industrial working class is higher and leans toward former communists, whether reformed or not; and that the anti – communist vote is highest in large cities and more developed regions.
  

In terms of formal membership, the Orthodox Church of Romania is, and has historically been comparable with its Roman Catholic counterpart in Cuba. However, the Orthodox Church has been a center of nationalism prior to World War II and a close collaborator, at least at leadership level, of the Communist regime, which it officially supported to the end. Patriarch Teoctist was in fact briefly dismissed in early 1990 for his blatant subservience to the Ceausescu clan, but reinstated and is now present at most state functions. Monasteries have been reopened and the number of monks, nuns and seminarists has increased significantly, as has the Church’s wealth. Freedom of religion is recognized and protected, albeit property of the non – Orthodox denominations has not been completely restituted, and local persecution of neo – Protestants still occurs. The Orthodox Church has reverted to its traditional role - a de facto beneficiary of state support, but also manipulated and ultimately controlled by the state. In Cuba, on the other hand, one could expect a repetition of the post - 1989 Polish scenario – a dramatic but quite brief increase in the popularity and influence of the Church after Castro. That issue, however, if beyond the scope of this paper.

The institution of an independent judiciary has remained a goal rather than a reality in Romania since the transition began in December 1989, again, because judges, prosecutors, and the other members of the judicial system could only be “reformed” by replacement, which took the transitional regimes some time and, judging by the experience of the non-communist regime (1996–2000) is difficult at best. Simply put, truly independent judges are still a rare phenomenon, a decade after the end of the Ceausescu regime—and that applies to corruption in general as well as to soccer in particular. However, the explosion in the number of law schools since 1990, a free press publicizing judicial abuses, and a population made aware of its rights by the growing number of NGOs, all suggest progress.

On the other hand, Romanian justice simply did not work in the most symbolically important issue facing the society in the aftermath of Ceausescu’s collapse. To begin with, the Ceausescu couple’s “trial” and execution were largely seen, even by the dictators’ opponents, as a travesty and an excuse to avoid the embarrassment of a public trial. Furthermore, the few trials of high officials of the former regime – Party leaders, Securitate top generals, Nicu Ceausescu himself – were correctly perceived as lacking in seriousness. Few of those tried received long sentences, and most were released sooner still for reasons of age, health, etc. Attempts to ban from politics former regime collaborators, as was done in Czechoslovakia, were blocked by the Iliescu group; a law passed during the centrist government opening secret police files to its victims (as was done in Germany) has remained largely without effect.

Almost as discouraging is the progress made in changing the legal framework. Parliaments ever since 1990 have been slow, unwilling or both, to tackle decisively major issues – property being the most obvious case. Indeed, it took until 2002 for a ‘‘definitive” set of laws dealing with private housing confiscated by the communists since 1945 to be approved.

Nor was the issue of privatization of major state enterprises handled well – in this respect Romania is still the least advanced among East European states, behind even Albania. The major reason was political – strong resistance to privatization among key constituencies of Iliescu and his PDSR: miners, steel workers. Nor was the process – or respect for law - made easier by Iliescu’s personal appeal to coal miners in 1990 and 1991 to come to Bucharest to repress his political adversaries – including to force out of office his own Prime Minister – amidst acts of vandalism and violence for which nobody has ever been punished.

Privatization and Social Instability

It seems to be a common pattern in post-communist societies—whether in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and its successors, Angola, Nicaragua, or elsewhere—that one of the main problems of transition, internally, are the disposal of pre-communist property (including émigré property) and the establishment of democratic institutions. These are both related to a change of the elite’s image, personnel, and public behavior. In most such cases the old security apparatus types became the “new” business class, through training, mafia-type methods, official connections, or all of the above. Romania’s post-1989 experience is the apotheosis of this, and highly relevant to a post-Castro Cuba.

As in the case of Cuba after 1959, the Romanian communist regime after 1945 “nationalized” (i.e. confiscated) most privately held real estate. A large diaspora presence of the dispossessed opponents of the communist regime made the Romanian regime’s life even more difficult. This will be a, if not the, major problem for any post-Castro regime in Havana, given the size and power of the Cuban diaspora.

To begin with, the initial Iliescu regime decided to sell all state-owned and build apartments to their tenants, at what was in 1990 and is now even more a ridiculously low price. This did not address the issue of confiscated properties, and the much larger number of tenants of such houses, compared to that of dispossessed owners, made it politically impossible to fully return those properties; the government’s budget simply did not permit financial compensation. Ultimately, few such properties were returned at all – in some cases the owners received a small compensation, in others they gave up their claims, in a few they went to the European Court of Justice, were some cases are still pending.

Dealing with nationalized land is also going to be the main immediate issue to any post-Castroist regime will need to address. In Romania some nationalized land and forest was indeed returned (for instance to the former royal family and churches) – a situation better than that of housing, but never in toto and many times in the form of “equivalent” land in a different location.

Which raises the more important and politically sensitive issue of the disposition of land confiscated by the state from private owners or companies, and later used as collective or state farms. In Romania, that accounted for 90% of the total agricultural land area. Taking advantage of the fact that, after decades of losing the work ethic and interest, as well as skills in managing their own property, many Romanian peasants were not interested in receiving it back, the first Iliescu regime (1990 – 96) limited the area to be returned to any person to 10 hectares – and without the right to sell it. The main beneficiaries of that policy were, and are still, former industrial workers who lost their jobs, returned to their old villages and obtained enough land to live somewhat better than as unemployed in the cities.

Since then the later restriction has been lifted, and with it the obstacle for some peasants to borrow and establish medium size profitable farms – but mostly in areas where there was a pre – communist tradition of efficient agriculture (Transylvania and Banat), all of which suggests that traditions and values play a significant role.

Privatization as such has been a political and ideological problem in Eastern Europe and indeed in Latin America for a decade. Is Cuba, or was Romania different? The answer is yes, if we look at the details.

In post – Ceausescu Romania the transitional regime, and especially its leader - Ion Iliescu himself - not only DID NOT TRY to de - politicize privatization – as most East Europeans elected leaders did since 1989, but, in actually calling in the miners to Bucharest for political reasons, in 1990 and 1991, the Iliescu regime of the time used the post -communist regime as an instrument to oppose post -communist policies and - communist methods. That was unique in Eastern Europe – hence, once again, the impossibility of establishing a pattern of transition between Cuba and Romania, pace the attempts of the likes of Linz and Stepan – and, once gain the probability of a post -Castro PCC incarnation doing the same.

Ultimately, and even given the admittedly limited knowledge of this author on Cuban realities, the ideological flexibility between socialism and nationalism, the attraction of a “Third Way” and the innevitable, immediate social results of mass privatization – as demonstrated in most of Latin America today, let alone Eastern Europe or the post – communist world - any post- and neo – communist regime in Havana, as the one in Bucharest between 1990 – 1996 - would have most political arguments to delay, postpone and manipulate free market – i.e. privatization - reform. Then Romanian case, once again against patterns, real or not, sought by Stepan and Linz, describes the disabling exception from the rule, if any is indeed warranted. As previously mentioned, we are indeed dealing with two “exceptional cases.” Hence this paper’s theoretical modesty.

It may appear that this author is cynical regarding the omnipresence of corruption in post -1989m Romania and, by analogy, in any post – Castro transition in Cuba. Perhaps – but sociological reality and political realism – internally and externally – both suggest that corruption is not only innevitable but, at the early stages at least, a prudentially acceptable and stabilizing factor for a post - communist transition in countries like Cuba and Romania.

The temporary collapse of law and order, inevitable in any post-communist, indeed any post-dictatorial (see the cases of Spain, Portugal or Greece) transition, encouraged an explosion of crime and associated corruption in Romania, from the political elites to the clergy down to small-time crooks. This should be a natural expectation in a post-Castro regime in Havana. Havana will also likely have to deal with that other level of corruption (which Bucharest faced and still has not dealt with): the rise, mentioned above, of a “new class” of “businessmen” rooted in the former intelligence and military, party bureaucracy, and associated elites. Bucharest decided to tolerate that – indeed, during all the Iliescu regimes (1990 – 1996 and 2000 – present) and indeed encouraged it – legally or not so legally. Is a post – Castroite Havana going to do the opposite, and risk internal subversion and instability, by rejecting it – even assuming that it could – an unrealistic assumption?

The corruption of the FSN in Romania was known and understood by all as a natural result of the collapse of the Ceausescu regime. It also seeped down to the smallest elements of society, from gypsy “kings” and “emperors” building illegal palaces, to newly rich former nobodies establishing, often through bribes, commercial empires in oil distribution and construction. It appeared, after the 1996 opposition victory in the general elections, that this would be dealt with, but it was not. The corruption, and especially the incompetence, of the new government became obvious very soon, as did the cause: that there was no alternative elite to replace the neo- or post–communists. One of the reasons as that many Romanians - including very educated computer experts – rejected the very basis of free enterprise - such as the idea that they should be paid less than their boss. That is changing now – but it took a decade for it -and that change is still a middle class phenomenon, rather than a universal, one. Thus, a majority of Brasov truck factory workers still believe, today, that they could blackmail the government in retaining their enterprise – and their jobs – and all this 12 years after the fall of Communism. So did the unproductive miners in the Jiu Valley -who engaged in politically motivated assaults against elected politicians on numerous occasions.

All of this is to be not only expected but prepared for in any post - Castro transitional regime. Privatization, needed as it may be if Cuba is to become a democratic and free state, is to be seen in the light of anti – privatization regimes, campaigns and mentalities in Latin America - not the case in that of Romania post – 1989.

What is ultimately decisive in any post-communist transition, Romania’s as well as Cuba’s, is the speed with which political culture, social behavior, and elite reinterpretations of both national history and values, as well as the popular acceptance of such changes occur. Those elements include media behavior, educational curriculum, the role and acceptance of NGOs, the review of national history, and ethnic relations – in other words, a new manner of seeing and behaving as a people.

The post – 1989 Romania print media (political and porno, literary and economic – in this order) literally exploded in numbers – and promptly helped create both popular confusion and a healthy skepticism that continues to this day.

Education, dramatically changed only during the centrist regime of 1996 – 2000, and resulted in a temporary explosion of often bad, more often still opportunistic, private institutions of higher education – most by now bankrupt, banned or losing their credentials. All of this is to be both expected and recommended in a both – Castroite Cuba – which is not to say that it has to be taken at face value - too many opportunists, crooks and corrupt judges for entrance examinations are likely to play a role for the idea to work as a general principle.

The curriculum, in the still dominant public education system, was changed - with a view of copying the French one – and became more demanding and diversified at the secondary level. The old problem of highly and arbitrarily selective admission to university under the communist regime was largely solved by the creation of expensive, but available, private institutions; and the hated system of state distribution of university graduates was eliminated. The rewriting of national history is an ongoing process – with the initial temptation of rejecting everything thought by the Communist regime returning to traditional interpretations of the past - Romania as victim of the Russians and the Slavs in general, communist as an “import” forced by Soviet tanks, etc. - a cycle which is both natural, probable and indeed acceptable for those in a post – Castro Cuba trying to reinterpret Martí as less of a predecessor of “socialism” and rabid anti – American than a spokesman of Cuban identity.

As a European country, Romania has a relatively old population. But it also had 44 years of communist rule; Cuba, as a Third World country, has a much younger population, and 43 years of Castroism. There is no way one could overstate communism’s impact on popular behavior, work ethics and political options, all of which are negative. In Romania, anti-Semitism—which seems an odd phenomenon, considering that there are no more than 20,000 Jews in a population of 22 million—reemerged after 1989. That the first post-1989 Prime Minister, Petru Roman, was partially Jewish did not help. On the other hand, as more and more Romanian workers found jobs in Israel, the sentiment tended to abate, replaced in some (again, and encouragingly, in smaller and smaller circles) by anti-Hungarian attitudes, especially in the richer Transylvania region.

The profound anti-Russian, not just anti-Soviet, sentiments of most Romanians, however, persist as strong as ever. Similarly, in Cuba’s case, no matter what the U.S. role in a post-Castro transition may be, direct or implicit, anti-Americanism, including distrust for the Cuban-American diaspora, will remain a potent political tool, especially for whatever name the post-Castro PCC adopts.

In Romania, unlike Cuba, there is a significant ethnic problem the post -1989 was as unable to cope with as were all its predecessors -communist or not. That problem, contrary most expectations, in Romania and elsewhere, is not the historic conflict with Hungary and the 1.7 million Hungarians living in Romania – but the gypsy ethnic element, perhaps as large as the Hungarian. Romanians and Hungarians share a common distaste for gypsies, who are reasonably associated with the increase in criminality and accused of damaging the country’s image abroad.

By contrast, Cuba has no ethnic problem. Its racial divisions are mild and, ultimately solvable in any fairly democratic post-Castro regime – except for one fact, which does indeed offer some analogy with the gypsy case in Romania: the role of international human rights NGOs. Despite their good intentions, such NGOs accusations of racism against Romanians, avoidance of the realities of gypsy activities and social role, have more often than not inflamed, rather than calm down emotions – on both sides. Similarly, once the Castro regime is removed, the race issue may appear from outside, largely as a “human rights” claim.

And then there are the NGOs and “civil society.” In post – 1989 Romania there was an explosion of NGOs, most allegedly concerned with “human rights,” but many, at least the largest , behaving in a manner that blurred, and indeed weakened the distinction between them and political parties. Considering the proximity and cultural influence of Miami and Washington to Havana, a similar and even more militant phenomenon ism to be expected – with both positive and negative results.

Positive because NGOs will encourage participation; negative because they will compete (or blurry the difference) with incipient political parties and, overall, will possibly be seen as foreign (read gringo) forms of interference. The very perception of NGOs as distinct from “somebody’s interests – parties, foreigners, small elite elements - is still prevalent in Romania, and will be even more so in Cuba – with the usual suspects being American or Miami émigrés.

And there is the role of dissidents - most if not all members of the (very) educated classes – and there is little more to say about it than it was not already said or proven. In no post – communist country, Romania included (see above) , did they play a significant political role after the transition – and the size of the Cuban diaspora, once again, may be a problem rather than a help. ³ Similarly, and closely related, in no East European (other than some Baltic states) – or post – Soviet regime, intellectuals and /or diaspora elements won any lasting significant political or economic power – to the contrary, their political appeal almost universally, was limited and resulted in major rejection at the polls – often, as in Romania, and probably in Cuba, because of their diaspora (or foreign) – influenced, ideas, origins, and programs.